THE EARLY WARS

At the commencement of the French Revolutionary Wars, most of the important early campaigning occurred on the French frontiers with Germany and the Netherlands; but it was inevitable that conflict would also take place on the Franco-Italian frontier, due to the presence there of France's enemies—most notably the Austro-Hungarians, whose emperor was a driving force being the first coalition which sought to reverse the effects of the French Revolution.

Italy was divided into a large number of states, and had been relatively peaceful since the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had ended the War of the Austrian Succession in 1748. The Austrian Habsburg possessions in the north were considerable: Austria, in the person of the emperor, ruled Lombardy, including the duchies of Milan and Mantua; and although the grand-duchy of Tuscany was nominally independent, its ruler was the son of Emperor Leopold II (1747–92), who had himself possessed the state until he succeeded his brother Joseph II as emperor in 1790. The Spanish Bourbons ruled the 'Kingdom of the Two Sicilies' (Naples and Sicily) which extended north to the Papal States, ruled by the Vatican. The house of Savoy ruled Piedmont, Savoy, Nice and Sardinia; and the declining republics of Venice and Genoa were independent. Although the south was beset by feudalism and oppression, and despite the relatively liberal regime in the Austrian territories, most internal unrest was present in Piedmont, initially among the most affected by the spread of Jacobinism from France, and Milan.

With the hostile territories of the house of Savoy on their borders, the French were initially more concerned with securing their frontier than in exporting republicanism into Italy. Nevertheless, in 1792 Savoy and Nice were invaded by the French and seized with some ease, as the Piedmontese administration and forces were in no state to wage war, and the ruler, Victor Amadeus III, was but a pale shadow of his famous warrior father Charles Emmanuel III. Savoy was incorporated as a province of France, but no immediate further conquest was attempted. In 1793 France was beset by royalist risings in the south, Toulon was occupied by an Anglo-Spanish force, and until the autumn the situation of the French on the northern frontiers was parlous in the extreme.

From January 1794 the French 'Army of Italy' was commanded by General Pierre Dumerbiou (1737–97); although the fighting against the Piedmontese was only sporadic, he acknowledged a great debt to his 25-year-old commander of artillery, Napoleon Bonaparte, who had recently been distinguished by his conduct at Toulon. In a remarkably mature and considered plan, young Bonaparte proposed a major French drive against Piedmont to compel Austria to transfer troops to bolster her north Italian possessions, thus weakening her resistance.
against the main French effort on the German front. Accordingly, Bonaparte was authorised to go to Genoa to reconnoitre for such operations; but following the purge of Robespierre’s supporters in the coup d’état of 27 July 1794 he was arrested on suspicion of treason, due partly to his friendship with Robespierre’s younger brother. Bonaparte was released when the reason for his Genoa trip was established, but his plans for an offensive in Italy were discounted by Lazare Carnot (1753–1823), who from August 1793 had been de facto French war minister and chief of general staff; he forbade offensive operations in Italy in order to concentrate resources on the Rhine. As operations against Piedmont tailed off, Dumerbion relinquished his command in November and retired the following May; and in early 1795, having an excess of generals, the war ministry placed Bonaparte on the unemployed list, his lack of seniority outweighing his precocious talent.

General Barthelemy Schérer (1747–1804) took command in Italy, where he was opposed by an Austro-Piedmontese army ultimately led by the Austrian general Wallis. After a French renewal of operations, Wallis was surprised at Loano on 23 November 1795 and suffered a heavy defeat, the French success being owed more to General André Massena (1758–1817) than to Schérer. Due partly to the wretched condition of his army, Schérer made little attempt to exploit the victory, despite exhortations from Paris prompted by urgings from Bonaparte. His appeals for reinforcement unanswered, Schérer tendered his resignation, and on 2 March 1796 the Army of Italy received a new commander: General Napoleon Bonaparte.

Bonaparte and his army

Bonaparte’s rapid elevation from obscurity was a testimony to the changes in the military system occasioned by the French Revolution. The army of the Ancien Régime had been virtually destroyed and rebuilt, and had lost a large proportion of its officers—from emigration arising from their opposition to the republican government; and from purges which persecuted even loyal servants of the new republic (and encumbered commanding generals with political commissars who interfered to the great detriment of operations). Although the nucleus of the ex-royal army contributed to the successful defence of France in the early campaigns, a huge new army was created, initially from volunteers imbued with revolutionary fervour, and subsequently from a conscription which introduced the concept of a ‘national’ war involving all citizens, instead of the small professional forces of the earlier 18th century. Such were the political constraints upon the military that even the term ‘regiment’ was prohibited until September 1803, for its aristocratic connotation; it was replaced by demi-brigade (for the line infantry, demi-brigade de bataille, changed to demi-brigade de ligne in January 1796).

Occasioned originally by the need to field large numbers of volunteers or conscripts without time to train them fully, a new system of operation evolved. By uniting one ex-regular battalion with two new battalions in each demi-brigade, it was possible to combine the disciplined firepower and training for fighting in line of the regulars, with the charge in column, inspired initially by revolutionary fervour, which was the most practicable tactic of the untrained battalions. This ordre mixte (‘mixed deployment’)
The battle of Loano, 23 November 1795: French troops storm Austrian fortified positions, one of which (Castellar) was held with great resolution, the defenders eventually cutting their way free. In the background may be seen the smoke from the fire of French gunboats on the Mediterranean, supporting the attack. (Print after Hippolyte Bellangé)

was so successful in the early revolutionary wars that it was retained, and could be operated at all levels from battalion to division.

A second innovation was in light infantry tactics, previously restricted largely to irregular units operating on the flanks, front and rear of the army. With the new French forces, skirmishing and harassing the enemy with incessant musketry fired at will and in ‘open order’, instead of conventional volley-firing in close formation, reached an unprecedented level. By the mid-1790s the tactic had been perfected, combining l’ordre mixte with a strong frontal screen of skirmishers (tirailleurs), to harass the enemy until the combination of skirmish-fire and artillery bombardment had so shaken the enemy that a massed attack could be delivered by the main body. Whole brigades might be deployed in open order before concentrating to make their attack; and with both line and light infantry equally capable of both skirmishing and fighting in formation, the French possessed a flexibility and tactical capability denied to their enemies.

The creation of the huge ‘citizen army’ indirectly provided France with a great strategic and tactical advantage. The rapid expansion of the army outstripped its ability to supply the troops, so that ‘living off the land’ became a necessity: in effect, the pillage of the areas through which the army marched. Although the French army was thus often in a semi-starved condition, by freeing them of the slow-moving supply-trains by which other armies were shackled their generals gained an immense advantage in speed of movement, made even more effective by the developing ability to make rapid forced marches.

The cavalry had suffered more severely than the infantry from the emigration of officers, so that (in the early stages, at least) the French cavalry were considerably less effective than that of their opponents. The artillery, however—which under the Ancien Régime had been the refuge of the middle-class and minor gentry who were less acceptable socially as infantry or cavalry officers—suffered least from emigration, and retained a standard of professionalism greater than that of the other ‘arms’, at least in the early campaigns. Thus, although Bonaparte added much of his own theory, the tactical elements of his successful army were already largely established for him.

It was this system which advanced Bonaparte to a position of high command at an age which would have been impossible under the Ancien Régime. Although his talents were obvious, especially when compared with those of some other republican generals, he owed his rise largely to political connections, never hesitating to push himself to the fore. Born of Corsican minor gentry in 1769 and commissioned in the artillery of the royal army in 1785, Bonaparte studied his trade assiduously. Regarded as a safe adherent to the republican regime, he formed a friendship with Paul Barras (1755–1820), the leading member of the five-man Directory which replaced the National Convention as the government of France in October 1795. Bonaparte’s position was
Infantry of the Army of Italy, 1796: note the bad state and lack of uniformity in their clothing, and the general air of dejection characteristic before Bonaparte took command.

French grenadiers in a contemporary watercolour depicting a number of ‘campaign’ variations: loose trousers with drawstrings around the ankles, a handkerchief tucked into the coat pocket of the standing figure, and a civilian waistcoat of yellow and white stripes.

assured by his celebrated ‘whiff of grapeshot’ in Paris in that month, which dispersed a royalist mob threatening the Convention; promotion and command of the Army of the Interior were just rewards from Barras and his fellow directors to their saviour. Translation to command the Army of Italy followed shortly thereafter; and before his departure Bonaparte married Barras’ cast-off mistress, Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie, widow of the guillotined general Alexandre de Beauharnais.

Bonaparte’s enemies

Bonaparte waged his early campaigns against the army of the Holy Roman (later Austrian) Empire: an immense territory combining Germans, Hungarians, Serbs, Poles, Croats, Czechs, Walloons, Flemings, Italians and numerous smaller nationalities, over whom Francis II ruled from 1792 as emperor of Austria and king of Hungary. The army comprised ‘German’ and Hungarian regiments, the former including all non-Hungarians irrespective of actual nationality; and was representative of the old-style organisation and tactics which found the innovative French systems so difficult to overcome. The individual soldiers, whether volunteers or conscripts, were solid and reliable, but lacked the fervour, flexibility and initiative of the French.¹

Government parsimony reduced the effectiveness of their training, and as national esteem was difficult to engender in a multi-national army the soldier’s pride was channelled towards regimental esprit de corps—not always with beneficial results. An example demonstrating this, and the lack of initiative which existed at many levels, occurred at Borghetto in 1796, when a regiment (Kheul) suffered 150 casualties to French skirmishers when a withdrawal of six yards would have placed them under cover: an act condemned by the British observer Thomas Graham as ‘stupid bravado’.

Skirmish capability was restricted to the independent Frei-Corps and the light infantry battalions which succeeded them, and the Grenzers, battalions formed from the inhabitants of the ‘military borders’ adjoining the Ottoman Empire, where the entire

¹See MAA 176, The Austrian Army of the Napoleonic Wars: (1) Infantry; MAA 181, (2) Cavalry; MAA 223, (3) Specialist Troops.
population was a military force. Thus the regular army was incapable of matching the skirmish tactics of the French; the Frei-Corps were sometimes undisciplined and incapable of operating proficiently in a conventional manner, and even the Grenzers had lost much of their inherent skill through attempts to convert them into ordinary infantry. The resulting reliance upon manoeuvre in formation led The Military Mentor (London 1804) to comment that ‘the instant the ranks are broken, the Austrians become like a flock of sheep, scattered, and incapable of being re-united’.

The French system of living by foraging meant that their formations had to move in widely-separated bodies; as Napoleon remarked, they had to separate to live and unite to fight, which had disadvantages, but these were outweighed by the speed of movement thus attainable. The Austrian reliance upon supply-trains and depots limited their speed of march, and yet did not prevent their formations from being often widely spaced. The Military Mentor stated: ‘Never does the whole of their troops, as might be done upon any other system, take part in the engagement; the reserve, if there be any, is so distributed, and at such a distance, that the different corps are beaten and overthrown without having been able to keep themselves together ... this injurious distribution of their force ... of course weakens them’ — a factor which Bonaparte exploited fully. The Austrian cavalry was generally superior to that of most other nations, but the Italian terrain was largely unsuited to the employment of large cavalry forces, negating their advantage. The artillery, which in the mid-18th century had been the best in Europe, had not developed as much as in other armies, and placed too great a reliance on ‘battalion guns’ (light fieldpieces which accompanied the infantry). This hindered the employment of ‘massed battery’ fire, a concentration of bombardment upon a particular sector of the enemy line, and ignored the increasingly general acceptance that the effect of a concentration of fire was greater than the sum of its parts.

The lesser partners in the Italian campaigns against the French were the troops of several of the Italian states, none of which possessed any great leaders or troops of any real quality. The well-known condemnation of his own troops by the King of the Two Sicilies (to the effect that no matter what colour they were dressed in, they would still run away) may be exaggerated; but the Italian forces which opposed Bonaparte in these campaigns were not generally formidable, especially when devoid of Austrian support.

The first campaign

If the young and largely inexperienced Bonaparte was an unusual choice for command of the Army of Italy, then any of his three senior divisional commanders appeared better suited: Massena, victor of Loano, previously a sergeant-major in the royal army, sometime fruit merchant and smuggler; Pierre
When he put on his general's hat, observed Massena, he appeared to increase his height by two feet.

From the very beginning there was evidence of Bonaparte's charismatic personality, which entranced many of his officers and most of his men, inspiring a level of personal devotion (among the rank and file at least) recalling the reverence paid to the Duke of Marlborough by his soldiers, but magnified to idolatry. Throughout his career it was this personal magnetism—studiously cultivated until it might even be regarded as artifice—which led his troops to withstand almost unbearable conditions with only token complaints, and to sacrifice their lives almost willingly in pursuit of his ambitions.

A personal appeal to the rank and file was never needed more urgently than when Bonaparte took command of the Army of Italy on 27 March 1796. It numbered about 45,000 men for field operations, but its condition was wretched in the extreme: ill-supplied, unpaid, starving, in rags, and consequently dispirited. The famous speech made by Bonaparte upon first assumption of command may have been fabricated later, but was characteristic of his rhetoric. It ran something like this:

'Soldiers! You are naked and without food; your country owes you much, but cannot give you your own. Your patience and courage amidst these rocks are deserving of admiration; but it procures you no glory. I come to lead you to the most fertile plains in the world. Wealthy provinces, large towns will be in our power; and there you will acquire riches, honour and glory. Soldiers of Italy! Will you be wanting in courage?'

This rallying-cry found willing listeners and put heart into an army whose morale could not have been lower. More practically, Bonaparte instituted a thorough reorganisation, and profited greatly from the assistance of the ex-royalist engineer officer Louis Berthier (1753–1815) as his chief of staff, a role he fulfilled with the greatest distinction (though often with scant acknowledgement) almost to the end of his master's military career. Bonaparte's immense self-confidence is evident in a report he sent to the Directory less than two weeks after assuming command:

'I found this army, not only destitute of everything, but without discipline; their insubordination and discontent were such that the malcontents had
formed a party for the Dauphin, and were singing songs opposed to the tenets of the Revolution. You may, however, rest assured that peace and order will be re-established; by the time you receive this letter, we shall have come to an engagement.

The campaign upon which Bonaparte embarked was part of a strategy planned by Carnot, in which the main effort would be made in Germany, with operations in Italy serving to absorb Austrian resources; and ultimately the Army of Italy could unite with Moreau’s French army in the Tyrol and march together on Vienna. Two armies confronted Bonaparte on the western edge of the plain of Lombardy: some 25,000 Piedmontese under the Austrian Baron Michael von Colli, and 35,000 Austrians under General Johann Beaulieu, the Brabant-born Austrian commander-in-chief in north Italy. Relations between the two were poor, and their forces separated, giving Bonaparte the opportunity for the first employment of what became a hallmark of his strategy: to overcome a superior enemy by dividing their forces, interposing his own army between them, using a minority of it to hold one enemy force whilst the major part crushed the other; and then switching operations against the first enemy force. In this way an outnumbered army could gain local superiority of numbers in each battle, facilitating a ‘defeat in detail’ of the enemy, made possible by the French army’s superior ability of rapid movement. The mountainous terrain was also of use in negating the superiority of the Austrian cavalry, against which Bonaparte could muster only some 3,500 troopers.

As Beaulieu and Colli prepared to advance, Bonaparte marched north from the coast into the gap between the opposing armies, and on 12 April made a frontal assault upon the Austro-Piedmontese force of General Argenteau at Montenotte, while Massena swung around and attacked the enemy’s right flank. Outnumbered (some 9,000 against 6,000), Argenteau was driven away in disorder, and Bonaparte’s position between the two enemy forces was secured. He intended to deal with Colli first, and detailed Massena to hold off Beaulieu. On 14 April Massena captured the town of Dego; but on the following day was caught by an Austrian reinforcement under General Wukassovitch while his troops were scattered, looking for provisions. Massena was hustled out of Dego with the loss of all his artillery, and Bonaparte was compelled to abandon his pursuit of Colli to recapture Dego, which was accomplished later in the day. With his eastern flank thus secured, Bonaparte was free to march westward against Colli.

On 16 April Colli repelled Bonaparte’s first thrust (under Augereau) at Ceva, but withdrew in the face of increasing French pressure; he was engaged again at
Mondovi on 21 April, where despite a strong position he was outnumbered, and his army collapsed under the attack of three French columns led in person by Sérrurier. So complete was the demoralisation of the Piedmontese army that as Bonaparte continued his pursuit, King Victor Amadeus capitulated, and by the armistice of Cherasco (28 April) Savoy withdrew from the war. Although Bonaparte had no authority to determine political treaties he presented the Directory with a fait accompli, and they acceded to the terms he had extracted, including French freedom of passage through Piedmont. Victor Amadeus died shortly afterwards, and in 1798 his son Charles Emmanuel IV was induced to hand over the fortress of Turin, ending Piedmontese independence; the royal family of Savoy withdrew to Sardinia and took virtually no further part in the wars of the era.

In ten days, Bonaparte had removed one of France’s opponents from the war, and secured his base of operations; by any standards it was an amazing debut for a young general untried in independent command, and laid the foundation for his reputation. Now free to turn upon Beaulieu, Bonaparte advanced upon the River Po, along which the Austrian had spread his forces in a defensive cordon. Bonaparte demonstrated to conceal his intentions; and then, on 7–8 May, plunged across the river at Piacenza, threatening Beaulieu’s left and his communications with Mantua, the main Austrian fortress and administrative centre in north Italy. Beaulieu accordingly withdrew eastwards in the direction of that city, abandoning Milan. As he retired Bonaparte rapidly concentrated his army, intent on crushing the Austrians during the disorganisation of their retreat; but Beaulieu escaped, leaving a rearguard of about 10,000 men under General Sebottendorf to cover the crossing of the River Adda at Lodi.

Having occupied this town on 10 May Bonaparte was faced with the difficult task of storming the bridge across the Adda, and whilst awaiting the arrival of the main body he personally aimed an assembly of some two dozen guns on the river bank to bombard the Austrian positions across the river—a mundane task for a general, which it is said earned him his nickname ‘the little corporal’. Exhorting his advance column with a heartening speech, Bonaparte launched them onto the bridge; after the first wave was beaten back Massena led the renewed assault which carried the position, and the Austrians withdrew as other French detachments forded the river upstream.

The battle at Lodi was a disappointment, in that Beaulieu had evaded Bonaparte; yet it proved to be
one of the crucial events in Bonaparte’s career. To the army, it confirmed his reputation and began to build the Napoleonic legend, of a leader at once imbued with mystique yet also a man of the army (hence the significance of the affectionate nickname *le petit caporal*, recalling Marlborough’s ‘Corporal John’); and it convinced Bonaparte that he was marked for a spectacular career. Later he recalled that not until the evening of Lodi was he convinced that he was ‘*un homme supérieur*’, and that he began to believe that he really could achieve what had previously been only a dream. Five days later he entered Milan in triumph in the guise of liberator, at the same time extracting funds from its citizens which enabled him to pay his troops—the first money which some had received for three years.

Beaulieu patched together a defensive line running some 20 miles from the shores of Lake Garda to the great fortress of Mantua, on the line of the River Mincio. Bonaparte’s advance was delayed by the need to reorganise and to suppress anti-French risings in Milan and Pavia, in the course of which he permitted his army to sack the latter city as a lesson for the whole of northern Italy. On 30 May he stormed across the Mincio at Borghetto, and the widely-separated Austrian forces were compelled to withdraw northwards towards the Tyrol, leaving Mantua to be besieged.

Mantua became the focal point for the remainder of the campaign; it was virtually the only Austrian possession remaining in north Italy, and the enemy was determined that no effort should be spared in effecting its relief. Its original garrison comprised some 12,700 Austrians, and its investment, a blockade by some 9,000 French troops under Séurier, began on 4 June. The remainder of the French forces were deployed along the River Adige to cover the operations. In the areas now under French control Bonaparte began to organise Italian units for internal security duty, and in June 1796 he granted an armistice to the King of the Two Sicilies, removing Naples from the enemies which confronted him.

The campaign of Castiglione
A new Austrian army assembled to relieve Mantua, led by Dagobert Wurmser (1724–97), a native of Strasbourg whose first military service had been in the French army. His own force, about 24,000 strong, advanced south from Trent on Verona, joining the remnants of Beaulieu’s force between Trent and Lake Garda. A second column, some 18,000 strong, advanced to the west of Lake Garda, commanded by General Peter Quasdanovich, with 5,000 more advancing down the Brenta valley on Wurmser’s left. To meet the Austrian advance, Bonaparte reluctantly had to order the lifting of the siege of Mantua on 31 July; the French withdrawal was so urgent that the siege-train was abandoned, some guns being spiked but most captured, with the loss in all of some 179 pieces of ordnance. Wurmser’s obvious aim was to unite his army with that of Quasdanovich at the southern end of Lake Garda, to bring overwhelming numbers to bear against the French; but he was so concerned with the fate of Mantua that he delayed until he was certain that the siege had been lifted, which gave Bonaparte the time to employ his tactic of moving between his enemies, holding back one whilst concentrating upon the other.

Massena fell back before Wurmser, whose small
Massena’s force towards Castiglione, where Augereau and the Irish cavalry general Charles Kilmaine (1751–99) were still just holding Wurmser. Intending to bring up reserves so that his army numbered 30,000 (against Wurmser’s 25,000), Bonaparte hoped to occupy Austrian attention along their front, and then fall upon their left rear with some 5,000 men from Sérurier’s force, marching north from Mantua (a contingent commanded by the Corsican general Pascal Fiorella, as Sérurier had fallen ill). As Wurmser would have to switch forces to deal with this attack, his front might be sufficiently weakened for Bonaparte to break it.

The battle which developed at Castiglione on 5 August did not go to plan, however, as Fiorella’s force was too small to threaten effectively the Austrian line of retreat, and his flank attack was made before the Austrian front line had been committed fully against probing attacks by Massena and Augereau, enabling Wurmser to meet the attack without weakening his front sufficiently to permit Bonaparte to smash through. Although the Austrians were defeated their army was able to extricate itself with the loss of about 2,000 casualties and 1,000 prisoners; and no effective pursuit was possible due to the exhaustion of the French army (Augereau’s division, in addition to fighting two battles on 3 and 5 August, had also marched some 50 miles in a day and a half). Nevertheless, although Wurmser had been able to reinforce the Mantua garrison, the utilisation of his tactic of ‘defeat in detail’ had enabled Bonaparte to repel the first Austrian attempt to relieve the city, which was again besieged on 24 August.

The relief of Mantua: the second attempt
Leaving 8,000 men to invest Mantua, Bonaparte moved north towards Trent with some 34,000 men. Wurmser, having regrouped and with reinforcements, again elected to split his forces. His own army of about 20,000 was to advance down the Brenta valley, intent on approaching Mantua from the north-east, making a wide flanking movement around Bonaparte’s position; and a further 15,000 under General Paul von Davidovich were to hold a line south of Trent, defending the Tyrol.

Bonaparte’s march north was in accord with Carnot’s original plan of effecting a junction between the Army of Italy and Moreau, who was advancing on
the Danube. On 4 September the divisions of Massena and General Charles Vaubois (1748–1839) drove back Davidovich at Caliano (or Roveredo), the Austrians falling back upon the Tyrol; but at this juncture Bonaparte learned of Wurmser’s advance down the Brenta valley. Leaving Vaubois to block any Austrian reinforcement from the Tyrol, Bonaparte set off on 6 September down the Brenta valley with the divisions of Massena and Augereau, in pursuit of Wurmser. On the following day Augereau swept aside the Austrian rearguard (three Croat battalions) at Primolano, and was within striking distance of the Austrian main body. Astonished at the speed of the French pursuit—almost 60 miles in two days—Wurmser turned to face Bonaparte, and sent a message to recall his vanguard (under General Meszaros) which had almost reached Verona.

With his forces widely separated on the march, Wurmser was able to field only about 7,000 men to meet the French emerging from the Brenta valley at Bassano on 8 September; with Augereau advancing down the river’s east bank and Massena on the west, Wurmser’s army was overthrown and scattered, losing some 4,000 prisoners and 35 guns for negligible French loss. Some of the survivors, under Quasdanovitch, retired east in the direction of the Austrian base at Trieste; Wurmser and the remainder moved south to Vicenza to join Meszaros’ advance-guard. When it became clear that Wurmser was still intent on reaching Mantua, Bonaparte again pursued, the French marching as much as 114 miles in six days, regularly engaging the Austrian rear-guard. Kilmaine had been instructed to hold the line of the River Adige, which Wurmser would have to cross to reach Mantua; but had been so alarmed by Meszaros’ earlier advance that he had withdrawn to protect Verona, allowing Wurmser free passage over the Adige at Legnago. With Bonaparte’s exhausted army unable to catch up, Wurmser fought his way into Mantua on 13 September.

Wurmser attempted to extend his hold on Mantua to the surrounding countryside, to provide provisions, but after sharp fighting on 13–15 September his sortie was defeated by Bonaparte’s army, which had come up in strength; and after losing 4,000 men Wurmser retired into the city, its garrison now swollen to about 24,000. Although this force was not far from the number of troops available to Bonaparte its condition deteriorated rapidly, as some 9,000 were ill, Mantua being a notoriously unhealthy place; the
The main French positions were concentrated to the north and east of Mantua, around Verona and on the line of the River Adige; Massena held an outpost at the head of the Brenta valley, and Vaubois with some 10,000 men fell back down the Adige valley, opposing Davidovich's southward march from the Tyrol. Alarmed at the reports coming from Vaubois, on 7–8 November Bonaparte went in person to join him and reorganise his dispirited command, issuing a stern reproach to units of Vaubois' force which he considered had disgraced themselves. Bonaparte ordered a new position to be established by Massena and General Barthelemy Joubert (1769–99; who in five years had risen to that rank from being an NCO in the national guard, following service as a gunner under the Ancien Régime). Joubert's two brigades were added to the force. Davidovich, however, was slow to exploit the disorganisation of the French, allowing Bonaparte to concentrate on the greater threat from Alvintzi, while remaining concerned about the threat to his rear.

Despite opposition, Alvintzi's forces united at Vicenza, Massena and Augereau falling back upon Verona. Bonaparte determined to take the initiative with Massena's division and part of Augereau's, together about 13,000 strong. On 12 November he marched east from Verona along the Vicenza road, intending to overthow Alvintzi's advance-guard before the main body could assist. Atrocious weather and muddy roads delayed progress, however, and after initial success against the Austrian advance-guard at Caldiero elements of Alvintzi's main body came up; the French were beaten back, and retired again on Verona. After this first serious defeat, which cost Bonaparte some 2,000 casualties, a note of despondency entered his correspondence with the Directory, in which he declared in a somewhat theatrical manner that his exhausted army had been abandoned in the middle of Italy, and that perhaps their deaths were all at hand.

However, this moment of crisis brought out the best of Bonaparte's resource. As another frontal battle might bring disaster, and as withdrawal from Verona would allow Alvintzi and Davidovich to unite, Bonaparte sought to defeat Alvintzi by threatening his communications eastward, involving a march swinging around the Austrian's left flank toward the town of Arcola, the bridge of which
crossed the River Alpone, a tributary of the Adige. Leaving less than 3,000 men in Verona, Bonaparte began his flanking march late on 14 November with all his available forces: Massena, Augereau and a brigade under General Jean Guieu (1758–1817) detached from Vaubois. Having crossed the Adige on a pontoon bridge at Ronco, Bonaparte sent Massena north to cover his left flank and hold off any southward attacks by Alvintzi, and personally led Augereau’s division across the Alpone at the Arcola bridge, from where he could threaten Alvintzi’s rear. Despite heroic attempts to storm the bridge, however, the small Austrian defending force held firm; this action was the scene of a theatrical gesture by Bonaparte, who grasped a colour of the 51st Demi-brigade and made to lead them over the bridge in person (he was restrained by an officer who declared that his life was too valuable to be risked).

Alvintzi reinforced the defenders of Arcola, and sent the Italian-born General Johann Provera (1740–1804) to assail Bonaparte’s flank; he was stopped at Belfiore di Porcile by Massena. Mean-while Guieu had been sent to cross the Adige further downstream; but although he was thus able to approach Arcola from the Austrian side of the river, it was too late in the day to be effective. Bonaparte had received news that Vaubois was again falling back, so called off the attacks and withdrew the French forces to the far bank of the Adige; marshy terrain, crossed by narrow dykes, prevented occupation nearer Arcola.

Having received no more desperate news of Vaubois, Bonaparte renewed the attack on 16 November, Augereau again attempting to carry the Arcola bridge while Massena drove back Provera on Bonaparte’s left. The renewed conflict brought no more success than on the previous day; but, as intended, it used up more Austrian resources and so undermined Alvintzi’s confidence that by the end of the day he was already retiring his baggage eastwards, towards Vicenza, lest his communications be cut. Having withdrawn again in the evening, on 17 November Bonaparte advanced once more, part of Massena’s command continuing to engage Provera whilst the remainder ambushed an Austrian force pushing ahead from Arcola. Augereau crossed the Adige downstream and approached Arcola from the ‘Austrian’ bank, and a small detachment of Bonaparte’s Guides (cavalry) was sent into the Austrian rear to make as much noise as possible, throwing the Austrians into confusion. Massena at last stormed across the bridge at Arcola, and the Austrians abandoned the fight; Alvintzi began a full retreat to negate the perceived threat to his communications. Although Alvintzi was able to extricate most of his army, as was Davidovich despite an attempt by Bonaparte to engage him, and although Arcola had not been a tactical masterpiece, its strategic effect was profound: by preventing the junction of Alvintzi and
Davidovich and by holding Verona, Bonaparte had ensured that the noose remained around Mantua.

The Rivoli campaign
The final attempt to break the siege of Mantua was made in January 1797, Alvintzi leading some 28,000 men down the Adige valley from Trent, with two diversionary forces further east: 6,000 down the Brenta valley advancing on Verona, and Provera with 9,000 advancing west from Padua against Legnago. Bonaparte's overall field strength had increased to about 34,000 (plus about 9,000 under Sérurier besieging Mantua). Augereau covered the eastern

Bonaparte addresses the Army of Italy upon first assuming command: engraving after Horace Vernet. (Although born only in 1789, Emile Jean Horace Vernet was an ardent Bonapartist and, having himself served in the National Guard, was able to portray the French soldier with accuracy and sympathy).
lores Heights to repel another Austrian assault on the centre.

Meanwhile, the Austrian attempt to outflank Bonaparte’s left (General Lusignan’s division, about 4,000 strong) had made a very circuitous march several miles from the main action, and reached a position south of Rivoli, from where Bonaparte’s rear could have been assailed; but Lusignan was trapped between the arriving troops of Rey and the remainder of Massena’s division, and the entire Austrian column was captured. By early evening Alvintzi was in full retreat the way he had come; Bonaparte detached Joubert and Rey to pursue, and marched south with the remainder of his force to deal with the Austrian columns approaching Verona and Mantua from the east. The former was a feint, but Provera’s column evaded Augereau’s cordon of defence, crossed the Adige and marched towards Mantua. Wurmser made a sally out of the beleaguered city on 16 January in an attempt to link up with Provera; but the effort was repelled, and Provera was trapped between Augereau in pursuit, Massena marching from Rivoli, and Séurier’s troops from the siege lines. With his command reduced to only some 5,000 or 6,000 men, Provera surrendered at La Favorita.

* * * *

The defeat of Alvintzi at Rivoli, with the loss of half his army, had the double effect of sealing the fate of Mantua and securing the French possession of northern Italy. Leaving Joubert with about 10,000 men to watch the southern egress of the Tyrol, Bonaparte marched south into Papal territory, compelling the Pope to accept harsh terms (including the payment of a large subsidy to finance France’s war with Austria), thus removing another hostile state from the field. On 2 February 1797 Wurmser accepted the inevitable and surrendered the disease-ridden garrison of Mantua, having lost about 18,000 men to sickness.

With north Italy secure and having at last received reinforcements, Bonaparte was able to take the war towards Austria. Alvintzi was replaced in command of what remained of the Austrian forces by the Archduke Charles (1771–1847), the emperor’s brother and the most capable Austrian commander of the period. His task, however, was daunting: he had about 27,000 men along the Tagliamento, and some 14,000 under Davidovich in the Tyrol (plus about 10,000 volunteers), but neither could support the other. With about 43,000 men Bonaparte advanced against Charles, leaving Joubert with about 19,000 to advance into the Tyrol. Both Austrian forces retired before the French, Charles falling back to escape encirclement and losing men all the way, including a detachment to Massena at Malborghetto on 23 March.

Bonaparte pursued through the passes of the
Julian and Carnatic Alps, uniting his columns at Klagenfurt in Carinthia on 28 March. Despite his successes Bonaparte’s position was not secure: he had extended lines of communication, and smouldering unrest in the areas to his rear; Moreau’s advance over the Rhine was delayed; and there were sizeable enemy forces still in existence. Determined to retain the initiative, however, Bonaparte ordered Joubert to support him (leaving a force in the Tyrol as a guard) and pushed forward, at the same time demanding an armistice from the Austrians. On 6 April the French occupied Leoben, only 95 miles from Vienna; and Austria accepted a truce. Without authority or time to consult the Directory, and knowing his position was not safe and aid not imminent, Bonaparte audaciously dictated his own terms of peace; these were accepted by the preliminary Peace of Leoben (18 April) which ended the war, and were confirmed by the Treaty of Campo Formio (17 October 1797).

By any standards, Bonaparte’s achievements in the fourteen months since he had assumed command of the Army of Italy were prodigious. Although some of the elements which produced his successful army were already in place, and he was lucky in having able subordinates, and although he had experienced some good fortune, his own talent was largely responsible for his success, backed by assiduous study and an indefatigable zeal for relentless toil. During the Italian campaigns he was still learning, but the elements of his system of war were clearly visible: most notably, perhaps, the ability to overcome superior numbers by defeating them in detail; the importance of outflanking and operating in the enemy’s rear, threatening their lines of communication while not being too concerned with his own (due to the French army’s ability to sustain itself temporarily even when its supply lines were severed); and the ability to identify essentials immediately, coupled with the flexibility to alter plans according to circumstance.

Equally important were facets of his character: an unprecedented ability to motivate his followers, belief in himself, ruthless ambition, audacity and resolution, these together producing a commander unequalled in Europe, and by far the most dangerous single factor which France’s enemies had to face. Only a lack of resources prevented him from winning a truly decisive battle during this period; and after his fourteen months’ campaign in Italy he was already the dominant military personality of the age.

**THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION**

Received as a hero in Paris, Bonaparte was given command of the ‘Army of England’ intended to invade that most inveterate of France’s enemies; but as this project was not feasible, he persuaded the Directory to sanction a scheme for an attack on
The battle of Dego: Bonaparte (centre) arrives to find General Causse mortally wounded whilst rallying the 90th Demi-brigade. 'Has the position been retaken?' Causse is supposed to have asked; when Bonaparte confirmed that it had, Causse replied, 'Vive la république; I die happy.' (Print after Mulard)

Egypt, to form a basis of a French eastern empire and jeopardise Britain's trade with the middle east and India. Probably the Directory was not sorry to see him go, as his popularity could have been perceived as a threat to themselves. In May 1798 Bonaparte sailed for Egypt.¹

During his absence, events in Italy took a wholly different turn. By the Treaty of Campo Formio, Austria had acknowledged the existence of three French satellite states. The Transpadane Republic (proclaimed 9 July 1797 and soon renamed the Cisalpine Republic) incorporated the former Austrian provinces in the area of Milan, enlarged by the addition of ex-Venetian territory west of the Adige, and in the following month by the addition of the Swiss district of the Valtelline, so that it extended from Como and Verona in the north to Rimini in the south. The Cispadane and Ligurian Republics were similar satellites centred on Modena and Genoa respectively. By Campo Formio, Austria received Venetian territory east of the Adige and Dalmatia in exchange for losing Lombardy; but she remained resentful, and regrouped for a renewal of the conflict.

After Bonaparte's imposition of terms upon the Papacy, including the disbandment of the army of the Papal States, France encouraged republican agitation in Rome; and after the French General Duphot was killed in a scuffle in the city the Directory ordered Berthier to take possession of it. The French were welcomed as liberators by Roman democrats, but with the predatory Massena in the lead they thoroughly ransacked the city. The French satellite Roman Republic was proclaimed on 15 February 1798.

In December 1798 a second coalition was organised against France, led in part by Czar Paul I of Russia (who was generally regarded as insane, and whose the British Gentleman's Magazine in December 1800 described as 'odious in the mind of every impartial person'). His principal partners were Britain and Austria, with others including the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. The first operations initiated by a member of the new coalition was an attack on the Roman Republic by a Neapolitan army commanded by the somewhat inept Austrian general Karl Mack, Freiherr von Leiberich (1752–1828)—whom Horatio Nelson had characterised as 'a rascal, a scoundrel, and a coward'. Rome was captured on 29 November, but a French counter-attack led by General Jean Championnet expelled the Neapolitans (15 December). In the same month the French overran Piedmont; the resulting Piedmontese Republic was integrated completely with France in September 1802.

The coalition's plan envisaged a simultaneous drive against the French by the Archduke Charles in Germany and Switzerland, an Anglo-Russian expedition under the Duke of York in the Netherlands, and an Austro-Russian army under the old Russian General Suvarov in Italy, where the French dominance established by Bonaparte was transformed.

In the face of initial French progress, King Ferdinand IV of Naples fled to Sicily as his supporters on the mainland commenced to massacre those

¹See MAA 79, Napoleon's Egyptian Campaign
suspected of republican sympathies. Faced with anarchy, much of the middle and upper classes turned to the French for assistance; and Mack fled to the French lines to escape his mutinous army. The British *Morning Chronicle* commented on his failure: ‘General Mack’s military reputation is defended ... on the ground that he had not valiant troops to execute his wonderful plans. What a notable projector this same General Mack, who draws a plan without considering how it is to be executed, and takes the field with threats of destruction without reflecting whether his soldiers could stand fire!’

On 20 January 1799 Championnet fought his way into Naples against royalist opposition; on 23 January the Parthenopean Republic was established, but the state was ill-organised and with ruinous finances, and was thus ripe for a royalist counter-blow. From safety in Sicily, Ferdinand sent the influential Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo to Calabria to organise a counter-revolution. His ‘Christian Army of the Holy Faith’ (largely brigands, peasants and some military), with Russian and Turkish assistance, defeated the republicans and persuaded the French to evacuate Naples under an armistice. Ferdinand returned from Palermo in July 1799 and began executing supporters of the Parthenopean Republic.

Russian operations in Italy were comparatively brief. Although the Russian Army was one of the largest in Europe, Czar Paul had cancelled recent reforms and returned the army to mid-18th century standards. Sir Henry Bunbury, who saw them in 1799, described them as ‘exactly the hard, stiff, wooden machines which we have reason to figure to ourselves as the Russians of the Seven Years’ War ... they waddled slowly forward to the tap-tap of their monotonous drums; and if they were beaten they waddled slowly back again, without appearing in either case to feel a sense of danger, or the expediency of taking ultra tap-tap steps to better their condition’.

When combined with brutal discipline and extreme devotion to their Czar and officers, however, their apparent disregard of danger made them a formidable enemy.¹ *The Military Mentor*, written shortly after the campaign, described them as bearing ‘strong marks of the savage origin of the greatest portion of their soldiers’ as if they were less feeling than the troops of other nations: ‘The courage of the Russians is proof against every thing; they know how to die to ensure victory, and to die rather than be beaten. They will beat all other troops, if they can but bring them to action: they are moving machines of fire that consume all in their way. No troops in the world are so careless of being attacked in flank, or turned; they think, let the enemy be where he will, if they can but face about to meet him, that he is in front and in regular order before them.’

Their leader was Field-Marshal Alexander Vasilievitch Suvarov, Count of Suvarov-Riminsky (1729–1800): one of the greatest Russian commanders in history, with a most distinguished record of service against the Turks and Poles. The *Mentor* described his unlikely demeanour: ‘... old, and

¹See MAA 185, *The Russian Army of the Napoleonic Wars (1) Infantry*, and MAA 189, *2 Cavalry*.}
subject to the infirmities of age, when he came into Italy, as far as they affected the body; but its spirit preserved all its fire and vivacity. Every thing in his manner was singular and eccentric... a mountebank does not display so many tricks, contortions, and grimaces, as he did... his table was remarkable for its filth and bad cheer; he drank out of his neighbour's glass...'; yet when conversation turned to military affairs, he appeared a complete master of the subject, not one 'whom, the moment before, we were tempted to look upon as in a state of madness or imbecility'.

**Suvarov's offensive**

To oppose the Allies, Schérer commanded about 80,000 men in northern Italy, and Championnet led about 30,000 French and Italians in southern Italy (from the first establishment of the satellite republics, Italian units had been formed to assist the French); Massena was in Switzerland with about 30,000 more. Despite, or perhaps because of, the superior numbers of Allied troops ranged against them, Carnot ordered a French offensive on all fronts.

The first action occurred along the Adige, where Schérer attempted to defeat the existing Austrian forces before they could be reinforced. The Austrian commander was the Hungarian General Paul Kray (Baron Kray de Krajowa, 1735–1804), Melas being ill; he had about 50,000 men. After French moves around Verona were repulsed in late March 1799, the two main armies met at Magnano, south of Verona, on 5 April; Kray absorbed Schérer's first attack, then counter-attacked and broke the French right, and Schérer withdrew in some disorder.

Suvarov arrived shortly afterwards and took command of the combined Allied forces in northern Italy, with a field army of about 90,000 men. Schérer resigned his command, and was replaced by General Jean Moreau (1763–1813), a fine general but one whose lack of political skill doomed his career. It was said that had Bonaparte not been Bonaparte, then Moreau would not have been—perhaps an exaggeration, but a reflection of the regard in which he was held.

Suvarov left Kray with some 20,000 men to besiege Mantua, and advanced on Milan, having about 65,000 men to oppose Moreau's field army of only some 30,000. Moreau was defeated on 27 April at Cassano (about two-thirds of the way from Brescia to Milan), and Suvarov entered Milan on the following day. Differences with the Austrian government brought a temporary halt to Suvarov's offensive, and Allied attention was directed towards eliminating the remaining French garrisons in northern Italy.

Moreau retired to the area around Genoa to await reinforcements, which were rushing north under the command of the Scottish émigré (born in Sedan) Jacques Macdonald (1765–1840), who in February 1799 had been placed in command of the French 'Army of Naples'. His advance threatened to trap Suvarov between two fires; but Suvarov concentrated some 25,000 men and defeated Macdonald at the

---

*The battle of Lodi: French troops attempt to fight their way across the bridge, covered by artillery on the riverbank. (Print after Baron Lejeune)*
Battle of the Trebbia (17–19 June 1799), pursuing him into Genoa.

Joubert was now given command of the French forces, and moved north-west from Genoa to block Suvarov’s advance. On 15 August he attacked with about 35,000 men against Suvarov’s 50,000 at Novi and was defeated decisively, losing almost a third of his army and his own life, shot through the body at the commencement of the action; Moreau again assumed command.

Suvarov drove the French across the Apennines, but broke off pursuit upon learning that the French Army of the Alps (commanded by Championnet) had traversed the Mt. Cenis pass into Italy. Suvarov turned north, but then received orders to take a Russian army into Switzerland, where Massena was making progress. The Allied forces there had been defeated before Suvarov arrived, and he retired into Austria; despite his remarkable achievements the Czar dismissed him from command, and he died shortly afterwards. After Suvarov’s march towards Switzerland, Melas assumed command of the Allied forces in Italy, and on 4 November defeated Championnet at the Battle of Genoa, propelling the French back over the Alps.

The operations of 1799 were unsuccessful for the Allies elsewhere, but thanks to the indomitable Suvarov their campaign in Italy had undone all of Bonaparte’s successes. Reverses in Switzerland and the Netherlands, coupled with his fury over the British possession of Malta (of whose Order of St. John the mad Czar had declared himself head) caused Paul I of Russia to withdraw Russia from the war, so that Bonaparte had no opportunity of engaging Russian troops in Italy.

THE FIRST CONSUL

The destruction of the French fleet by Horatio Nelson at Aboukir Bay effectively decided the outcome of Bonaparte’s oriental expedition by marooning the French army in Egypt. Bonaparte left his army in secret on 24 August 1799, landing in France on 9 October; his reputation ensured him an ecstatic welcome from the population, if not from the corrupt and now unpopular Directory. Two of its members, including Barras, were instrumental in staging the coup d’état of 18 Brumaire (9 November 1799), which replaced the Directory with a three-man Consulate. Two of the new Consuls were ex-Directors, Abbé Emmanuel Siéyès and Roger Ducos; the third was General Bonaparte. The conspirators probably intended merely to use Bonaparte as a popular figure-head, but if so they underestimated the ruthless political skill of the young general, who soon forced himself to the front as First Consul. The other Consuls were replaced by less prominent personalities; and Bonaparte became in effect the dictator of France—an amazing achievement for one who five

Barthelemy Catherine Joubert (1769-99), wearing the 1798 staff uniform. (Print after Eric Pape, from a portrait by François Bouchot)
years before had been only a very obscure artillery officer.

The Marengo campaign
For the operations of 1800, Austria intended to contain Moreau’s French Army of the Rhine in Germany, and to concentrate against what remained of the French in Italy. Massena’s Army of Italy, about 40,000 strong, held western Piedmont and the coast from Genoa to Nice; against them Melas fielded an army of about 100,000, with a further 20,000 garrison troops. Despite the disparity of numbers, Bonaparte chose not to reinforce the Italian front immediately but to form a new ‘Army of Reserve’ at Dijon, nominally under Berthier, but actually commanded by the First Consul himself. (Berthier, although an invaluable chief of staff, was not ideally suited for a major field command; Napoleon once remarked, somewhat harshly, that ‘Nature has evidently designed many for a subordinate situation; and among these is Berthier. As chief of staff he had no superior; but he was not fit to command five hundred men’). With this new army, Bonaparte intended to invade northern Italy through Switzerland to trap Melas between himself and Massena; but it was the Austrians who took the initiative.

In early April 1800 Melas attacked Massena’s outnumbered army, driving him with about 12,000 men into Genoa; the remainder, commanded by General Louis Suchet (1770–1826), withdrew into the Var valley beyond Nice. Massena was besieged in Genoa by General Peter Carl Ott (1738–1809) and some 20,000 Austrians, cut off from support by the Austrians on land and by a British fleet at sea.

With the French hold on Italy thus virtually extinguished, Bonaparte began to advance from Switzerland, crossing the Alps via the Great St. Bernard Pass; he had had the Alpine passes surveyed in 1799, and the Great St. Bernard was regarded as the most impracticable, unsuitable for both artillery and baggage. It was a move, however, which demonstrated fully Bonaparte’s audacity and ingenuity: as the alpine tracks and deep snow precluded the use of ordinary artillery carriages, the gun barrels were laid in hollowed tree-trunks and dragged like sledges by teams of men, with the carriages taken to pieces and manhandled; supply-waggons were sent through the pass unloaded and their contents carried by mules and men. It was a most perilous undertaking, yet accomplished with remarkably little trouble; and it enabled Bonaparte (as he himself described) to fall as unexpectedly as a thunderbolt upon the Austrians, who never imagined that such a route of advance was practicable. Bonaparte also sent smaller detachments along the Little St. Bernard and Mt. Cenis passes, and had Moreau send reinforcements down the Simplon and St. Gotthard passes. The Austrian detachments detailed to cover these routes were swept aside; and after some ten days of struggling through snow and avalanches, by 24 May about 40,000 Frenchmen were established in the Po valley—one of the most remarkable achievements of Bonaparte’s career.

Learning this, Melas hurried back from Nice where he had been confronting Suchet. Bonaparte calculated that Massena would occupy much of the Austrian forces and began to advance to his relief, occupying Milan and Pavia and threatening Brescia and Piacenza. In Genoa, however, after a most terrible siege, the garrison was finally starved into surrender; following an unsuccessful attempt to break out, Massena yielded the city on 4 June, and was allowed to take his 8,000 survivors to join Suchet.

The fall of Genoa disordered Bonaparte’s plans, but by the first week of June his forces, spreading eastwards through Lombardy, had manoeuvred into a position to threaten Melas’ communications with
Austria. Melas advanced north to Turin, and upon discovering the threat moved east and ordered a concentration around Alessandria. Bonaparte’s forces were of necessity spread throughout Lombardy, reducing the troops available immediately to some three corps. These were commanded by General Jean Lannes (1769–1809), one of Bonaparte’s close friends, a brave and capable commander who had accompanied Bonaparte from Egypt; Claude Victor (1764–1841), who had enlisted in the old royal army as a boy and spent the recent past campaigning in Italy; and, joining the army late, Louis Desaix (1768–1800), a universally-admired scion of an aristocratic family, who had been so fair in his treatment of the Egyptians that he had been styled ‘the Just Sultan’. Captured by the Royal Navy when returning from Egypt, he had been freed just in time to join Bonaparte in Italy. Also in the main army was the cavalry reserve of Joachim Murat (1767–1815), the flamboyant sabreur who had served as Bonaparte’s aide, became his brother-in-law, and had assisted in the coup d’état of 18 Brumaire.

On 9 June Lannes’ advance-guard of about 6,000 men, marching from Pavia, unexpectedly encountered Ott with some 17,000 men at Montebeello. Lannes was initially repulsed, but when Victor came up with a further 6,000 men he renewed the attack and drove back the Austrians with heavy loss. Ott retired upon Alessandria, upon which Bonaparte advanced, to concentrate around the village of Marengo about a mile east of Alessandria.

Imperfections in reconnaissance gave Bonaparte no clear idea of Melas’ intentions or position (he believed Melas still to be around Turin); yet he took the gamble of dispersing his army in an attempt to prevent Melas’ escape, sending a detachment north to cover the crossings of the Po, and dispatching Desaix with Boudet’s division (about 5,300 men) towards Novi, to prevent Melas retiring on Genoa. This left less than 24,000 men positioned around Marengo. It was thus a considerable surprise when Melas attacked on 14 June.

Early that morning Bonaparte received news that three Austrian columns were crossing the River Bormida from Alessandria and engaging the foremost units of Victor’s troops; Melas’ main assault was in the centre, with flanking columns under Ott (left) and O’Reilly (right). Not until mid-morning did Bonaparte realise that he was facing a major assault, and at about 11 a.m. desperate messages were sent off to recall the scattered forces. By this time both Victor on the left of the French line, and Lannes on the
France:
1: General Bonaparte, 1796
2: Line fusilier, 1796
3: Light infantry carabinier, 1796
France:
1: Grenadier, 1796
2: Light infantry carabinier, 1796
3: Infantry private, Lombard-Cisalpine Legion, 1797
France:
1: Trooper, 2nd Cavalry, 1800
2: Trooper, 8th Dragoons, 1800
3: Gunner, Foot Artillery, 1800
France:
1: Captain, Light infantry, 1800
2: Sergeant-major, 30th Demi-Brigade, 1800
3: Corporal, Consular
   Guard Grenadiers, 1800
Austria:
1: Grenadier, Regiment Belgiojoso, 1796
2: Fusilier, Regiment Kheul, 1796
3: Fusilier drummer, Regiment Terzi, 1796
Austria:
1: General Officer, 1800
2: NCO, Artillery, 1800
3: Private, Light Battalion Bach, 1800
Austria:
1: Trooper Mounted Jagers, 1800
2: Trooper, Light Dragoon Regiment Lobkowitz, 1800
3: Wachtmeister, Hussar Regiment Liechtenstein, 1800
Austria:
1: Officer, Regiment Splényi, 1800
2: Fusilier, Regiment Johann Jellačić, 1800
3: Fusilier, NCO, Regiment Hohenlohe, 1800
right, were giving way; both appealed for assistance, but Bonaparte’s reserve of his newly-formed Consular Guard and Monnier’s division (part of Desaix’s command which had not accompanied its leader) had to be sent north to hold off Ott’s column, which was threatening the French right flank. Although an envelopment of the flank was prevented, by mid-afternoon the French had been driven back some two miles, with morale shaken and ammunition running low. Melas was so confident that the battle was won that he handed control of the coup de grâce to his chief of staff, General Zach, and (having sustained a slight injury) retired to Alessandria.

Bonaparte’s defeat seemed imminent; but at this juncture, well before he could have been expected, Desaix arrived from the south with Boudet’s division. Floods had delayed his march in the morning, so he heard the battle commence; without waiting to receive Bonaparte’s desperate plea for help, he had obeyed the old maxim of ‘always march towards the sound of the guns’. His troops had force-marched and were half exhausted, but Desaix was supremely confident, remarking that although it was obvious that the battle was lost, there was still enough of the day left to win another. By about 5 p.m. his reinforcement was in position on the left of

---

**Orders of Battle: Marengo**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Army: Berthier</th>
<th>Advance-guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victor</td>
<td>Left column (Ott)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Chambarlhac: 24th DBL; 43rd and 96th DB</td>
<td>Light Dragoon Regt. Lobkowitz (10); infantry regiments Hohenlohe (17), Stuart (18), Mittrowsky (40), Splény (51), Josef Colloredo (57), Frolich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Gardanne: 44th, 101st and 102nd DB</td>
<td>Main column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lannes</td>
<td>Div. Haddick:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Watrin: 6th DBL; 22nd, 28th and 40th DB</td>
<td>Bde. Bellegarde: Regts. Erzherzog Anton (52), Johann Jelačić (53) (2 bns. each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desaix</td>
<td>Bde. Briey: Regt. Kinsky (47) (2 bns.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div. Monnier: 19th DBL; 70th and 72nd DB</td>
<td>Cavalry: Light Dragoon Regts. Kaiser (1) (4 sqns.), Karoczy (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consular Guard</td>
<td>Div. Kaim:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry; Cavalry, grenadiers and chasseurs à cheval</td>
<td>Bde. Knesevich: Regt. Grossherzog von Toscana (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry (Murat)</td>
<td>Bde. La Marseille: Regt. Erzherzog Josef (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bde. (Kellermann): 2nd, 20th and 21st Cavalry</td>
<td>Grenadier Div.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bde.: 1st, 8th and 9th Dragoons</td>
<td>Bdes. Lattermann and Weidenfeld (total 11 bns.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Bde.: 5th Cavalry, 6th Dragoons, 12th Chasseurs</td>
<td>Cavalry:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Bde.: 12th Hussars, 21st Chasseurs</td>
<td>Hussar Regts. Erzherzog Josef (2), Liechtenstein (7), Erdödy (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Bde.: 3rd Cavalry, 1st Hussars</td>
<td>Right column (O’Reilly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian Army: Mack</td>
<td>Light Dragoon Regt. Württemberg (8) (1 sqn.); Hussar Regts. No.5 (no Inhaber) and Nauendorf (8); Grenz Regts. Otočaner (2), Oguliner (3), 1st Warasdiner (5) (1 bn. each)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Regiments identified by the name of the Inhaber, with numbers in parentheses where applicable. Unless stated otherwise, infantry regiments had three battalions each; brigading is specified only for the main column)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bonaparte's line and ready to make the counter-attack which Bonaparte had ordered.

The relief with which their appearance was greeted by the desperate French army can be imagined: Coignet of the 96th Demi-brigade, which as part of Chambardiac's division of Victor's corps had been severely mauled and was on the French left where the approach of Desaix could be seen, described the relief force hurrying up with arms at the 'carry' as resembling a forest swayed by the wind. Bonaparte rode over to greet the first of Desaix's troops, telling them that the army had fallen back far enough, and to remember that it was his custom always to sleep on the field of battle.

A hiatus in the Austrian pursuit permitted the shaken French forces to reorganise, Lannes and Victor continuing to hold the centre of the French line, Monnier's division and the Consular Guard the right, and Desaix with Boudet's division the left. Desaix requested the maximum artillery support, provided by some 18 guns directed by Auguste Marmont (1774–1852; previously Bonaparte's aide, and later one of the most distinguished of his subordinates), ten of his own guns and eight which had come up with Desaix. Because Austrian cavalry were visible, Desaix requested cavalry support and was allocated the brigade of General François Keller-

The battle of Arcola: Bonaparte seizes the colours of the 51st Demi-brigade to encourage the attempt to capture the bridge. (Engraving after Horace Vernet)

Marengo: the French counter-attack.
mann (1770–1835), son of the victor of Valmy: a small command originally of only some 470 men of the 2nd, 20th and 21st Cavalry. Kellermann had suffered considerable losses covering the retreat of the French army, but was reinforced by detachments of the 1st and 8th Dragoons from Champeau’s 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

The Austrian main body advanced along the road towards the village of San Giuliano, which was in the immediate rear of the French position; Zach in person led the vanguard of the brigades of St. Julien (Regt. Wallis) and Lattermann’s composite grenadier brigade. Desaix formed Boudet’s division in echelon with the left flank leading: the 9th Demi-brigade Légère on the left in ordre mixte, with the 30th and 59th Demi-brigades in the centre (in line) and right (in ordre mixte). Marmont pushed forward some of his guns, and Kellermann gathered his cavalry onto the right rear of the formation.

As the leading Austrian column approached, Marmont bombarded it, and Desaix ordered his troops forward, leading the 9th Léger himself on the left, and Boudet leading the right. The 9th fired on St. Julien’s brigade, which, having been mauled by artillery, broke and fled; but Lattermann’s grenadiers came on undaunted. As Austrian guns began to rake the 9th, Desaix was shot through the heart; the stories that he gasped ‘Dead!’ (or, more theatrically, said, ‘Tell the First Consul that I die with regret, because I feel I have not done enough to be remembered by posterity’) are surely false; those who embalmed his body after the battle found the injury so severe that it would have killed him instantly. The 9th Léger fell back in confusion, and Zach’s column pressed on.

At this critical juncture, Marmont brought up three or four guns and opened fire with canister at almost point-blank range; an Austrian caisson exploded, causing confusion, and at precisely the right moment Kellermann launched a charge into the left flank of the column. This was the decisive blow; the Austrian column dissolved and Zach was captured, depriving the Austrians of their commander at this vital instant. Even had he remained free, however, it is doubtful whether he could have accomplished much in the confusion; with the Austrian infantry column in flight, Kellermann rallied his survivors, deployed and charged again into the Austrian cavalry which was approaching to cover the retreat of the advance-guard. As Kellermann overthrew them, they recoiled in confusion into the approaching main body of infantry, which was disordered completely. Again Kellermann rallied and, reinforced by the cavalry of the Consular Guard, made a third charge. Much of the main Austrian force collapsed into a disorganised mass of fugitives, abandoning artillery and throwing away weapons and equipment in the rush to escape. Boudet, having succeeded to command after Desaix’s death, led his division forward, followed by the remainder of the French line. Of the Austrian force, the Weidenfeld grenadier brigade alone covered the flight of the remainder from a position north-east of Marengo: virtually the only part of the main column which retired in good order.

Ott’s column, marching on the left of the Austrian main body, prepared to envelop the French right wing, but so sudden was the collapse of the main body that as the French advanced Ott was confronted by much of the French army. Pressured by Monnier and the Consular Guard, and with the approach of Rivaud’s 4th Cavalry Brigade from the north, Ott withdrew in good order. His path of retreat was partially cut by Monnier, but he fought his way clear. O’Reilly’s right column, apart from neutralising a small French detachment on Bonaparte’s extreme left flank, had done little since the early part of the battle, and apparently was even unaware of Desaix’s arrival. As the situation deteriorated O’Reilly re-
traced his steps to the Austrian bridgehead over the River Bormida, where his Grenzers took over its defence from Weidenfeld’s grenadiers.

Bonaparte’s army was too exhausted and mauled to attempt anything further, and withdrew, leaving the Austrians in possession of the Bormida crossing. The French had suffered about 7,000 casualties; Melas nearer 14,000 (including 8,000 prisoners), and some 40 artillery pieces. Next day Melas held a council of war and decided that further resistance was pointless; the defeat at Marengo seems to have so shaken the Austrians as to destroy their will for a renewed contest. Bonaparte, with full powers to negotiate as France’s head of state, granted a 24-hour armistice on condition that the Bormida bridgehead be yielded. By the Convention of Alessandria (15 June 1800) Melas surrendered all remaining holdings in Piedmont and Lombardy and withdrew all his forces eastwards, beyond the River Mincio. As Bonaparte himself remarked, in one day he had recovered Italy.

When assessing the abilities of a general Napoleon would ask, ‘Is he lucky?’ Perhaps his concern for so indefinable a factor may have been influenced by his own luck at Marengo; for despite his claims that all had gone to plan, the victory was due less to his own ability than to the actions of Desaix and Kellermann. Bonaparte was fulsome in his praise of the former (who, the cynic might remark, was no longer a threat to his own reputation). Kellermann, whose perfectly-timed charge was decisive, received scant recognition, and ever afterwards bore a grudge that he had never been rewarded adequately.

Although Marengo and its immediate results were not the truly decisive victory Bonaparte had sought, following his great achievement of establishing his army in Italy by the march through the Alps, they proved to be the conclusion of his campaigning in Italy. On 17 June he left the army for Paris, and six days later the Army of Reserve was absorbed by the Army of Italy. In the second half of 1800 Moreau advanced in Germany and won a considerable victory at Hohenlinden (3 December); Macdonald invaded the Tyrol from Switzerland, and the Army of Italy both held off the Neapolitan army and advanced towards the Julian Alps, pushing the Austrians before them. On 25 December 1800 the emperor sued for peace, concluded on 9 February 1801 by the Treaty of Lunéville. Bonaparte profited greatly from this successful conclusion: in August 1802 he was proclaimed Consul for life, only a short step from his coronation in December 1804 as Napoleon I, Emperor of the French. Lucky he may have been; but his rise to supreme power was founded upon his undoubted military genius, and the expression it found in the campaigns in Italy.

The later campaigns

Napoleon’s disregard for the conditions of the Treaty of Lunéville, which guaranteed the independence of the Ligurian and Cisalpine (from 1802 renamed the Italian) Republics, led to the creation in 1805 of the Kingdom of Italy; of this Napoleon made himself sovereign, crowning himself in Milan Cathedral with the ancient iron crown of Lombardy. Although he never again campaigned in Italy, there was considerable military action there during the Napoleonic Wars.

In 1805, as part of Napoleon’s strategy against
The battle of Rivoli: Bonaparte remounts after losing his horse. In the background is the Osteria Gorge. (Print after H.E.F. Philippoteaux)

Rivoli: Hungarian infantry lay down their arms in surrender. (Engraving after Horace Vernet)

Austria, Massena drove the Archduke Charles across the Julian Alps, including a second battle at Caldiero (30 October), won by Massena. After Austerlitz the Kingdom of Italy’s borders were extended by the acquisition of part of Venezia, Istria and Dalmatia, and its southern border extended to those of the Kingdom of Naples after the annexation of the Papal States in 1809. A French army drove the Neapolitans to Sicily and in early 1806 a new Kingdom of Naples was established under the reign of Joseph Bonaparte and, from 1808, Murat; unrest continued, including a British expedition to Calabria which defeated a French army at Maida (6 July 1806).

In the war of 1809 Napoleon’s stepson, Eugène de Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, ejected an Austrian invasion of the Kingdom of Italy and marched on to join Napoleon for the decisive campaign of Wagram. Italian and Neapolitan troops participated in large numbers in Napoleon’s later campaigns, notably against Russia in 1812 and in the Peninsular War. Eugène again defended Italy during the winter of 1813–14, until Napoleon’s abdication resulted in the extinction of the Kingdom of Italy; and in 1815 Murat’s attempted support of Napoleon ended with his defeat at Tolentino (3 May), the loss of his throne and ultimately his life. To a considerable extent, the collapse of Napoleon’s empire was followed by a restoration of the old order throughout Italy.

THE PLATES

Note: much information on the organisation and uniforms of the armies which participated in the Italian campaigns may be found in previous titles of the Men-at-Arms series, including nos.: 88 Napoleon’s Italian and Neapolitan Troops, 141 Napoleon’s Line Infantry, 146 Napoleon’s Light Infantry, 153 Napoleon’s Guard Infantry (1), 176 Austrian Army (1) Infantry, 181 Austrian Army (2) Cavalry, 199
Napoleon’s Specialist Troops, and 223 Austrian Specialist Troops.

A1: General Bonaparte, 1796
Based on Gros’ picture of Bonaparte at Arcola, the staff uniform shown is that established by regulations of 30 January 1796. The single-breasted coat had a red stand-and-fall collar, red cuffs with white flaps, and gold oak-leaf embroidery which varied in quantity according to rank. A général de division had embroidery on the collar, cuffs and pockets, a tricolour plume over a red panache on the hat, and a red sash with tricolour fringe; a général de brigade, a single line of embroidery in the same places, a tricolour plume and panache and a sky blue sash with tricolour fringe; and a général en chef (as here) had embroidery on the front and rear openings of the coat as well as on the collar, cuffs and pockets, a red plume over tricolour panache, and red and white sash with gold fringe. Regulations of 7 August 1798 introduced a similar but double-breasted coat.

A2: France: Line fusilier, 1796
A number of contemporary illustrations depict the wretched state of campaign uniforms at this period, in both Italy and Germany, the rigours of campaigning compounding chronic shortages. The coat of line demi-brigades from 1793 was dark blue with scarlet collar and cuffs piped white; white lapels, turnbacks and cuff flaps piped red; red pocket-piping, and brass buttons. Numerous cuff designs existed, including red or blue flaps or (as here) the 1786-style flapless cuff with piped opening. Blue shoulder straps, piped red, were decreed for fusiliers, but red epaulettes (officially the mark of grenadiers) were worn indiscriminately. The 1791 ‘Tarleton’ type leather helmet had a fur or imitation fur crest and imitation fur turban; on the left side it usually bore a tricolour cockade, and often plumes for full dress or woollen pompons; it was not popular, and the bicorn was often worn instead. The regulation white waistcoat and breeches with gaiters were usually replaced either by loose trousers or any civilian small clothes which could be acquired; shoes were in such short supply that many men went barefoot.

A3: France: Light infantry carabinier, 1796
Carabiniers were the light infantry equivalent of line grenadier companies, but the bicorn illustrated was worn by all infantry, with a tricolour plume; the grenadiers’ drooping red plume was popular with all troops. Light infantry coats were distinguished by dark blue pointed lapels and white piping; blue waistcoats and breeches were common. Apparently

Bonaparte promised his troops ‘the most fertile plains in the world. Wealthy provinces, large towns will be in our power; and there you will acquire riches, honour and glory.’
This engraving after Horace Vernet depicts a favourite recreation of the French in Italy.
cartridge box belt, the combined frog on the sabre belt being prohibited officially in 1791 in order to regularise the ‘fix-bayonets’ drill; but this order appears never to have been obeyed universally, and the combined sabre and bayonet frog was reintroduced officially in October 1801.

B1: France: Grenadier, 1796

The grenadiers’ distinctive fur cap generally had a cloth rear patch of quartered red and blue, or red, bearing a white lace cross; and an embossed brass plate, of which many varieties existed, some bearing simply a grenade and others including scrolls bearing patriotic mottoes or unit titles. There were elaborate regimental patterns, like that of the 97th Demi-brigade, which bore a grenade over ‘97 within an oval inscribed REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE/VERTUS GUERRIERES, backed by a trophy of arms and surmounted by a ‘bonnet of liberty’. Red or white cords, and usually a red or sometimes tricolour plume, were worn for ‘dress’, although on campaign the bicorn with a red plume was popular. This figure wears one of the commonest styles of legwear, loose trousers with red and/or blue stripes, generally vertical but sometimes depicted with the stripes horizontal or diagonal.

B2: France: Light infantry carabinier, 1796

Light infantry frequently used light cavalry style items of uniform; most notably this figure, based upon a contemporary depiction, includes a mirliton cap with a red ‘wing’ and cords. The coat has the distinctively-shaped light infantry lapels and pointed cuffs, both features continuing in use when light infantry adopted short-tailed coatees from around the turn of the century, at which time peaked shakos began to be worn.

B3: Infantry private, Lombard-Cisalpine Legion, 1797

A precursor of the army of the Cisalpine Republic, the Legione Lombarda was a regular corps formed by Bonaparte in 1796, previous Italian republican units

Bonaparte salutes the 30th, 43rd, and 66th Demi-brigades at a parade prior to the departure of the Army of Reserve for Italy in 1800; all three units fought at Marengo. (Engraving after Horace Vernet)
having been in the style of national guards. Its uniform was specified in October 1796; the infantry wore the costume depicted, the Italian republican colours of red, white and green being copied from the red, white and blue of France. The ‘Corsican hat’ with upturned left brim bore a metal plate inscribed VIVA/LA LIBERTA; an alternative version was described as LIBERTA ITALIANA. Officers had French-style rank distinctions, including gold epaulettes. An alternative uniform recorded early in the unit’s existence was of French light infantry cut, in green with red collar, cuffs and turnbacks; green lapels, waistcoat and breeches, and white piping and cuff flaps; with the brass hat plate worn on the front of the crown of a bicorn with the front flap lowered (or a Corsican hat with upturned rear brim). The artillery of the Lombard Legion wore the same with black facings, and the cavalry a dark green dolman and breeches with white lace, and a shako with white trim and the white/red/green plume illustrated.

**C1: France: Trooper, 2nd Cavalry, 1800**

The French heavy cavalry wore a bicorn and a blue coat with flapped cuffs. The regiment depicted was part of Kellermann’s brigade, which executed the vital charge at Marengo; uniform distinctions were those existing in 1791, and for the Marengo regiments were as follows: 2nd, scarlet cuffs, lapels and turnbacks; 3rd, scarlet collar, cuff flaps, lapels and turnbacks; 5th, scarlet cuffs, lapels and turnbacks; 20th, pink cuffs, lapels and turnbacks; 21st, pink collar, cuff-flaps, lapels and turnbacks. Pockets were vertical for the 5th and horizontal for the remainder; the facing-colour was also present in the edging to the sheepskin saddle cover and at the top of the black plume.

The number of heavy cavalry regiments had been increased to 29 in February 1793, but with the emigration of the 15th in June 1793 the succeeding regiments were renumbered, and the number reduced to 25 in September 1799. The first twelve regiments were converted to cuirassiers in 1803.
C2: France: Trooper, 8th Dragoons, 1800
Dragoon uniform included a brass helmet with brown fur turban and horsehair mane; a feather plume worn in full dress was often black or green with facing-coloured tip, though other regimental variations are recorded. Campaign variations included the use of a single-breasted green surtout instead of the lapelled coat; overalls; and the conversion of the waist belt into a second shoulder belt, worn over the right shoulder. The 8th was one of the Marengo regiments; uniform distinctions for the regiments engaged in that battle were: 1st, scarlet collar, lapels, turnbacks, cuffs and flaps; 6th, scarlet collar, lapels, turnbacks and cuff flaps; 8th, crimson cuffs, lapels and turnbacks; 9th, crimson collar, lapels, turnbacks and cuff flaps; vertical pockets for the 6th and horizontal for the remainder. The straight-bladed sabre of An IV pattern had a hilt shaped like that of the earlier heavy cavalry pattern, but for the elimination of the royal fleur-de-lis device; it was suspended on slings, but the bayonet was carried from a frog on the waist belt. The dragoon musket was slightly shorter than the infantry pattern; horse furniture was like that of the heavy cavalry, but green.

C3: France: Gunner, Foot Artillery, 1800
The artillerie à pied wore infantry-style uniform in dark blue with red piping and turnbacks and brass buttons. This campaign variation, taken in part from a uniform seen in Switzerland in 1800, includes a hat with red lace ‘ties’ and drooping plume (a red tuft was more usual); and instead of the regulation dark blue waistcoat and breeches and black long gaiters, the man has removed his waistcoat, and wears short gaiters and apparently civilian breeches. Equipment was similar to that of the infantry, but sometimes included the 1771 pattern artillery ‘glaive’, a sword with wide, straight blade and a brass, eagle-headed, guardless hilt; the ordinary infantry sabre was also used, with a red knot.

D1: France: Captain, light infantry, 1800
This depicts a typical light infantry uniform; line officers wore a similar costume, with line-pattern coat. The tricolour plume was common at this period; officers’ ‘metal’ was usually silver for light regiments, although some had gold like the line infantry. Officers wore two epaulettes: colonel, with bullion fringes; chef de bataillon (battalion commander) with bullion fringe on left only; captain, lace fringe on left only; lieutenant, as captain but with a red stripe on the strap; sous-lieutenant, as captain but two red stripes, sometimes in the form of interlocking diamonds. Sabres were generally carried by light infantry and grenadiers, straight-bladed épées being common for the remainder.

D2: France: Sergeant-major, 30th Demi-brigade, 1800
This shows a typical campaign uniform, with loose
Phrygian cap (‘bonnet of liberty’) and surrounded by a wreath in proper colours. The regimental number was borne four times in gold on each side, with white labels above and below the fasces, inscribed in gold REPUBLIQUE/FRANCAISE on one face, and DISCIPLINE ET SOUMISSION/AUX LOIS MILITAIRES on the other. These regimental patterns were regulated in 1794 and remained in use until 1804; but a special design was carried by units of the Army of Italy 1797–98, initiated by Bonaparte and including battle honours. The unit shown was part of Boudet’s brigade at Marengo, and took part in Desaix’s counter-attack.

D3: France: Corporal, Consular Guard Grenadiers, 1800

The Garde des Consuls was established in November 1799, although Napoleon’s Imperial Guard, which it became, took 2 December 1799 as its date of creation, and the official decree specifying its organisation was issued on 3 January 1800. Initially it comprised two grenadier battalions and a light infantry company, a company of chasseurs à cheval, two squadrons of grenadiers à cheval and a company of light artillery. It was from the beginning an exclusive corps, composed only of veterans of three campaigns, aged not less than 25, of robust constitution and exemplary conduct. The Consular Guard won its reputation at Marengo, when it advanced as if on parade, band playing, resembling a ‘granite fortress’. Its distinctive grenadier uniform, continued when it became the Imperial Guard (1804), was probably worn only from about 1801. In the 1800 campaign it probably used that of the previous Garde du Directoire (formed in 1796), similar to that of line regiments, including fur cap with red plume and cords, coat with red collar, cuffs and epaulettes, and white lapels, skirt lining and turnbacks (bearing red grenades). The man illustrated is wearing the long infantry gaiters, and the corporal’s rank insignia of two orange bars above the cuff.

E1: Austria: Grenadier, Regiment Belgiojoso, 1796

Austrian infantry uniform included a single-breasted white or off-white coat with turndown collar, cuffs and large turnbacks in the regimental facing colour, with white breeches and black long gaiters for
'German' regiments. Hungarian regiments had pointed cuffs with a fringed lace loop, and light blue braided pantaloons and laced ankle boots (see Plate H). The fur grenadier cap had a brass plate and a cloth rear generally of the facing colour with wavy white lace decoration, but with no peak at this period; other grenadier distinctions were a brass match-case on the shoulder belt and a grenade on the cartridge box flap.

It was usual for each regiment's two grenadier companies to be detached on campaign, and combined with others to form élite grenadier battalions. Units were generally known by the name of their Inhaber or colonel-proprietor (hence changes of title when new colonels were appointed), and also by a number; No.44, whose colonel from 1778 to 1796 was Graf Belgiojoso von Barbiano, is illustrated to represent one of the Austrian army's Italian regiments, recruited from the empire's Italian possessions, with its depot at Cremona. Following the loss of its Lombardy recruiting grounds its depot was relocated.

**Ez: Austria: Fusilier, Regiment Kheul, 1796**

The ordinary infantry (fusiliers) wore a squat, false-fronted leather cap (*Casquet*), bearing a brass plate struck with a crowned double eagle, and the imperial

---

*Massena negotiates the surrender at Genoa; the dark-uniformed figure in the Austrian delegation (right) appears to represent an officer from the British fleet. (Print after F. de Myrbach)*

*Louis Charles Antoine Desaix: 'esteemed by the French soldiers, honoured by the Austrians, and loved by all who knew him'*

according to the British Monthly Review in 1804. (Engraving by R.G. Tietze after J. Guerin)
yellow pompon with black centre; on campaign a green sprig was often worn in the head-dress, the feldzeichen, a relic of the 'field signs' of the 17th century. Equipment comprised a cartridge box (the flap bearing a plate similar to that on the cap) on a shoulder belt, a hide knapsack slung over the right shoulder, a waist belt supporting a combined sabre and bayonet frog, and an ovoid metal canteen with fabric cover (metal flasks were also used). Grenadiers’ sabres had a knucklebow and white leather knot; fusiliers’ sabres had only quillons and no guard. Regiment No.10 (Kheul) was recruited in Bohemia, with depot at Budweis.

E3: Austria: Fusilier drummer, Regiment Terzi, 1796

Drummers wore the ordinary uniform with the addition of scalloped-edged white lace on facings and on facing-coloured wings, which also bore a lace rosette; they carried the knapsack over the left shoulder, presumably to facilitate the suspension of the drum belt over the right. Regiment No.16 (Terzi) was recruited in Styria, with depot at Graz, and was one of those which fought at Lodi.

F1: Austria: General Officer, 1800

This figure, after Ottenfeld, shows an old-style coat with falling collar, not the standing collar generally adopted from 1798. General officers' uniform was white with red facings and breeches and gold lace with a marked zigzag weave; the hat bore the green plume of staff appointment. Generals of Hungarian cavalry wore red hussar uniform; General-Adjutants and Flügel-Adjutants had green infantry-style coats with red facings and gilt or silver buttons respectively; and members of the Generalquartiermeister staff wore green with black facings and gold lace. The gold and black sash was a universal symbol of commissioned rank.

F2: Austria: NCO, Artillery, 1800

Artillery uniform was styled like that of the infantry, with coats of medium to red-brown with red facings and yellow buttons. This Feldwebel (senior NCO) has the standing collar authorised for infantry in 1798, with rank distinguished by the silver hat lace, the yellow and black sword knot, and the cane, which when not carried could be suspended from a coat button, sometimes held in place by a loop on the shoulder belt. Although the artillery was authorised to wear the 1798 helmet with a red crest and a plate bearing a horizontal cannon barrel, the earlier 'Corsican hat' (Corschet) seems to have remained in use, and was re-authorised in 1803 when the helmet was discontinued. The version shown is based partly on an illustration by J.B. Seele, c.1799–1800; for the rank and file it is often shown with the upturned brim at the rear, displaying the cockade at the back; the national black over yellow plume carried above the cockade would not have been practical on campaign and was probably removed.

F3: Austria: Private, Light Battalion Bach, 1800

In 1798 fifteen regular light battalions were formed
from personnel of the Frei-Corps which had previously provided the army’s light infantry: five light battalions were designated as Italian, five Hungarian, two Slavonian, two Galician and one Croatian. They wore the 1798 helmet with a brass cypher ‘F.II’ instead of a plate, a ‘pike-grey’ coat with coloured facings, ‘German’ legwear (as illustrated) for the Italian regiments and Hungarian breeches for the remainder. Battalion No.4 (Bach), which served with No.3 (Am Ende) at Marengo, was ‘Italian’, and wore brick red facings and white buttons (Am Ende the same with yellow buttons); both had been formed from the former Grün-Laudon Frei-Corps.

G1: Austria: Trooper, Mounted Jägers, 1800
The Mounted Rifles (Jäger zu Pferd) Regiment ‘Bussy’ was formed in 1798 from the mounted elements of various Frei-Corps, and was present at Marengo as part of the advance guard. Its 1798 dragoon-style uniform was pike-grey with green facings and helmet crest, and black leather equipment; officers had a similar uniform but with the emperor’s cypher on the helmet, and a black over gold crest for field ranks. The unit was armed with the very short light cavalry carbine and dragoon sabre. Horse furniture for all cavalry was red, with yellow and black lace and cypher, the hussar shabraque having more pointed rear corners than that of dragoons. The saddle cover was generally of black sheepskin for hussars and officers and white for others, but this distinction in colours is not always confirmed by contemporary pictures.

G2: Austria: Trooper, Light Dragoon Regiment Lobkowitz, 1800
The 1798 reforms merged the medium cavalry (dragoons and chevauxlegers) into a single list of 15 Light Dragoon regiments, which were separated again after the Treaty of Lunéville. The 1798 cavalry uniform replaced the previous white uniform and bicorn of dragoon regiments with the 1798 leather helmet and a green coat, here with the light blue facings and white buttons of Regiment No.10 (Lobkowitz), which fought at Marengo in Ott’s column, including a conflict with the Consular Guard. Grey overalls with buttons on the outer seam were used by all cavalry on campaign, in place of the ordinary white breeches and black knee boots. The sabre was the heavy-bladed pattern originating in 1775. Light Dragoons were armed with the longer dragoon carbine, its ramrod carried on a strap attached to the pouch belt; a second shoulder belt supported the swivel to which the carbine could be attached. Other regiments serving at Marengo included Regiments No.1 (Kaiser; poppy red facings, yellow buttons), 4 (Karaczay; poppy red facings, white buttons) and 8 (Württemberg; ‘gris de lin’ facings, yellow buttons).

G3: Austria: Wachtmeister, Hussar Regiment Liechtenstein, 1800
Prior to 1798 hussars wore a peakless hussar cap, but from that date the headdress evolved into a true shako, shown here with the upper lace band of NCO rank. For each regiment the dolman and pelisse were of matching colour; the yellow and black braid on
these garments, the breeches and cap cords were universal; and all used the yellow and black barrelled sash, and sabretache with a red face edged with yellow and black lace and braid and bearing the emperor’s crowned cypher. Regiment No.7 (Liechtenstein) was part of the main column at Marengo; its regimental distinctions included a grass green shako; light blue dolman, pelisse and breeches; and white buttons. Examples of hussar uniform of other Marengo regiments are: No.5, bright red shako, dark green dolman and pelisse, carmine breeches, white buttons; No.8, black shako, ‘parrot green’ dolman and pelisse, poppy red breeches, yellow buttons; No.9, as No.8 but with dark green dolman and pelisse and carmine breeches. The gilt-mounted sabre carried by the sergeant (Wachtmeister) illustrated was a distinction of NCO rank, like the cane and yellow and black sword knot; other ranks had red-brown knots and sabres with plain steel hilt and scabbard. Grey overalls could be worn on campaign, and the rank and file carried a carbine belt.

H1: Austria: Officer, Regiment Splényi, 1800
The uniform designed in 1798 included a large black leather helmet with a comb supporting a black over yellow woollen crest (silk for company officers, black and gold cord for field ranks) and a plate bearing the emperor’s cypher ‘F.II’; officers’ helmets were more ornate than those of other ranks and included a gilt comb. Officers’ coats were long tailed, generally without turnbacks; a metallic lace cuff edging for field officers was the only rank distinction. Officers of ‘German’ regiments had white breeches, knee boots, and round cuffs; ‘Hungarians’ had light blue breeches with metallic lace decoration, Hessian boots, and pointed cuffs with tasselled lace loop (styled barentatzen or ‘bear’s paw’). The waist belt was white leather (black with gold lace stripes for field ranks); ‘German’ officers were armed with a straight-bladed épée (Degen); grenadiers and Hungarians carried curved sabres. Grenadier officers wore the fur cap, to which a peak was added about 1806–05, though peakless caps are depicted at least as late as 1806. Regiment No.51 (Splényi) was a Transylvanian (and thus ‘Hungarian’) corps, with dark blue facings and yellow buttons; at Marengo it formed part of Ott’s column.

H2: Austria: Fusilier, Regiment Johann Jellačić, 1800
The other ranks’ 1798 uniform included a jacket with standing collar, skirts less voluminous than before, and straps on both shoulders. This shows the other ranks’ version of the 1798 helmet, with leather chinstrap in place of the chains of the officers; and the distinctive Hungarian pantaloons. Also worn with the earlier uniform, these were sometimes depicted as a dark shade, but were usually medium to light blue, with mixed black and yellow braid on the outer seam and in small knots on the front of the thighs. Regiment Johann Jellačić, No.53, was Slavonian (thus ‘Hungarian’), with dark red facings and white buttons; at Marengo it fought as part of Bellegarde’s brigade of the main column. It should not be confused with Regiment Franz Jellačić, No.62, formed 1802.

H3: Austria: Fusilier NCO, Regiment Hohenlohe, 1800
This illustrates the ‘German’ version of the 1798 uniform, with round cuffs, white breeches and black

The 1794 regulation colour carried by 2nd Bns. of French line Demi-brigades: white, blue (solid colour) and red (shaded), with tricoloured bonnet, fasces and wreath in proper colours, and lettering on white labels; inscription on reverse reads ‘Discipline et Soumission/aux Loix Militaires’. The white squares bore the unit-number.
The French 1794 regulation colours of 1st and 3rd Bns. of line Demi-brigades exemplified by those of units which fought at Marengo: all were white, blue (solid colour) and red (shaded), bearing in the centre the fasces and inscriptions as for 2nd Bn. flags. The unit number was repeated four times on each side, on edges or corners, on white or coloured squares. Left to right: top, 22nd, 28th, 30th, 40th, and 43rd Demi-brigades; middle, 44th, 50th, 70th, 72nd; bottom, 96th, 101st, 102nd, and the 'Army of Italy' design which had battle-honours added, carried 1797–98 by units in Italy. The flags of the 43rd, 44th and 70th above are known minor variations on the regulation design.

gaiters, the latter shortened in 1798 so as no longer to cover the knee. The knapsack was now carried on the back by shoulder straps; and the sabre was withdrawn from all except grenadiers, NCOs and musicians. NCOs were distinguished by yellow and black sword knots (in camel hair, and associated with gilded hilts for the so-called Prima Plana ranks – Feldwebel (sergeant) and Fourier); leather gloves; and a cane, normally suspended from a coat button and fitting through a loop in the shoulder belt. Corporals had the same, but with woollen sword knots and ordinary grenadier sabres. The canes were ‘Spanish reed’ for Prima Plana ranks and hazel for corporals. Regiment No.17 (Hohenlohe) had light brown facings and white buttons; at Marengo it served with Ott.

Sources

Virtually any ‘general’ history of Napoleon or his times includes material relative to the Italian campaigns. Specific campaign histories include Napoleon in Italy 1797–98, E.Adlow, Boston 1948; and The Campaign of Marengo and Napoleon Bonaparte's First Campaign, both H.H.Sargent, Chicago 1897 and 1912 respectively. The Campaigns of Napoleon, D.G.Chandler, London 1967, remains the most valuable modern study on events and on Napoleon’s methods of war, and contains much on the Italian campaigns; the same author’s Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars, London 1979, is an admirable companion. The best maps, with excellent commentary, are in A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, V.J.Esposito and J.R.Elting, London 1964. In addition to the Men at Arms titles already listed, much relevant uniform information concerning the Italian states may be found in Uniformi Militari Italiane del Settecento, and Uniformi Militari Italiane dell'Ottocento: periodo Napoleonico, both by M.Brandani, P.Crociani and M.Fiorentino, Rome 1976 and 1978 respectively. For a detailed list of sources on Italy during the Napoleonic Wars, including Napoleon’s campaigns, see Robert Epstein’s essay and bibliography in Napoleonic Military History: A Bibliography, ed. D.D.Horward, London 1986.
Notes sur les planches en couleur

A1 D’après la peinture de Gros figurant Napoléon à Arcola; uniforme réglementaire du Général en Chef en janvier 1796. A2 Les manteaux d’ordonnance de 1793 ont des styles de manchettes différents; les fusiliers portent des bretelles bleues à ganses rouges, mais les grenadiers portent librement les épaulettes rouges; les képis bicornes sont plus larges et ils ont des manchettes à la pointe. Les manteaux d’ordonnance en cuir de 1791. Les pantalons larges remplacent souvent les hauts-de-chausses blancs réglementaires; par très mauvais temps, les soldats sont souvent déguiénels et pieds-nus. A3 Les revers bleus pointus et la gaine blanche sont la marque des manteaux de l’infanterie légère; ils ont des manchettes en double filet rouge et bleu coiffées de la lanière large garnie de boutons. Les commandants, grenadiers et les musiciens sont les seuls en principe à porter les sabres, mais on en voit souvent, en vérité.


C1 On voit ici l’uniforme d’ordonnance de 1791 porté par un régiment de la brigade de Kellermann qui a assisté à la grande charge à Marengo. On peut distinguer entre les régiments grâce aux manchettes écarlates, les revers et la trame du manteau. C2 Au cœur des manchettes, l’insigne "pourtour" rectangulaire du manteau réglementaire à revers; on porte aussi souvent les boucles et la ceinture de taille comme lanière à l’épaule droite. Ce régiment de Marengo porte aussi les revers écarlates. C3 Style d’uniforme d’infanterie bleu à ganses rouges; les hauts-de-chausses civils et les nattes de courtiers sont des variations personnelles, voir l’exemple de la Suisse en 1800.

D1 L’infanterie de la ligne porte souvent des uniformes semblables mais avec le motif d’infanterie de la ligne. Les officiers de l’infanterie légère portent d’habitude les distinctions en argent au lieu de doré; tous les officiers portent les épaulettes en or sur le corps, et ils ont aussi le caractéristique de l’infanterie légère; ils ont les manchettes d’un revers à l’arrière. Les officiers portent des pièces épaisses. D2 Uniforme de campagne typique. On ne trouve pas de règle de distribution des couleurs sur les pompons qui distinguent la compagnie à l’intérieur du bataillon. Les drapeaux de la tranchée et de la trêve sont des uniformes qui varient avec le temps, le motif étant daté de 1794-1804 mais l’Armée d’Italie porte un motif spécial avec les étoiles de bataille qui date de 1797. Cette unité est s’attaquée à Marengo pour la bataille de Boudet. D3 La Garde datant de novembre 1796 se distingue à Marengo. L’uniforme est du type porté par l’ancienne Garde du Directoire. C’était dès le début un corps élite formé de volontaires choisis des trois campagnes.

E1 Régiment d’origine italienne; toutes les unités sauf les hongrois portent cet uniforme style allemand. Le col, les manchettes et la trame du manteau au revers régimental comme sur l’arrière de la casquette en fourrure. C’est l’unité no.44; les noms changent suivant les colonels. E2 Le Régiment no.10 originaire de Bohême; les fusiliers ordinaires portent cette casquette en cuir et un sabre plus simple que celui des grenadiers. E3 On identifie les joueurs de tambour par les ‘ailles’ en couleur du revers et la dentelle à festons. Ce régiment no.16 s’est battu à Lodi.

F1 On utilise encore le manteau qui date d’avant 1778; tous les officiers portent les écharpes dorées et noires. F2 Les soldats d’artillerie portent les manteaux style infanterie légère, mais les cuirassiers portent des gants blancs et une casquette de lourd cuir. Les drapeaux de la tranchée et de la trêve sont des uniformes qui varient avec le temps, le motif étant daté de 1794-1804 mais l’Armée d’Italie porte un motif spécial avec les étoiles de bataille qui date de 1797. Cette unité est s’attaquée à Marengo pour la bataille de Boudet. D3 La Garde datant de novembre 1796 se distingue à Marengo. L’uniforme est du type porté par l’ancienne Garde du Directoire. C’était dès le début un corps élite formé de volontaires choisis des trois campagnes.

G1 Formé en 1798 à partir des soldats Freicorps, ce régiment Bussy porte l’uniforme gris à revers vert style dragon; les shabraques dans tous les régiments de cavalerie sont rouges avec de la dentelle jaune et noire. G2 Les revers régimentaires bleu-clair distinguent le régiment no.10 qui s’est battu à Marengo contre la Garde Consulaire. En forme, il s’agit d’un nouveau régiment légers ‘dragon’ à partir de toutes les unités de cavalerie moyennes, ils portent les casques en cuir et les manteaux verts de 1798. G3 Shako de 1800, illustré ici avec la dentelle du commandant; le régiment no.7 porte les shakos verts et l’uniforme bleu-clair – d’autres unités portant des couleurs différentes. A noter le sabre à doreur avec le noeud jaune et noir.

H1 Uniforme de style ‘hongrois’ pour l’infanterie; a noter le détail sur les manchettes et hauts-de-chausses. Les officiers portent les manteaux à longue traîne, mais le rang est seulement marqué s’il s’agit d’un officier supérieur par la bordure à dentelle métallique sur le revers. C’est réglementaire. Ce régiment, no.17, s’est battu à Marengo dans la colonne d’Otto. H2 Uniforme équivalent pour les soldats normaux; cette unité s’est battue faisant partie de la brigade de Bellegarde. H3 Uniforme d’infanterie ‘Allemande’ de 1798 avec les distinctions du commandant et les revers marron-clair du régiment no.17; ils se sont battus sous Otto à Marengo. A noter: la nouvelle position du sac à dos (voir E2).
Continued from back cover

211 Nap’s Overseas Army
227 Nap’s Sea Soldiers
88 Italian Troops
176 Austrian Army (1): Infantry
181 Austrian Army (2): Cavalry
223 Austrian Specialist Troops
152 Prussian Line Infantry
149 Prussian Light Infantry
192 Prussian Reserve & Irregulars
162 Prussian Cavalry 1792-1807
172 Prussian Cavalry 1807-15
185 Russian Army (1): Infantry
189 Russian Army (2): Cavalry
84 Wellington’s Generals
114 Wellington’s Infantry (1)
119 Wellington’s Infantry (2)
253 Wellington’s Highlanders
126 Wellington’s Light Cavalry
130 Wellington’s Heavy Cavalry
204 Wellington’s Specialist Troops
167 Brunswick Troops 1809-15
98 Dutch-Belgian Troops
206 Hanoverian Army 1792-1816
226 The American War 1812-14
96 Artillery Equipments
77 Flags of the Nap Wars (1)
78 Flags of the Nap Wars (2)
115 Flags of the Nap Wars (3)

19TH CENTURY
232 Bolivar and San Martin
173 Alamo & Texan War 1835-6
56 Mexican-American War 1846-8
63 American-Indian Wars 1860-90
170 American Civil War Armies:
(1) Confederate
177 (2) Union
179 (3) Staff, Specialists, Maritime
190 (4) State Troops
207 (5) Volunteer Militia
37 Army of Northern Virginia
38 Army of the Potomac
252 Flags of the American Civil War (1)
Confederate
258 Flags of the American Civil War (2)
Union
163 American Plains Indians
186 The Apaches
168 US Cavalry 1850-90
241 Russian Army of the Crimean War
193 British Army on Campaign:
(1) 1816-1853
196 (2) The Crimea, 1854-56
198 (3) 1857-81
201 (4) 1882-1902
212 Victoria’s Enemies
(1) Southern Africa
215 (2) Northern Africa
219 (3) India
224 (4) Asia
249 Canadian Campaigns 1860-70
67 The Indian Mutiny
91 Bengal Cavalry Regiments
92 Indian Infantry Regiments
233 French Army 1870-71 (1)
237 French Army 1870-71 (2)
57 The Zulu War
59 Sudan Campaigns 1881-98
230 US Army 1890-1920
95 The Boxer Rebellion

THE WORLD WARS
80 The German Army 1914-18
81 The British Army 1914-18
245 British Territorial Units 1914-18
208 Lawrence and the Arab Revolts

182 British Battle Insignia
(1) 1914-18
187 (2) 1939-45
74 The Spanish Civil War
117 The Polish Army 1939-45
112 British Battledress 1937-61
120 Allied Commanders of WW2
225 The Royal Air Force
70 US Army 1941-45
216 The Red Army 1941-45
246 The Romanian Army
220 US Army 1941-45
24 The Panzer Divisions
34 The Waffen-SS
229 Luftwaffe Field Divisions
124 German Commanders of WW2
213 German MP Units
139 German Airborne Troops
131 Germany’s E. Front Allies
103 Germany’s Spanish Volunteers
147 Wehrmacht Foreign Volunteers
254 Wehrmacht Auxiliary Forces
238 Allied Foreign Volunteers
142 Partisan Warfare 1941-45
169 Resistance Warfare 1940-45

MODERN WARFARE
132 Malayan Campaign 1948-60
174 The Korean War 1950-53
116 The Special Air Service
156 The Royal Marines 1956-84
133 Battle for the Falklands
(1): Land Forces
134 (2): Naval Forces
135 (3): Air Forces
255 Argentine Forces in the Falklands
127 Israeli Army 1948-73
128 Arab Armies 1948-73
194 Arab Armies (2): 1973-88
165 Armies in Lebanon 1982-84
104 Vietnam War Armies 1962-75
143 Vietnam War Armies (2)
209 War in Cambodia 1970-75
217 War in Laos 1960-75
183 Modern African Wars:
(1) Rhodesia 1963-80
202 (2) Angola & Mozambique
242 (3) South-West Africa
159 Grenada 1983
178 Russia’s War in Afghanistan
221 Central American Wars

GENERAL
65 The Royal Navy
107 British Infantry Equip., (1)
108 British Infantry Equip., (2)
138 British Cavalry Equipments.
72 The Northwest Frontier
214 US Infantry Equipments.
205 US Army Combat Equipments.
234 German Combat Equipments.
157 Flak Jackets
123 Australian Army 1899-1975
164 Canadian Army at War
161 Spanish Foreign Legion
197 Royal Canadian Mounted Police
An unrivalled source of information on the uniforms, insignia and appearance of the world’s fighting men of past and present. The *Men-at-Arms* titles cover subjects as diverse as the Imperial Roman army, the Napoleonic wars and German airborne troops in a popular 48-page format including some 40 photographs and diagrams, and eight full-colour plates.

**COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY**

**ELITE**
Detailed information on the uniforms and insignia of the world’s most famous military forces. Each 64-page book contains some 50 photographs and diagrams, and 12 pages of full-colour artwork.

**WARRIOR**
Definitive analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation of the fighting men of history. Each 64-page book contains cutaways and exploded artwork of the warrior’s weapons and armour.

**NEW VANGUARD**
Comprehensive histories of the design, development and operational use of the world’s armoured vehicles and artillery. Each 48-page book contains eight pages of full-colour artwork including a detailed cutaway of the vehicle’s interior.

**CAMPAIGN**
Concise, authoritative accounts of decisive encounters in military history. Each 96-page book contains more than 90 illustrations including maps, orders of battle and colour plates, plus a series of three-dimensional battle maps that mark the critical stages of the campaign.

---

**THE ANCIENT WORLD**

- **218** Ancient Chinese Armies
- **219** Ancient Middle East
- **220** The Scythians 700-300 B.C.
- **221** Greek & Persian Wars 500-323 B.C.
- **222** Army of Alexander the Great
- **223** Carthaginian Wars
- **224** Roman Army
  - (1) Caesar-Trajan
- **225** (2) Hadrian-Constantine
- **226** Rome’s Enemies:
  - (1): Germanics & Dacians
- **227** (2): Gallic & British Celts
- **228** (3): Parthians & Sassanids
- **229** (4): Spain 218-19 B.C.
- **230** (5): The Desert Frontier

**THE MEDIEVAL WORLD**

- **247** Romano-Byzantine Armies 4th-9th C
- **248** Arthur & Anglo-Saxon Wars
- **249** Armies of the Muslim Conquest
- **250** Armies of Islam, 7th-11th C
- **251** The Age of Charlemagne
- **252** Byzantine Armies 886-1118
- **253** Saxon, Viking & Norman
- **254** French Medieval Armies 1000-1300
- **255** Armies of the Crusades
- **256** Saladin & the Saracens
- **257** Knights of Christ
- **258** El Cid & Reconquista 1050-1492
- **259** The Mongols
- **260** The Age of Tamerlane
- **261** Medieval Chinese Armies
- **262** Medieval European Armies
- **263** Scots & Welsh Wars 1250-1400
- **264** The Swiss 1300-1500
- **265** Italian Armies 1300-1500
- **266** German Armies 1300-1500
- **267** Hungary & E. Europe 1000-1568
- **268** Ottoman Turks 1300-1774
- **269** Venetian Empire 1200-1670
- **270** Crete & Poitiers
- **271** Medieval Burgundy 1364-1477
- **272** Armies of Agincourt
- **273** Wars of the Roses
- **274** Medieval Heraldry

**16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES**

- **275** The Irish Wars 1485-1603
- **276** Henry VIII’s Armies
- **277** The Landsknechts
- **278** Aztec Armies
- **279** The Conquistadores
- **280** Gustavus Adolphus (1)
- **281** English Civil War Armies
- **282** New Model Army 1645-60
- **283** Louis XIV’s Army
- **284** Marlborough’s Army
- **285** Skirmish Armies 1500-1615
- **286** Polish Armies 1569-1696 (1)
- **287** Polish Armies 1569-1696 (2)

**18TH CENTURY**

- **288** Jacobite Rebellions
- **289** Frederick the Great (1)
- **290** Frederick the Great (2)
- **291** Frederick the Great (3)
- **292** Wolfe’s Army
- **293** American Woodland Indians
- **294** Brit. Army in N. America
- **295** French in Amer. War Ind.

**NAPOLEONIC PERIOD**

- **296** Napoleon’s Campaigns in Italy
- **297** Napoleon’s Egyptian Campaign
- **298** Napoleon’s Marshals
- **299** Nap’s Cuirassiers & Carabiniers
- **300** Nap’s Dragoons & Lancers
- **301** Nap’s Line Chasseurs
- **302** Nap’s Hussars
- **303** Nap’s Guard Cavalry
- **304** Nap’s Line Infantry
- **305** Nap’s Light Infantry
- **306** Nap’s Guard Infantry (1)
- **307** Nap’s Guard Infantry (2)
- **308** Nap’s German Allies (1)
- **309** Nap’s German Allies (2)
- **310** Nap’s German Allies (3)
- **311** Nap’s German Allies (4)
- **312** Nap’s German Allies (5)
- **313** Nap’s Specialist Troops

Title list continued on inside back cover

*Avec annotations en français sur les planches en couleur.*

*Mit Aufzeichnungen auf Deutsch über den Farbtafeln.*