ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS
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FOREWORD by Allan Mallinson

Who, in the end, defeated Napoleon Bonaparte? And what defeated him? This is a question that has kept historians busy and booksellers happy for the best part of two centuries.

Austria, dogged in rising from defeat again and again, deserves high praise. Prussia, after a beginning that would have reduced Frederick the Great to tears had he been alive, in the end recovered national self-respect and was there for the kill. Russia, with her ablest general, Winter, brought Bonaparte to a frozen halt in 1812, after which he was never the same man. But it is surely more than mere patriotism to stake the highest claim for Britain? Pitt’s and then Grenville’s continental coalition-building, the Royal Navy’s astounding feats, especially under Nelson, and Wellington’s relentless campaign in the Peninsula — these were the solid pillars of victory. For it was Bonaparte’s failure to invade these islands, or to strangle Britain economically, that thwarted his goal of mastery of Europe (if not the world) when every continental power lay prostrate at his feet. And it was the Peninsular War, the side-show, the mere running sore, that first exposed France’s weakness and tied down huge French armies, encouraging first Russia and then Austria and Prussia back into the war with the help of treasure won by the Royal Navy.

But Bonaparte was not to be beaten indirectly — at sea or on far-off islands that flew Le Drapeau Tricolore. As one historian has put it, “France, like Attila, did not fight on a book-keeping system. She could be reduced by a blow at Paris, but not at Port-au-Prince.” And here is the point: dazzling as was many an episode of the war at sea — to which the perennial popularity of books about Hornblower, Aubrey-Maturin, Bolitho and others attest — it was in the end the defeat of the Grande Armée that sent Bonaparte to Elba and then to St Helena, just as it was only defeat of the German army in 1945 that brought an end to Hitler. *Sic semper tyrannis!*

The “never-ending war”, as some of the less-than-enthusiastic Whigs called it, was an affair of two decades — more, if the pre-Imperial years are added — and during those two decades every nation in Europe was under arms at one time or another. Their armies had certain things in common — the flintlock musket, for example — and yet each was very different, and looked
very different. The nation’s army was a reflection of the nature of the state, and likewise the character of its soldiers. Even with his uniform in tatters, a grognard could not have passed for anything but a Frenchman. Nor could Tommy Atkins have been mistaken for a soldier from the Continent. Could “the scum of the earth, enlisted for drink”, as Wellington described his ranks of red, also have been, in his own words again, “that finest of all instruments, the British Infantry”? The Italian historian Alessandro Barbero, in his brilliant account of Waterloo – The Battle (2006) – explains: “However proletarian and semiliterate he may have been, the English soldier, well nourished with meat and beer, stimulated with gin, and convinced of his own racial superiority to the foreign rabble he had to face, was a magnificent combatant, as anyone who has ever seen hooligans in action at a soccer match can readily imagine.”

The exception to the rule was perhaps the Portuguese after their reorganization. Clothed in British wool, their weapons and equipment bought from British factories and their regiments frequently commanded by British officers, they fought indistinguishably from the rest of Wellington’s Peninsular army, and earned as much praise from the duke – and, indeed, their cavalry caused him as much exasperation.

How, then, were the armies of France and her principal adversaries – Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, Spain and Portugal – organized? What did they look like? What weapons did they carry? And what of the ‘extras’ in the cast of millions that was the tragedy of the Napoleonic Wars – Sweden and Denmark, Hanover, the Low Countries, the Italian states, Sicily and Sardinia, Poland, the wild Austrian marches of the Balkans, the multitudinous German states – and even that unlikely and unnecessary co-belligerent of Bonaparte’s, the United States of America? The whole is a glorious military tapestry, in turn woven and unpicked in this magnificent single volume.

It is, indeed, a stupendous undertaking. How were Belgian battalions incorporated into the Dutch army in 1814? Where on his uniform did a Danish officer display his rank? Were the Russian grenadiers still wearing ‘mitres’ at Austerlitz? Did the 1807 Regulations permit an Austrian feldwebel to beat a man with his hazelstock or Spanisches rohr? What were the two forms of skirmishing prescribed for British light infantry? These and countless questions like them are answered in brisk narrative or superb illustrations and captions.

And so, as Patrick O’Brian wrote in his foreword to Brian Lavery’s equally detailed Nelson’s Navy (1989), should the reader have an inclination to join the ranks of historical novelists he may reflect that genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains, and since these pains have already been taken for him – by Chris McNab and Osprey – all he needs to do is find a plot and to lay in a store of paper and ink.
INTRODUCTION

The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were a convulsion that gripped European governments and armies for over 20 years. From the year of the Revolution in 1789, to Napoleon’s second, and final, critical defeat at Waterloo in 1815, millions of the Continent’s men were dragged into active service through conscription or volunteering, while countless thousands of regular troops sought to add to their battalion or regimental battle honours in fresh engagements.

France’s *levée en masse* in 1793 undoubtedly changed the military landscape of 18th and 19th century Europe. It showed how not only all able-bodied men, but also an entire population, could be utilized to form a massive, if largely unprofessional, army. The words of the *levée en masse* embodied in the National Convention of 23 August 1793 gave clear indication of how the notion of ‘army’ was literally revolutionized:

> From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn linen into lint; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.

Such noble sentiments weren’t entirely fulfilled, but they did produce a simply massive land army. By September 1794, the French Army had risen to a total strength of 1.5 million troops (a practical field strength of 800,000). Although the army of the *levée en masse* was far from perfect, and would require much professional reordering and slimming down to make it truly effective, it showed a new way of thinking about armies, and the connections between the military establishment and national identity. Steadily, more European countries bought into the ideas of creating national armies via conscription and general mobilization, and set the scene for clashes of vast scale and cost.
The theatres of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars stretched from North Africa, through Italy and the Iberian Peninsula, across all of Western Europe and north into Scandinavia, through Eastern Europe and into, in 1812, the depths of Russia. As they did so, they brought with them military engagements that ranged from isolated skirmishes between outlying pickets, to full-scale battles involving tens of thousands of troops in massed formations. The armies that locked horns were an eclectic mix, ranging from the stoically professional through to the grandly incompetent. At one end of the scale, for example, we have the Spanish Army at the beginning of the Peninsular War in 1808, an army that suffered from such deficient standards of leadership and supply that it was, at first, 'more like an armed mob than regularly organized soldiers', as one British observer commented. It should be noted, however, that the Spanish Army was professionally transformed by a massive influx of
British arms, kit and training from around 1812, proving the point that ill-equipped armies generally have dragging morale, whereas those properly kitted out tend to step into battle with enhanced confidence and discipline. Moreover, those armies given to poor performances could often track their problems back to general national governance. The complexities of the conflict for Denmark and Sweden, for example, led both countries into financial rack and ruin between 1810 and 1815. Under such circumstances it is hard to maintain a field army at a high level of pride and talent, although even under dreadful circumstances their troops still managed to pull off some important local victories.

At the other end of the scale were, of course, major players such as the British, French, Austrian, Russian and Prussian armies. All these armies had their problems, but the attempted emphasis on proper training, effective command-and-control, regular drill and the maintenance of regimental or battalion reputation bore out in some degree of battlefield skill. Looking closely at such armies, we can also see the flowering of some of the tactical developments that would go on to inform the manoeuvre warfare of the 20th century. Commanders sought to make the best use of both mass and manoeuvre, seeking the decisive and elusive mix of movement, line and column, and of infantry musket firepower. Artillery was an increasingly critical ingredient, providing defensive attrition against attacking enemies but it was also, through horse mobility, able to deploy quickly to threatened flanks, both enemy and Allied. The cavalry played their age-old roles, with the heavy and medium cavalry (dragonos, Charge of the Scots Greys at Waterloo. In order to counter d’Erlon’s massed infantry attack, the Earl of Uxbridge launched two brigades of cavalry, including this distinguished regiment. On catching the French completely by surprise, the Greys inflicted heavy casualties and took 2,000 prisoners and two Eagles. Overcome by their success, oblivious to danger and shouting ‘Scotland Forever!’, the troopers galloped on, saber ing the gunners and drivers of a grand battery before being overwhelmed by French lancers and practically destroyed. (Getty Images)
carabiniers, cuirassiers etc) dedicated to shock charges that smashed open enemy ranks for exploitation, while the light cavalry (such as hussars) were ostensibly devoted to reconnaissance, screening, skirmishing and raiding, although in the desire for glory all too often every type of cavalry launched itself into the battlefield charge.

Light troops also came fully into their own as respected battlefield troops. The French Army, for example, developed skirmishers during the Revolutionary period partly because of their inability to meet the professional and structural requirements of the 1791 Reglement (Regulations), but they soon became an integral part of France’s military package. Using freedom of movement, covered positions and accurate shooting, often from rifled weapons, the skirmishers plagued enemy formations, cracking ranks and killing officers to make openings for line infantry assaults and rapid cavalry charges. Other nations also bought into or expanded the tactics of light infantry. Britain, for example, discovered their great value in the Peninsular War – a theatre, if even there was one, geophysically suited to fast-marching, manoeuvrable troops. There Wellington came to rely upon light troops such as the 95th (Rifle) Regiment of Foot, using them increasingly in an emergency ‘fire brigade’ role at critical points along a line or on a battlefield. The Russian Army not only used its infantry and mounted Jägers in the light role, but also came to utilize the semi-irregular tactics of its Cossack forces to harry and attrite enemy forces, never more so than during Napoleon’s harrowing retreat from Moscow in 1812. Outright guerrilla forces also made their own dark impact, especially those of Spain and Portugal. While such formations often demonstrated little in the way of professional organization, Wellington himself recognized the value of allied guerrilla forces in nibbling away at French morale and manpower.

While the Napoleonic era undoubtedly has a magnetic fascination in terms of its tactics and engagements, the scale of the wars and the armies can often mask the individuality of the men that fought. All soldiers suffer in war, but the hardships and brutality of campaigning in the late 18th and early 19th centuries makes one wonder at the toughness of the men who fought. In terms of kit, for example, both the modern soldier and the Napoleonic soldier often endured marches of 16–32km (10–20 miles) in a day carrying around 27kg (60lb) of pack. The difference in the Napoleonic age, however, was that such kit generally hung on body-cutting leather straps, not the ergonomically designed webbing and load-bearing systems of today. Today’s uniforms are designed for comfort and ventilation, whereas the uniforms of the past could be laughably impractical. Furthermore, one marvels at the sheer force of will that kept soldiers standing in formations that were being ripped through by gales of grape and round shot.
This book is an exploration of both the men and the armies that fought from 1789 to 1815, bringing together in one volume some of the vast knowledge contained in Osprey’s long-respected series of Napoleonic titles. It is a vast subject, covering matters of structure, organization, command-and-control, tactics, uniforms, kit and so on. While we cannot commit ourselves to being exhaustive on these issues, we can look at what made each army of the Napoleonic era special in its own right, from the way its troops were recruited to the way that it fought and bled.
CHRONOLOGY

1789
20 April  France declares war on Austria
13 June   Prussia declares war on France
14 July   The fall of the Bastille and the beginning of the French Revolution

1790
In France, the nobility is abolished by the National Assembly, with a critical impact on the leadership of the army.

1792
20 April  France declares war on Habsburg emperor Francis II
26 June   The First Coalition is formed against France
30 July   Austria and Prussia begin a failed invasion of France
September French forces annex Nice, beginning five years of campaigning in Italy
3 September Verdun falls to Duke of Brunswick
20 September Battle of Valmy

1793
1 February France declares war on both Britain and the Netherlands
23 August  National Convention of France calls the levée en masse
18 October Napoleon promoted to battalion commander during the siege of Toulon
23 December Anti-Republican forces in the Vendée defeated

1794
6 February Napoleon becomes artillery commander of the Army of Italy

1795
26 October Napoleon becomes commander of Army of the Interior
2 November Executive Directory takes power in France

1796
2 March   Napoleon is made commander of the Army of Italy
4 June    First siege of Mantua begins
2 August  First battle of Lonato
8 October  Spain declares war on Britain
15–17 November  Battle of Arcola in northern Italy

1797
2 February  Mantua surrenders
16 May  French forces occupy Venice
4 September  Coup 18 Fructidor
17 October  Peace of Campo Formio between Austria and France

1798
12 April  Napoleon sets out on Egyptian expedition
2 July  French assault on Alexandria
21 July  Battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon’s victory over the Mamelukes
1 August  Nelson’s victory at the battle of the Nile
29 December  Second Coalition forms against France

1799
1 March  War of the Second Coalition begins
25 July  Battle of Aboukir, French defeat Turkish forces
9 October  Napoleon returns to France
9–10 November  Directory is abolished following the Coup of Brumaire
14 December  Napoleon is made First Consul

1800
5 April  Austria begins war against Italy
15 May  French Army of the Reserve crosses the Alps
14 June  Battle of Marengo

1801
8 February  Treaty of Lunéville between France and Austria
14 September  French forces leave Egypt

1802
2 August  Napoleon proclaimed Consul for life
15 October  France invades Switzerland
1803

20 May  War breaks out between France and Britain
1 June  France occupies Hanover

1804

21 March  Execution of the Due d’Enghien
19 May  Creation of the Marshalate
2 December  Napoleon’s coronation as Emperor of the French

1805

11 April  Formation of the Third Coalition against France
25 August  *Grande Armée* leaves Boulogne for Germany
9 October  Ney forces the Danube at Gunzburg
14 October  Ney closes the door on the Austrian army at Elchingen
19 October  Mack and the Austrian army capitulate at Ulm
21 October  Battle of Trafalgar
2 December  Battle of Austerlitz
26 December  Austria makes peace in the Treaty of Pressburg

1806

14 February  Massena leads the invasion of Naples
12 July  Creation of the Confederation of the Rhine
7 August  Formation of the Fourth Coalition against France
7 October  Napoleon receives Prussian ultimatum; he crosses the border the next day
10 October  Battle of Saalfeld; Lannes defeats Archduke Ferdinand
14 October  Twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt
27 October  Napoleon enters Berlin
21 November  In the ‘Berlin Decrees’ Napoleon institutes the Continental Blockade
28 November  French troops enter Warsaw
26 December  Battles of Pultusk and Golymin

1807

8 February  Battle of Eylau
10 June  Battle of Heilsberg
14 June  Battle of Friccidland
7 July  Treaties of Tilsit between France, Russia and Prussia
7 September  Copenhagen surrenders to British
18 October  French troops cross into Spain en route to Portugal
27 October  France and Spain conclude the Treaty of Fontainebleau

1808

23 March  French troops occupy Madrid
6 June  Joseph Napoleon proclaimed King of Spain
15 June–13 August  First siege of Saragossa
1 August  Army of Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) lands at Mondego Bay, Portugal
30 October  French evacuate Portugal
4 November  Napoleon arrives in Spain at the head of 125,000 troops to attack the Spanish armies on the line of the Ebro.
4 December  Napoleon enters Madrid
25 December  British retreat to Corunna

1809

20 February  Fall of Saragossa after three-month siege in which approximately 50,000 people perish
9 April  The Fifth Coalition against France is proclaimed; the Austrian Army attacks Bavaria
20 April  Napoleon victorious at the battle of Abensberg
22 April  Napoleon victorious at the battle of Eckmuhl
13 May  Napoleon enters Vienna
21/22 May  Napoleon narrowly avoids destruction at the battle of Aspern-Essling
14 June  Battle of Raab
5/6 July  Napoleon victorious at the battle of Wagram
27–28 July  Wellington defeats the French at Talavera
29 July  The British land in Walcheren
17 September  Peace of Frederikshamm confirms Russia’s conquest of Finland from Sweden

1810

2 April  Napoleon marries Marie-Louise, the Habsburg princess
24 July  Ney defeats Craufurd at the River Coa
21 August  Bernadotte becomes Crown Prince of Sweden
27 September  Battle of Busaco. Wellington defeats Masséna
1811
1 May Wellington occupies Almeida
3–5 May Battle of Fuentes de Onoro. Wellington defeats Massena

1812
19 January British storm and capture Ciudad Rodrigo
24 March Secret Russo-Swedish agreement
6–7 April Wellington takes Badajoz by storm
28 May Treaty of Bucharest; Russia secures its other flank through peace with Turkey
18 June United States declares war on Britain
24 June The French Army crosses the Niemen River
23 July French control of Spain shattered at the Battle of Salamanca
17–19 August The Russians evade Napoleon at the battles of Smolensk and Valutino
7 September Napoleon victorious at the Battle of Borodino
14 September The French enter Moscow; the great fire begins the next day
2 October Wellington appointed commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of the Spanish armies
19 October The French Army leaves Moscow
27–29 November Napoleon escapes the Russian trap at the River Beresina
5 December Napoleon leaves the Grande Armée
14 December The French rearguard reaches the Niemen; end of the 1812 campaign

1813
16 January Russians resume their advance west, crossing the Vistula
7 February Russian troops enter Warsaw unopposed. The French ally, the Duchy of Warsaw, ceases to exist
3 March Sweden agrees to join the Sixth Coalition
6 March French forces retreating eastwards reach the Elbe
13 March Prussia declares war on France
3 April Battle of Möckern
1 May French open their offensive in Germany
2 May Battle of Lützen
20–21 May Battle of Bautzen
27 May French evacuate Madrid
4 June Napoleon and the Allies sign an armistice, effective until 20 July, but later extended to 16 August. Both sides use this breathing space to prepare for renewed hostilities
28–30 July Wellington defeats Soult at Sorauren
12 August  
Austria declares war on France

26–27 August  
Battle of Dresden

30 August  
Battle of Kulm

24 September  
French troops withdraw behind the Elbe.

16–18 October  
Battle of Leipzig. Culminating and decisive engagement of the campaign in Germany. Napoleon retreats to the Rhine, abandoning military and political control over Germany.

22 December  
Elements of the Allied forces begin crossing the Rhine into France

1814

22 January  
Prussian forces cross the river Meuse in France

21 February  
Napoleon proposes a new peace plan to Francis; this is rejected

24 March  
Ferdinand VII returns to Spain as the French are finally defeated in the Iberian Peninsula

31 March  
French troops at Montmartre and in Paris surrender. Nearly 150,000 Allied troops move against the capital.

6 April  
Napoleon abdicates unconditionally

16 April  
Treaty of Fontainebleau gives Napoleon sovereignty over Elba. He departs for the island on 28 April

17 April  
Marshal Soult surrenders to Wellington in southern France, ending the Peninsular War

30 April  
Treaty of Paris concluded between the victorious Allies and the restored Bourbon monarch, Louis XVIII, bringing a formal end to the war

1815

1 March  
Napoleon escapes from Elba and lands in France

20 March  
Napoleon enters Paris; beginning of the ‘Hundred Days’

25 March  
Allies agree to form a Seventh Coalition

16 June  
Battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny

16 June  
Battle of Ligny

18 June  
Battles of Waterloo and Wavre

22 June  
Napoleon abdicates

8 August  
Napoleon departs England aboard HMS *Northumberland*, bound for exile on the remote south Atlantic island of St Helena, where he dies in 1821
OVERVIEW

Of all the political, social and military achievements Napoleon wrought in Europe in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the transformation of the French Army must rank as one of the greatest. His army became the powerhouse of both the Revolution and Napoleon’s continental ambitions, although when he came to power its condition was far from promising. A frequently ineffective social elite monopolized the officer ranks, pay and logistics for the enlisted men were irregular and poor, and training in tactics was inadequate.

The Revolution itself scarcely seemed to improve matters at first. Hundreds of officers deserted the army ranks, and the French cavalry force all but collapsed as nobles found themselves feeling unwelcome in a political environment generally hostile towards their class. The army became a hotch-potch of militia soldiers and volunteers, although between 1789 and 1792 the state did manage to attract some of the noble leadership back into military service.

The catalyst for genuine transformation was war. The war of the First Coalition (1792–97) gave the Revolutionary army victories at battles such as Valmy and Jemappes in 1792, and provided invaluable combat experience. Political turbulence still undermined progress, and the Terror of 1793–94 further destabilized confidence, but a more meritocratic command system gradually emerged, with officers such as Jean Victor Marie Moreau, Jean-Baptiste Jourdan and, of course, Napoleon emerging from the ranks of junior officers to promise greatness.

The introduction of mass conscription in August 1793, a measure directed by war minister Lazare Carnot, brought a total of 1.5 million men under arms by the end of the year. The following year saw structural reorganization, as the army was rearranged into infantry and cavalry demi-brigades, with one regular and two volunteer battalions within each. Further organization into corps- and army-sized formations gave the army better structural integrity and flexibility.

A pause in the wars (the war against the First Coalition had drawn to an unstable close in 1797) gave the French some breathing space to establish a well-organized fighting force. At its core was a veteran army hardened by six
years of campaigning. Under Jourdan’s 1798 Conscription Law, 200,000 men were called up over 1798–99, but the results were disappointing. Despite the introduction of a new standard uniform in 1798, and continued use of the Charleville musket, the Directory’s inability to feed and clothe its troops worsened during 1798; arrears of pay only accelerated the resultant desertions. The government realized that most of the army would have to be supported on foreign ground and paid from the financial spoils of war.

Napoleon would help to turn matters around. In 1797–98, Napoleon’s star had begun to rise in earnest. His Middle Eastern expedition brought some impressive early victories, and against the threatening backdrop of the war of the Second Coalition (1799–1802) he took power in France in 1799. Now he could truly transform the French military along the lines he saw fit.

Napoleon organized his army afresh while incorporating the ideas of French military theorists of the previous generation. Himself a product of the royal military academies, Napoleon drew inspiration for his reforms from the period prior to the Revolution. In 1803 the Revolutionary term demi-brigade was replaced by the traditional designation régiment; the eagles, which the newly crowned emperor issued to the army in 1804, were a mark of its allegiance to the imperial throne, not the nation; the republican tricolour was reduced to a secondary status; military academies opened their doors to officer cadets drawn from the sons of imperial France’s new social elite. In a measure supposedly to deprive Britain of a market for indigo, Napoleon briefly experimented in 1806 with a return to the white uniforms of the Royal Army. The republican-style blue coat soon returned, although as an economy measure a less elaborate style was promulgated in 1812.

Another major organizational reform was the conversion of one company in each battalion into voltigeurs (meaning ‘vaulters’), light infantry trained for skirmishing. In reality, this measure was not particularly innovative, as the new regulations largely standardized an existing unofficial practice. In the Royal
DEPLOYEZ EN TIRAILLEUR!

The French Army did not have a specific regulation for skirmishing, so individual regiments developed their own techniques, based on common experience of the Revolutionary Wars. Here a voltigeur company (1) has been sent several hundred paces forward to screen the battalion’s front. Before instructing his men to deployez en tirailleur, the captain designates the size of the intervals between each file. As the first two ranks advance at the pas de course, fanning out into open order, the third rank halts and is formed into two ranks by the sergent-major (2). Standing with the reserve, the captain (3) orders the halt. These orders were transmitted by drum or voltigeur horns. The captain could then order his men to fire in position or fire and advance by ranks. Each rank would advance a preset number of paces before firing; while they reloaded, the second rank advanced at the run. The reserve would keep pace, sending forward reinforcements as required. The lieutenant (4) and sous-lieutenant (5) would take position at the rear and centre of their sections. The sergents’ (6) positions were not fixed, so they could go where necessary. Skirmishers fought in pairs, either with their file partner or with the man to their right, ensuring that one of them remained loaded at all times. Although alignments had to be maintained, skirmishers would take advantage of any cover they found. The biggest threat to skirmishers was from cavalry, which could ride down a skirmish line rapidly. If the ralliement sounded, the skirmishers would run to the reserve and reform. If there was no time, they formed rally clumps around their section commanders, or took cover as best they could. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Army, companies of chasseurs had been attached to each battalion to act as scouts and skirmishers, and many demi-brigades had maintained the practice with elaireurs (scouts) who fulfilled the same function. In 1808 a successive reform returned infantry battalions essentially to their 1776 arrangement of four companies of fusiliers and one each of grenadiers and light infantry. The main innovation of the 1808 reforms was the increase in the size of infantry regiments from two to four bataillons de guerre (battalions of war), with a fifth forming the depot. In 1812 Napoleon added a sixth battalion.

Napoleon was the first to attempt to use a permanent corps structure. Prior to the French Revolution, any organization above the brigade was temporary. The French had established permanent divisions to great effect during the wars of the French Revolution (1792–1801). Now Napoleon decided to create permanent corps that were in effect miniature armies, each with its own cavalry and artillery complements attached to two or three infantry divisions. The success of this structure can be shown by the fact that modern armies use the same organization in a largely unaltered form.

The French corps had a permanent staff attached. Commanders would come to know their subordinates. Divisions would become accustomed to manoeuvring in conjunction with their sister divisions. The light cavalry, attached to the corps, went through exercises that brought a higher degree of cooperation than any other army in the world enjoyed.

European armies consisted of a series of building blocks. Infantry regiments were made up of battalions, which in turn were comprised of companies. A brigade consisted of regiments, and divisions were composed of two or more brigades. On top of this, Napoleon added infantry corps of two or more infantry divisions with one or two cavalry brigades attached. Napoleon had infantry of two types: ligne (line) and légère (light). The light infantry, more than the line, tended to be used for skirmishing, reconnaissance and rearguard protection. Infantry battalions in the early 19th century were made up of nine companies: seven centre companies and two elite companies; the latter were a voltigeur company and a grenadier or carabinier company, depending on whether it was a line or light battalion. In 1805, Napoleon stripped the elite companies from a number of regiments left in garrison to form an elite division under General Oudinot. This formation became known as Oudinot’s grenadiers.

The light cavalry attached to the infantry corps was one of two types: either hussars or chasseurs. These were functionally the same outside of their dress, although the hussars generally had the better reputation, due in part to their dashing appearance. Napoleon then created the Cavalry Reserve Corps from the line cavalry (dragoons) and heavy cavalry regiments (cuirassiers and carabiniers). Their intent was to act as the ‘arm of rupture’ to be committed to break an enemy that had been worn down by the infantry. To a lesser extent
VOLTIGEUR, 1806

In 1806 Napoleon experimented with replacing the blue coat (introduced in 1793) with the traditional white of pre-revolutionary times. Its introduction was short-lived and unpopular. (1) An IX pattern dragoon musket; (2) steel bayonet with a 38cm (15in) triangular blade; (3) An IX pattern fusil d’infanterie; (4) cartridge box; (5) oil flask; (6) turnscrew; (7) a ball extractor; (8) spare flints; (9) lead envelopes; (10) wooden practice ‘flint’; (11) pick for unblocking the musket’s touchhole; (12) brass cors de chasse badge, which symbolized the voltigeur’s special status; (13) sabre-briquet side-arm, traditionally worn by elite company troops and sous-officiers. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
The soldiers' huts are lined up in two rows, with cooking areas behind. The officers' huts form a third line in the distance. (Collection Alfred and Roland Umhey)

they could be used to stabilize a situation that was getting out of hand. To accompany these heavy cavalry were batteries of horse artillery, whose 8pdr guns could be brought quickly into position and deliver tremendous hitting power. The combination of these two arms was extremely hard to resist. Napoleon, having trained as an artillerist himself, aided by fine gunners like Auguste de Marmont, had implemented many improvements that greatly increased the power of the French artillery. Better, lighter and more mobile guns, better gunpowder, better training and better tactics gave France a major superiority in this field.

One problem for the French in the campaigns of 1805 was that they did not have enough mounts for their dragoons. Therefore, one division of dragoons had to fight dismounted as infantry. They would not prove to be effective as infantry, but they eventually received their horses from captured stocks. Finally there was the Imperial Guard Corps. These elite men combined to form Guard infantry regiments (the grenadiers and chasseurs of foot), the Guard cavalry (the grenadiers, carabiniers and chasseurs of horse) and the flying horse artillery batteries. The Guard acted as a final reserve and as the force that could deliver the battlefield coup de grace.

There is no doubt that the Napoleonic armies of the first decade of the 19th century rocked the military world. French victories at Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 proved that tactically and strategically Napoleon had revolutionized the way of war. Napoleon had also sought to improve his army as a field force, as foreign deployments were true testing
grounds of his military talents. In 1799, for example, the 36,000 French troops in Italy were in a desperate state. Supplies of all sorts were inadequate, discipline was breaking down, desertion was increasing, and on a few occasions, whole formations marched to the rear in search of food. The survivors would be of limited combat value. In establishing the Army of the Reserve in France in 1800, Bonaparte’s first move was to overhaul the supply system to provide

(Centre) Hussar officer, early regimental uniform, 1811. To a typical Polish style of uniform, some Dutch hussar items have been added, such as the pouch belt and the barrel sash. (Right) Hussar officer, parade dress, 1811–14. The czapska is after a model on display at the Invalides in Paris; two unusual features are the gold braid around the edges of the square top, and the plume fixed into a gold pompon. (Left) Hussar officer, full dress, 1811–14. This figure shows the squadron officer’s shabraque with one narrow gold lace stripe inside one wider stripe. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
the troops with regular food and decent uniforms. Lacking the large superiority in infantry and artillery enjoyed in many republican campaigns, the core of Bonaparte’s reserve was 30,000 men, mostly from Holland, who had been used under Brune to crush the rebellion in the Vendée. Additional veteran troops came from the remains of the former Army of England. Filled out with the best conscripts, by early May 60,000 quality troops were based around Geneva, having marched through Dijon to collect these improved supplies.

Additional veteran troops under Marshal Bon Adrien Jeannot de Moncey would join them from Germany, where Moreau had been given command of the 120,000-strong Army of the Rhine, which combined the former Armies of Germany and Switzerland, with its right wing anchored on Lake Constance. The weakest demi-brigades driven from Italy and some cavalry regiments were moved back around Dijon, forming the cadres for the 30,000-strong force, organized there as a diversion, which drew in more conscripts and returning convalescents. An extra division was formed from the Army of the Orient depots and a Legion of Italian Republicans. This real reserve force of 30,000 troops continued to be trained at Dijon, but would play little part in the main actions.

Bonaparte’s veteran troops, raised from the Pyrenees and Vendée, gave his army a particular edge in mobility in the broken Italian landscape, especially in the Alps and the Apennines, and remedied many of the supply problems. The French armies used nine days’ ration of biscuit instead of Austrian bread (two to three days), so the waggon trains could carry three times as much biscuit, allowing the French greater mobility and reducing the need for them to halt to prepare food. Operating outside France, however, the Revolutionary troops continued to have no qualms about appropriating supplies from local
The French armies in the Iberian Peninsula in the early years of the war were certainly large, but most of the men were raw recruits, about one third drawn early from the levies of 1808 and 1809. Yet when Austria threatened in 1809, Napoleon could only afford to recall his Guard and a few extra troops to meet the threat. These joined with Davout's and Marmont's, the veteran corps of Marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout and General Auguste de Marmont. The remainder of the army was made up of newly formed troops and various allies. With all the demands being made upon the Empire, Napoleon had to rely increasingly upon his client states to provide manpower. Poles, Swiss, Germans from the states of the Confederation of the Rhine, volunteer Irish, Italians and Neapolitans, all served in the Peninsula, with different degrees of willingness and skill. Over 50,000 Italians alone fought as French allies. Many of these troops saw serious fighting throughout the campaign, and large numbers of the Germans deserted when the opportunity presented itself, joining the British-allied King's German Legion, a fine corps of Hanoverians formed in 1803 during the French occupation of this north German patrimony of George III. The remainder of the army was created by calling up the conscription classes early. On the whole the army was a grade down from previous campaigns.

In 1807, Napoleon stood at the height of his power, having defeated every major European power except Britain, who resolutely refused to abandon the struggle against an unbeaten and, apparently, unbeatable foe. Yet Napoleon's decision to occupy the Iberian Peninsula resulted in a long and costly war to which, at long last, Britain could make a substantial contribution on land.

The French employed those tactics that they had used with such consistent success in the past on the battlefields of western and central Europe: concentration of artillery and massed attack in column. Their armies were accustomed to 'living off the land', and as such did not establish the network of supply depots that Wellington wisely did. As the land was found woefully deficient for their needs, with many people already living at subsistence levels, the French found their freedom of movement severely impaired and relied ever more strongly on plunder and requisitions of the civilian population. As there was no overall commander in the Peninsula, there was often no coordination between the various armies, which were scattered across Spain and struggled to maintain communications along its primitive and often nonexistent roads.

French generals were shameless in stripping the assets of the towns they occupied, stealing art and raiding treasuries as they went.
Unlike the infantry, Napoleon’s cavalry was at its height in 1809. After incorporating superior horses captured during 1806–07, the units were expanded and improved, most notably the 30 regiments of dragoons that were transformed from mediocre to formidable. The cuirassiers had expanded too and had received additional training to make them a powerful breakthrough force. The French light cavalry, hussars and chasseurs, gained a reputation for battlefield prowess, but their scouting skills were poor, and Napoleon was often left blind as to the whereabouts of the enemy.

Defeat And Transformation

By the end of the 1810s, Napoleon was prepared for the invasion of Russia, pulling in troops from every available source. There is little to distinguish between Napoleon’s armies of 1809 and 1812 other than increased size of the latter. Regiments acquired a 4th, 5th or even 6th field battalion; cavalry regiments were brought up to an average of six squadrons; and a new class of light cavalry was introduced — lancers. (These were converted dragoon regiments.) There was no change in the artillery batteries except that they were given their full complement of men. In all, the army that started out in 1812 was the largest Napoleon had ever assembled and showed the variations in quality expected in such an all-out muster of force.

The catastrophic losses suffered in Napoleon’s Russian campaign had a profound and multi-faceted effect on the Grande Armee, as Napoleon had named the principal French campaign army from 1805. Of the approximately 655,000 troops with which Napoleon had crossed the Niemen in June 1812, scarcely 100,000 bedraggled, broken men staggered into East Prussia little more than six months later. Of the 1,300 pieces of field artillery that had accompanied the army into Russia, only about 250 guns remained, most of the others having been simply abandoned due to lack of transport.

Notwithstanding these unprecedented losses, Napoleon immediately set to work to revive his shattered army, demonstrating in the process his organizational genius. His vision was ambitious indeed: he wanted 656,000 men, and he set about drawing together troops from various sources that ultimately netted him about 400,000, of whom half constituted the field army when hostilities intensified in April 1813. A high proportion of the new levies were very young and came to be called the ‘Marie-Louises’, after the Empress who in 1812 ordered their assembly on behalf of the absent Emperor. With admirable foresight, Napoleon had called up the class of 1813 before the Russian campaign. These consisted of about 130,000 conscripts in the process of completing training, 80,000 National Guardsmen placed in the ranks of the regulars, and 100,000 more men who had, for various reasons, not joined the colours between 1809 and 1812. To all these were added troops withdrawn from Spain, from
which they could not be spared without adverse effects on that theatre of operations. Finally, patient British blockading had trapped naval vessels in ports for years, rendering their crews useless. These underemployed men and others from the coastal garrisons, particularly marines, were sent east where they could be of more immediate use.

There is no doubt that French soldiers would often fight bravely in the campaigns ahead, but their efforts were frequently hamstrung by inadequate training and experience at all levels, and this resulted in a decline in their fighting capabilities. Colonel Raymond de Montesquiou, Due de Fezensac, attributed the French defeats of 1813 to the decline in the quality of the soldiers.

The army was composed of young soldiers who had to be taught everything, and of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) who did not know much more themselves. The officers were better, for they were old cadres who had suffered far less destruction in Russia than had the NCO cadres. But the process had begun even before 1812. As early as 1809, he noted, Napoleon began to complain that his soldiers were not like those of 1805: the men at Wagram were not like those at Austerlitz.
Yet Napoleon was not to be daunted by circumstances that lesser commanders might have deemed hopeless. The Emperor resurrected a new army with which he achieved hard-fought victories in 1813 at Lützen and Bautzen before, in late summer, Austria finally threw in her lot with the Allies, thereby creating the most formidable military alliance Europe had ever seen and the combination of Great Powers that was absolutely essential if Europe was to free itself of Napoleon's control.

Further epic struggles were to follow in the autumn campaign, including the battles of Dresden and Leipzig. When operations shifted to French soil in 1814, the beleaguered Emperor found himself outnumbered by more than three to
The French retreat from Moscow in 1812 has gone down in the annals of history as one of the cruelest military withdrawals in history. Nevertheless, Marechal Ney's heroic command of the rearguard made him a legend.

one, yet in a series of brilliant actions he managed to hold the Allies at bay, displaying a military genius reminiscent of his earlier years. Nevertheless, with Paris threatened, his army overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, and his marshals refusing to fight on, Napoleon was ultimately forced to abdicate, only to return the following year to fight his last, and history's greatest, battle.

For both the ordinary ranks of Napoleon's army and for senior commanders, campaigning had always been accompanied by a degree of hardship, particularly after nearly 20 years of unremitting war. Yet the immediate wake of the Russian campaign was to render the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 especially hard, with march, countermarch, bivouac, hunger, thirst, rain, mud, cold, and privation. It would also be a time when commanders were tested to the limit and the flaws in Napoleon's command structure became glaringly apparent.

In the past, field commanders had seldom been allowed to coordinate their operations except with the express orders of Napoleon and little was done to encourage them to develop independent thought or initiative. Without adequate understanding of the Emperor's grand strategy or their own roles in it, Napoleon's subordinates could do little but follow orders unquestioningly at a
THE MARIE-LOUISES

The thousands of teenagers pressed into service following the Russian campaign were nicknamed the Marie-Louises after the equally young empress who signed the conscription decrees in Napoleon's absence. Through necessity, the uniform was stripped down to its most basic requirements and hinted at the future style of field uniforms worn in northern France 100 years later. Even at the beginning of the war, Blaze said that 'On taking the field, everyone reduced his kit to the smallest possible dimensions, by ridding himself of all useless articles.' (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
time when armies had grown so much larger than in past campaigns that Napoleon simply could not oversee everything, and needed commanders capable of independent decision-making. By 1813 some of these had been killed in action (Desaix, Lannes, Lasalle), others would die in the coming campaign (Bessières and Poniatowski), and still more were simply tired of fighting or were busy in Spain. Some were excellent as leaders of men in combat, but were not themselves strategists and were reluctant to take independent decisions lest they fail.

With marshals constantly shifted from command of one corps to another and corps changing in composition as circumstances seemed to require, no viable command structure could be created. Proper control of increasingly poor-quality soldiers became all the more difficult. Under such circumstances, with Napoleon unable to be everywhere and monitor everything, errors were inevitable, and at no time in his military career were these errors so glaring as in 1813–15.

**Command and Control**

By late August 1805, Napoleon had been forced to abandon the idea of invading Britain, for which he had assembled his *Grande Armée* around Boulogne. While Britain's Royal Navy attacked the barges assembling in the mouth of the Rhine and thwarted French squadrons in the Mediterranean, the West Indies and the East Indies, British diplomacy and gold had been building the Third Coalition of Continental powers against France – Austria, Russia, Sweden and Naples. By the time Austria invaded the territory of Napoleon's ally Bavaria on 2 September, French troops were already on the march to the east. Immediate action was necessary, and the Emperor had under his hand a war machine consisting of some 200,000 men. It was unique in its composition, in that more than 50 per cent of its officers and soldiers were veterans of earlier campaigns; even its armament and training were superior to those of its adversaries. Napoleon would never command a more battle-proven army.

Organized into several army corps, the *Grande Armée* would march eastwards in three major columns; everything was planned in detail – itineraries, bivouacs, provisions and transport. This campaign of 1805 would be Napoleon's *Blitzkrieg*. In 24 days his army was across the Rhine; eight days later, on 6 October, it would reach the Danube; on 17 October an Austrian army, brilliantly outmanoeuvred, surrendered to Napoleon at Ulm; and on 14 November he occupied Vienna. Racing on northwards, on 2 December he crushed the combined Austro-Russian armies in his most famous victory, at Austerlitz.

Moving a force of that size from the English Channel and North Sea coasts deep into central Europe in just three months demanded sophisticated planning on a huge scale. The Emperor could undertake this audacious campaign
PERSONALITIES AT IMPERIAL HEADQUARTERS,
C. 1805–06

(Bottom) Marshal Berthier. Napoleon's chief of the general staff was of high birth, and had served as a staff officer under Rochambeau in America during the War of Independence. His outward style remained old-fashioned, and in the service of the Empire he was always surrounded by numerous aides and servants, with much display of sumptuous, non-regulation dress and equipment. (Middle) General Savary, commanding the Elite Gendarmes of the Imperial Guard. (Top right) General Count Bertrand, ADC to the Emperor.

(Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
because he could rely upon the experience of his Imperial Headquarters, a well-oiled machine, at least in the early days, for waging mobile warfare. With this staff, together with the members and staffs of his households, Napoleon could rely upon an organization that provided him with all the necessary information, technical support and comfort to allow him to function as effortlessly as he could have done in one of his palaces.

The structure of the Imperial Headquarters can be divided into two major sections, each independent of the other: the *Maison Militaire de l’Empereur* or the Emperor’s Military Household, and the *Grand État-Major Général* or Army General Headquarters. A third department dependent on the Imperial Headquarters was the office of the *Intendant Général* (Quartermaster General), providing the administrative staff of the army.

When France was declared an empire, Napoleon quickly adapted many of his revolutionary creations into imperial ones. As First Consul he had created the *Légion d’honneur* (Legion of Honour), which became a method of rewarding people who had excelled in their field—a sort of minor nobility, but one based on merit. Along the same lines, Napoleon now created the marshalate. Originally, 18 generals became marshals. They were chosen for their ability and either for their personal loyalty or because they represented a political military faction that Napoleon wished to win over. These were many of the men who would lead Napoleon’s corps in the following years. With these titles came a large salary—to become a marshal was the aspiration of every French soldier. The phrase ‘There is a marshal’s baton in every knapsack’ was more than just propaganda, for some of Napoleon’s marshals had indeed come up through the ranks.

The *Maison Militaire* was Napoleon’s personal military staff, consisting of his *aides de camp* (ADCs) and orderly officers. The ADCs to the Emperor were mainly loyal, experienced generals or, at times, other senior officers whom he knew from his Italian or Egyptian campaigns. All were famous for their bravery and were experts in their own branches of service. Working directly under the supervision of the Emperor, these officers were sometimes assigned to temporary command of units or formations, or entrusted with diplomatic missions. Most of the time, however, their tasks consisted of making detailed

The great leader himself—Napoleon Bonaparte as he appeared at the beginning of the Italian campaigns, wearing the 1796-pattern coat of a *général en chef*. (Philip Haythornthwaite)
STAFF OFFICERS

(Centre) Adjutant-commandant, *Grand etat-major général*. This shows the regulation mounted full dress of an adjutant-commandant; only the aiguillettes indicate his appointment to Army General Headquarters. The regulation red facings were often replaced with dark blue, and both blue and white trousers were worn according to season. (Right) Adjutant-commandant, *Garde Impériale*. This general or colonel, from a contemporary portrait, has a thoroughly non-regulation uniform but on which we can still see the regulation buttonhole loops of this staff appointment. (Left) *Adjoint*. The ‘assistants to the general staff’ were distinguished by embroidered double loops on the collar only, and by a simpler belt. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
inspection tours and long-distance reconnaissances. When they had to carry orders from the Emperor to an army commander, these would be verbal rather than written. The appointment of ADC to the Emperor was so influential that they were considered to be ‘Napoleon’s eyes and ears’, and even marshals were wise to follow their advice and render them the respect due to their function.

On 29 April 1809, a decree organized their service. Every morning at 0700hrs, the duty ADC and his staff were relieved, and the new ADC for the next 24 hours had to present the Emperor with a list of names of the staff under his command. This would consist of two supplementary daytime general ADCs and one night ADC (himself included), one equerry, half the number of orderly officers, half the number of the petits aides de camp (see below) and half the number of pages. Their numbers differed from time to time, but only 37 officers were ever commissioned ADC to the Emperor, and at normal times their number was restricted to 12.

Each of these officers wore the normal general’s uniform of his rank, but with gold aiguillettes as the symbol of his function. Each had his own two or three personal ADCs — petits aides de camp — who might also be commanded directly by the Emperor. The appointment of ADC to the Emperor did not always last as long as the Emperor’s reign; an ADC might be given another position such as a field command, a governorship, etc., and would be removed from his ADC status until recalled to that post.

Officiers d’ordonnance (orderly officers) may be considered as junior ADCs, with the rank of squadron leader, captain or lieutenant. They, too, were used for special missions such as reconnaissance and inspections, but also to carry written orders. In 1806, when these posts were created, they were members of the Imperial Guard; in 1809, while retaining their military status, they were

From 1808, the fourriers du Palais started wearing a more military style of uniform, though retaining the green, red facings, and silver lace. The holster covers are in black bearskin; the round-cornered shabraque is dark green edged with silver. (Collection Alfred and Roland Umhey)
ARMY GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PERSONNEL

(Left) Grenadier, Bataillon de Neuchatel, 1806–12. As was the norm in the French Army, the grenadiers were distinguished by fringed red epaulettes, and red braid, cords and plumes on the headdress. (Centre) Courier, c.1807–09. The red of this uniform was probably considered as Berthier’s livery colour, since it was also worn by his ADCs. Note the brassard of red edged with blue and bearing an eagle badge. (Right) Guide-interpreter of the Army of Germany, 1805. This short-lived special unit of two squadrons was raised from German-speakers to serve as headquarters couriers and orderly officers. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
Napoleon snatches a moment's rest on the battlefield of Wagram, his staff and household at work around him.

The decrees regulating their service were signed on 15, 19 and 24 September 1806, and finally on 19 September 1809.

Alongside the Emperor's Military Household but functioning as a totally independent organization was the Grand État-Major Général. Since the earliest collaboration of Bonaparte and General Louis Berthier during the first Italian campaign, the organization of this Army General Headquarters was more or less fixed, and it would see only slight changes during the later campaigns of the Empire.

From 1804 until 1807, Marshal Berthier had a double role: as Minister of War, and as Major-General (in modern terms, Chief of the General Staff) of the Grande Armée. The General Headquarters was Berthier's unique domain, and Napoleon respected this demarcation. Its personnel received orders only from Berthier, and even the Emperor did not interfere in its immense tasks; he would never walk in on Berthier's private staff while they were writing and copying the orders that he had just given. Since Napoleon was his own 'operations officer', we can say that Berthier's job consisted of absorbing the Emperor's strategic intentions, translating them into written orders, and transmitting them with the utmost speed and clarity. He also received in the Emperor's name the reports of the marshals and commanding generals, and when necessary signed them on the Emperor's behalf. Detailed reports on everything that occurred for good or ill were to be sent to Berthier; nothing was to be concealed from the Emperor.
As Minister of War he was responsible for all matters such as personnel, the ministerial budget, the Emperor’s orders regarding troop movements within the Empire, the departments of artillery and engineers, and prisoners of war. In fulfilling his multi-faceted task, Berthier could rely upon carefully selected civilian employees and a military staff, but all the work they undertook was verified by him. Even when exhausted he would read the written orders, sign them and have them sent off before trying to get some rest. It was not unusual for Berthier to stay awake for several days and nights at a time.

Marshal Davout on the eve of Borodino, 7 September 1812. Our illustration depicts the interior of the Emperor’s field tent; in the background we can discern Napoleon’s camp bed, table, escritoire, lamp, folding-table and personal filing portfolio, all reproduced after the actual items he employed in the historic Russian campaign of 1812. Here we see Marshal Davout in a marshal’s greatcoat, and the seated Emperor Napoleon in his familiar grey greatcoat. (Chris Warner © Osprey Publishing)
INFANTRY

The majority of the recruits to Napoleon’s infantry regiments were conscripts. During the Revolutionary Wars, Jourdan’s Law (5 September 1798) had established a conscription process that rendered all unmarried males aged 20–25 liable for military service. A lottery was used to decide who would actually be called up to meet the quotas set by the government. Service was set for four years in peacetime, or the duration of the war. As the wars of the empire continued and the need for manpower became more pressing, conscripts were ‘borrowed’ from the following year’s class, thereby increasing the numbers of teenagers in the ranks.

Except in Paris, from 1799 it had been possible to purchase a substitute to take a conscript’s place in the ranks. The arrangement was a private matter between the individuals concerned, with the going rate between 2,000 and 4,000 francs, rising to as much as 12,000 francs during the last years of the wars. This fee was out of reach of most families, with only about 5 per cent of the population being able to afford that kind of sum. Other than being in government service, the only other alternative was to simply vanish and be listed as a deserter. In the south and west of France, where there had been numerous rebellions against Paris since the Revolution, draft-dodgers could better expect to be hidden from the gendarmes sent to arrest them.

In the regimental depot, the new recruits received their basic training and uniforms before being sent off to the regiment’s bataillons de guerre out in the field, in garrison or in camps dotted around the empire. The length of time spent in the depot varied depending on the needs of the field army – times of crisis speeding up the processing from several months to a matter of days. The first significant stage was the entry of conscripts into the regimental register, or contrôle, which recorded the conscript’s full name, parents’ names and date and place of birth. For identification purposes, a rough physical description was added, including the conscript’s height (in metres), the colour of his eyes and hair, the shape of his nose, chin and mouth, and any notable distinguishing features such as scars or freckles. Finally, the conscript was issued with a serial number, and the name of the battalion and company in which he would serve. Later in his career, the conscript’s service history would be recorded alongside this initial information, including transfers, promotions and wounds. The entry would eventually conclude with the reason for his career’s termination: whether killed in action, invalided, retired or listed as a deserter.

The escouade (squad) was the most basic administrative unit of the regiment. A dozen to 15 men would find themselves in each squad, where they would share fatigue duties, and cook and eat together. The caporal was responsible for assigning duties and keeping up-to-date and coherent records. While the conscripts got used to their new surroundings and comrades, the business of
providing them with uniforms began. The supply of uniforms was the responsibility of the capitaine d'habillement, (clothing officer), who headed a team of master-artificers, their assistants and apprentices. Uniforms and shoes were manufactured in just three standard sizes. The quality of these uniforms varied considerably depending on the resources and time available for making a proper fitting. The basic uniform would suffice during the earliest days of training in the depot, only those with rank being routinely required to wear their coat or habit.

As the years of the empire passed, the uniform became more practical. The splendid parade uniform of the early empire, with its breeches, gaiters, neck stock and long-tailed coat, gave way to greatcoats, short gaiters and baggy trousers. Hairstyles also evolved. At the outset of the imperial era, soldiers were required to have their hair cut short like a brush at the front, with the back grown long and dressed into a queue (pigtail) of 15cm (6in). Over time, the queue disappeared in favour of a closely cropped style.

Perhaps the most impractical and unpopular garments were the tight breeches and long gaiters worn by line infantry. 'Now tell me, if a person wished to devise a most inconvenient method of clothing the soldier, could he have hit upon one more to the purpose?', complained soldier Elzéar Blaze: ‘You should have seen the grotesque figure cut by the young conscripts, with these breeches and gaiters, which, not being kept up by the calves, fell down about their heels. For this dress a man should be well built, well made; he ought to have legs furnished with fair protuberances... A man of twenty is not yet formed; nay, we were joined by conscripts who were under nineteen; this accoutrement gave them an absolutely silly look.’

Whether the conscripts found military life mundane and tedious, or if it seemed like the beginning of a big adventure, all must have known that there was a deadly serious side to their training. News from the field armies found its way back to the regimental depots, as the wounded returned, spreading the latest campfire gossip.
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS
Volunteers and Officer Cadets

Although it was by far the biggest source of recruits, conscription was not the sole source of manpower for the army, some men volunteering for service quite willingly through a sense of duty, adventure or as a means of social advancement. Volunteers had three options: the simplest was joining a regiment as a common soldier. Some men, such as Jean-Baptiste Cardron, managed to enrol in a regiment in which a friend of the family served as an officer. Having a well-placed family friend meant that if Cardron was lucky enough to dodge the bullets, he could expect to be shown some favouritism. On the eve of his first campaign in 1806, Cardron would gleefully write home that his mother's friend, his battalion commander, Monsieur Rigeard, 'assures me that I will win my officer's epaulettes on this campaign'.

For those from affluent backgrounds, there were two additional possibilities: the first was to gain admittance to the Velites of the Guard, where an officer's commission was promised after four years' service. The alternative for those with the means available was to enrol in the Fontainebleau military academy, and on graduation gain a commission. In effect, this allowed the sons of the empire's social elite to buy commissions for a tutelage fee of 1,200 francs a year. The result was to limit considerably the opportunities for common soldiers to rise swiftly through the ranks, which had been one of the defining characteristics of the Revolutionary army and the route many of the new elite had utilized themselves.

Camp and Campaign

Between campaigns, huge camps were erected to house the soldiers and hone their skills. Here large-scale manoeuvres, the like of which would have been impossible in the depots and urban areas, could be practised. These camps were an enormous success and were especially useful for training the detachments of conscripts sent from the depots to replenish losses in the ranks. The relatively light-hearted atmosphere in the camps swiftly changed as war approached.

The distance marched each day on campaign was referred to as an etape (stage). The length of the etape could vary considerably, depending on the

SCHOOL OF THE SOLDIER (opposite)

A corporal and three chasseur recruits in fatigue dress demonstrate various ways of carrying the musket, taught under the école de soldat part of the 1791 regulations. (From left to right) L'arme comme sergent: When the men were at portez vos arms (shoulder arms) the NCOs would maintain this position. Portez vos armes. L'arme au bras: This was the usual way of carrying a musket while under arms and marching. L'arme à volonté: When marching in column at pas de route, the command 'l'arme à volonté' opened up the ranks by four paces. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
A French staff officer on reconnaissance, with a mounted chasseur as escort. This light cavalry-style uniform seems to be based on that in the Martinet study of a staff captain, although the angle hides his Guard aiguillette. Officers were trained not only to take notes on what they saw, but also to make skilful topographical drawings. Since the chasseurs a cheval of the Guard were always part of the Imperial Headquarters, it was probably not unusual for this unit to provide escorts to staff officers. (Ronald Pawley)

urgency of the moment. On average the infantryman could be expected to cover 30km (eight leagues; 18.6 miles) a day, but with an accelerated pace it could be doubled. The march could also be forced, continuing longer than usual, sometimes through the night and well into the next day. By limiting the march to eight leagues, there was plenty of time for food and shelter to be prepared and for the stragglers to catch up, but an extension would inevitably increase the numbers left by the wayside.

Sleeping rough on damp ground under the stars took its toll on even the fittest soldiers, many of whom would experience rheumatism early in their lives. The quickest cure seemed to be copious amounts of alcohol, even among the officers. When not marching, the soldiers were often billeted in a town or village for a few days. The quality and quantity of food available depended largely on the time of year, the location, and on how many regiments had already passed through the area. Although attacks on civilians and their property did occur and the stealing of food was often tolerated, the French Army was not without discipline. If rations were provided, the official response to looting could be severe, and the sentence of death was occasionally imposed where it was thought the mark had been overstepped. Corporal punishment had been outlawed in the French Army since the Revolution, but necessity often meant that officers resorted to it and with good effect.

Line and Light

In 1789 Napoleon’s line infantry consisted of 79 French and 23 foreign regiments, almost all of two battalions. From 1 January 1791, a major reorganization began. Out went the old regimental titles, and between 1791 and 1793 a major number
of volunteer and conscript battalions were created, leading up to the levée en masse in 1793. The quality of the new mass army was extremely variable, and in an attempt to combine discipline with revolutionary fervour the Amalgame (lit. 'mixture') was instigated on 8 January 1794 – thus each regular battalion became the nucleus of a demi-brigade. The regular (2nd) battalion was augmented by newly raised 1st and 3rd battalions, the idea being that the 2nd battalion would take the centre on the battlefield and thus could manoeuvre in line and focus its firepower; the conscript forces to the sides would make rapid manoeuvres in column. This system led to Napoleon's l'ordre mixte (composite order), which used some units to provide fire cover, while others performed manoeuvre.

BARRACKROOM LIFE

Casernes (barracks) housing the regimental depots were located all over France, but especially on the eastern frontier in the chain of Vauban fortresses stretching from Calais to Switzerland. Some were former church buildings or convents, which had been converted to military use after the Revolution. The soldier's rooms were spartan: two men shared each bed, sleeping on a straw palliasse and covered by blankets. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
‘Our conscripts,’ remembered Captain Elzear Blaze, ‘were bent low under the weight of a knapsack, a musket, a cartridge box; add to these fifty ball-cartridges, bread, meat, a kettle, or perhaps a hatchet and you may have some conception of the plight of those poor fellows, especially in hot weather.’ Exhausted soldiers catnap during the advance into Russia, 1812. (Collection Alfred and Roland Umhey)

Demi-brigade battalions were know as de Bataille for line infantry and légère for light infantry. Each consisted of eight fusilier companies and one grenadier company, plus a regimental artillery company. In a demi-brigade, each fusilier company theoretically possessed the following ranks: a captain, a lieutenant, a sous-lieutenant (2nd lieutenant), a sergeant major, five sergeants, a caporal-fourrier (quartermaster-corporal), eight corporals, two drummers and 104 fusiliers. The grenadier companies had likewise, apart from four sergeants and 64 grenadiers. Of course, the exigencies of campaigning often meant that actual strengths often bore little relation to theoretical strengths.

In September 1803 the word régiment came into official use once again, and demi-brigade was applied specifically to provisional units. Under these reforms a total of 90 infantry regiments existed, 19 of which had four battalions and the remainder of which had three. From 20 September 1804, each battalion had its own light voltigeur company created from the conversion of the fusilier company, and used in the traditional light infantry roles of scouting and skirmishing. Structural changes to the line infantry continued throughout the period. A decree of 18 February 1808 officially structured each regiment around four bataillons de guerre and one depot battalion, the latter of which had four companies under the command of a senior captain. The bataillons de guerre each had four fusilier companies and one grenadier and one voltigeur company. Total regimental establishment would be just under 4,000 men. In later Napoleonic campaigns, additional battalions were added to existing regiments.

In terms of light infantry, France had formed light infantry corps by the mid-1700s, but until the 1780s these were principally volunteer troops or parts
of mixed corps of light infantry and light cavalry, known, appropriately enough, as *corps mixte*. Through several convoluted organizational changes, the *chasseurs a pied* (light infantry) were permanently separated from the *chasseurs a cheval* (light cavalry) by 1788. At this point the light infantry consisted of 12 battalions, each with four companies that in turn were manned by six officers and 102 men, although wartime conditions increased the manpower by 21 men per company. On 1 April 1791 the light infantry once again came under reorganization; this time the traditional regimental titles were abolished in favour of using numbers only. Company strength in each

(Left) Grenadier, 15th Line, 1807. This figure wears the white uniform and 1806 shako as originally issued, minus chinscales. (Centre) Voltigeur Cornet, 18th Line, 1809. This figure wears voltigeur distinctions, with the regimental crimson facings and tricolour lace. (Right) Voltigeur, 3rd Line, 1809. The voltigeur illustrated wears the 'sunburst' shako plate shown by Martinet c. 1808–09, though the regiment is also believed to have worn other non-regulation plates of eagle-on-crescent form. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
battalion was now raised to eight companies, and in April 1792 a complement of each company was increased to a total 130 men, while at the same time the number of battalions was increased to 14.

The uniforms of the light and line infantry went through a series of shifts and regularizations during our period, although it should always be noted that official dress regulations were often not followed. In 1791 new uniform regulations were introduced, further developing the white uniforms and the blue uniforms worn
by line infantry and volunteer and conscript battalions respectively. The light infantry regiments wore a dark-green infantry-style coat with white metal buttons that displayed the battalion number within the loop of a hunting horn. Lapels were green, and piped in the facing colour specific to the unit, and cuffs and cuff flaps with either the facing colour or green. The line infantry had a white uniform with facing colours on the lapels, collar, cuffs and turnbacks of the coat. Headdress for both line and light infantry was either the ‘Tarleton’ type with peak and imitation fur turban and fur crest, or the bicorn helmet.

White uniforms would not disappear for many years, but in 1793 a universal blue uniform was introduced across the French army, based on the old National Guard uniform, worn with a bicorn hat. The 1793 pattern laid the foundations for many subsequent variations. (It must of course be remembered that individual units and formations would have their own different take on all uniforms, particularly in terms of piping, epaulette and headdress plume/cord colouration.) Around 1800–01 the habit received shorter tails with false turnbacks and more curved lapels. In 1801 the first shako was authorized for wear amongst the light infantry, with the line infantry following suit in 1806 (by the following year the bicorn hat had been effectively replaced by the shako). A taller and more robust shako was introduced in November 1810. Also in 1806, the line infantry kept the same style of uniform, but reverted to the white colour of the early/pre-Revolutionary period. Yet indecision persisted, and in 1812 came the so-called ‘Bardin’ regulations, named after the man responsible, a Major Bardin. Blue made a return in a double-breasted, short-tailed blue jacket or habit-veste, with a red collar piped blue (except voltigeurs, who had chamois collars piped blue). The white turnbacks featured badges to distinguish the arm of service: red grenades for carabiniers; yellow or chamois horn for voltigeurs; blue ‘N’ for fusiliers. It was in the 1812 uniform that the French Army experienced its final defeat at Waterloo. Whatever the time period, a freshly turned out formation of French infantry must have been a sight to behold, although no doubt campaign realities soon degraded the sharpness of appearance.

The Infantry in Battle

The way French infantry actually fought from the start of the Revolution all the way through to Waterloo, and the way its leaders thought it ought to fight, were not always the same thing. There was always a tension between practice and theory, just as there was between tactics that depended on shock action and those that depended on firepower. There were further wide variations in approach from one individual commander to another, and from one type of battle to another. The tactics that could be executed by experienced and well-trained troops were much more complicated than those that were within the grasp of freshly raised or second-line troops.
During the period 1792–1815, the French fielded many different armies in many different theatres, and their quality was far from uniform.

During the 1790s the French armies were often relatively inexperienced, and even ramshackle in terms of their logistics and supply arrangements; yet at least they were usually led by well-trained commanders. It is important to remember that the military thinking of the Ancien Régime had been very significantly moulded by French experiences during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63). At the level of tactics, an enormously important lesson from that conflict – particularly the French-Indian War in America – and from the American Revolutionary War, had been the great value of skirmishers. In difficult terrain where formal close-order drill was impossible, well-trained snipers or marksmen (tirailleurs), rangers or ‘hunters’ (chasseurs), scouts (eclaireurs), or simply light infantry often proved invaluable. During the 1790s and 1800s a number of other supposedly specialized types would be added, most famously the voltigeurs, who were supposed to enter battle riding pillion behind a cavalryman and then leap off to open a galling musketry fire upon the enemy.

Such fantasies were laughably impractical, and in the fiery crucible of real campaigning all these intended varieties and distinctions immediately evaporated. The troops designated for light infantry work should more realistically be classified, firstly, according to whether they fought in line (i.e. in close order) or as skirmishers (i.e. in open order); and then, if they did in fact fight as skirmishers, they should be graded on how carefully they had been trained for that specialized role. In the period 1792–1815 one suspects that many of the supposedly ‘light’ troops were actually used as ‘heavy’ infantry; and many of those who really were used in the light role had received absolutely no training for it. This was perhaps unsurprising, in view of the absence of any official army-wide manual on how skirmishing should be conducted.

The line was the ‘classic’ or conventional formation for infantry, and it implied a battle based on firepower. Yet the disadvantage was that it was always difficult to keep a line in position unless a long time was spent in checking and re-checking its alignments. The task of maintaining every man in place over a long frontage was daunting indeed, and trebly so if they were all expected to move forwards, backwards or sideways in step with one another. Columns were much easier to manoeuvre than lines, particularly over broken ground; and

POLAND, 1807 (opposite)
A carabinier officer of the 9th Light infantry warms himself with a pipe and some brandy from a cantinière. He is wearing the Legion d’honneur medal, instituted by Napoleon in 1802 to reward special service to France. In the background, the regimental eagle is carried by a sergent-major who, with one of the sappers, is befriending a local lad. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Lines and Ranks
During the early part of the 18th century, the conventional wisdom had been that infantry should conduct both its approach march and then its combat action in lines three deep. This arrangement had the advantage of maximizing the continuous frontage that could be occupied on the battlefield, since, with a density of three men per 55cm (22in) – each touching elbows with his neighbours – an army of 60,000 men could occupy a frontage of no less than 13km (8 miles). Even allowing for a second or reserve line, the frontage would be 6.5km (4.5 miles) – which is still a major piece of real estate. A second, and possibly even more important advantage of the line formation was that, at least in theory, every soldier would be able to fire his musket or point his bayonet in a meaningful way.
In practice the third rank, and to some extent the second rank too, tended to find it somewhat difficult to fire or stab 'through' the front rank, and there were some reports of nasty injuries being inflicted on the latter. Nevertheless, it was normally deemed best to stick to three ranks rather than two (let alone one, although a few examples of both may be found in Napoleonic times), since the extra men in rear would provide moral support to the men in front, as well as physical file-fillers who could step forward to plug gaps in the event of heavy casualties. The 'solidity' of a three-deep line was deemed to be especially required when there was a serious threat from cavalry.
There was also a widespread belief that they were good for maintaining the morale of shaky troops, who would gain confidence by the close proximity of so many of their comrades. The opponents of columns, however, such as Comte Hippolyte de Guibert and the Chevalier Tronçon du Coudray, were quick to reply that they were far more vulnerable to artillery fire. A cannonball could theoretically knock down only one file of three men in a line, whereas there would be many more men per file in a column; a deep column might well suffer a dozen men hit by each accurate round.
Perhaps the most important figure in these debates was General Count Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert (1743–90). The document that eventually laid out the official tactics for the French infantry in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and then on into the 1830s, appeared on 1 August 1791. Entitled the Règlement concernant l'exercice et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie ('Manual for the training and manoeuvres of infantry'), or simply 'the Règlement of 1791', it owed more than a little to Guibert's guiding influence. The Règlement remained essentially an 18th-century and conservative document, since it was based almost entirely upon the manoeuvres of the line. Yet the Revolution changed everything. The civilian politicians laid down some new and 'democratic' military doctrines of their own, in an attempt to counteract the
influence of the old royalist army. Once the soldiers could be trusted to do the right thing, it was assumed they could then be released in large numbers, without any particular training, as unsupervised skirmishers. They could also dispense with all the complex minutiae of the Règlement, which was dismissed as 'Prussian drill' suitable only for mercenaries and slaves, but not for free citizens. All that these citizens had to do in battle was simply form up in a mass and charge forward fearlessly to crush the craven lackeys of autocrats and kings.

Yet in military terms the results were much more questionable. The French infantry's record in the field during the Revolutionary Wars is notably peppered

(Left) Captain, light infantry, 1800. This depicts a typical light infantry uniform; line officers wore a similar costume, with live-pattern coat.
(Centre) Sergent-chef, 30th Demi-Brigade, 1800. Here we see a typical campaign uniform.
(Right) Caporal, Consular Guard Grenadiers, 1800. The distinctive grenadier uniform was probably worn only from about 1801. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
To galvanise his gunners at the siege of Toulon, Napoleon Bonaparte, who commanded the artillery, asked a young corporal by the name of Andoche Junot (the future senior general) to put up a sign with ‘Batterie des hommes sans peur’ (Battery of the fearless men) in front of his gun’s position. Thereafter every gunner in the army wished to serve there. This incident shows how Napoleon understood the motivations of men at war and their desire to surpass themselves when well led. (Rene Chartrand)

with a series of the most shameful routs and panics. To a French general in this period it must often have seemed that the best thing to do was to stand on the defensive, so that his unreliable troops would hardly have to manoeuvre at all in the presence of the enemy. French generals were expected to fight on the offensive, but during the Revolutionary Wars they did not possess infantry that was capable of winning clean and decisive battles of manoeuvre. Instead, the battles tended to be messy attritional affairs, with blobs of infantry and unorganized skirmish lines being the main tactical formations. It was often merely the dogged persistence of the French, and their ability to continue reinforcing the front line (with or without a formal ‘passage of lines’) that won the day.

Skirmishers were central to French tactics during this period. It is clear that for well over a decade enemy troops were often very impressed by the numbers and firepower of their skirmishing opponents, and on a few occasions they reported that the French went one step further and actually launched bayonet assaults in open order.

The troops who had survived the multiple crises of 1792–94 had necessarily grown in experience and understanding of what they might expect to encounter in combat.

By the time Bonaparte launched his famous offensive into Italy in 1796, a high proportion of his subordinates were already battle-hardened, and ‘professional’ in the sense that they knew what they were doing in military terms. The division had already established itself as a unit of manoeuvre: but now the army corps was beginning to be seen as an efficient way to combine the action of several divisions, and all their supporting arms, under the hand of a single commander.

Some commanders still liked to launch their infantry in line, according to the classic model. Others preferred to attack in column since, even if it did not break through cleanly, or even deploy cleanly into a regulation firing line, it could still be expected to break down into some sort of ragged firing line or thick skirmish line rather than running away. In his Italian campaign, Bonaparte lodged a rather dubious claim to tactical originality when he favoured l’ordre mixte. In practice, however, the whole idea of l’ordre mixte smacked of an over-theoretical solution. If there was a cavalry threat, the central
line might be seen as too thin, whereas if there were an artillery threat, the columns on the flanks would be too vulnerable. It is noticeable that although Bonaparte continued to advocate *l'ordre mixte* throughout his wars, rather few of his subordinates seem to have adopted it when not directly under his eye.

The creation of the *Grande Armée* changed the face of French infantry warfare. Each corps was intended to manoeuvre as an autonomous formation, with its own separate aims. In some cases a single corps was enough to control a province or even a whole country (with the consequence that more than a few of the marshals soon developed ambitions to become princes and kings in their own right). In other cases a group of corps would manoeuvre in generally the same direction, in a broad fan covering a total frontage of perhaps 200km (125 miles). Then, at a word of command from Imperial Headquarters, the fan would snap shut, and all would concentrate together on a single battlefield, with a total frontage of perhaps 10km (6 miles). It was this flexibility which gave the French a distinct operational advantage over their opponents for several years.

Each of Napoleon’s commanders had his own personal ideas about an infinity of details; but at least there were a few common themes. The first was that remorseless training in drill (which in those days amounted to much the same thing as tactics) was essential for everyone at every rank. The second was that the column was the real key to battle-handling. As Ney put it, ‘The march and evolutions of columns form the essential part of tactics’ — although he would certainly have added that these evolutions should include deployments into line whenever they were required.

The other consensus that was forming among prominent tacticians by 1804–05, which many of them had already realized years earlier, was that the *Règlement* of 1791 needed to be simplified. The problem, as always, was that there were as many conflicting opinions as to exactly how it should be simplified as there were experts in the field. The perceived need seems to have been a reduction of pedantry, from which the *Règlement* could emerge as a set of essential but simple drills that could easily be learned. The list did not extend very much further than the march in line and column (including how to narrow frontages when obstacles were encountered); a few simple ways to change from one to the other, or back again; and, of course, forming square against cavalry.

When the *Grande Armée* marched out of Boulogne in the autumn of 1805 it was not only its generals who possessed a sophisticated understanding of tactics, as had too often been the case in the early 1790s. This time it was the entire army, right down to the last drummer boy, who knew all the drills; and they proved it, all the way down the Danube to Austerlitz in that year, and through Jena to Berlin in 1806. The secret of the French success surely lay in the fact that they possessed the cohesion and resilience to adopt whatever tactical arrangements they chose, even in the heat of battle. But there were
weaknesses emerging. In the Polish campaign that followed the same tactical virtuosity was still apparent, although the adverse conditions of terrain and weather blunted some of its sharper edges. This was a winter campaign, in which the Emperor had ordered greatcoats for his army lamentably too late to be of service (in the event they arrived only in May 1807, rather than in January, when they might have been useful). At Eylau on 8 February the battle began before the French were properly concentrated, so they were badly outnumbered for a long time, and suffered especially heavily to Russian artillery, which was twice as numerous as their own. All attempts to fight forward in small columns, monstrous columns, lines or skirmish swarms were doomed to failure, and in falling snow the day ended as an inconclusive but very costly draw. It brought a sudden end to the uninterrupted succession of victories that had begun at Marengo seven years earlier.

If conditions in Poland could be harsh, the same was also true in Spain and Portugal, but for different reasons. Mountainous terrain, agricultural shortages and the long distances separating French depots meant that food was always in short supply – the need to gather it could dictate the strategic movements of whole Army Corps. Simultaneously, relentless guerrilla activity made the stretched lines of communication notoriously dangerous and unreliable. In tactical terms, however, the French usually enjoyed a great advantage. In siege operations, whether in attack or defence, they had the best corps of engineers, and engineer officers, in the world. Only occasionally would their projects run out of control, as happened most famously at Saragossa (20 December 1808–20 February 1809). In that epic struggle they did not have to capture a regular fortress that was built and defended according to the well-understood classic rules. Instead, they had to subdue a city’s population under arms, who were prepared to defend every block of apartments, room by room, in a war to the knife (or indeed, ‘to the bucket of boiling oil’). This type of frenzied house-to-house fighting was not taught in any military school or training camp, and it came as a nasty shock to the infantry who found they had to do it.

After Waterloo, the surviving French generals would reflect on the lessons of Bonaparte’s whole mad adventure, and many of them would publish their thoughts – most notably Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, but also Marmont and Morand. The one thing most of them could agree upon was that Bonaparte’s biggest mistake had been to indulge in ‘corrupt gigantism’ during his last six or seven years in power. By this they meant that when the relatively small but excellent professional army of the Boulogne camp, Austerlitz and Jena had gradually wasted away, it had not been replaced by another cast in the same mould, but by one that was larger but professionally inferior.

Apart from anything else, the battles themselves were getting bigger, or at least those outside the Peninsula. Rightly or wrongly, Bonaparte’s enemies
perceived that in earlier years the French had often been able to field larger infantry forces than the Austrians and Prussians, because of their use of mass conscription. Now those powers reformed their own military systems in order to catch up. At the battle of Leipzig in 1813 the French would have all of 195,000 men; but the Allies, from all over Europe, were able to put a massive total of 365,000 men into the field. This expansion took place in a relatively short timescale, so there was never enough time for training – especially since the casualties in these battles also continued to grow, including among the experienced NCOs and regimental officers. The half-million men that Bonaparte led into Russia in 1812 were also largely lost to him thereafter. Thus the experience and therefore the quality of the French infantry was always falling inexorably away, and combined with strategic mistakes this fact put Napoleon on course to his final defeat.
ARTILLERY

In 1785, the young Napoleon Bonaparte graduated from the Military School in Paris to become a second lieutenant in the La Fere Regiment of the Corps royal de l’artillerie (Royal Corps of Artillery); his supreme commander was the elderly Général de Gribeauval. After a long series of political battles, France had adopted the innovative system of artillery drawn up and introduced by Gribeauval. The young Napoleon was therefore fortunate to become an officer within a few years of the adoption by the French Army of what was arguably the best artillery system in Europe at that time, replacing the previous system, adopted in 1732, that of Lieutenant-General Jean Florent de Vallière, the Inspector of the Artillery.

The royal order introducing the Gribeauval system went into effect from 15 October 1765. Gribeauval’s system considerably augmented the amount of field artillery given to an army. The following figures regarding artillery numbers for an army of 100 battalions in the field demonstrate the differences. Using the Vallière system, an army of 100 battalions had the following artillery complement: 150 guns, 1,720 horses and 230 waggons. According to Gribeauval’s system, an army of 100 battalions would now have the following field pieces: 200 guns, 2,840 horses and 440 waggons.

The advantage was obvious. There was a great increase in heavier calibre field guns, which, thanks to their reduced weight and better-designed carriages and limbers, were actually lighter and could keep up with the field army much more easily. For 100 battalions, the number of 8 and 12pdrs went from 60 to an amazing 160, a revolutionary increase in firepower. True, there were now more horses and waggons (now named caissons), but the total weight of the guns, carriages and caissons was lower. They were also more effectively
THREE FRENCH ARTILLERYMEN

(Top) Gunner, foot artillery, 1804; dressed in the characteristic blue infantry uniform of the French Revolution and Consulate, and early Napoleonic period. (Centre) Gunner, foot artillery of the line, 1807; note how the cocked hat has been replaced by a black shako. (Right) Officer, horse artillery, 1804; horse artillery soldiers adopted a style of dress more akin to that of hussars. (Michael Roffe © Osprey Publishing)
harnessed so that artillery trains following the armies were actually much shorter and less prone to breakage and accidents slowing them down. Thus, by following Gribeauval’s system, firepower was doubled and the French Army, in one stroke, went from having a relatively weak and outdated field artillery system to having one of Europe’s most redoubtable and modern.

The new artillery was also more likely to hit its target as the windage (space between the diameter of the barrel’s bore and the diameter of the cannonball) was lessened. To take aim there was an adjustable backsight instead of a simple notch cut on the top of the gun’s rear. Range was improved too so that a Gribeauval gun, although much lighter, was more likely to hit its target at a greater distance.

Whatever the technical virtues of the new artillery, its major role was still to support the infantry.

SERVING A 4PDR GUN

The plate shows a foot artillery detachment of 1808–11 in the Peninsula serving a 4pdr field piece. Some of the detachment might also have been infantrymen detached to help the gunners, notably the men guarding the limber and some of the men moving the piece. This gun has just been fired. (Ray Hutchins © Osprey Publishing)
Material Improvements

As well as improvements in the organization of French artillery, production materiel was similarly improved in quality. Carriages were better made and sturdy. Their axletrees were of iron instead of the more breakable wood. Wheels were increased in size and solidity. Harnesses had wooden poles rather than only leather and rope, which made them more solid and easier to handle. The way horses were placed, two by two, greatly reduced the length of artillery trains on the march. One of the most important aspects of the system devised by Gribeauval was its principle of uniformity in all components. The aim was that any piece from a carriage, limber or caisson would be interchangeable. Previously, while the designs were the same, there could be many variations depending on the habits of the local blacksmith and workmen who made the vehicles. The result was that, although they looked the same from a distance, the parts were often unique to the blacksmith who made them. On campaign, when there was often damage from travel or weather, as well as from enemy action, repairs would be hampered until a blacksmith or a skilled worker could make a suitable replacement. To remedy all this, Gribeauval had detailed specifications drafted up for distribution to all artillery workshops so that all components became as similar as possible.

Manoeuvre of the field artillery was greatly improved by a few of Gribeauval’s simple but enlightened inventions. The gunners were equipped with a bricole, a drag-rope carried on a shoulder belt, with which they could easily pull their guns into position. Sets of levers made pointing a lot more efficient and a screw elevating device to aim the barrel was quicker and more precise. The split trail held an ammunition box placed between its cheeks when travelling. This was put on the limber when the gun was set up for action providing an immediate source of ammunition. The prolonge, a long rope, fastened the rear of the carriage to the limber. The gun could therefore be pulled back some distance without hitching it up again to the limber. The rounded rear of the carriage prevented the gun being stuck in the ground while being pulled by the prolonge.

Artillery units

The officers and men who served in the French artillery were part of a number of complex organizations. In 1790, during the early months of the French Revolution, the French Army’s Corps royal de l’artillerie had seven artillery regiments, six companies of miners and ten companies of ouvriers (artisans). They had a peace establishment of 8,663. An ill-advised Revolutionary government decision was the disbandment of the seven provincial militia.
Gribeauval 8pdr and limber with ammunition box and instruments. (1) 8pdr Gribeauval gun placed in the carriage's travelling slots. (2) Gribeauval system ammunition box fitted on the trail of the carriage between the cheeks when travelling. When the gun went into action, the box was taken from the trail and put on the limber further back. (3) Top, front and side view of ammunition box. The main gunner's implements were: (4) Sponge and rammer combination tool (for a 12pdr shown) used from 1801. Previously the rammer and the sponge were two separate tools. (5) Sponge and rammer combination tool (for an 8pdr shown) used from 1801. (6) The crooked handle sponge (for a 4pdr shown). (7) Worm and ladle combination tool used from 1801. Previously the worm and the ladle were two separate tools. (8) Linstocks, one having an intertwined slow match. (9) Priming wires. (10) Portfire stick. The stick is made of two pieces of sheet iron that hold the portfire, a thin cylindrical piece of paper filled with combustible ingredients that burn slowly. (11) The Gribeauval system water bucket was ingenious in that it was narrower at the top so it was less likely to be tipped over. When travelling, it was hooked under the carriage. Its shape also retained water better. (12) The bricoles was a leather belt slung over the shoulder from which hung a length of rope at the end of which was a steel hook. Used by gunners to pull their field gun. A long bricoles was the rope's full length, a short bricoles was the rope doubled. (13) The prolonge was the long length of rope connecting the limber to the rear of the gun's carriage. Field artillery fired the following main types of shot: (14) Canister. (15) Solid round shot, the usual cannonball. (16) Shell (howitzers only). (17) Grape shot. (18) Side cutaway view of a sabot. This item was used for cannonball and shell cartridges. (Ray Hutchins © Osprey Publishing)
artillery regiments. This act wiped out the corps’ reserves, although many of these trained men would later reappear as volunteer gunners. On 1 April 1791, the seven army artillery regiments, which had been known by their regimental and school names, were designated by numbers:

La Fère = 1st, Metz = 2nd, Besançon = 3rd, Grenoble = 4th, Strasbourg = 5th, Auxonne = 6th and Toul = 7th.

At the same time the companies of *ouvriers* and miners, which had been known by their captains’ names, were henceforth numbered. The ‘royal’ prefix was dropped during the summer of 1792 following the proclamation of the Republic in France. On 27 August 1792, the 8th Foot Artillery Regiment was formed by the transfer of the colonial artillery corps from the navy to the army. A 9th Foot Artillery Regiment was raised in 1794 but disbanded a year later. In 1804, when Napoleon became Emperor of the French, the ‘imperial’ prefix was added to the name, which became the Corps impérial de l’artillerie (Imperial Corps of Artillery). The 9th regiment was raised again on 18 August 1810 by the incorporation of the Dutch artillery into the French Imperial Army, but was was disbanded on 12 May 1814.

Horse artillery was also in the process of development, as the effects of the French Revolution brought about a new opportunity. Young officers carried the idea to the new National Assembly, which, on 28 September 1791, recommended the formation of light artillery units. The minister of war Narbonne was enthusiastic and, in January 1792, allowed two such companies to be experimentally raised in Metz while convening a board of officers to push the idea forward. On 17 April, the speedy creation of nine companies of horse artillery was decreed and the remaining seven companies were raised in May. They were organized on the Prussian detachment system, but the new French

The southern battery at the fortress of Almeida. The thick surrounding walls would be all but impervious to enemy shot, and only a direct hit on the gun itself would put it out of action. (Rene Chartrand)
horse artillery was superior in that all its gunners were mounted. Every gunner was trained as a cavalryman and the battery could therefore gallop and keep up with the cavalry, giving this arm its own quick-moving firepower. Each battery was equipped with six 4pdr guns and a 152mm (6in) howitzer.

The horse artillery companies became an important part of the new mass-levied French armies. Every general in the field clamoured for them and the number of units was greatly increased during 1792/93 going from nine to 40 companies each consisting of 100 men. The companies were initially attached to existing foot artillery regiments, but by the summer of 1793, this system had become unmanageable. There were also some independent horse artillery units raised spontaneously from volunteers. On 7 February 1794, a new artillery arm was created by an order to organize the existing companies into eight regiments, each having six companies and a depot. They were mostly organized with gunners mounted on horses, but some had Würtz caissons. The new regiments, numbered 1 to 8, were organized during the spring and summer of 1794. A 9th regiment was raised in 1794, but disbanded on 9 September 1798. The 8th and 7th regiments were disbanded respectively in January and December 1801. Another 7th horse artillery regiment was raised in August 1810 by incorporating the Dutch horse artillery, but it only had two companies and these were incorporated into the 1st and 4th regiments in February 1811.

Dressed in a fashionable hussar-style uniform of blue with red facings and cords, the horsed gunners acquired a rather elitist style and attitude comparable to the French cavalry of the period. This attitude was strengthened by the fact that they were drawn from the fittest and best young men in the foot artillery and had a higher pay. However, this pay was certainly earned. A horse battery would move ahead of the main force under fire from the enemy’s usually heavier-calibre guns, its salvation residing in returning rapid fire, ideally twice as fast, from its lighter guns. It could be useful as a mobile reserve to the forward units of an army, ready to be deployed at a critical moment when the commanding general spotted a weakness in his enemy’s army. This was one of Napoléon’s favourite moves and he used it with great effect in several battles. While such tactics were effective, the horse artillery could suffer heavy casualties due to their exposure to enemy fire.

To be a fully operational and integrated system, Gribeauval’s bold innovations needed manpower. These greatly increased numbers of artillery and auxiliary units brought a very large establishment of men attached to the ordnance services in the Revolutionary and Imperial French Army. In 1801, there were eight foot artillery regiments, six horse artillery regiments, two battalions of pontonniers, 15 companies of ouvriers, eight train battalions and one horse artillery company of the Consular Guard, all of which amounted to
28,196 officers and men. New staff offices and schools were set up and units strengthened so that, by the end of 1804 when Napoleon became emperor, the establishment was up to 35,865 officers and men. The numbers increased steadily during the next ten years. The Imperial Guard artillery also grew, its horse artillery achieving regimental status in 1806 and foot artillery being added from 1809. At length, the Imperial Guard artillery provided Napoleon with a reserve of 198 guns. By March 1814, the various army artillery units amounted to an establishment of 80,273 officers and men, although by that date, barely a month before Napoleon’s abdication, the real numbers would

**GRIEUAUVAL 12PDR FIELD GUN**

This was the typical appearance of the Gribeauval field guns. The 12pdr shown was the largest, the 8 and 4pdrs were smaller but had the same features. The elevating screw was below a board on which the barrel rested. Note the two slots for the trunnions. The gun shown is in the battle action slots, the ones further back were for travelling. The 8pdrs also had the travelling slots but these were not needed for the 4pdrs. (Ray Hutchins © Osprey Publishing)
have been lower. It was, nevertheless, an indication of what it took for a great nation to have effective artillery services as defined by Napoleon.

In May 1814, the new government of King Louis XVIII brought this down to an establishment of 17,041. The numbers went up as the regiments tried to expand during the ‘Hundred Days’ of Napoleon’s return, which ended at Waterloo on 18 June 1815. Thereafter, the establishment was slashed to some 12,500.

The An XI system
The 4 and 8pdrs of the Gribeauval system were not always found to be the best solution against enemy 6pdr guns and several senior generals requested a weapon of similar calibre. Back in France, Marmont wrote a memoir to Napoleon, when he was First Consul, proposing changes to the Gribeauval system to reflect these developments. Marmont felt that a single 6pdr calibre could replace both the 4pdr, considered too light, and the 8pdr, which was too heavy. The 6pdr, he argued, was almost as mobile as Gribeauval’s 4pdr and was almost equal in firepower to the 8pdr. He also called for a new howitzer of 127mm (5in). Napoleon reacted with interest and, on 29 December 1801, appointed a commission of artillery officers to evaluate the existing system and make proposals to update it.

On 2 May 1803, the commission proposed a new An XI (Year XI) system, which featured: a short 24pdr gun; long 12pdr gun; short 12pdr gun; long 6pdr gun; short 6pdr gun; 3pdr mountain gun; 24pdr howitzer; and a 24pdr...
mortar. On the whole, the proposed new system favoured heavier calibres. Instead of 4 and 8pdrs, the field artillery would have 6pdrs and short 12pdrs. However, it was not a report that met with unanimous approval. Napoleon for his part favoured the proposals, especially regarding the introduction of the 6pdrs. Napoleon still favoured other areas of Gribeauval’s system but felt that efforts to make it as simple and as light as possible while increasing firepower should continue.

As the First (or senior) Inspector-General of Artillery, General Marmont also pushed for the new An XI system, but the opposition from Gassendi and others was fierce. Tests and experiments were also necessary to determine the exact lengths of the future guns and some were held in Strasbourg. However, this could not be done overnight and it took much work and many months to test and refine the proposed new system. In 1804, Marmont went on to other duties while Napoleon became Emperor and the An XI system became more of a gunners’ debate. The 6pdr was generally seen as a good idea and was the only An XI gun cast in quantity. However, its manufacture was cancelled in 1808 as the army had an ample supply of this calibre. Much of this abundance of 6pdrs was due to the many captured Prussian and Austrian pieces that had been taken into the French artillery.

In January 1809, Napoleon was informed that the An XI system really only consisted of the 6pdr, the 3pdr mountain gun and the 5in 6 lines howitzer. There were complaints about the new system too. The 6pdr barrel was good enough, but its poorly designed carriage caused problems. Some veteran soldiers felt that, on the whole, Gribeauval’s 4 and 8pdrs were better. Nor did the howitzer introduced by Marmont make all gunners happy. Some wished for something like those used by the Austrians and Russians. Indeed, apart from the new 6pdr gun and the 5in 6 lines howitzer, it seemed that the An XI system was not a really new system, merely a reorganization of Gribeauval’s. Even with this limited reform, the original Gribeauval system seemed better to many gunners. The tangible result of all this was a growing perception that the Year XI system had not lived up to its promise.

To sort this out, the Emperor finally set up a commission in January 1810 to evaluate the system and recommend a solution. Headed by General Songis, the current First Inspector General of Artillery, the commission concluded that the Year XI system was largely unsuitable and that it was best to continue with Gribeauval’s system while accommodating the 6pdr field piece. The howitzer was retained but some copies of the Austrian and Russian 152 and 203mm (6 and 8in) ones were later produced. Furthermore, as early as 1804, Gribeauval 152mm (6in) howitzers were being cast at Douai and Strasbourg instead of the An XI howitzer and more were cast as late as 1813 at Douai.

NEXT PAGES
The Allied retreat across the Satschan Ponds. With the battle of Austerlitz clearly lost, those Allies still able to extricate themselves headed for the only open escape route between the southern end of the Pratzen plateau and the frozen Satschan pond. They were forced, however, onto the frozen Satschan Ponds – unable to bear this weight the ice began to crack, then break. Seeing this, French artillery now drawn up overlooking the village of Augezd opened fire on the frozen pond adding to the confusion. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Imperial campaigns

During the later part of Napoleon’s imperial reign, the main field gun became the *An XI* system 6pdr, at least for the campaigns in central and eastern Europe. Some *An XI* howitzers were also present but, for nearly everything else, the gunners continued to rely on the dependable Gribeauval system. In tactical terms, there was an increasing shift in the use of the field artillery that was introduced and first put to the test on a grand scale by Napoleon. Batteries were grouped to provide for increased firepower. Up until then, field artillery had always been seen as a support weapon for the cavalry and infantry. At Austerlitz, on 18 December 1805, a group of 18 line artillery guns along with 24 of the Imperial Guard Horse Artillery had a decisive effect on the Russians’ defeat at the Santon Heights sector of the battlefield. The guns at the heights had been rushed there to cover a gap between the corps of Marshals Lannes and Soult. They prevailed over the enemy infantry’s attack. This was not missed by Napoleon. Line artillery batteries tried it again with 25 guns under Lannes at Jena, on 14 October 1806. The tactic met with renewed success against the Prussians and Napoleon did not even have to commit the guard artillery. At Eylau, on 8 February 1807, the Russians and Prussians had about 400 guns and the French only 200, but General Senarmont brought the massed French guns closer to the enemy, which had a devastating effect. At Friedland, on 14 June 1807, the gathered artillery from the three divisions of Marshal Victor’s corps, some 38 guns, again pounded the Russians and turned the tide for the French.

Definitely, gathering the guns for massed artillery barrages was now perceived by Napoleon to be a decisive factor that could change the course of a battle. The Russians too had toyed with the idea. However, corps commanders, French or otherwise, were jealous of their guns and were unwilling to let them pass under the command of other generals. Napoleon found the solution to this problem by using the Imperial Guard’s artillery as a powerful reserve. At Wagram, on 6 July 1809, the guard and line artillery provided a concentration of some 102 guns that eventually won the battle over the Austrians. Such numbers of guns brought new problems in coordination and command.

In 1812, the *Grande Armée* marched into Russia with some 30 4pdrs and 260 6pdrs. By then, the Russians had adopted massed artillery too and at Borodino both sides cannonaded each other relentlessly. Some 400 guns fired over 100,000 shots during the battle, but with no clear advantage to either army. Napoleon’s Russian campaign ended in the disastrous retreat where so many men were lost to ‘General Winter’, as the Russians called their cold season ally. The loss of guns was enormous and, when what was left of the army regrouped in Germany during the spring of 1813, hardly any guns remained. Whatever was in reserve or could be pressed into service was rushed from France to Germany, where Napoleon faced a new pan-European coalition. At Lützen, 2 May 1813, some 60 guns of the Guard’s artillery stopped a Prussian attack in its tracks.
Massed artillery was again used by the French at Bautzen, 20–21 May, and Dresden, 26–27 August, but the advantage given by the artillery was not exploited by the infantry at either battle. Some 600 field guns were with Napoleon's army at Leipzig, 16–19 October, but the emperor wanted 1,300 – with reason, as the allied army facing him had 900 guns. At one point of the three-day battle, the guard artillery wiped out the Bavarian cavalry with 50 guns but the battle was ultimately lost and Napoleon had to withdraw due to a shortage of ammunition. Some 150,000 rounds were fired during that battle.

The last great concentration of artillery was at Waterloo, on 18 June 1815, with both sides cancelling each other out. Wellington, true to his habit, had positioned his troops and guns in locations with better cover than the French. In the Iberian Peninsula, where the French were fighting the British, Portuguese and Spanish from 1808, the Gribeauval 4 and 8pdrs remained the French Army's standard field guns. This may have been because the Spanish artillery matériel and ammunition, some of which was captured by the French, was also of the Gribeauval pattern. A typical artillery unit was the 2nd Company of the 2nd Horse Artillery Regiment, which had two 4pdrs, two 8pdrs and two 152mm (6in) howitzers in 1809. The French in Spain and Portugal thus had very few An XI 6pdrs. In tactical terms, the French used massed artillery with great success against the Spanish in several large engagements. At Tudela, on 28 November 1808, the French massed some 60 guns, which annihilated the Spanish. This was repeated at the battle of Ocaña, on 17 November 1809, where Spain's main army was disastrously crushed. In general, the overwhelmed and usually outnumbered Spanish regular artillery could not counter with effective artillery tactics.

When the French came up against the Anglo-Portuguese it was a different contest. Initially, from 1808 in Portugal, the French did not have great numbers of field guns and neither did their opponents. It must be noted that Portugal's rugged geography hardly favours vast artillery trains. However, the Portuguese regular artillery was rapidly reorganised and re-equipped as field artillery during 1809 and was soon as efficient as the excellent British artillery with whom it served side by side. Marching into Spain from 1811, Wellington proved a match for any French marshal by choosing ground that was always more favourable for his own artillery. The French guns and gunners fought hard against the British and Portuguese but their commanders, often feuding amongst each other, never caught up to Wellington's tactical edge. By 1813, the French were in retreat and many of their field guns were lost at Vittoria on 21 June 1813.

It is important to note here that, on the Continent, British artillery systems were practically unknown until the French encountered them during the Peninsular War. They were impressed with what they found and, in time, the British system used by Wellington's army would inspire the post-Gribeauval French artillery.
Siege and Garrison Artillery

The Gribeauval system siege and garrison artillery consisted of 24, 16, 12 and 8pdr guns; 203mm (8in) siege howitzers; 12, 10 and 203mm siege and garrison mortars (with cylindrical chambers); 12, 10 and 203mm siege and garrison Gomer mortars (with truncated conical chambers); and a 381mm (15in) stone mortar. Unlike the field pieces, the heavy artillery in Gribeauval’s system incorporated some of the older designs. The 8in siege howitzer was Vallière’s basic design adapted by Gribeauval for siege operations. The 8, 12 and 381mm mortars were also appropriated into the new Gribeauval system. The 304mm (12in) mortar was also from the old Vallière system; existing pieces were taken into Gribeauval’s system, though any newly built 304mm mortars were to be reinforced by another 136kg (300lb) of brass.

GRIBEAUVAL BRASS 24-PDR SIEGE GUN AND CARRIAGE

The ‘battering’ siege guns of Napoleon’s army were the 24pdr and the 16pdr. For both models, Gribeauval kept basically the same proportions as the Vallière guns, but without the intricate decorative mouldings. (Ray Hutchins © Osprey Publishing)
Gribeauval's system of heavy artillery was less obviously superior to the system it replaced when compared to his improvements to the field artillery. The first test performed in 1764 did not seem to show a marked superiority for Gribeauval's higher calibre guns compared to existing older weaponry. The problem with Vallière's heavy guns, as with his field pieces, was their great weight. Gribeauval's guns were much lighter, and so they were officially adopted in 1765.

Although Gribeauval system guns were cast during the 1760s, there was still some controversy surrounding their effectiveness, especially regarding the heavier 'garrison' 8, 12, 16 and 24pdrs. As these were intended to arm fortresses as garrison pieces, and their weight did not matter very much as they were mounted in fixed position, Gribeauval's critics maintained that there was little point in going to the expense of casting them. The debate went on and, in 1786, further tests of the Gribeauval designs for 16 and 24pdr garrison guns were made. These tests proved to be inconclusive. The tolerance of the 24pdr, as cast by the foundry of the reputable Potevin brothers, was especially disappointing, with some barrels only lasting 100 shots before suffering some stress damages. Under these circumstances, and bearing in mind the high cost of casting such heavy pieces in brass, production ceased until the French Revolution.

The main features of the Gribeauval heavy artillery guns were: The 8 and 12pdr guns were longer and heavier than the field pieces of the same calibre.
A heavy 8pdr measured 285cm (112in) and weighed 1,060kg (2,332lb), compared to a field 8pdr that was 200cm (78.7in) long and weighed 580kg (1,276lb). A heavy 12pdr was 317cm (124.8in) long with a weight of 1,550kg (3,410lb), whereas the field 12pdr had a length of 229cm (90in) and a weight of 880kg (1,936lb). The dimensions were essentially the same as the guns of the 1732 Vallière system, except that there were fewer mouldings and other decorative elements. The 4pdrs might be the type cast at Douai in the 1790s, but were more likely to be simply field 4pdrs mounted on travelling carriages. Such guns were especially handy in a besieged fortress, as they could be moved easily and rapidly from one place to the other.

By the time the French Revolutionary War broke out in 1792, the distinction between siege and garrison artillery had become largely academic. By then, the accepted wisdom regarding firepower and range was in favour of heavy calibres: the heavier the calibre, the longer the range. Thus, not only would a larger calibre deliver a heavier round but also, because of the distance, it might be done with increased safety from enemy fire. The long 8 and 12pdrs were now used as armament within fortresses.

The range of 16 and 24pdr guns made them especially useful to the garrisons of besieged fortresses. A 16pdr at a 45-degree elevation could fire at targets up to 4,300m (4,702 yards) away, a 24pdr at the same elevation could reach 4,800m (5,249 yards). These ranges could also be increased if the besieged town occupied a commanding height over the surrounding countryside. This long-range capacity could create many problems for a besieging enemy if they placed their magazines and artillery park too close. The 12 and 8pdrs had a range of about 4,000m (4,374 yards) and 3,500m (3,827 yards) respectively, and could not compete with the heavier guns, especially if they were located in siege batteries beneath the town. Only if the besieging army had some 16 and 24pdrs (or some heavy guns of approximate calibre) in its batteries would the odds be more even. Indeed, it was almost essential to have such pieces for a siege to be successful, but they were slow and cumbersome to move around.

The siege artillery also included the old 223mm (8in) howitzers, weighing 540kg (1,188lb) with a length of 94cm (37in). They were designed by General Vallière and first cast in 1749. The 8in howitzers were too heavy for much use in the field, and they were relegated to siege and garrison use by Gribeauval. They were effective to a range of 3,200m (3,500 yards) at a 45-degree elevation, but howitzers were mainly intended for ricochet fire. At a six-degree angle, a howitzer shell would first hit the ground at about 830m (908 yards), at ten degrees about 1,200m (1,312 yards).

When the An XI system was introduced in 1803, the only additions to the heavy artillery were a long 12pdr gun and a short 24pdr gun. These heavy
guns were not a priority and very few were cast. On the whole, Napoleon’s heavy artillery inland remained of the Gribeauval system.

There were some exceptions to this rule, a notable example being the very heavy ordnance used by the French against Cadiz in 1811. This great port had come under siege in 1810, and was valiantly defended by a Spanish garrison with British and Portuguese reinforcements. Hoping to break the resistance of the city by a long-range heavy bombardment, the French decided to make two large pieces of artillery for the purpose. On another occasion, the French cast large 228, 254 and 279mm (9, 10 and 11 in) ‘gun-howitzers’ in brass at Sevilla. They were very heavy, weighing from 3,500kg (7,700 lb) to about 9,000kg (19,800 lb). They had a range of 6,000m (6,562 yards), but were of limited use due to the difficulty of moving them because of their enormous bulk. A further attempt was made to cast a large piece of ordnance at Liège in 1813, this time out of iron, but nothing much resulted from this experiment.

**Mortars**

These weapons, which were used to shoot exploding bombs, were the subject of a great deal of experimentation in the 17th century, but then remained relatively the same during most of the 18th century. They were rightly considered to be the most dangerous type of ordnance to serve, as well as being the most complicated. Even with the best precautions, the mortars were prone to fire prematurely and the bombs explode accidentally. This was because a mortar was really fired twice: first, the bomb had to be shot and propelled to descend over its target and, secondly, the bomb had a fuse that had to be lit so that it would explode just over the heads of the enemy.

To succeed, a specialized class of experienced and fearless artillermen was required: the bombardiers. They were the highest paid and most respected group of artillermen. Their duty was to ensure that the correct charges sent the bomb over the target, and that the fuse they had prepared would be lit and ignite its charge causing the bomb to explode at just the right moment. When it worked correctly the mortar bombs could cause many injuries or else set fire to buildings if they burst over the rooftops.
RED LANCERS, 1811–14

(Left) Lancers, full dress, 1811–14. This man wears the double cross belt incorporating the pouch belt and the sling for the carbine that was issued in time for the Russian campaign. (Right) Marechal-des-logis, full dress, 1811–14. (Centre) Lancer in early regimental uniform, 1811. This trooper is seen at the time of the creation of the regiment, when the Polish-style uniform retained some hussar features. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
CAVALRY

The cavalry was Napoleon's shock arm, the most mobile of his battlefield forces and deployed not only for attack but also for a variety of light and reconnaissance duties. By 1806 and the time of the Jena campaign, Napoleon's cavalry - cuirassiers, dragoons or light - were divided into regiments of four, five and six or more squadrons respectively, each squadron being further divided into two companies (or troops). Twin squadron charges were the main method of attack, but great stress was laid on discipline in action – particularly on rallying following a charge. Light cavalry - hussars, lancers and the like - were trained (as were dragoons) in reconnaissance and pursuit duties. The bulk of the 'heavies' - cuirassiers and carabiniers - often constituted the basis of the Reserve Cavalry, under the Emperor's own command, but the cavalry division or brigade attached to each corps d'armée usually included units of all three mounted categories of l'arme blanche. Cuirassiers and carabiners still wore breast and back plates. Armed with swords or sabres, pistols and carbines, the cavalry formed a spectacular part of the Grande Armée.

Light Cavalry

The value of light cavalry during the early years of the Revolution and in the eventual emergence of the Empire is apparent. By 1793 the number of light cavalry regiments of the French Army had more than doubled their strength of 1789, while the number of medium and heavy regiments had increased by a paltry four. The fact that the chasseurs a cheval regiments (less vaunted than the hussars, but identically armed) should number 26 against a bare 12 four years previously, is highly indicative of the state of the army as a whole.

The offensive and defensive roles of Napoleon's light cavalry were essentially reconnaissance plus advance, flank and/or rear and outpost protection of the main column. One of the most dashing and visually romantic elements were the hussars, which could trace their origins and dress all the way back to a cavalry corps of the Ottoman Empire. The hussars consisted of only 14 regiments during the period of the Napoleonic Empire. Six of these existed well before the massive reorganizations of 1791 and the rest were raised over the following years: the 7th and 8th regiments in 1792; the 9th, 10th and 11th in 1793; the 12th in 1794; the 13th in 1795; and the four teams in 1814. These regiments consisted of four squadrons, each comprising two companies which in turn were subdivided into two troops.

The mobile power of the hussars was persuasively displayed in 1806 when they made a pursuit of the Prussians over 1,160km (721 miles) from the river Saale to the Oder in 25 days. Yet despite this bold demonstration, the large-scale use of flying columns of Blitzkrieg-style cavalry was never fundamentally explored. Generally speaking, the deployment of mobile spearheads was restricted
CAMPAIGN DRESS OF THE RED LANCERS

(Top left and right) Lancers show campaign dress in Russia, in 1812. The trooper on the left wears the caped, sleeved manteau-capote riding cloak or overcoat which was new for the cavalry at this time. The trooper on the right wears the pale blue gilet d’ecurie stable jacket (sleeved ‘waistcoat’). In the foreground, this trooper illustrates how the aiguilletes and epaulettes were removed when on campaign. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
to patrol units of 20–100 men, and this application may well have resulted in many wasted opportunities on the battlefield. Confined to the most part to patrol in the countryside around the main columns of infantry, the hussars would work around the edges of the main columns, deployed in squadrons in battle order (straight lines or in echelon). If they should chance upon the enemy, a troop of the leading squadron would race outward at a gallop and create a screen of sharpshooters across the regiment’s front. If the enemy drew into combat, the hussar skirmishers would take up static positions and unload a carbine volley at the enemy from a distance of around 100m (109 yards). Then, pistol in the right hand and sabre hanging from a swordknot at the wrist, they would make a charge. When they had closed to close quarters, they would discharge the pistol, then transfer the pistol to the left hand to attack with the sabre. Where such a charge required the back-up of the entire regiment, the squadrons would advance in extended waves staggered obliquely to either right or left, for maximum impact on the enemy ranks.

*Shortage of Mounts*

Cavalry were defined by their mounts, and essentially became nothing more than inadequately trained infantry once deprived of their horses. Shortage of horses was one of the most serious deficiencies suffered by Napoleon’s forces during major campaigns, particularly in the latter years of the Napoleonic Wars. While the ranks of the infantry could, as a result of exceptional efforts, be filled with the young and the old, and while guns could be found in depots or manufactured anew, the complete replacement of lost horseflesh proved impossible.

During Napoleon’s Russian campaign of 1812, in all the various arms that required horses in Russia – the artillery, the sundry transport services, and of course the cavalry itself – losses numbered between 160,000 and 200,000. These were not merely woeful, but irreparable losses, depriving Napoleon of the mounted patrols required for proper reconnaissance, in addition to cavalry for ordinary combat and pursuit operations. After the Russian campaign new mounts would never remotely match Napoleon’s stated requirements, nor could the numbers or quality of the troopers themselves be replaced, for even where a horse could be provided, it required three times longer to train a cavalryman than a simple foot soldier, and such training could not be provided on the march. Thus, deficiencies in cavalry simply could not be made good in the time available. The same, of course, applied to the artillery, a specialized arm that required time to acquaint officers and their crews with the science of gunnery. Here, too, the guns required horses to pull them, as did the thousands of supply wagons that accompanied the army. An obvious expedient lay in stripping formations posted elsewhere in the empire, and therefore Napoleon issued immediate orders for the transfer of most of his cavalry from Spain.
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS
In defensive actions, the hussars operated in the same manner as described above, but essentially in reverse. They would maintain contact with the enemy and seek out an engagement at the earliest opportunity to deprive the enemy of manoeuvre advantage. In so doing, they would aim to mask the manoeuvres of the French infantry positioning behind them.

The troubleshooter role of the hussars created a strong *esprit de corps* that resulted in the light cavalry having over-muscular notions of their own superiority. Such was the arrogant indiscipline of the hussars that Napoleon commented: ‘These hussars must be made to remember that a French soldier must be a horseman, infantryman and artilleryman, and there is nothing he may turn his back on!’

Chasseurs and lancers performed much the same role as hussars. The former was armed in the same manner as the hussars, but being the indigenous French light horse, can perhaps therefore be equated best with the infantry demi-brigades, a half-trained, unprofessional, makeshift collection, making up with zeal what they lacked in experience. The latter was distinguished by their principal weapon – a couched lance 2.06m (6ft 9in) long. Napoleon created a total of nine regular regiments of lancers, mostly by converting existing dragoon and chasseur regiments, and also formed three regiments of lancers within his Imperial Guard. There was much debate about the value of the lance in combat. While it looked ferocious, it was awkward to handle in close combat and was a burden during fast manoeuvres. Lancers could make a fairly terrifying massed charge, but at the point of contact the charge usually slowed to a melee engagement anyway.

This being said, the lance was not the only resource of the lancer. Light sabres were standard, and as time went on the lancers also took aboard firearms, as took place within the 2e Régiment de Chevaux-légers-Lanciers (2nd Regiment Light Horse Lancers) of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard – the ‘Red Lancers’.

Late in 1811 the numbers of personal weapons of the Red Lancers troopers were increased, and the thunder clouds of war against Russian gathered. Napoleon noted that as well as sabres and lances, the Russian Cossacks carried pistols and carbines (or in some cases, bows and arrows). To have an answer to this longer-range threat, Napoleon had some carbines issues to the Red Lancers for practice. Opinions on their worth differed: some believed that the carbine would be valuable for skirmishing and keeping the enemy light cavalry at a distance, while others were concerned over the practicality of loading the troopers with such an arsenal – a sabre, a lance, two saddle pistols, and now a slung carbine. The Russian campaign would prove that both schools of thought were right. Carbines were clearly issued, and were handy for keeping the Cossacks at a distance; but the weight of all the weaponry was too much for the horses, sometimes causing severe injury.
**Medium and Heavy Cavalry**

While light cavalry scouted and skirmished, the heavy cavalry's job was to take on the enemy formations directly, and smash open their ranks for exploitation by the infantry. The carabiniers and cuirassiers were at the core of the heavy cavalry. In 1791, the French Army's two regiments of carabiniers were composed of four squadrons each and the 27 *cavalerie* regiments of three squadrons. In 1792, the *cavalerie* regiments were reduced to 25 and, in 1793, had the number of squadrons brought up to four.

In September 1802, Napoleon wrote to General Berthier, Minister of War: ‘I desire you, citizen minister, to submit to me a scheme for reducing the

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**Battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, Spain, 3–5 May 1811**

Massena noted that Wellington's southern flank was overextended and ordered the bulk of his cavalry to assault the Allied right supported by three infantry divisions. Thousands of French troopers swept through the village of Pozo Bello defended by the British 85th Foot and 2nd Portuguese Cazadores. The defenders were badly mauled in the ensuing melee but, like most of the troops on Wellington's right, managed to retreat to the strong new defence line established further north.

(Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
regiments of heavy cavalry to 20 – two of which should be carabiniers – all four squadrons strong. The last six of the now existing regiments should be broken up to furnish a squadron to each of the first 18 proposed regiments. Of the 18 regiments, the first five are to wear the cuirass, in addition to the eighth, which is already equipped in this manner, making in all, six regiments with, and 12 without cuirasses.1

The 1st Regiment of cavalerie had, on 10 October 1801, already been converted to the 1er Cavalerie-Cuirassiers (1st Cavalry-Cuirassiers) and, on 12 October 1802, the 2nd, 3rd and 4th regiments followed suit; shortly thereafter, on 23 December 1802, the 5th, 6th and 7th did likewise. Within a

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**GENERAL RAPP AND THE MOUNTED CHASSEURS AT AUSTERLITZ,**
**2 DECEMBER 1805**

After leading two unsuccessful charges by squadrons from the cavalry of the French Imperial Guard against those of the Russian Imperial Guard, Napoleon’s ADC General Rapp leads the duty squadron of the Mounted Chasseurs in a third attempt, which will prove irresistible – though Rapp himself will soon suffer a serious face wound. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
year the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th regiments were also transformed, bringing the new arm to the strength of 12 cuirassier regiments. This situation remained static until, in 1808, the 1st Provisional Regiment of Heavy Cavalry became the 13th Cuirassiers, followed by the 2nd Regiment of Dutch Cuirassiers who, in 1810, were renamed the 14th Cuirassiers.

The regiments were composed of four squadrons, raised to five in March of 1807, each of two companies of two troops apiece. In 1806 the regimental staff in theory consisted of a colonel, a major, two chefs d’escadron (company commanders), two adjudant-majors, a paymaster-quartermaster, a surgeon major, an aide-major, two sous-aides-major, two adjutants, a brigade-trompette (brigade bugler), a veterinary surgeon and six maîtres (i.e. cobblers, tailors, armourers and saddlers).

Each company supposedly boasted a captain, a lieutenant, a second-lieutenant, four marechaux-des-logis (lit. ‘marshal of lodgings’, equivalent to sergeant ranks), a marechal-des-logis-chef, a fourrier (quartermaster), eight brigadiers, 82 troopers and a trumpeter. As we shall so often discover throughout this book, the difference between theoretical strength and actual field strength could be wildly divergent. The following returns of two divisions of heavy cavalry, both within the reserve cavalry corps of the Grande Armée of 1805, illustrate this fact nicely.

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<th>Nantsouty’s First Division:</th>
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<td>9th Cuirassiers</td>
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<td>3rd Cuirassiers</td>
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<td>11th Cuirassiers</td>
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In terms of weaponry, from 1803 to 1805 the cuirassiers were issued with the flat and straight-edged An IX pattern sabre with a plain iron scabbard. At this time the regulation sword belt was of the old cavalerie design, as worn by carabiniers prior to 1810, which held the sabre at an angle at waist height; this was a rather impractical arrangement for armoured troops since the cuirass impeded the drawing of the sword and emitted an unmilitary ‘clang’ at the least movement of the wearer. The situation was resolved by the adoption of the An XI pattern of waist belt that suspended the sabre from a pair of slings, the hilt at wrist level. This improvement was soon followed by the distribution of the An XI pattern
The Cuirass

The 'Mk I' cuirass dated back to 1802 and was that year issued to the 1st Cuirassiers. The breastplate of this model was not very rounded and formed a blunt angle at the bottom; the total of 34 copper rivets were driven into the perimeters of both breast and backplate. The cuirass was put on by first hooking the ends of the metal-scaled, cloth-covered, leather shoulder straps to the spherical copper buttons riveted to the breastplate, lifting the ensemble over the head, then fastening the two halves together at the waist by means of a copper-buckled leather belt that was secured to the backplate by twin copper rivets at each end. Though shoulder straps were normally covered in brass scales, those of the 9th Cuirassiers were armoured with twin yellow-copper chains along their length, and those of the 8th Cuirassiers were devoid of any metal, being merely unadorned black leather. After 1806, a 'Mk II' cuirass came to be issued, but it differed from the Mk I only in that the bottom of the breastplate had been rounded off. As of 1809, the 'Mk III' cuirass' made its appearance, differing only in having a more rounded profile and being slightly shorter. Officers' cuirasses tended to the more stylish: the Mk I, for example, had a deeply engraved single line, placed 3cm (1.2in) from the edge, that describe a margin about the perimeter of the breast and back plates into which 32 gilded copper rivets were driven.

The carabiniers' iron cuirass was covered overall by a thin sheet of brass that left but a 2.5cm (1in) margin of white metal about the edge, into which the yellow copper rivets were inserted. The cuirass was otherwise essentially no different from the cuirassier versions save for the natural leather waist belt and shoulder straps, both of which had copper fittings.

sabre with its 97cm (38in) twin-guttered plate and more robust iron scabbard. The standing height of this sword, sheathed, was 120cm (47in).

Cuirassier officers were armed with a sabre de bataille with ivory straight or lightly curved blued steel blade engraved along a third of its length. Both types of sabre fitted into the same variety of scabbard and these were either of black leather with gilded copper fittings or of browned sheet iron reinforced with gilded copper. The sabre was at first carried in a three-section swordbelt much like the troopers' An XI model, but as the years wore on a slimmer single-section belt tended to be favoured; both varieties was secured with a gilded copper buckle bearing a grenade emblem.

Before 1810, the carabiniers were issued either the An IV or An IX pattern sabre. The An IV model stood 115cm (45in) tall when sheathed and had a copper guard with a grenade device stamped upon it; the blade was straight and flat and the scabbard was of black leather with brass fittings. The An IX pattern differed only in that the guard had an additional branch and the scabbard fittings were of red copper. Upon becoming armoured in 1810,
the carabiniers were obliged to acquire sabres with a curved blade *a la Montmorency*. While awaiting these, however, they retained their old straight sabres but housed them in the iron *An XI* dragoon pattern scabbards. It would seem that the carabiniers were rather attached to their old sabres with the prestigious grenade symbol upon the guard and, having received the

(Left) Trooper of the 5th Cuirassiers, 1807–09. (Centre) Officer of the 10th Cuirassiers, 1807–09. This officer’s uniform was standard for that of most ranks during the imperial period, apart from the officer’s pattern breastplate. (Right) Officer of the 4th Cuirassiers, 1804–09. Here we can see the single-breasted habit-veste in more detail. (Angus McBride © Osprey Publishing)
Montmorency blades, they had the hilts soldered to the new sabre rather than lose them. The dragoon pattern scabbard was now discarded and replaced by either a curved iron or a black leather version, with copper fittings. The distinctive black leather swordknots also had to go and these were exchanged for white buff models with scarlet tassels.

Despite the official directive to arm the cuirassiers with muskets looted from the Vienna Arsenal in 1805, they were only equipped with pistols until 1812. The pistols were of An IX and An XIII patterns of which the latter had the following characteristics:

- Length: 35.2cm (13.9in)
- Barrel: 20.7cm (8.1in)
- Weight: 1.269kg (2.791b)
- Calibre: 17.1mm (0.67in)

Further to the Imperial Decree of 24 December 1811, the cuirassiers were equipped with the An XI pattern cavalry musketoon complete with crossbelt and bayonet, in early 1812. The musketoon was approximately 115cm (45.2in) long with an 85cm (33.5in) barrel and the bayonet, sheathed in a scabbard inserted in a frog sewn to the middle section of the sword belt, had a blade 46cm (18.1in) long. The musketoon was slung on a crossbelt, thrown over the left shoulder and fixed to the cartridge-pouch belt by means of a spherical button. It incorporated a steel clip, through which a ring on the left side of the musketoon was passed, and a buff strap, which was wound once about the lock and then buckled.

The carabiniers not only carried the same pistols but were additionally armed with muskets. Contemporary illustrations depict carabiniers with long and short muskets, and for lack of any official information we can only hazard that these are probably the An IX and An XIII dragoon patterns. The bayonet was hung in a frog stitched to the swordbelt but, unlike the sabre, at the perpendicular. The cartridge pouch in use prior to 1812 was of black leather, with a brass grenade badge and a strap by which to secure trade button on the tunic.

Early in 1812, the carabiniers were also issued the An IX cavalry musketoon and bayonet complete with cartridge-pouch and musket crossbelt. Note, however, that these were no idle replacements for their old muskets and equipment, since these had been surrendered with their old uniforms in 1810. Like the cuirassiers, the officers and musicians of carabiniers were not equipped with muskets or musketoons and therefore did not wear a cartridge pouch.

The dragoons were Napoleon’s workhorse cavalry. They were not just any band of individuals sorted and labelled cavalrymen; they were mounted infantryman, trained to be equally adept with musket and sabre, and proud of
that distinction. Originally mounted for the sake of mobility, but generally fighting on foot, they evolve into an army equally at home sabring at the charge as firing dismounted, becoming neither light nor heavy but medium cavalry by the time of revolution.

(Left) Maréchal-des-logis (lit ‘Marshal of Lodgings’) of the 2nd Carabiniers, 1812–14. The sky-blue cuff-flaps piped in white distinguished the 2nd Regiment from the 1st Regiment. (Centre) Officer of the carabiniers, 1811–14. The officer tunic was the same as that of the rest of the men, just of finer quality. (Right) Trumpeter, 2nd Carabiniers, 1812. Trumpeters did not wear the cuirass. (Angus McBride © Osprey Publishing)
Of the 62 regiments of cavalry inherited from the *ancien régime*, only 18 were dragoon regiments, but the reorganizations of 1791 and 1792 raised the number to 20, then to 21. Only in 1803 did Napoleon, as First Consul,
bring the number to 30: on paper that is, for the additional nine regiments were dragoon in name only. Formed of six of the old ‘cavalry’ regiments and three of Hussars, their men remained for some while dressed and equipped as though their old units had never been disbanded; as late as 1805 the three former hussar regiments had not received their full quota of dragoon uniforms and accoutrements. Thereafter, however, all regiments were more or less uniformly dressed and equipped. The regiments were distinguished not only by their number, but also, more readily, by the colours adopted for the facing severe tunics. The distinctive headgear of dragoons was their helmet: a copper cap encircled by a fur turban, with a heavily embossed copper crest supporting a black horsehair mane, a peak, and chinstraps of either plain leather or copper scale.

**Other cavalry units**

Various other cavalry regiments bolstered the numbers and talents of mounted warriors in Napoleon’s army. Within Napoleon’s prestigious Imperial Guard, for example, were three medium/heavy cavalry regiments and eight light cavalry regiments. These were:

**Heavy Cavalry:**
- Horse Grenadiers
- Élite Gendarmes
- Dragoons

**Light Cavalry:**
- 1st Chasseurs-a-Cheval
- 2nd Chasseurs-a-Cheval
- Mamelukes
- 1st (Polish) Lancers
- 2nd (Dutch) Red Lancers
- 3rd (Polish) Lancers
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd Guard Scouts
- 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Honour Guards

In 1807, furthermore, Napoleon created the Gendarmes d’ordonnance, a mounted foot corps consisting mainly of noblemen, but under pressure from his jealous Imperial Guard he was more or less obliged to disband them. In 1813, following the cataclysmic losses in Russia, Napoleon ordered the creation of four regiments of Guard d’honneur, and two days later the decree was proclaimed. The four regiments of Guard of Honour were to be formed from volunteers, born Frenchmen – i.e. born in the empire – and were to be clad in...
elegant hussar-style uniforms. Each regiment was to be composed of a staff of 65 men and 156 horses, and no less than ten squadrons. Each squadron was of two companies, each of 122 men and 127 horses. The establishment of the 20 companies in each regiment would be 2,440 men with 2,540 horses, the staff bringing the total to 2,505 men with 2,696 horses. His four regiments of Guards of Honour would together bring the Emperor 10,000 well-equipped, well-mounted and spirited men, who would in due course provide the leadership cadres for his armies. The regimental colonels were chosen from among divisional or brigadier generals; the majors were colonels in the line, though all the other officers would keep the same rank as they held in the line. Though spectacularly unready for combat upon their arrival within the army, the Guard of Honour would gain skill and confidence while serving alongside the elite Imperial Guard in the campaigns of Saxony and France, 1813–14, and distinguished themselves in battle at Hanau and Rheims.

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Together Napoleon’s infantry, cavalry and artillery made a battle-winning combination for many years, but ultimately strategic overreach, an impractical command system and the prolonged attrition of war took their toll. The culminating action at Waterloo was more than a battle with far-reaching political effects: it was a human drama perhaps unparalleled in military history, and it is no accident that far more has been written about this eight-hour period of time than any other in history. The defence of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, the charge of the Scots Greys, Wellington’s steadfast infantry defying the onslaught of the cuirassiers, the struggle for Plancenoit, and the repulse of the Imperial Guard—all became distinct and compelling episodes in a battle on which hinged nothing less than the future of European security. When it was all over, the Allies could at last implement their extensive and historic plans for the reconstruction of Europe. Though these plans did not guarantee peace for the Continent, they offered a remarkable degree of stability for the next 40 years. Indeed, the Vienna Settlement, in marked contrast to those before it and since—especially that achieved at Versailles in 1919—stands as the most effective and long-lasting political settlement up to 1945.
OVERVIEW
Throughout the 18th century and into the Napoleonic Wars, Britain remained a largely self-reliant nation whose strength derived mainly from the Royal Navy, unquestionably the greatest maritime force of its day. Geography and superior naval power had meant that only a small standing army was necessary for the country’s defence. In any event the size of the army was limited by financial and above all political considerations. A mistrust of the military amongst Parliament and nation was a legacy dating back to the Commonwealth, under Cromwell, who had used the army as an instrument of despotism. Suspicion continued under the Restoration, making the army feared and in some cases even despised as the enemy of liberty. The regular army lived on the margins of society, supplying garrisons for the colonies and Ireland. New units were raised on the outbreak of war and disbanded at the peace. Protection of the homeland was the responsibility of the navy as the first line of defence and the militia as the second.

Recruiting methods and the social make-up of the British Army remained effectively unchanged from its 18th-century forebears, such that the professional and mercantile classes scarcely appeared in the officer corps, making the army highly divided on class lines. The officer corps was the preserve of the aristocracy (mostly confined to the Guards and cavalry) and, above all, the gentry. This situation was perpetuated by the purchase system: gentlemen aspiring to an officer’s rank had to possess sufficient funds to buy their regimental commissions. The monopoly of wealth and social connection all but guaranteed that the upper ranks remained in the hands of the ruling classes. In this respect it bore no relation to its French counterpart. The reforms of the Revolution had swept away such forms of privilege and, as we have seen, it was said that every soldier carried a marshal’s baton in his knapsack – an allusion to meritocratic promotion.

British officers were generally brave and possessed a social status that commanded respect and obedience from the men under their leadership. Officers were expected to lead from the front, with predictably high rates of casualties. The ordinary ranks were, unlike the French, volunteers, drawn to the colours by bounty and, being the poorest elements of society, shared nothing...
in common with their officers. Indeed, the only link between them were the sergeants and other NCOs.

The British Army had its reformers in men such as Sir Ralph Abercromby and Sir John Moore, but no personality put a greater stamp on this period than Wellington. Wellington embodied 18th-century stability, and did not undertake any fundamental change to a system which appeared to function well. Nevertheless, Wellington maximized the effectiveness of the system he inherited. As commander-in-chief in the Peninsula, Wellington chose to have a tiny staff headquarters and no second-in-command, keeping matters in his own hands and those of a few key officers, particularly the quartermaster-general, the adjutant-general, the head of the Commissariat, the chief of artillery, and the chief engineer. He relied heavily on his intelligence network, acquiring useful information on French strength, plans and dispositions from his own superb intelligence officers, ‘correspondents’, and observers.
A PRIVATE OF THE 13TH (1ST SOMERSETSHIRE) REGIMENT IN SAN DOMINGO, 1807

His uniform (1) is that distributed to troops destined for the West Indies from 1790 onwards, and his kit consists of: (2) canvas knapsack; (3) cartridge box; (4) horse hair stock and brass buckle; (5) cartridge and former; (6) wooden two-quart canteen; (7) linen haversack for rations and tin mug; (8) brush and picker, for cleaning gun lock; (9) brass fife case; (10) lock cover; (11) wooden tompion for protecting barrel; (12) regimental button. (Graham Turner © Osprey Publishing)
throughout the Peninsula, and from civilians and guerrillas, who provided much useful information through simple observation or by interdicting French dispatches.

Wellington took great pains to see that the Commissariat kept his army well supplied with the necessities of war: food, clothing, and ammunition. In this he held a significant advantage over the French army, which suffered a chronic shortage of all matériel and could not feed itself without recourse to plunder. The Peninsula lacked the fertile plains of Germany and Italy, but Wellington could compensate by using unrestricted access to the sea to obtain supplies and, however poor the inhabitants of Iberia, at least they were friendly. He developed an effective system of depots which provided for the needs of tens of thousands of men and animals, both horses and the livestock which supplied meat for the army.

The result of Wellington's personal attention to the administration, supply and training of the army was the creation of one of the greatest fighting forces of modern times. As he himself claimed in 1813: 'It is probably the most complete machine for its number now existing in Europe.' Their record on the battlefield is a worthy testament to Wellington's achievement, for they never lost a battle. Their commander proudly acknowledged: 'I have the satisfaction of reflecting that, having tried them frequently, they have never failed me.'

**Shaping The Army**

In 1763 the British infantry force numbered over 125 regiments containing some 150 battalions. Between that point and the onset of the Napoleonic Wars, the number wavered with the inevitable cycle of expansion and disbandments surrounding conflicts, but by the time Britain began its long battle against Revolutionary France in 1792, the infantry force was increased to 135 regiments plus many more second battalions. In addition, numerous French émigré and foreign regiments also served Britain during the Napoleonic conflicts, and there was a corresponding expansion of the militia and volunteer forces. Regular militia forces were conscripted through the means of a ballot, and each county had to provide its own contingent. The militia entered active service when they were 'embodied' — formed into permanent bodies and called forth for active service, even being channelled into regular line regiments. The local militia (as opposed to the regular militia) acted as a reserve force of scattered and irregularly sized units, and these could be called up during times of national emergency. Volunteer forces were privately raised units, usually with the backing of a wealthy patron or organization. It grew to be a substantial force — by 1806 it contained nearly 329,000 individuals. As the Napoleonic Wars ground on, subsequent Acts of Parliament expanded Britain's military forces, often by raising additional battalions for existing regiments, and effective infantry strength
rose by a factor of three between 1793 and 1801. The strength of the entire British infantry in 1803 was 126,677. There were also titular changes. From 1792 county titles were given to all numbered infantry regiments, although colonel’s names still took precedence in official use until 1803.

In terms of its system of command-and-control, when the Napoleonic Wars began Britain actually had no true commander-in-chief. Prime Minister William Pitt, however, solved the organizational vacuum by creating three positions: Secretary of War, Under-Secretary of State for War and Commander-in-Chief.

Further reform of the military structure was taken at unit and formation levels by Frederick Augustus, the Duke of York and Albany, who took command of the British Army in the campaigns in the Low Countries in 1793 and 1794. Although he took the blame for many of his army’s failings, he nonetheless introduced many beneficial reforms as the commander-in-chief of British forces. He revised field and manual exercises; introduced stricter codes of conduct for NCOs and officers, improved medical services; and enhanced standards of uniform. He also reduced the number of infantry battalions to around 100; made these battalions of equal strength; created efficient depot companies; and changed poor-performing battalions into second battalions in stronger existing regiments. In terms of staff arrangements, he improved the command links between the General Staff and the generals commanding armies in the field, and was a motivating force behind the creation of a highly professional Royal Staff Corps. For the frontline man, his formation of the Royal Waggon Train also brought logistical benefits, and from 1792 he pushed a major programme of barracks development to improve soldier housing. York oversaw two main military branches of the General Staff: the Departments of the Adjutant-General and the Quartermaster General (QMG), each with an establishment of deputies, assistants and deputy-assistants. The Duke of York was forced to resign over non-military matters in 1809, and he was replaced by Sir David Dundas, who had been the QMG between 1796 and 1803. He was an elderly and rather ineffective gent, and York was subsequently reinstated in 1811. Note also that following the death of William Pitt in 1806, government policy shifted against compulsory recruitment and placed enlistment on a purely voluntary basis.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, First Duke of Wellington. Having risen to military greatness as C-in-C of Allied forces during the Peninsular War, his first and last encounter with Napoleon took place at Waterloo, where he deployed a mixed force of British, Hanoverians, Dutch, Belgians, Brunswickers, and Nassauers, most of whom were not the hardened veterans he had led to victory only a year before. Thus, without the timely intervention of Blucher’s Prussians in the afternoon, history’s most famous battle might well have ended inconclusively. (Philip Haythornthwaite)
As well as the Duke of York, there were other figures lower down the rankings who nonetheless had a great influence over the British Army, especially in tactical terms. Not least of these was Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington, but others include Sir John Moore and Sir Ralph Abercromby. Such leaders, and the mass of well-trained infantry under them, made the British Army one of the finest fighting armies of the Napoleonic era.

INFANTRY

Life for the Napoleonic-era British infantryman was tough from the moment he was recruited. For a start, the army would never make him rich. Weekly pay for a private in 1797 was 7s., and out of this he had to pay 1½d a day for bread and meat. In total, 4s. a week was taken for messing, and another 1s. 6d for other costs. Food consisted of thin, hard biscuits (added to water to make an unnuutritious gruel) and 0.45–0.68kg (1–1.5lb) of tough bread each day. All being well, the soldier would occasionally receive a 0.3kg (0.75lb) beef ration and also local cheese, beans...
Living Conditions

British barracks provided the most rudimentary living quarters, little better than prisons. Twenty men would be placed in a room roughly 2.1m (7ft) high, 9.1m (30ft) long and 6m (20ft) wide, creating a malodorous atmosphere (urinals consisted of nothing more than wooden buckets). ‘Married quarters’ were created by partitioning a section of the barracks using blankets. On campaign, the soldiers would frequently live under improvised shelters built from boughs, foliage and straw – until the later years of the Peninsular campaign there was no universal issue of tents in the army. If no materials could be found, the soldiers simply rolled up on the ground in their greatcoats and blankets. Soldiers who strayed from military codes even under such harsh conditions could face a tough system of punishments. Normally a general court-martial was the only body that could impose the death penalty. Other punishments could include floggings (up to a theoretical maximum of 1,200 lashes) or transference to a penal battalion.

and peas. Lentils and rice were another staple. Supplementary food and alcohol was obtainable from sutlers, whose abilities to acquire vegetables might be the only thing preventing the soldier from contracting scurvy on campaigns.

In terms of weapons and equipment, there was obviously variation between units, but the British infantry did approach a standardized system. For weaponry, the smoothbore ‘Brown Bess’ flintlock musket was the legendary arm. This went through several transformations during its near century of service, but during the Napoleonic period the ‘Short Land Pattern’, ‘East India Land Pattern’ and ‘New Land Pattern’ predominated. (More about musket use is detailed below.) Other weapons included pikes, swords and pistols. Sergeants’ halberds were phased out of service in February 1792, and until 1830 a 2.7m (9ft) long ash-handled pike was issued to battalion company, grenadier company and fusilier sergeants.

Swords, naturally, were carried by officers, although some NCOs were also known to carry swords of their own pattern. The 1796-pattern infantry sword had a brass knuckle-bow guard and gilded ball pommei and side shells, and featured a twisted wire basket around the hilt. The straight blade totalled 81 cm (32in) in length. In 1803 a new sword was issued that featured a lion’s head pommei and a knuckle-bow guard incorporating the Royal Cypher. Instead of being straight, the blade was this time sharply curved.

In terms of other equipment, the infantryman was truly a beast of burden. Although officially the most active of light infantry, the burden carried by riflemen on campaign was little different from that borne by the ordinary infantry, and forms a representative guide. The equipment was so heavy that
WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT OF A PRIVATE RIFLEMAN, C. 1812

The figure shows the uniform of a private of the 95th, c.1812, wearing full equipment including knapsack, shoulder belt with cartridge box and flask cord supporting the powder horn, waist belt with bullet pouch at the right front, and bayonet-frog, haversack and canteen (1). Also shown here are two patterns of Baker rifle, the earlier (2) with larger butt box and swan-neck cock, the later (3) with smaller butt box and ring-neck cock; the detail illustration of the lock (6) shows the latter. The waist belt with bullet pouch and bayonet-frog (4) shows the second pattern of sword bayonet; the first pattern with stirrup-hilt is also shown (5). The folding back-sight (7) was fitted to some earlier Baker rifles, allowing for variation in range, although fixed back-sights became more usual. (8) depicts the 95th's regimental insignia. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Sergeant John Cooper of the 7th Foot remarked that ‘the government should have sent us new-backbones’ to bear it!’ Edward Costello described the typical load carried by a rifleman:

rifle and bayonet, knapsack and belts containing two shirts, a pair of shoes and one of soles and heels, three brushes, a box of blacking, soap box, razor and strap, a pair of trousers, mess-tin, haversack with three days’ bread and two days’ beef, greatcoat, blanket, belt and pouch containing 50 rounds of prepared cartridges, powder flask, ball bag containing 30 loose balls, and a full canteen.

Each squad had four bill-hooks, weighing 2.7kg (6lb) each, so that every other day a man had to carry one. The total load, according to Costello, was officially 70–80lb (32–36kg), but reduced on campaign by the discarding of non-essential items; at the end of the Peninsular War, he noted, ‘there was probably not a spare shirt or pair of shoes in the regiment.’ (For skirmishing, riflemen might be ordered to remove their knapsacks; indeed, on at least one occasion they were ordered to be carried by accompanying cavalry.) Officers’ equipment was of course much more extensive than that of the other ranks, but as much of it was often carried with the regimental baggage at the rear, they too were limited to what could be carried on the person.

In terms of uniforms, there were obviously many variations and distinctions between units and ranks, too many to cover here. A reasonably representative example is that of Wellington’s elite Foot Guards. In terms of private and NCO rank uniforms, the sergeants’ jackets were unusual in that they had gold lace. The jacket was scarlet and lined throughout – the sleeve with linen and the other parts with white serge. It had short skirts that were sewn back, lined with white serge and edged with gold lace. It was a single-breasted jacket, buttoned across the front, and the left side was edged with gold. The buttons were gilt and regimentally spaced; the loops were of gold lace – the number and spacing of the loops differed according to the regiment. The collar, cuff, wings and shoulder straps were dark blue and trimmed with gold lace.

The jackets of corporals and privates were similar to those of sergeants except that they were of red cloth, had white worsted lace instead of gold, and had woollen tufts on the shoulder straps and white edging on the wings. NCOs’ and privates’ waistcoats were white, with a standing collar, round cuffs and shoulder straps all in dark blue. The waistcoat doubled as a fatigue jacket and was worn for drills and often when out foraging. On state occasions NCOs and privates of the Foot Guards wore white cloth breeches and long gaiters, the latter extended well over the knee, and were fastened by black buttons. For full dress they wore black woollen gaiters which were fastened by ten small white
A LINE INFANTRYMAN OF THE ROYAL SCOTS
DURING THE 1800s

He wears the uniform prescribed in 1802, including the short-tailed 1797 jacket, felt cap, white breeches and black wool gaiters. Also displayed here are rank and regimental badges, the infantryman's knapsack, plus an infantryman's pocket knife and musket tool.

(Graham Turner © Osprey Publishing)
metal buttons. On campaign short grey gaiters were worn, strapped over the instep, beneath grey or grey-blue trousers or overalls. In summer white trousers were also worn.

For full dress, undress and service dress, Guard officers still wore the bicorne or cocked hat. However, in 1812 officers of all regiments of the army were expected to wear the 'stove-pipe' shako, already worn by other ranks and light infantry officers. Introduced in 1806, the shako was cylindrical in shape and made of strong felt. The shako plate was brass and bore the Royal Cypher within the garter, the Crown above, the Royal Lion below and trophies on either side. Officers wore cut feather plumes on their shakos whilst other ranks wore woollen tufts. The colours of the plumes were the same as for line regiments: white over red for battalion companies, green for light company, and white for Grenadier company.

Another change of headdress came about in 1812 with the introduction of the 'Waterloo' or 'Belgic' shako. This was made of strong felt for other ranks, coarse beaver for sergeants and fine beaver – with a taller false front to give the impression of height – for officers. A festoon of white worsted chain and tassels

Light infantry training. A British soldier receives instruction in the basics of ranked volley fire. (Graham Turner © Osprey Publishing)
was fixed across the front for other ranks, of gold cord for sergeants and of mixed gold and crimson chain cord and tassels for officers. The light companies wore green worsted chain and tassels. Although the ‘Waterloo’ shako saw service during the Waterloo campaign, there is little evidence to suggest that it was worn by the rank and file in the Peninsula, other than by drafts that came out late in the war.

HIGHLAND SOLDIERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 1806–1815

(Left) Battalion company, 91st Highlanders, 1810. (Centre) Lieutenant, 2/78th Highlanders, 1806. (Right) Battalion Company, 79th (Cameron) Highlanders, 1815. In 1809 most of the Highland regiments were ordered to abolish the kilt, often replacing it with tartan trousers.
(Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
Organization and drill

In the period preceding the commencement of the French Revolutionary Wars, the British infantry had no unified system of drill, so that ‘every commanding officer manoeuvred his regiment after his own fashion; and if a brigade of troops were brought together, it was very doubtful whether they could execute any one combined movement, and almost certain that they could not execute the various parts of it on the same principle. In 1788 David Dundas published *Principles of Military Movements*, a manual intended to produce a practical system; and in June 1792 the adjutant-general, William Fawcett, on behalf of the king, ordered that an amended version should be issued officially, *Rules and Regulations for the Movements of His Majesty’s Infantry*. The adoption of Dundas’ system must have been patchy, however, for when the Duke of York became commander-in-chief in 1795 he found it necessary to repeat the 1792 order that made the manual mandatory.

Dundas received some criticism, notably for concentrating the most necessary movements into a series of ‘Eighteen Manoeuvres’, and for the advocacy of a line three ranks deep. Despite its imperfections, however, Dundas’ manual was of the highest significance. Although a regiment might possess two or more battalions, only in the rarest circumstances did two battalions of the same regiment serve together, so that the principal tactical formation was the battalion. Each comprised ten companies, named from their position when the battalion was drawn up in line: eight numbered ‘centre’ or ‘battalion’ companies, and two ‘flank’ companies – one of grenadiers (which stood on the right flank) and one of light infantry (which stood on the left). The battalion companies were numbered 1 to 8 from right to left (producing a nomenclature such as 1/6th – the first subdivision of the 6th Company), and the battalion could be divided into two ‘wings’ of five companies each, or into ‘grand divisions’ of two companies each. A common cause of confusion today is that the terms ‘company’ and ‘platoon’ – nowadays used for two distinct sizes of sub-unit, the latter a smaller part of the former – were then used of groups with the same number of men, for different purposes: the company was an administrative sub-unit, while a platoon referred to a tactical sub-unit of the firing line. Dundas explained:

Coldstream Guards closing the gate at Hougoumont, a fortified farm which became the focus of some of the bloodiest fighting at Waterloo. This vital strongpoint in the Allied line nearly fell when axe-wielding French infantry broke open the great north door, allowing a handful of men to enter the courtyard. Colonel Macdonnell, sword in hand, along with four other Coldstreamers, just managed to close the gate, an action which Wellington later claimed had been essential to success that day. (Trustees of the National Museum of Scotland)
INFANTRY WEAPONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 1793–1815

(1) Short Land Pattern firelock; (2) India Pattern Firelock; (3) India Pattern locks; (4) New Land Pattern lock; (5) New Land Pattern firelock. The bayonets and related equipment here displayed are: (6) Land Pattern Bayonet 1760–80; (7) Land Pattern Bayonet 1780–1800; (8) India Pattern Bayonet 1787–1807; (9) India Pattern Bayonet (bearing East India Company marks) 1750–1805; (10 & 11) Bayonet scabbards of 97th (Highland) Regiment, c. 1795; (12) New Land Pattern bayonet sockets. (Graham Turner © Osprey Publishing)
Each company is a platoon. Each company forms two sub-divisions, and also four sections. But ... it will happen, when the companies are weak, that they can only (for the purposes of march) form three sections, or even two sections... The eight battalion companies will compose four grand divisions, eight companies or Platoons, sixteen sub-divisions, thirty-two sections, when sufficiently strong to be so divided, otherwise twenty-four... When the battalion is on a war establishment, each company will be divided into two Platoons. When the ten companies are with the battalion, they may then, for the purposes of firing or deploying, be divided into five grand divisions from right to left.

Dundas stated that each company should normally comprise three officers, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer and 30 privates, but for war establishment the numbers increased to a theoretical strength of about 100 per company, and thus about 1,000 per battalion. Even before the attrition of campaign, such numbers were attained only rarely; and while the Foot Guards always fielded stronger battalions than the average line regiment, regimental 2nd Battalions were generally weaker than 1st Battalions.

At full strength a battalion comprised a headquarters, eight battalion companies and two flank companies – the grenadier or right flank, and light infantry or left-flank companies. A headquarters comprise one lieutenant, two majors, one adjutant, one surgeon and assistant surgeons, one quartermaster, one sergeant-major, one staff sergeant paymaster, one sergeant armourer, one drum major, one corporal pioneer and ten pioneers. A company featured one captain, two lieutenants or ensigns, two sergeants, three corporals, one drummer, one fifer (in some battalions), and 85–100 privates. Although these figures are neat on paper, there were often deep discrepancies on the actual field of battle. For example, while Orders of Battle for the Peninsular army show that Foot Guards usually had around 1,000 men per battalion, regiments of Foot typically had 500–800.

The eight battalion companies were also divided into four ‘grand divisions’, each of these having two companies, producing 16 ‘sub-divisions’ or half companies or 32 sections. Battalions might be split into 24 sections for marching if they had inadequate strength. Files were also numbered 1, 2, 3 and so on. Grenadier and Light companies were also numbered, with the addition of their title. Colours were generally located between the 4th and 5th battalion companies in the front rank of the battalion line. The colours provided a vital sense of identity as well as a command tool, and they were protected passionately. An NCO or other experienced rank to the rear would ‘cover’ the colours in battle, and together with other NCOs distributed amongst the ranks enabled the battalion to move effectively in battle. Each battalion might expect
to have three officers per company, plus field officers, from whom all orders emanated. For example, at Waterloo (excluding the weak 3/95th and the KGL, but including the battalions at Hal and thus not engaged) the average number of officers was about 34 per battalion, ranging from the 52nd's 59 to the 42nd's 17 (the latter having suffered 18 officer casualties at Quatre Bras). Although officers might ride during marches, they served on foot in action.

The system of tactics was, of course, inseparable from the smoothbored flintlock musket with which the troops were armed. So inaccurate was the ordinary musket that an attempt to hit an individual who was aimed at beyond about 100 yards was fairly futile; but the prevailing system of tactics, itself determined to some degree by the efficiency of the musket, required only that a hit be registered at some point upon a large and compact body of enemy troops.

It was believed generally that three shots per minute was a fair average rate of fire; some commentators believed that more were possible, but when in 1802 an experiment was conducted, an experienced sergeant of the Coldstream

**Battle Commands**

The principal orders in battle were given by the battalion commander and repeated from right to left of a line or front to rear of a column by each company officer. Dundas suggested that the minimum number of commands be given, but these could still be quite extensive: for the Third Manoeuvre, for example (forming close column on a central company) the commanding officer could give six 'cautions' and seven commands, while the company commanders would issue up to nine separate orders.

Although the regulations emphasized that orders were to be given verbally, musical instruments also played a part. Drum-beats might be heard more easily than a voice in the noise of combat, but the number of instructions they could convey were limited. Drum calls included 'To action', to form line or column, to advance, 'Advance quick' and charge, to commence and cease fire, to form square or column from square; it is perhaps significant that the call to form square, a manoeuvre conducted on the battlefield in circumstances of greatest danger, was the most unmistakable beat of all - a continuous roll. Light infantry commands could be conveyed by bugle, easier to use than a drum when skirmishing and, as Captain Thomas Cooper's light infantry manual of 1806 noted, 'A good bugle may be heard at the distance of three miles' (4.8km). Initially bugle-calls were unregulated and were probably quite simple; but a work on trumpet- and bugle-calls appears to have been published in 1795, and in 1798 the Duke of York commissioned James Hyde, trumpet-major of the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers, to revise the existing cavalry calls. His own version of his work (1799) included light infantry bugle-horn calls as used in the Foot Guards.

**OPPOSITE**

The defence of the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte was one of the epics of the battle of Waterloo. This plate depicts a moment in the defence, with an officer and men of the 2nd Light Battalion and a sharpshooter from the 5th Line Battalion, whose equipment was of 'rifle' style but in whitened leather. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
British infantrymen make a halt on a march, requisitioning whatever stocks necessary from the local population. Places of halt were specified in a daily Marching Order document. (Graham Turner © Osprey Publishing)

Guards stated that he could have fired at least four shots per minute only if he had put his cartridges in his pocket, instead of having to reach into his cartridge box. (This may well imply that what happened on campaign could be very different from the prescribed drill.)

Musketry could be delivered in a number of ways, either by volley (generally involving sub-units of a battalion firing together), or by ‘file firing’. The latter involved each file of two (or three) men firing, and then reloading as the next file along the ranks fired, so that a fairly continuous fire was delivered, running from one part of the line along its length. In combat this soon degenerated into a fairly haphazard process of firing virtually at will.

Dundas’ manual did not cover the ‘manual exercise’ (musket-drill) or the minutiae of firing, but it did advocate four variations of firing: directly in front, obliquely to right or left, and file-firing. It was possible for three ranks to fire simultaneously, the front rank kneeling and the third firing through the intervals in the second; but as part of the 18 Manoeuvres it was instructed that the front
two ranks would fire standing (the third presumably reserving its fire) except when firing obliquely, when the front rank would kneel and the second rank fire over their heads. (It was possible for third-rank men to pass loaded muskets to the second rank, but as the two-rank line became almost universal this would not generally apply.)

**SPAIN, 1812**

British Army troops at Salamanca, 22 July 1812. The soldiers here are all of the Light Infantry Company, Coldstream Guards – of the Coldstream and 3rd Foot Guards, only the light companies took part in the action at Salamanca. The ranks present here are, from left to right, front rank: private, officer, sergeant. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The firing drill sought to ensure that a battalion always had part of its personnel ready to fire, so as not to be vulnerable through being completely ‘unloaded’ at any moment. Thus, firing a single huge volley was discouraged.

**Light infantry**
In addition to the light company of each line battalion, there were ultimately seven light infantry regiments (43rd, 51st, 52nd, 68th, 71st, 85th and 90th),
which were trained in skirmish tactics to a high degree, notably those in the Light Division of the Peninsular army – the 43rd and 52nd, arguably the elite of the army. In addition to their specialist training all were equally adept in the tactics of the ordinary line infantry. There were also the rifle corps, ultimately three battalions of the 95th and the rifle-armed battalions of the 60th; and the two light battalions of the KGL were also (initially only partly) armed with rifles.

Although an integral part of their own battalions, the light companies could be assembled into ad hoc units. Provisional or composite battalions could be created by amalgamating flank companies detached from their parent battalions; these were especially useful for small expeditions, as a way of increasing the number of battalions in a force without greatly affecting the potency of the parent corps. More generally, however, the light companies of the component units of a brigade, together with the rifle company that was usually attached to each brigade in the Peninsula, could be united into a single unit for action or on the march. Wellington issued a detailed General Order to this effect in May 1809, and a similar one on 9 May 1815. The 1809 order made it clear that the brigade rifle company was to be included in the consolidated light battalion, which was to form on the left wing of the brigade, but posted on the front, flanks or rear of the brigade as was necessary for combat or on the march. In 1810 another order indicated that when the light companies were not consolidated, the brigade rifle company should accompany brigade headquarters.

LIGHT TROOPS, PRE-1803 (opposite)

(Left) Private, Hompesch’s Light Infantry, 1796. The war with Revolutionary France brought about a rapid expansion of the British Army, during which many foreign light infantry corps were brought into British pay. This soldier serves with a unit raised in Germany in 1796, and eventually ‘drafted’ in the West Indies into the 2/60th and 5/60th (Royal American) Regiment in 1798. The entire regiment was originally armed with ‘carbines’ except for ten men in each company armed with rifles, although the proportion of riflemen grew to nearly half by the time they sailed for the West Indies. Our subject's uniform features the shako, green jacket and black equipment adopted by many of the Rifle regiments raised later, including the 5/60th and the 95th Rifles. Note the turban, chains and plate adorning his shako, and the ‘breastplate’ securing his pouch and sword belt. Note also the breech cover and loose sling on his carbine. (Centre) Private, 6th Battalion, 60th (Royal American) Regiment, 1799. Another German light infantry unit was the 6/60th, raised in 1799; the battalion were armed partly with muskets and partly with rifles – this soldier carries the standard British musket of the time, the India Pattern. Note the shako, green jacket and buff leather equipment, in which the 6/60th fought in Holland before being sent to the West Indies. German regiments were allowed to wear moustaches. (Right) Private, Light Company, 1st Foot Guards, 1793. The men of the light companies of British regiments continued to wear red coats. The Guards had not had light companies until 1793, and chose the uniform shown here for their ‘light bobs’. The extraordinary ‘round’ hat is set up with laces, a fur crest and a green plume. Note also his ‘gaiter-trousers’ buttoned at the bottom, short jacket with light infantry wings, musket and bayonet, and the knapsack at his feet. (Mike Chappell © Osprey Publishing)
Dundas noted that when light companies were ‘in line with their battalions they are to form and act in every respect as a company of the battalion’. Cooper’s manual described the essence of their service: light infantry, he wrote:

are of the utmost utility ... they conceal from the enemy the most important manoeuvres of a battalion ... vigilant day and night, and alert in the extremest degree... In the open plain, they can act as a compact body; in coppices and woods, as light troops; and in the line, as regulars: they can pursue their course with order and regularity over steep hills, and rugged precipices; and through woods and thickets... Depending upon light infantry, an army has its front, flanks, and rear, secured against a surprise... When an army advances in the presence of the enemy, the Light Infantry are in front; retreating, they are in the rear; foraging, they protect; landing, they are the first to jump out of the boats; embarking, they are the last to leave the shore.

To a considerable degree, light infantry service was developed by Sir John Moore at Shorncliffe camp, involving the 43rd, 52nd and 95th – regiments that were to form the Light Division in the Peninsula. The tactics were probably developed mostly by Lieutenant-Colonel Kenneth Mackenzie of the 52nd, but Moore added an additional dimension by encouraging the esprit de corps, intelligence and self-reliance demanded of troops who operated independently, sometimes without close supervision. Discipline and obedience derived from pride, comradeship and encouragement rather than from the threat of punishment – a theory at odds with the more reactionary attitudes of the military establishment, but one that proved remarkably successful.
Light infantrymen normally acted in pairs, the file-leader and his 'comrade'. In skirmishing, two formations were prescribed: open order, with files 0.6m (2ft) apart, and extended order, two paces apart or more according to circumstances. Movements were in quick time except when advancing, retreating or firing, which were to be in ordinary time; men were never to run until ordered, and then only at a pace at which order could be preserved. Muskets were ordered to be carried sloped, with bayonets fixed, but trailed when in extended order, and when appropriate without bayonets, 'for the purpose of taking cooler and more deliberate aim', i.e. to avoid the weight of the bayonet dragging down the muzzle. Light infantry were taught to aim at individual targets, and to shoot steadily; as one manual stated, 'light troops should all be expert marksmen. To fire seldom and always with effect should be their chief study... Noise and smoke is not sufficient to stop the advance of soldiers accustomed to war; they are to be checked only by seeing their comrades fall.' Firing was conducted individually, each man firing as quickly as prudent; but in extended order the two-man unit came to prominence, so that one of the pair was always loaded.

In close order the company commander was on the right of the front rank, covered by a sergeant, the second-in-command on the left, and the third officer three paces behind the centre of the rear rank, with any additional officers and sergeants. In open order the three principal officers were three paces ahead of the front rank, the commanding officer at the right; in extended order the officers and sergeants were at the rear, the company commander in the centre.

Although the battalion light company stood on the left flank when in line, in action it could be divided into two parties, standing behind the 2nd and 7th companies; when sent forward to skirmish they moved around the flanks of the line by files, then wheeled inwards to unite 50 paces in front of the line, in extended order. When in battalion strength, a cardinal rule was to maintain a reserve: half the men could be held back as the main reserve, another quarter 60 paces in advance of them as the immediate reserve for the remaining quarter, which formed the skirmish line 80 paces further forward. Naturally, under combat conditions these proportions and distances might vary according to circumstances.
Outpost and Reconnaissance Duties

Outpost and reconnaissance duty formed an important part of light infantry service, and was covered in more than one manual. The official manual recommended that if a scouting party comprised a sergeant and 12 men, then a corporal and two men should form an advance guard, with two men on each flank, all as far from the main body as possible without losing touch; it emphasized that the particular terrain should always be considered, and that initiative was required on the part of the troops.

Sir James Shaw Kennedy commented on how a battalion should be posted to cover the cantonments of a division: five companies forming outlying picquets about 2.4km (1.5 miles) from the division, with the remaining five companies as a reserve 914m (1,000 yards) behind the picquets, four advanced posts 1,000 yards forward of the picquets, and patrols a further 548m (600 yards) from the most advanced sentries. He stated, however, that this depended on the proximity of the enemy; when he helped set the pickets of the 3rd Division in the Waterloo campaign, on the night of 16 June they were 457–548m (500–600 yards) in front of the main position, but on the following night a maximum of 274m (300 yards) in front.

Another formation, notably used by riflemen, was ‘chain order’, which required a reserve of only one-quarter of the whole. It was composed of groups of four men, each group ten paces from the next; each member of the group fired in turn, so that by the time the fourth had fired the first was ready to fire again. The enhanced accuracy of the rifled musket, and the great proficiency of the British riflemen, made them especially valuable; a number of accounts from the Peninsular War describe how French units were devastated by having their officers singled out and shot by British riflemen. In addition to the designated light infantry, other members of a battalion might receive some light infantry training; at Quatre Bras, for example, the concentrated light companies of Kempt’s Brigade were supplemented by a company of the 79th and that regiment’s ‘marksmen’.

The Rifle Corps

Of all the forces of light infantry, the Rifle Corps has captured the most enduring interest from historians, and a closer look at its structure is valuable for understanding the British attitude towards light infantry, and something of the development of British military weaponry. In the Peninsular War, Wellington came to value his riflemen as the ultimate ‘fire brigade’ force, cracking nuts other units struggled to break. Officially formed on 25 August 1800, ‘the Rifle Corps’ carried that title until 25 December 1802, when it was allocated the rank of 95th in the sequence of line regiments, the number under which it became
universally famous. Officially, its title appears either as the 95th (Rifle Corps) or the 95th Regiment of Foot (Riflemen). The principal defining feature of the Rifle Corps was the weapons they carried. Initially the rifles used were continental imports (which may have remained in use for some time, as suggested by a report of 1807 that a rifle company of the King’s German Legion had weapons of three different calibres). In 1796 the Board of Ordnance had purchased some rifles from the famous gunmaker Durs Egg, which apparently resembled a musket but had a 99cm (39in) rifled barrel of .704in bore (ordinary musket-bore was about .75in). The Ordnance, however, preferred a short-barrelled rifled carbine, and, anxious to procure rifles manufactured in Britain, held a trial in February 1800 between several English and foreign rifles. The winner was a weapon designed by the gunmaker Ezekiel Baker, and it was his pattern that was put into production and remained in use throughout the period.

Baker’s rifle had a 76cm (30in) barrel with quarter-turn, seven-groove rifling. It was easier to load but inferior in performance to the best target rifles, but as Baker contended, was best suited for the military purpose required. To utilize existing ammunition, it was of ‘carbine bore’ (.625in); to use standard infantry ammunition, Baker produced some weapons of musket-bore, but Manningham rejected them as too heavy (the ordinary Baker rifle weighed just over 4kg/9lb). It was a sturdy weapon with brass furniture, including a scroll-shaped trigger-guard, and a brass flapped box in the butt to hold both cleaning tools and the greased patches employed when loose balls were used as

Battle of Salamanca, 22 July 1812 – the attack by Sir James Leith’s 5th Division. At about 1640hrs the 5th Division, after enduring a prolonged period under fire from French artillery, began its attack on Maucune’s division just above the village of Los Arapiles. When the 5th reached the crest of the heights they found Maucune’s division drawn up in squares. In the ensuing contest, the British firepower broke the squares apart. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
During the Peninsular War, at the Coa River on 24 July 1810, the Light Division was almost caught napping by Marshal Ney's 6th French Corps. The Coa River bridge was their only means of escape and had to be held at all costs. The scene shown is in the later stages of the battle when the Light Division had successfully retired across the bridge and French attempts to cross were beaten back. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)

The First Regular Rifle Corps of the British Army, the 5/60th, formed in 1797

It depicts Francis de Rottenburg, in the uniform of an officer of the battalion, who has called out from a line one of his men to show his rifle to a lieutenant-general, who represents the more "traditional" aspects of the army of the time. The first official mention of the green jacket appears to be in a clothing warrant of 1800, and more extensive details appear in the 1802 regulations. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
SKIRMISHING, c.1811

(Left and centre) Privates, 43rd (Monmouthshire) Light Infantry. (Right) Field officer, 43rd (Monmouthshire) Light Infantry. The private figures depict a ‘file’ of skirmishers. Trooper The soldier at the bottom waits, selecting a target, while his comrade loads his musket before calling to his mate that he is ready. By this time regiments had been issued with the ‘New Land Pattern Light Infantry Musket’ with its distinctive rear sight, ‘browned’ barrel, ‘pistol-grip’ trigger guard, and waterproof pan. Slings were kept loose when skirmishing, in order to steady the aim, and bayonets – always a hindrance to accuracy – were left unfixed until the last moment. (Mike Chappell © Osprey Publishing)
ammunition. It had both front and back sights, the latter originally adjustable for different ranges, though latterly fixed sights were more usual. Other progressive variations included a slit in the stock, instead of a drilled hole, for the ramrod (to prevent it becoming jammed), a replacement of the original rounded lock and swan-neck cock with a flat lock and reinforced 'ring-neck' cock, a flat lock with safety bolt and raised pan, and finally a return to the rounded lock.

The quantity of weapons required necessitated the contracting of a number of manufacturers; in the period 1805–8, for example, the Ordnance received into its stores no fewer than 10,078 rifles manufactured in Britain, and at the end of the Napoleonic Wars had some 14,000 in store. In addition, weapons were produced to equip the many volunteer corps who were trained as riflemen, some of whom purchased their weapons privately. This produced more variations: for example, the gunmaker Henry Nock produced rifles with his patent enclosed or 'screwless' lock design, and with the barrel smooth-bored for
several inches from the muzzle; some rifles were produced without butt boxes, with a variety of bayonet-fittings, and in superior quality for officers. A variation was made by Baker as a cavalry carbine, a number being issued to the Life Guards in 1801, for example, and others produced subsequently, presumably for men designated as 'flankers' (cavalry skirmishers or sharpshooters). Initially these resembled the infantry rifle but with a 20—22 in. barrel, and from 1813 at least some issued to the 10th Light Dragoons (one of the few regiments known to have carried rifled weapons) had the scroll-shaped trigger-guard replaced by an extension to the wooden stock resembling a pistol grip, which Baker claimed provided a better hold for the hand.

Contemporary statistics concerning the accuracy of rifles mostly concern tests conducted under ideal conditions, which could be very different from service in the field. The Prussian reformer Scharnhorst, for example, testing Prussian and Russian rifles, found them twice as accurate as the smoothbore at shorter range, and up to four times as accurate at longer range. Similarly,
in testing one of his own rifles against a man-sized target, Ezekiel Baker fired 34 shots at 100 yards, and 24 at 200 yards, and every one hit. When the 95th were training, Major Hamlet Wade and two riflemen named Smeaton and Spurry were so confident in the technology of the rifle, and in their own skill, that they would hold the target for the others to shoot at, at 150- or even 200-yards range.

Because of their perceived slow rate of fire, it was believed by some that riflemen required special protection, hence the continental practice of combining riflemen in the same units as men armed with smoothbores. Others advocated a resurrection of the ancient pike, either in place of a bayonet or as a defence for a rifleman. A combined pike- and rifle-rest had been used by the Austrian Grenzers (frontier light infantry), and it is significant that a number of volunteer rifle corps formed in Britain in the early 1800s were associated with units of pikemen, conceivably in pursuance of this tactical theory. Even after the Napoleonic Wars the pike still had its adherents as a protection for riflemen, and as late as 1831 an experienced rifleman was advocating an ‘infantry lance’ as being more effective than a bayonet.

In practice, however, the rifleman relied upon his bayonet as a weapon of last resort, even though there were very few bayonet fights during the period. Some rifles – notably those designed for hunting – had no provision for a bayonet, but most continental military weapons were equipped with knife-like bayonets derived from the German hunting-sword (Hirschfanger), with a long blade intended to compensate for the short length of the rifle when compared to an ordinary musket. These often clipped on to the side of the stock, as a conventional socket bayonet would have obscured the front sight. (Shooting with any kind of fixed bayonet would have been practised only in an emergency,
as the weight of the bayonet would have so altered the balance of the rifle that aiming would have been affected.) Nevertheless some patterns of British rifle did use socket bayonets; for example, the dismounted companies of the London and Westminster Light Horse Volunteers had ‘Broad Swords ... so contrived to serve occasionally as Bayonets’, according to Rowlandson’s *Loyal Volunteers*

**SPAIN, 1813**

(Centre) Subaltern officer, 85th (Bucks Volunteers) Light Infantry. Note the later pattern shako, which had a leather top and band and tapes to tie under the wearer’s chin in windy weather. (Right) Private, 85th (Bucks Volunteers) Light Infantry, loading his musket. (Top) Private, Calabrian Free Corps. (Left) Private, Italian Levy. (Mike Chapell © Osprey Publishing)
Death of a hussar. The rifleman on the left, firing a pistol at a French hussar, holds a short pike with an attached hook on which to rest the rifle, similar to the Hackenlanze of the Austrian border Grenzers. The rifleman is portrayed in the usual dark green with black facings. (The Royal Collection © 2008, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II)

of London & Environs. These had a straight, spear-pointed blade about 76cm (30in) in length and a hilt like that of the 1796 light cavalry sabre, with the rifle muzzle fitting through the knucklebow.

With its wooden stock extending virtually to the muzzle, the Baker rifle could not accommodate a socket bayonet, so the original pattern was of 'sword' type, attaching to the side of the stock by a metal bar and spring clip. It had a 58.4cm (23in), straight, unfullered blade, double-edged for 7.6cm (3in) nearest the tip, a spear point, and a cast brass stirrup-hilt with ribbed grip and single langet. Early in 1801 it was replaced by a similar pattern with a curved knucklebow, which remained in use throughout the Napoleonic Wars. In a memorandum of 1816 to the Horse Guards concerning rifle corps equipment, Lieutenant-Colonel Amos Norcott of the 95th recalled that the bayonet was so heavy as to be an impediment to marching, and that he hardly ever knew of it being used except for chopping meat and clearing undergrowth for camping. It was also reported that firing the rifle with bayonet fixed tended to damage the clip, confirmation of which was provided by the recollections of Captain John Dobbs of the 52nd, who recalled the 95th's commander at Corunna, Sir Sidney Beckwith, calling to the 52nd, 'Come here with your bayonets' as most of the 95th's bayonets were 'out of order' after the rigours of the campaign. Consequently, in 1815 a socket bayonet was ordered for the Baker rifle, which required a shortening of the stock, the moving of the front sight and the addition of a locking lug to the underside of the barrel. It was not introduced until August 1815, however, after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, and in 1823
was itself replaced by a side-fitting bayonet. The original design of bayonets led the 95th to refer to them as 'swords', a term retained by the Rifle Brigade to describe all bayonets they carried, of every succeeding pattern.

* * * *

Taken together, the British infantry of the Napoleonic era was undoubtedly one of the most effective land armies in the world. Napoleon himself noted how some of his most daring and innovative tactics came unstuck on the stubborn British line or defensive square. Although officially a volunteer force, the British Army certainly contained an element of unwilling recruits: criminals and vagabonds, thugs and ruffians who were only serving to avoid a prison sentence. It is however important to rectify a common misconception on this subject: when Wellington wrote of 'the scum of the earth', he was referring not to the army in general, but to that element that plundered in the wake of the Battle of Vitoria (21 June 1813). The capacity of soldiers to engage in violent plunder after a bloody engagement was a problem faced by almost all units in all armies during this era, especially under the conditions of near starvation or genuine poverty that many found themselves. Plunder may have been a motivation for some to join the infantry, but it is probably fair to say that most ordinary soldiers simply wished to escape from poverty or to seek adventure. Whatever their background, over time Wellington moulded them into a first-rate fighting force and he was impressed by the change wrought in his men by army life: 'It is really wonderful', he wrote during the war, 'that we should have made them the fine fellows they are.'

Following the storming of Badajoz, a French-held fortress in Spain, on the night of 6/7 April 1812, Wellington's men went beserk and sacked the town in an orgy of violence. The sacking of the town lasted for a full 72 hours and, as Napier wrote, 'the tumult rather subsided than was quelled'. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
ARTILLERY

During the Napoleonic period there was vigorous design and manufacturing activity relating to the British Army’s artillery weapons. Many of the artillery officers engaged during the American War of Independence were responsible for the design and development of the artillery arm in the late 18th century. Names such as William Congreve the Elder, Thomas Blomefield and Thomas Desaguliers became synonymous with development of artillery weapons.

During this period the supply and manufacture of the army’s artillery weapons was controlled by the Board of Ordnance. This board was composed of six principal individuals of whom the head was the Master-General of the Ordnance, a thunderously powerful military and political figure and one on whom any general in the field had to rely when expecting supplies. (The Duke of Wellington became the Master-General after the Napoleonic Wars.) The nature of warfare during the Napoleonic period dictated that guns heavier than the 12pdr were seldom used on the battlefield and therefore the main weapons in use with the British Army were the 3, 6, and 9pdr types. Howitzers, commonly 5½in designs, were also regularly employed.

Organization

Surprisingly few original publications exist that deal specifically with British artillery organization of the Napoleonic Wars. Some of these are contradictory but what is clear is that, during this period, the tactical use of artillery had begun to change quite dramatically. The innovations of Napoleon Bonaparte, himself a gunner, led to other countries taking a long, hard look at their own use of artillery.

At the beginning of the period artillery was divided up into battalion guns, horse artillery and artillery of the park. Battalion guns could be 3pdrs or light 6pdrs and were normally attached, as their name suggests, to a battalion of infantry. The horse artillery was formed in 1793 to provide a type of mobile artillery unit that was to follow the cavalry to give them more firepower or to move quickly to where more firepower was needed. Artillery of the park was the name given to the heavier types of guns such as the 12pdr. As the name suggests, the guns were less mobile and were used to occupy specific positions of advantage from which their greater hitting power could be brought to bear. By 1800 these three separate entities had changed so that artillery had become divided into foot artillery, horse artillery and artillery of the park. Spreading pairs of guns about infantry regiments had become a thing of the past and the artillery had become far more centralized.

Normally foot artillery was organized in ‘brigades’ of between six and 12 guns; the word battery now so commonly associated with an artillery unit of this sort of size was a later creation. The unit could be further broken down into sub-units called ‘divisions’ consisting of two guns. A single crew with its
gun and limber was known as a sub-division. In the Royal Horse Artillery the tactical unit equivalent to the brigade was the ‘troop’, with an establishment of six guns. Brigade and troop strengths varied on campaign and were often less than the official establishment. The British Army of the Peninsular War was chronically short of artillery, for example, and in particular heavier guns such as the 12pdr were very scarce.

By the time of the Peninsular War, brigades were mostly six guns strong, horse artillery troops having five 6pdrs and one 5½in howitzer. Early 19th-century sources state that a brigade of foot artillery consisted of an artillery company, drivers and horses, six guns and six ammunition waggons, a wheel carriage, a mobile forge, two store waggons and two spare ammunition waggons.

The previous practice of using civilians to drive the horses died out in 1794 when the Corps of Drivers of the Royal Artillery was created. A ‘section’ of drivers consisted of 90 men plus craftsmen, which was then combined so that a ‘troop’ of drivers was made up of five sections. These large units were split up and allocated to gun brigades as needed. Even though these men were part of the army, the problems of control still existed, as they were not actually part of the Royal Artillery, but formed a separate Corps. This led to some command difficulties when in the field. Munitions were transported by the Field Train

A Royal Horse Artillery battery with 6pdr gun on Congreve block trail carriage. The image shows the positions of the drivers and the horses. All of the crew would be mounted and the horses were normally held in a position behind the gun. The overhead view of the gun shows the positions of the principal gunners on the gun. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)
Department, whose job it was to ensure that all artillery units were kept supplied with ammunition. Members of the Field Train wore Royal Artillery uniform.

Before the advent of the internal combustion engine all guns were conveyed by two means of motive power: horses and men. It was only in 1794 that drivers became part of the Royal Artillery since in the early 18th century they were normally civilians hired for a specific purpose, though even after this date the Corps of Drivers was administered separately from the Foot Artillery which it supported. In the horse artillery drivers were fully integrated with their troops. Artillery officers spent a great deal of time learning how to handle horses and the best ways to look after them.

The equipment required to attach the horse to the limber was a complex array of traces (links that attach the horse harness to the gun carriage), leather and rope straps, yokes and swingle trees (iron or wooden bar that was attached to the splinter bar of the limber). A swingle tree was a baulk of timber with a number of metal loops fitted to it which acted as the draw bar and was connected to the limber. The British limber normally had a horse harnessed

Artillerymen

The cultural home of the Royal Regiment of Artillery was Woolwich in London. Since the mid-18th century officers had been trained at the Royal Military Academy on the Woolwich Arsenal site. The engineers and gunners were trained together and were given lessons in drawing, fencing, dancing and the military arts. In fact, two successive Drawing Masters at Woolwich were the Sandby brothers, Thomas and Paul, famous for their English landscape watercolours. It is no surprise therefore that gunner officers were able to draw so capably, landscape drawing being an integral part of surveying. Cadets as young as 12 years old were taken into the Academy at Woolwich but they were often not liked either by the commanders or by the local populace, one particular officer calling them ‘scabby sheep’. In 1806 training for the gunners transferred to a new military academy about two miles away near Shooter’s Hill and then colloquially known as ‘the shop’. Along with the Royal Engineers the officers of the Royal Artillery were the only scientifically trained men in the British Army and as such they achieved a relatively high degree of professionalism. Officers did not buy their commissions and were instead promoted strictly by seniority, which could cause some dissatisfaction since the average service required to attain a colonelcy in the Royal Artillery was 36 years.

The Royal Horse Artillery was a different matter. Its members were expected to be able to ride and use a sword. After its establishment in 1793 the Horse Artillery quickly became known as an elite unit, which was expected to deliver artillery fire quickly, and at the point needed.
to the shafts and one connected to the swingle tree. These horses were then connected to the ones in front by traces.

Normally there were four to six horses in a gun team. The ones nearest to the limber were known as the wheelers and those at the front were the leaders. The choice of horse for each position was extremely important because the wheelers had to be heavier and stronger than the rest of the team because they acted as the brake for the whole equipment. In British gun teams only three of the horses would be ridden in a six-horse team. Each pair had a rider and he normally sat on the right-hand horse (viewed from the front). The rider on the wheeler was normally the most experienced of the team and was considered to be in charge.

**Brass guns**

The Royal Brass Foundry at Woolwich Arsenal manufactured most of the bronze guns required by the Board of Ordnance. Nearly all field guns were made of bronze, commonly called brass in this period. Bronze was much lighter than iron, so it made sense in the interests of manoeuvrability to use bronze. In addition, it resisted the shock of firing, was able to stand the force of the

Bengal Horse Artillery with their 12-pounder gun and carriage. The Indian 12pdr barrel was almost identical to the Royal pattern, but the carriage was very different, harking back to an earlier age. It is a high cranked double bracket carriage with heavy wheels and must have weighed significantly more than its European equivalent. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)
projectile travelling down the bore and retained its shape after the whole event was complete. That is not to say that bronze was not prone to damage but a bronze gun did not explode into deadly fragments, as iron ones were prone to, but normally burst in a controllable way.

In the British artillery the main calibres were 3, 6, 9 and 12pdr guns, as we have seen. The 9pdr was a later addition brought into service to counteract the French 8pdr, which was thought to be more powerful than the 6pdr that had previously been the standard British weapon.

The first of these weapons, the 3pdr, was already a feature in British armies earlier in the 18th century and many different versions were produced. By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the 3pdr was used in many different roles. Drawings show 3pdrs mounted upon light carriages prepared for single draft (that is pulled by a single horse).

The Inspector-General of Artillery, Thomas Blomefield, designed many of the guns in the 1790s that were to be widely used in the Napoleonic Wars. Blomefield's designs moved towards a standardization of guns for the British Army. The guns were effectively the same whether they were 3, 6, 9 or 12pdrs, varying only in size. There were two 3pdrs in Blomefield's system, one was 1.26m (4ft 1.52in) long and weighed 229kg (504lb) while the other was 1.8m (6ft) long and weighed 305kg (671lb). They are distinctive in that the muzzle has a shallow flare and there is a pronounced vent field (area on the breech where the vent is drilled). Blomefield's designs were not the only 3pdrs produced in the late 18th century and it is reasonable to assume that quite a few of these other guns still existed and were used in the later campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars; guns, after all, have a long life span. General Desaguliers, for example, designed a light and a heavy 3pdr but details of these guns are scarce.

By contrast the 6pdr was a widely used size of gun and had been considered a standard size since the 1770s. William Congreve designed a light 6pdr and Desaguliers and William Belford also designed and produced guns of this calibre. Blomefield's system tended to overshadow all the others and he produced two 6pdr gun designs, in heavy and light versions. In 1802 the 12pdr was the heaviest British field gun, anything larger was normally either a garrison or siege piece. There were exceptions to this caveat, but even the 12pdr was eventually generally considered to be too heavy for the field.

**Howitzers**

The word 'howitzer' is thought to have come from the German *Haubitze*, but it is not clear what the original meaning was. In British service howitzers were short-barrelled light weapons with a chambered bore which fired hollow shells. The chambered bore meant that a small powder charge was used and so the howitzer was a relatively low-velocity weapon. It could fire at a high angle and
therefore was often used to fire over the heads of friendly troops, the projectile being designed to explode close above the heads of the enemy. There were two main types of howitzer in the British field artillery: the 4 2/3in howitzer, sometimes known as the Coehorn, and the 5 1/2in howitzer, which was the main type used by the field artillery. One theory has suggested that howitzers developed as alterations of existing forms of mortar since the calibres correspond to those of the Royal and Coehorn mortars of 4 3/4in and 5 1/2in calibre respectively.

The barrel of the 4 2/3in howitzer was very short, typically 0.55m (1ft 10in) in length. This howitzer was considered a useful mountain weapon, with a weight of 127kg (279lb); it had a powder charge of only 227g (8oz). The 5 1/2in howitzer was generally specified as being 0.7m (2ft 2in) long and weighing 203kg (447lb); the powder charge required was 0.45kg (1lb).

A much heavier 5 1/2in, 508kg (1,118lb), howitzer was produced for service and an example of this weapon exists in the Royal Artillery Museum. This howitzer is cast with dolphins and a dispart sight, which meant that, when aimed with this aid, the line of sight was parallel to the axis of the bore. This feature was thought to be a later development in bronze guns and so this may be one of the earliest examples of a cast dispart sight on a gun made at Woolwich. The 5 1/2in howitzer and detachment. The 5 1/2in type became the principal howitzer of field brigades and was initially mounted upon a double bracket carriage as shown here. The limber was initially a two-wheeled vehicle with a central pintle for the gun trail eye. A block trail carriage was certainly designed for the howitzer and the inset here is after the illustration by Shuttleworth c. 1820 which demonstrates how it would have looked. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)
dolphins are an addition, which do not occur on earlier models, and were probably added because of the extra weight of the howitzer. However, this weapon does not appear to have been issued widely and may only ever have been intended for garrison use. The 8 and 10in howitzers were the heaviest in service but were generally considered to be siege weapons and therefore were too heavy for use in the field, the 10in weighing over one ton.

Mountain artillery

The British and Indian armies had a proud tradition of mountain artillery units for employment in areas where larger artillery pieces could not be used. But mountain batteries were not formally organized in this period and certainly during the 18th century these units were only established on an ad hoc basis. Early references to mountain units are scarce and vague and it is not until we get to the Pyrenean campaign of 1813–14 that the beginnings of a British mountain battery can be identified. Both the French and Spanish armies made use of small guns for operations in mountain areas but for the British it was a certain Colonel Cookson who attempted to form such a unit under the auspices of the Royal Horse Artillery.

During the Corunna campaign there is evidence to suggest that a mountain battery was in use but it is not until 1813 that one becomes aware of a mountain battery actually in action. Following the passage of the Bidassoa on 7 October, one mountain battery engaged the French artillery in position there. Normal batteries had found the terrain impassable with the standard gun carriages being shaken to bits by the conditions. Marshal Beresford brought several 3pdr guns from Lisbon and eventually equipped a unit with mules and personnel. It is curious to note that Portuguese gunners and British officers and drivers were mixed in this unit. They were commanded by a Lieutenant Robe who came from a family of distinguished gunners and engineers and who was eventually killed at Waterloo. These guns were attached to the Light Division and were heavily used in the battles of La Nivelle, Arcanques, Orthes and Toulouse although the 3pdr calibre was found to be too small to affect some of the French defences.

The equipment was generally 3pdrs and 4½in howitzers. The carriages were carried by a single mule that bore both the trail (part of the carriage which rests on the ground when unlimbered) and the wheels. After some experimentation it was found that the mules were strained by this weight and the load was split. Mountain artillery was also used in the Nepal campaign of 1814–16 and again the equipment was the same. There are no reliable lists of the drill and arrangements of these mountain batteries but the records of a 4.4in howitzer battery sent to Spain during the Carlist Wars some 20 years later describes the unit as having two divisions, a front and a reserve division.
The number of men in this unit appears to have been between 48 and 60, and each division had 36 mules. Four carried the howitzers, two carried the beds, and eight carried the ammunition (48 rounds per gun). There were four spare mules, plus four for the men’s kit and two for provision and forage.

Ammunition

Of all the types of ammunition used in the Napoleonic Wars the cast iron, spherical, round shot was the staple of the British gunner. Even at long range when the shot was travelling relatively slowly it could be deadly, though it might appear to be bouncing or rolling along the ground relatively gently. At short range carnage would result.

Round shot were undeniably inaccurate. This was because, despite their name, round shot were never perfectly spherical, nor did they fit their gun barrels exactly. Air acted on the irregular surface of the projectile. These irregularities invariably threw them off target to some degree. It is often also a matter of confusion as to why a 12pdr shot was so much more effective than a 6pdr shot. This is because the impact of a shot was not only related to its weight but also to its velocity, which, with a heavier projectile, was much greater at the end of the trajectory.

There were two forms of close-range weapon, which were extremely useful at up to 274m (300 yards) range. Grape shot and canister, or case, were the
Gun Range

Artillery range depended mainly on two factors: the size of the powder charge and the elevation of the gun. As a gun is elevated the range increases up to a certain point. In contemporary manuals ranges for elevations of up to five degrees were often given. (Such ranges were usually listed in terms of the 'first graze' distance, the distance to the first point at which the shot will hit the ground. Depending on the composition and slope of the ground struck this distance was often much less than the total range at which destructive effect was possible since a bouncing or rolling shot could still do great harm.) So, for a medium 12pdr gun with a charge of 4lb of powder, first graze at three degrees elevation was 1,087m (1,189 yards). Compare this with the first graze of 1,320m (1,444) yards from a medium 6pdr gun using a charge of 0.9kg (2lb) of powder. Alternatively a gun could be fired with two projectiles, in which case from a 12pdr the first shot would travel 555m (607 yards) and second would travel 646m (706 yards). As a general rule guns could range to about 1,372m (1,500 yards), after which the aim and direction of the shot were completely uncontrollable. A lucky round could have the most unexpected results, however; Sir John Moore was mortally wounded by just such a shot at the Battle of Corunna, which injured his shoulder and chest.

anti-personnel weapons of choice of the gunner. Grape was a cluster of large metal spheres tied together around a central spindle and base and normally sewn into a bag, whereas canister was a metal case filled with smaller iron or lead spheres. The whole purpose of these types of shot was to break up when fired from the gun forming a wide cone of flying metal that acted in the same way as a shotgun cartridge.

For longer-range anti-personnel work the common shell was also used. This was normally only fired from a mortar or howitzer and was a hollow sphere filled with a gunpowder charge. The top of the shell had thinner walls than the bottom and had an orifice into which was forced a wooden fuse normally made of beechwood. The fuse was designed to be ignited by the discharge of the gun and had a central channel drilled through it filled with a burning compound. Before firing, the fuse was cut to a certain length corresponding to the desired time of burning and hammered into the top of the shell by a mallet. When it arrived over the target the fuse, if correctly prepared, exploded the main charge, breaking open the metal outer casing and forcing flying fragments in all directions. Although favoured for siege work, the common shell was not always effective against infantry. What was needed was a weapon with the killing effect of grape shot but able to be projected to the ranges achieved by round shot.
The answer was provided by the man whose name is now synonymous with the idea of anti-personnel projectiles. Henry Shrapnel developed a hollow shell filled full of small lead projectiles that on exploding showered the enemy with them in much the same way as the case or canister did. The weapon was first tried in 1803 and was extremely effective, so much so that guns began to be armed with the weapon from approximately 1808 onwards. The shrapnel shell was actually known as spherical case shot and was issued to British artillery in the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns. Its one great disadvantage was a tendency to explode prematurely and this was not rectified until after this period. It was also not always effective when it arrived at the target, as Portuguese gunners found when using it at the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro. According to Maxwell's *Sketches of the Peninsular War*, the Portuguese opened fire on a body of the Brunswick Oels, a unit on their own side. The shells exploded over the heads of the Germans but luckily not one of them was injured.

The final type of projectile for the field artillery was the incendiary or carcass (a name for an incendiary projectile). Initially this device was composed of a metal frame, which was covered with a canvas cover and filled with a special recipe, typically saltpetre 50 parts, sulphur 25 parts, antimony 5 parts, rosin 8 parts, and pitch 5 parts. However, during the early 19th century another form of carcass became common and this took the form of a common shell with two or three apertures in its exterior into which a similar composition was put. Carcass rounds were normally only issued to howitzers or mortars, the suggestion being they were intended to attack towns. This does not preclude them from being used on the field but quite what their purpose would have been there is not clear.

An image of the Royal Artillery foot detachment on the move with a double bracket carriage. The small wheel illustrated at the end of the trail is not normally shown on carriage drawings and one wonders how accurate the artist was, although the sketching is to a very high standard. By W.H. Pyne in 1802. (Trustees of the National Army Museum)
A selection of siege artillery from the early 19th century. The 18pdr siege gun is mounted on a double bracket trail carriage such as that used in the early 18th century. The 13in land service mortar illustrated underneath the gun has the standard type of mounting that existed from the middle of the 18th century until the middle of the 19th. The other two images are Coehorn mortars and show the way that they could be grouped together to be fired during a siege.

Tools and Loading

The gunner required a large number of specialist tools to enable him to perform his tasks efficiently. In general there were several side arms, as they were known, that were indispensable. Firstly there was a sponge rammer, a tool that doubled both to ram the projectile and to sponge the bore after the gun had been fired. The idea was not to clean the bore but to put out any burning embers that might remain in it and fire the next round prematurely. The tool had two heads, a wooden cylinder and a sheepskin-covered cylinder. The next tool was the wadhook, also known as the worm, which was used to scour the bore of the gun for any remnants of wad or cartridge left in the gun. Again the tool was a bore-length stave fitted with a spiral-shaped hook on the end and a wooden cylinder on the other end for ramming if need be.

Wooden staves called handspikes were used to traverse the gun. A specially shaped one was used to fit at the bracket at the end of the trail so that the gun could be moved left or right. A wooden or leather bucket was provided for the sponge so that it could be kept moist and also to clean the bore after the cease-fire had been given.

Loose powder might be needed for loading so a copper-headed ladle was provided for that eventuality but in general most guns fired fixed rounds already made up. Moving to the rear of the gun, the ventsman used a priming iron to pierce the cartridge bag and a leather thumb stall to wear when serving the vent. Ignition was carried out by using small vent tubes. The tube allowed a convenient amount of gunpowder composition to be placed in the vent and was safer during firing. These
tubes could be tin or goose quill. The tube was lit by a portfire. The portfire was a length of rolled paper filled with a composition, which burned at a known rate. They were 30.5–38.1 cm (12–15 in) long and were lit off the linstock placed at the rear of the gun. The portfire was held in a portfire holder, basically a short wooden staff. The linstock was a long wooden stave with a metal head having two jaws. The jaws held a piece of burning match or rope soaked in saltpetre and gunpowder, which smouldered slowly. Before the Napoleonic Wars the linstock itself had been used to fire the gun and could still be used in an emergency but it was thought better to keep it away from the gun. In adverse weather conditions the gun would need to be protected from the weather. A lead cover known as an apron was provided to cover the vent and tarpaulins for the guns. Drag ropes were provided to move the guns if horses were not available. Each rope had a chain section at the end and they were often fitted with wooden handles inserted into the rope length to improve grip.

Finally, the gun was a valuable weapon which could, if captured, be easily turned on its owners. Therefore the gunner needed a quick way of disabling the gun to render it useless to the enemy. The method that was used was to spike the gun. This involved taking a metal spike and hammering it down the vent of the gun. Some spikes had a roughened surface, which made them grip the softer metal of the barrel.

Once used the vent spikes were very difficult to remove and normally the vent would have to be drilled. There was one other way of spiking the vent which did not completely disable the gun and that was to use a sprung spike. This was a metal rod cut across its diameter about halfway down the length of the spike. The cut did not go all the way across the diameter of the rod so it effectively formed a flap or spring that protruded from the side of the spike. When forced down the vent it acted like a normal spike, but after the gun was recovered a shaft could be pushed down the bore of the gun compressing the spring and allowing the spike to be removed.

Drill and Tactics

It is thought that a good gun crew could fire as many as five rounds a minute and there is no doubt that improvements in the provision of ammunition, principally fixed rounds and vent tubes, contributed to increases in the rate of fire. But in reality it was the discipline and skill of the men that really told in battle. A gun crew might have to approach the enemy, unlimber, load and fire in a very short space of time. For the gunners, standing in front of a gun when an enemy cavalry unit was charging down on them must have been a nerve-wracking experience. Drill was the key to good fire discipline. In British gun crews, nine men were allocated to each gun, with each man allocated a specific number corresponding to his role, with a possible maximum of 15 if it was expected that the gun would have to be manhandled. Curiously some sources state that the men were numbered from seven to 15, although this is not always consistent.
The 6pdr, cast by Francis Kinman, with a representative crew in the uniforms of the Royal Artillery of 1813–15. (Royal Artillery Historical Trust)

The operations of the gun depended principally on five of the crew members. The remaining crew were 4.5–9m (5–10 yards) in the rear and brought up ammunition and tools. The duties of the main crewmen were as follows: No. 7 sponged, No. 8 loaded, No. 9 served the vent, No. 10 fired the gun, No. 11 was the gun commander. Other crew roles were: No. 12 carried the match and water bucket, No. 13 served No. 8 with ammunition from No. 14, who carried a cartouche bag (a waterproof canvas bag for holding gun charges) and a pair of drag ropes, and No. 15 held the limber horses and carried a cartouche bag.

When viewed from the rear, the positions were: No. 7 between the right wheel and the muzzle, No. 8 between the left wheel and muzzle, No. 9 clear of the right wheel and No. 10 clear of the left wheel, both in line with the vent. No. 11 at the rear of the gun on the left of the handspike. The only difference with larger calibres was that Nos. 9 and 10 stood outside the wheels and Nos. 7 and 8 at the front assisted with ramming.

For howitzers the positions were the same, but the duties were slightly different: No. 7 sponged, uncapped the fuse, and loaded the shell. No. 8 took the sheepskin out of the piece, laid it on the ground, loaded the cartridge, wiped the bottom of the shell and put the sheepskin in again. The sheepskin was used to stop the muzzle immediately after it was fired because there was a greater risk of accident with this type of weapon, due to the howitzer shells being filled with gunpowder and fused, whereas the round shot was inert. No. 9 served the vent, No. 10 fired the gun, No. 11 commanded and estimated range and fuse burning time, No. 12 carried the match and bucket, No. 13 served No. 8 with cartridges, No. 14 served No. 7 with shells from the limber, which he laid on the sheepskin,
and No. 15 attended the limber. There was a system of sharing out the duties should a man be injured or killed and it was reckoned that a gun could still be kept firing with only three men in the detachment.

Horse artillery drill was essentially the same but all the gunners were mounted on horses so there had to be a horse holder. The horses and the horse holder were normally positioned behind the limber with five gun numbers manning the gun, with a sixth slightly behind them and one gunner controlling the limber team.

During our period the use of artillery subtly changed within the British Army. At the beginning of the period, as we have seen, the guns were divided up into battalion guns, artillery of the park and horse artillery. The battalion guns were normally 3pdr or light 6pdr. Strict instructions on the positions of the guns relative to their parent units are not available, but in review the

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**PART OF A BATTERY AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, SPAIN, IN 1811**

This scene shows a battery position with two 24pdr guns and two 8in howitzers, of which one is shown here. According to Major Cocks, who was present at the second siege in May and June 1811, a battery was erected in front of the first parallel which held 14 24pdrs, two 10in howitzers and four 8in howitzers. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)
battalion guns were placed to the right of the regiment with 10 yards between them and 10 yards between the left gun and the infantry, normally the battalion's grenadier company. It was said that the gun numbers 7 and 8 who stood at the rear of the trail, but at a distance from it, were to be in line with the front rank of the infantry. It is clear, though, that when guns were in action they would take any position that gave them advantageous locations from which to hit the enemy. A manual of 1802 gave the following advice:

With very few variations, the guns should attend in all movements of the battalion, that division of it to which they are particularly attached; and every attention should be paid in thus adapting the movements of the guns to those of the regiment.

At the start of the period artillery of the park could normally include 6, 9 or 12pdrs. These guns were organized into brigades of six guns and the British used the heavier calibres, again normally 12pdrs, in a very specific way. The heavier guns were placed at weak points in the line and at places where they could do the most damage at the furthest range. The emphasis was placed on hidden positions and the creation of defensive works. Contemporary authors stress the use of ground and we can see that they were inclined to use guns in a similar way as a World War I tank in that the reverse of the slope was used for cover and the gun was run up to fire at the very last moment. The need to wait, hidden, until the very last moment to gain the element of surprise, was very important according to contemporary authors. There was also an optimum height at which the guns should be placed on a hill, a height of 27–36.5m (30–40 yards) at a range of 549m (600 yards) being thought most suitable.

It should be made clear that most Napoleonic combat took place at very short range compared with modern day values. Musket range was very short; anything in excess of 100m (91 yards) was out of the
question and the normal effective range was really half that or less. The artillery guns then were extremely significant, as they could range out to a maximum of 1,371m (1,500 yards), giving the army an opportunity to destroy some enemy units long before they reached their destination.

Interestingly, in theory, guns were not to be used against other guns. Whilst this may well have been the generally accepted theorem it was clearly not the practice since there are many guns from the period with damage sustained from enemy guns. It is also interesting to note that one author suggests the masking of guns by another unit until they are needed. This suggests that their power and effect on the battlefield were very great indeed. As soon as a gun was in an advantageous position it was suggested that they were protected by some kind of defensive measure.

Britain did not follow France’s example and create grand batteries to destroy a particular part of the enemy line, but during the wars the emphasis came to be placed on the need to concentrate fire on a particular target. French armies almost always had more guns than the British forces, for example during the Peninsular War Britain could rely on one gun per 1,000 men whereas the French often had four per 1,000 men.

The optimum effect would be produced by a cross-fire from the guns. This meant either choosing a target and attacking or choosing a pre-arranged point over which the enemy was likely to pass. The main thing was that the gunfire should hit an enemy unit at the head of the column and the weakest points of the front. The secret was to hit a unit at its greatest depth. For example, infantry in line were ideally to be attacked by enfilade fire (to fire at an object along its greatest length from a perpendicularly placed gun). Columns were to be hit from the front. Emphasis was placed on the senior artillery officer knowing where and how his guns would produce the desired result, which was to be communicated to him by the senior commander. The only form of communication available was the messenger or word of mouth and so pre-arranged orders and changes in plan were difficult to carry out.

Horse artillery was another matter altogether since it was specifically formed to be light and mobile. A horse artillery unit was expected to be courageous and skilled, the gunners being good swordsmen as well as horsemen. They were expected to ride close to the enemy and unlimber to fire as soon as possible. A good example of how close this could be is demonstrated by the actions of Norman Ramsey’s division at the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro in Spain. As part of Bull’s Troop Ramsey’s two guns were firing on the retreat and were left out of the protective square of infantry within which they could have sheltered. They were attacked and completely enveloped by French cavalry and Major General Sir W. F. P. Napier describes what happened next:

OPPOSITE
Proportions of ammunition for each type of ordnance as provided by the Bombardier and Pocket Gunner. (Royal Artillery Historical Trust)
Men and horses were seen to close with confusion and tumult towards one point, where a thick dust and loud cries, the sparking of blades, the flashing of pistols indicated some extraordinary occurrence. Suddenly, the multitude became violently agitated, an English shout pealed high and clear, the mass was rent asunder and Norman Ramsey burst forth sword in hand at the head of his battery [sic] his horses, breathing fire, stretched like greyhounds along the plain, the guns bounded behind them like things of no weight.

Napier’s view may be fanciful but this incident has become something of a celebrated event in the Royal Artillery and it certainly demonstrated the high morale of the horse gunners.

Since Britain always had less artillery available than the French, as the wars proceeded British commanders began to experiment with and then carry out the practice of holding an artillery reserve. At the end of the wars this reserve usually formed a large percentage, up to half, of the overall artillery available.
We should not think of the reserve as a number of units held in one place but as a central grouping from which units were drawn to support particular sectors of the battlefield when the need arose.

Siege Artillery
If one looks at a list of battles fought during the Napoleonic Wars an interesting fact becomes apparent: a number of these battles were fought as a result of sieges, such as the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro, fought in order to forestall Massena's resupply of Almeida in 1811. Fortified strongpoints still dominated the transit routes of Europe and control of these places gave the military commander control of large areas of country out of all proportion to the forces required to maintain them. Sieges were a large part of military life. The time spent fighting field battles was less than the time spent besieging fortified towns. This process was not as pronounced as in the mid-18th century, but sieges were still an essential part of military campaigning in the Napoleonic period. The Peninsular War alone saw at least 17 major sieges and countless minor ones.

For coastal and siege work, guns tended to be manufactured in similar calibres to naval guns, such as 32, 24, 18 and 12pdrs, and in both brass and...
iron. If we look at the sieges of the Peninsular War, the conflict in which a great deal of Britain's siege artillery was used, two main calibres of bronze guns stand out: the 24pdr and the 18pdr. Theoretically, during a siege a 24pdr would be allocated 50 rounds of shot per day. The amount of powder used per round would vary from 0.9kg (2lb) if the gun were to fire en ricochet or 3.6kg (8lb) of powder were the full charge to be required. Even so an observation made by Major E.C. Cocks during the 1812 siege of Badajoz stated: 'A 100

The main French attack on the village of Fuentes de Oñoro on 3 May 1811 met determined resistance from the British garrison of 24th Foot, 71st Highland Light Infantry and 79th Highlanders. A second massive assault by 18 companies of elite French grenadiers led to desperate fighting in the village and was only defeated by the timely arrival of the British light infantry companies and the 6th Portuguese Cazadores. The French now threw in two more divisions and the Allies retreated. Wellington then gave permission for Mackinnon’s Brigade of Picton’s 3rd Division to charge. Picton himself ordered 'this business must be done with cold steel'. The bayonet charge by the 45th, 74th and 88th, supported by the surviving defenders, eventually drove the French out after a desperate struggle amid streets choked with dead and wounded. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
shot per piece is the complement. Our powder is placed in a depot near the last trench from whence the battery magazines are fed, but enough is never brought into any magazine to occasion serious damage."

Mortars and howitzers also played an important part in British siege gunnery. Regarding mortars, the largest calibre was the 13in mortar, but 10in and 8in weapons were also popular. In addition, smaller bronze mortars were widely used in siege work and the two smallest, the Coehorn and Royal mortars of $4\frac{2}{3}$in and $5\frac{1}{2}$in, were generally used in large groups.

The bronze 8 and 10in howitzers were considered to be the main siege weapons of the day of this type. Normally a 10in howitzer was mounted on its travelling carriage but it is not clear how this was deployed in a siege battery. Smaller iron howitzers were in development by 1800 and it would seem that these were intended to be used for coastal defence. It is impossible to know if these were ever used but drawings exist for their carriages and cast examples certainly exist.

A further weapon, which was neither a mortar nor a howitzer, was considered part of the siege train and that was the petard. The petard was really an explosive device for destroying the gates of a defended town. It appeared as an iron or bronze bell that was filled with gunpowder and was fixed to the enemy gates by means of hooks. The powder charge was about 4.5kg (10lb) and the whole thing was fused. The fuse was lit by a length of quick match leading up to it. Using a petard was an extremely hazardous undertaking since the whole operation had to be carried out in front of the enemy and hence the expression ‘hoist by one’s own petard’ has entered the English language as a euphemism for being caught by one’s own device.

CAVALRY

Wellington, as is well known, had a very poor opinion of his cavalry. This proceeded from a number of causes, but the most important was the simple fact that the nature of the service precluded the tight autocratic control that he was accustomed to exercising over his infantry. Consequently, he was in the ordinary course of events reluctant to let it out of his sight or to allow its officers the latitude allowed in other armies. This in turn meant that while he formed them first into one and then two divisions, they were never employed tactically as such. Unlike the infantry divisions, they were merely administrative formations and eventually both were abolished. Sir Stapleton Cotton, who commanded the 1st Cavalry Division for most of the war, acted throughout as Wellington’s chief of cavalry, a staff role rather than in a tactical role like his infantry counterparts.

The highest level of tactical control exercised on the battlefield was therefore the brigade, initially made up of two regiments but latterly of three. It was very rare for individual regiments to operate independently, except on
picquet duties, and ordinarily infantry divisions were not allocated an organic cavalry unit for scouting purposes. The exception was the frequent attachment of the 1st Hussars KGL to the Light Division, but even this was very much an ad hoc arrangement for specific operations. Once in the field, attrition was just as much of a problem for the cavalry as the infantry. Generally speaking,

BRITISH DRAGOONS, 1811–13

Around 1800, most of the heavy cavalry regiments in the British Army began wearing the classic shako, which was like the infantry cap but had a movable peak. The figures here are (from left to right): Officer, 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons; Trooper, 3rd (Prince of Wales') Dragoon Guards; Officer, 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards, 1813. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
cavalrymen personally tended to be physically superior to the poor infantry, but horses were a different matter and regiments rarely mustered much more than about 400 sabres fit for duty.

At the outset of the wars all cavalry regiments were organized in ten troops, each with an official establishment of 63 troopers besides the usual allowance of commissioned and NCOs. The troops were given letters (A, B, C etc) and the squadrons were given numbers. Since cavalry regiments did not have the equivalent of a second battalion, two of the troops were designated as the regimental depot and permanently retained at home for recruiting and basic training. The service troops were paired off to form squadrons – ordinarily the smallest tactical unit capable of operating independently. Heavy cavalry regiments, variously designated as Dragoon Guards or Dragoons, had four service squadrons until 1811 when the establishment was reduced to three. Light cavalry on the other hand, variously designated as Light Dragoons or Light Dragoons (Hussars), not only retained their four squadrons but even had a fifth added in September 1813.

The light cavalry was a relatively new innovation in the British Army. Up until 1745 only ‘Horse’ and ‘Medium’ cavalry were in use, although a short-lived regiment of Light Dragoons had been raised during the Jacobite Rebellion, followed on its disbandment in 1746 by another regiment led by the Duke of Cumberland, disbanded in 1748. After an interval of eight years, the Horse Guards then accepted the addition of a single ‘light troop’ to most cavalry regiments, comprised of just over 70 officers and men. They proved their worth to such an extent that in 1759 the British military staff decided to form complete regiments of light cavalry, beginning with the 15th Light Dragoons and soon followed by the 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Light Dragoons. By 1809, in the middle of the Napoleonic Wars, the light cavalry arm had waxed and waned to the following regimental list:

7th Hussars (H)
8th Light Dragoons (LD)
9th LD
10th LD
11th LD
12th LD
13th LD
14th LD
15th H
16th LD
17th LD
18th H
Interestingly, despite this substantial body of troops the Horse Guard did not create any specialized light cavalry training manual. This gap in part was plugged by a 1778 publication by one Captain Hinde entitled _Discipline of the Light Horse_, which gathered together a mass of sound advice on training, tactics, duties, equipment and the like.

The heavy and medium cavalry regiments also went through a similar convoluted process of disbandment, formation and rebranding during the second half of the 18th century. By 1795 there were two regiments of Life Guards, one regiment of Horse Guards, seven regiments of Dragoon Guards and six regiments of Dragoons. The Life Guards, Royal Horse Guards and the Dragoon Guards were classified according to the older terminology as 'regiments of horse', whereas the Dragoons acted as the medium cavalry, operating essentially as mounted infantry. The establishment of each regiment, as with the light cavalry, varied depending on status and campaign. In 1800, for example, the King's Dragoon Guards had ten troops, whereas the Life Guards in 1795 had five troops, raised to six in 1799 (although all of the troops had a large establishment). Many cavalry regiments of all types never reached their on-paper strength.

By 1801 the British cavalry force had expanded to a theoretical establishment of 260,000 in 40 regiments, up from 190,000 in 1795. Note also, however, that there were a significant number of émigré cavalry regiments serving in Britain, with lively names such as the Choiseul Hussars, the Uhlans Brittanique de St Domingo and Corsican Light Dragoons. These made their own proud contribution to British service, although many of the units were both small and short-lived.

Otherwise the differences between heavy and light cavalry regiments – however titled – in the British Army were largely cosmetic. There were no regiments equipped as lancers until after the war and while all troopers had pistols and carbines, these were only used by sentries (and even then chiefly for sounding the alarm rather than actually shooting anyone) or for skirmishing
ineffectually on the picquet line. In battle both heavy and light dragoons invariably used their swords. The ‘heavies’ were dressed in red jackets and carried straight-bladed swords, while the ‘lights’ were dressed in blue jackets or hussar costume, with curved sabres. Both, however, rode what were big horses by continental standards and followed the same 1796 *Instructions and Regulations for the Formations and Movements of the Cavalry*.

Wellington’s reluctance to let the cavalry out of his sight also proceeded from a widely shared perception that cavalry officers lacked the professionalism of their pedestrian colleagues in the infantry. That this was by no means an
ill-founded prejudice is borne out not only by a rather patchy record on active service, but also quite graphically by a horrifying remark carelessly expressed by Cornet the Marquis of Worcester of the 10th Light Dragoons (Hussars) on being placed under arrest by his commanding officer for neglecting drill parades. Colonel Quentin angrily informed him that even if he was the King’s son he would be put under arrest for neglecting his duty. Far from being cowed, Worcester loftily declared to his mistress with mingled astonishment and indignation that this was the most disgusting and vulgar thing he had ever heard, for, ‘what has a King’s son, or a duke’s son, to do with the usual discipline observed to lieutenants in the army?’

Unfortunately this attitude was widely shared by a great many of his colleagues and led eventually to the infamous ‘Quentin Affair’, when most of the regiment’s officers conspired to have their commanding officer court-martialled. A number of relatively trivial charges were brought against Quentin but it soon became clear that his real ‘crime’ was attempting to impose some discipline on the aristocratic rabble. In the end not only was he exonerated, but the Prince Regent himself also intervened to throw all the officers concerned out of the regiment. This in itself caused an uproar in some quarters, and one supporter rhetorically asked ‘are six and twenty spirited offspring of the truly noble Devonshire, the patriotic Leinster, the beneficient Beaufort, the virtuous Egremont, and other houses ... to be scattered through a select number of regiments, for pity, and for tuition and correction?’

However, as the government rather tartly pointed out, the case ‘would prove to the young officers of high birth, how little their rank or connections would avail them, if they were not attentive to their duty.’ The Times rather more pithily expressed the hope that the 10th would now become a proper regiment of English cavalry ‘rather than a regiment of dancing masters or merry-andrews’.

Whilst this deplorable attitude to proper soldiering was most commonly found in the fashionable hussar regiments, it was, unfortunately, only the most extreme expression of a general malaise afflicting all of the cavalry. Professional soldiers had always been well aware of the need to separate the functions of heavy ‘battle’ cavalry from that of light cavalry, whose field of operations properly lay in scouting and skirmishing. The effectiveness of the former was widely agreed to depend not on the trooper’s weapons (or armour), but on being mounted on large and powerful horses. Such horses needed to be kept in good condition, and above all it was important to avoid working them too hard until they were actually needed. It followed therefore that instead of breaking down expensive troop horses on outpost work, smaller, hardier horses should be employed instead, ridden by men who understood their business.
Unfortunately these light cavalrymen, whether successively designated throughout history as light horse, harquebusiers, dragoons, light dragoons and most recently as hussars, all without exception displayed a depressing tendency to re-invent themselves as battle cavalry. Dragoons, for example, when first raised in the 17th century were merely mounted infantry who were primarily tasked with scouting and outpost duties, but as time went by they became increasingly reluctant to get off their horses. By the middle of the 18th century they had become so completely assimilated within the cavalry proper that the old regiments of heavy 'horse' were themselves re-designated as Dragoon Guards – the latter part of their title serving only to preserve their old social superiority. This in turn necessitated the raising in the 1750s of what were called 'light' dragoons specifically for outpost work. Predictably enough after a very promising start, they in turn, despite in some cases taking on the name and sartorial foibles of hussars, very soon forgot that their raison d'être was scouting and skirmishing. The Marquis of Worcester and his aristocratic
friends affected considerable admiration for the dashing exploits of the 
Prussian hussar General Zeiten, but when given the opportunity to emulate 
him it was very much a case of all dash and no substance. To officers like 
Worcester, the unglamorous outpost work was probably far too much like hard 
work. Indeed, William Tomkinson of the 16th Light Dragoons famously 
noted: ‘To attempt giving men or officers any idea in England of outpost duty 
was considered absurd, and when they came abroad, they had all this to learn. 
The fact was, there was no-one to teach them.’ In all fairness it might also be 
remarked that there was also a shortage of sufficient open space on which to 
practise cavalry tactics.

The natural consequence was that while drill and discipline was tight 
enough at a troop or even squadron level, British cavalry were on the whole 
deretrained by continental standards. As Tomkinson once more lamented, 
‘In England I never saw nor heard of cavalry taught to charge, disperse and 
form, which if I taught a regiment one thing should be that.’

Notwithstanding the various ‘formations and movements’ prescribed in 
the 1796 regulations, British cavalry tactics in the end normally amounted to 
nothing more sophisticated than lining up two deep with squadrons abreast 
and charging straight at the enemy. This applied to complete regiments and 
brigades as well as to individual squadrons, and in his comprehensive 
instructions issued to the cavalry forming the Army of Occupation in 1815, 
Wellington stressed the overriding importance of maintaining a reserve.

Strangely enough, despite the rather obvious importance of this point, it 
was a lesson which British cavalry never quite grasped. In fact even as late as 
Waterloo, the destruction of the ‘Union Brigade’ was largely down to the fact 
that the pre-designated reserve unit – the 2nd Dragoons (Scots Greys) – 
enthusiastically moved up to join the main battle line at the outset of the 
charge. As usual therefore the initial contact was spectacularly successful, but 
when the French recovered sufficiently to mount a counter-attack with fresh 
troops, the absence of British reserves proved fatal.

In an 1826 critique Wellington provided a revealing insight into his 
Peninsular cavalry. The determined professionalism of the KGL cavalry 
eventually imparted a certain degree of competence in outpost work to their 
British colleagues, and once they had mastered their proper role the Duke 
found them useful enough, ‘first ... upon advanced guards, flanks &c. as the 
quickest movers and to enable me to know and see as much as possible in the 
shortest space of time; secondly to use them in small bodies to attack small 
odies of the enemy’s cavalry.’ Unfortunately, he went on, because they ‘would 
gallop (and) could not preserve their order ... although I consider one 
squadron a match for two French squadrons ... I should not have liked to see 
four British squadrons opposed to four French squadrons; and as numbers
increased, and order became more necessary, I was more unwilling to risk our cavalry without having a greater superiority of numbers."

* * * *

It should be noted that at the battle of Waterloo, the culminating engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, the army under Wellington was composed of a mish-mash of different nationalities, ranging from regular British infantrymen through to men of the Netherlands, Belgium, Nassau and Brunswick. The quality and experience of this army varied as much as the accents, with some soldiers being high-quality veterans, while others were merely frightened, poorly trained conscripts plugging gaps in the line. (There were particular concerns about the Dutch-Belgian troops, who made up 30 per cent of Wellington’s command yet were culturally more allied with the French, and had recently been French allies.) Nevertheless, the British soldiers themselves served with distinction, and it was their grit and military talent that helped bring Napoleon to his knees.
AUSTRIA

OVERVIEW
The Austrian Army at the very beginning of the 19th century was in a state of confusion, still reeling from the debacles of the First and the Second Coalitions. In these wars, the armies of the French Revolution and Consulate continually outperformed their Habsburg counterparts. The problems that confronted the armies of the Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II (r.1792–1806), were broad: logistically, tactically, strategically, and politically, the armies suffered handicaps compared to the rapidly modernizing French. The army of the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria (r.1740–80) had held off the greatest general of his day, Frederick the Great of Prussia (r.1740–86). Her artillery was the envy of the world, and the infantry and cavalry accounted well for themselves. Following the Seven Years War (1756–63), a number of ‘reforms’ were attempted. The worst of these was an overhaul of the artillery arm. The result was a disaster, with several humiliating defeats at the hands of the Turks. Attempts to redress this situation succeeded only partially. Austria had the best artillery of the continental allies, but it could not compare to that of the French.

Throughout the reigns of the Emperors Joseph and Leopold, a number of changes were attempted in the infantry. Light infantry regiments were raised in 1798, but disbanded in 1801. The Habsburg commanders had no faith in the average troops performing well when not under the direct supervision of their officers. There were Jäger battalions (elite rifle-armed light troops) and the Grenz troops (hardy frontiersmen from the Balkans with a traditional duty of military service), but there were never enough to counter the infuriating French swarm of skirmishers. To compound the problem, the Austrians were introducing greater discipline into the Grenzer to ensure their political reliability and make them more compatible with the rest of their army, but suppressing their old flair for irregular warfare.

The problems faced by the Austrian Emperor were in large part due to past Habsburg successes. Primarily through marriages, they had acquired many provinces with varied ethnic and racial populations – therefore, no universal language existed in the army. Further, many of these provinces owed no loyalty

OPPOSITE
The battle of Marengo, 14 June 1800. Feldmarschall Hadik was fatally wounded leading this assault with four Hungarian battalions over the difficult Fontanone stream, beyond which stood the 1st Battalion, 43rd Demi-Brigade, in line. With their ranks broken up, the Austrians suffered heavy casualties from French musketry, and Hadik was wounded just as he ordered a withdrawal. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Napoleon once said ‘You did not see the Austrians at (Aspern-) Essling; therefore you have not seen anything’. Some of the worst fighting of the wars happened in Aspern village on 21–22 May 1809. Small groups of soldiers defended each house like a small fortress, unable to see far in the smoke. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)

to the Austrians, just to the Emperor personally. This meant that the Hungarians, for example, believed they could decide among themselves how much they would support the war effort. As the Empire was teetering on bankruptcy in 1805, the regiments were dispersed to minimize the costs of upkeep and to aid recruitment. Whatever its economic advantages, such dispersal meant that mobilization was a long process.

The Emperor’s brother, the Archduke Charles, had set about reforming the army in 1801. He had taken power from the Hofkriegsrat, a military/civilian assembly, and had streamlined the logistical procedures. He was unquestionably Austria’s best field commander, but he had a knack of alienating the court personalities and the ossified high command. He had close favourites whom he allowed to dictate to others considered above their station. Charles was constantly at odds with a series of foreign ministers and a combination of his enemies worked to remove him from his position of power. They launched a two-front attack, playing on Francis’s paranoia regarding his brother’s popularity, while urging him to join the alliance against Napoleon. Charles was adamant that the army was in no shape to fight the French and that Austria needed further peace to get her financial house in order. To that end he even advocated recognizing Napoleon’s imperial status, humiliating as that might be for the oldest ruling family in Europe.

Charles, by advocating peace, gave his opposition an opening. Pitt, succeeding Addington as British Prime Minister in May 1804, offered subsidies and lavished bribes around the Viennese court, and Charles’ enemies pounced. Finally, they advocated General Mack von Leiberich as a counterweight to Charles on military matters. Mack argued for joining the alliance and going to war. While Charles said the army was not ready, however, Mack’s soothing words to Francis dismissed such worries. When Britain provided the required subsidies, the die was cast. Francis joined the alliance and Charles was assigned to the nominal ‘main theatre’ of Italy, while Mack took the largest army and in the late summer of 1805 prepared to invade Bavaria.

Mack chose this ill-suited time to reorganize the infantry regiments. He changed their existing structure, three battalions of six companies each, into four battalions of four companies. To complete the confusion, Mack did not provide for properly trained higher commanders for the extra battalions. That Mack attempted this change on the eve of war shows how unrealistic he could be.

While major efforts were being made to meet the supply and tactical needs of the Austrian army, scant attention had been given to its strategic doctrines. Austria still fought her wars by trying to manoeuvre her opponent out of theoretically vital geographic objectives. The concept of annihilation was foreign to the expensive armies that Austria fielded. However, the French Revolution and its levies had changed the way that war would be waged.
Austria was not ready to adapt, adhering to a belief in a cordon style of defence, with fortresses holding key points. These would act as rocks against which the enemy would dash himself, while the field army massed to strike a decisive blow. Austria would in turn take the enemy’s strongpoints and achieve ‘checkmate’. The problem with this thinking was that it had failed against Napoleon in the past. But Mack would not tolerate the cautious thinking coming out of Charles’s camp.

One final consideration hampered the Austrians: in order to place their troops under an Austrian commander, the Russians insisted that the commander be of the appropriate royal stature. The Protestant Mack would never do, therefore Mack’s army was nominally placed under Francis’s younger brother Ferdinand. Ferdinand failed to grasp that he was a figurehead until late in the campaign, causing no small amount of friction between the two leaders.

Conditions for soldiers of the Austrian Army improved greatly following Charles’ appointment as Generalissimus in 1806, as his reform programme began to take effect and new regulations began to be introduced for all branches of the army. In 1809 the mainstay of the army was its 46 German and 15 Hungarian line regiments. Each regiment was formed of three battalions, the basic battlefield formation, each of six companies. Company strength was laid down at 218 men for the German units and 238 for the Hungarians, but these figures were rarely attained on the field. Every regiment also had two grenadier companies, each about 145 strong, which were detached on campaign and amalgamated into mixed grenadier battalions of six companies, the elite of the army. The infantry were mostly armed with the 1798 pattern flintlock musket, with a calibre of 17.56mm (0.69in). When fighting, the infantry formed in three ranks, all standing, although the third rank did not fire. The favoured formation on the battlefield was the battalion mass, devised as an improvement on the square; this was a solid block of men, one company wide by six companies deep. Although vulnerable to artillery fire, this formation could manoeuvre and yet, when closed up, be strong enough to repel cavalry.

In addition to the line regiments, the army also contained nine battalions of Jäger and 17 regiments of Grenzer infantry. The Jäger battalions had six companies, each of 166 men when at full strength, and were expected to perform in close order and as skirmishers. The first two ranks of each company were armed with carbines, while the third rank carried rifles. The Grenz (the Military Border between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires) had supplied regiments of tough peasant farmers to the army for more than seventy years. Each Grenz infantry regiment, which was deployed as both line and light infantry, was composed of two battalions of six companies; company strength, set at 220 men, was rarely reached.
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS

BATTALION AND DIVISION MASSES (1807 EXERCIERREGLEMENT)

As the troops loaded, the officers on the sides ordered the four flank files to turn to each side. To protect the vulnerable corners, these files could aim obliquely. On the command, the first four ranks brought their weapons into position; the others remained with shouldered weapons. The front rank, lowered bayonets, with the butt held against the crook of the elbow. The second rank opened fire when enemy cavalry reached 300 paces. Their muskets were then brought to the vertical and quickly exchanged for the loaded musket of the third rank. A second volley was immediately fired by the second rank, who then lowered their weapons as for the first. As the second rank fired, the third exchanged the discharged weapons for the fourth rank's muskets. If the enemy risked close-quarters action, the first rank used their bayonets on the horses, the second on the cavalrymen. The third rank fired their weapons at the enemy's upper body, singling out the bravest troopers (reducing the danger to the forward ranks). If the three ranks had fired, then all four ranks immediately reloaded and continued until the drums beat: cease fire.

Unlike Waterloo, the Austrians faced an all-arms assault at Aspern. The closed-up Masses created a killing zone as French cavalry flowed through. Smoke reduced ranges and concentrated fire. The second rank fired at 100 paces. At Wagram, French cavalryman Parquin saw 'at 100 paces, a terrible volley... cause the most fearful confusion'. It killed one general, several officers and over 50 troopers. Then, fire was held by both ranks until 10-15 paces for maximum effect. Needing to extend the battle line, regiments deployed in division Mass to maintain the frontage, while offering a shallower artillery target. Not shown here, artillery pieces located between the Masses would fire canister with each volley. If skirmishers approached, men were despatched from the sixth row of the front and rear sides or from the fourth side ranks to drive them off. They didn't venture far, so that they could return at dublir without disordering the Mass. Alternatively, sharpshooters within each Zug fired on them. If caught in the open or a Mass broke up, troops could gather around an NCO in Klumpen of two circular ranks with bayonets lowered. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)
The cavalry consisted of 35 regiments, eight cuirassier, six dragoon, six
chevauxlegers, twelve hussar and three Uhlan. The heavy cavalry regiments
(cuirassiers and dragoons) each fielded six squadrons of about 135 men, the
cuirassier having the added protection of a blackened metal breastplate. Both
types were armed with a straight sword, cuirassiers additionally carrying a
brace of pistols, while the dragoons were issued carbines. The light cavalry
(chevauxlegers, hussars and Uhlans) were formed of eight squadrons, each
approximately 150 strong. Armament for the chevauxlegers was identical to
that of the dragoons; hussars carried a curved sword and carbine, while the
Uhlans' main weapon, the lance, was supplemented by a curved sword and a
brace of pistols.

Charles had also augmented the regular army by raising the Landwehr,
a national militia for the defence of Austrian lands. The planned figure
of 180,000 men was not realized for this campaign, but many enrolled
enthusiastically, as there was much popular support for the war with France.
The best of these troops were therefore creamed off and formed into the
Volunteer (Friewilligen) battalions, which joined the main army at the outbreak
of war. In Hungary the parliament (Diet) refused to raise a Landwehr, but
agreed to mobilize the Insurrectio, the cavalry and infantry militia forces of
Hungary, Croatia and Slavonia. Like the Landwehr, the troops were of varying
quality and inclination.

Charles introduced another reform: the army adopted a corps system
similar to the French. The advantage of the system, amalgamating infantry,
cavalry and artillery into self-contained commands, enabled each to fight
independently if required and allowed the army to advance faster than the
slow moving Habsburg armies of the past. Unwilling to follow the French
practice of living off the land for fear of provoking local resentment, his much
criticized lack of speed in the advance was ultimately dictated by the need to
keep in contact with is crawling supply convoys to the rear.

The generals who commanded the Austrian armies came from a variety
of areas, reflecting both the multi-national composition of the Habsburg
Empire and a cross-section of the Holy Roman Empire, whose titular head
was a Habsburg until its dissolution in 1806. Unlike Napoleon, who directed
intelligence-gathering, planning and operations himself, the Austrian army was
developing a system that made the chief of staff (CoS) responsible for these
headquarters functions. As today, the overall campaign objectives for the
Austrian Army were set by the politicians in Vienna. As the preparations for
war began, plans to meet those objectives would be devised by a group
comprising the CoS, senior commanders likely to be in the field, and Vienna’s
military administrators. Once in the field, the Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C)
and his CoS would devise the operational plans within that overall remit. The
C-in-C, appointed by the military administration in the name of the Emperor, began to assume a more public position, being directly responsible to Vienna for fulfilling these objectives and for leading and inspiring his men in battle. However, the workload was found to be too much for one man; so to provide effective assistance to the C-in-C, Archduke Charles redesigned his staff in Italy in his Dienstvorschrift of 1 September 1805: ‘The Chief of Staff stands at the side of the Commander-in-Chief and is completely at his disposal. His sphere of work connects him with no specific unit ... The C-in-C decides what should happen and how; his chief assistant works out these decisions, so that each subordinate understands his allocated task.’

For the 1809 campaign the staff was divided into three directorates: Political Correspondence, Operations & Planning, and Service, and the CoS’s concern

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was now Operations & Planning. Each corps had a smaller version of the army command staff, where the corps CoS drove operations in fulfilment of the overall plan. The final phase began in 1811, as Radetzky – now a member of the Hofkriegsrat (Military Administrative Department in Vienna) – proposed in his *Über die bessere Einrichtung des Generalstabs* that the CoS’s managerial and supervisory role should be prioritized. He was to take charge of all staff officers and the various branches, each of which was directed by its own head of department, while also supervising all the troops and their activities and being aware of everything which was happening. He was in short – as Charles had intended – to be the C-in-C’s right-hand man. With Schwarzenberg’s selection of Radetzky as his CoS in 1813, the direct influence of Vienna’s politicians was removed forever. The C-in-C himself was now free to develop the general lines of strategy and operations within the politicians’ overall priorities.

**INFANTRY**

The army’s core was its German infantry, Upper Austrians in particular being considered ‘brave, laborious, industrious, intelligent and agreeable’. Conscription had operated across the Hereditary and Bohemian (western) lands from 1781, based on population rolls of each regiment’s district. All able-bodied men aged between 17 and 40 (with those aged 18–26 taken first) were liable unless exempted – those exempted included nobles and priests; most skilled workers, including miners and workers in licensed factories; many townsfolk; and all free peasants and their eldest sons. The burden thus fell on junior sons of peasants and the urban proletariat. Service was for a tough 25 years (effectively life), except for bakers and equipment suppliers, who enlisted for three years. Prior to 1802, aside from complete incapacity, release was only possible when, through inheritance, purchase or marriage, a man acquired property or a business which he was required to run; but release was conditional on the district providing a substitute.

From 1782 to 1808 German regiments had *Aushilfsbezirke* (supplementary districts) in Galicia, and they were certainly productive: by 1802 Galicia’s population was contributing about 54,000 Poles and Ruthenes (Russians) to the army, and 11 regiments were transferred to Galicia in 1808 when the recruitment districts were changed. Moravian regiments retained their districts, which supplied half of their 3rd battalions.

The army contingent of Hungary (comprising Croatia, Hungary and Transylvania) rose steadily from 35,000 to 63,000, requiring 6,034 recruits per year. Renowned for their fighting spirit, the eastern provinces retained a feudal system to raise infantry, mainly from a peasant population ‘as rude and savage as the animals they dwelt amongst’. In the south the Serbs and Croats provided ‘doughty fighters [who] consumed vast quantities of strong liquors’, according to one contemporary commentator. Officered by local Saxons, who were ‘tall
GERMAN INFANTRYMAN, 1788–98

Wearing the 1769 pattern uniform. The surrounding equipment is: (1) leather cartridge box; (2) brass cartridge box badge; (3) 1780 Giradoni air rifle; (4) air rifle lock mechanism; (5) 1769 Granatgewehr - carried by Infanterie-Arkebusiers; (6) 1754 Commissilinte - 6/4 Loth calibre (18.3mm) with 1748 bayonet; (7) 1767 musket with 1767 bayonet; (8) 1767 swan-neck lock; (9) 1784-pattern musket; (10) 1784-pattern lock; (11) fusilier sabre 1765; (12) detail of fusilier sabre 1784; (13) 6/4 Loth canister round. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)
and more commonly fair than brown' with ‘a high forehead, large blue eyes and an open cheerful countenance’, the Transylvanian regiments contained a mix of them, known for their ‘industry and sobriety’ and Vlach (Romanians) who were ‘rather lively, but of cunning, revengeful, indolent [and] brutal character... short in body, but of a strong, muscular strain [which] bears hardship with fortitude... His features are strong and expressive, his hair dark and bushy.’ The addition of ‘well-made brave, robust, and indefatigable’ Szeckels, with their reputation for ‘preceding the army and lying in ambush’, made them regular advance- and rearguard troops. (See Chapter 8 for more on Balkan troops.)

Apart from Galician regiments, the infantry were usually garrisoned in their home district. Some barracks, such as that of the Infanterie-Regiment 4 (4th Infantry Regiment) at Alserkaserne in Vienna, accommodated one battalion, but lack of purpose-built facilities meant most units were garrisoned in fortresses. Officers naturally enjoyed the best local houses, with some companies quartered in houses in the locality.

The recruit was formally enlisted at the garrison, and having sworn a resounding allegiance to the Emperor, received 3 Gulden, from which he had to purchase hairbands, comb, knife and fork, shoebrushes and cleaning equipment. His pay didn’t go far – it had to cover his daily food, laundry and cleaning costs. His tunic was undyed ‘perlgrau’ wool (1769 Regulations), with a camisol (waistcoat) worn underneath. The regulations continued: ‘The uniform [must be] cleaned daily with a brush, and each piece cleaned with pipeclay and chalk [to render it white] and dusted down, shoes were to be polished every day’, and the leather maintained by ‘rubbing in unsalted fat regularly’. Both uniform and weapon were to be maintained in good order and the man ‘must not lose, exchange or sell any of it’ (1807 Regulations).

Those garrisoned in houses were fortunate: in barracks the man’s bed was ‘a wooden bed for two with a bed-end and a raised head board... on it a square pallias and straw bolster, a linen sheet, which the man could pull off to improve his uniform by cleaning it. In winter, a coarse blanket... which is like a board; in summer, he has nothing beyond his coat to cover himself with.’

Unable to invoke nationalism, the July 1801 Officers’ Instructions encouraged officers to create an esprit de corps. The 1807 Dienst Reglement (Service Regulations) appealed grandly to a sense of honour, love of God and the monarch, with the primary role of defending the Fatherland. These were impressed into the men: ‘The soldier’s duties, contained in the Service Regulations, together with the Articles of War, will be regularly read out in front of the men and explained to them in their mother tongue.’ In this multi-lingual army, all drill was conducted with German commands, and common commands were given by drum or by signals from the flank men.
Grenadiers and infantry in camp around 1811. The Sanität (medical orderly) soldier’s 1809 uniform was similar to the 1813 Landwehr with ‘S.C.’ on the Corsehut shield. In the background is a Feldschmeide. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)

In order to instil a respect for rank, the first drill after the standing position was saluting an officer, both individually and by groups, turning the head smartly to face him. All superiors were to be addressed as: ‘Herr’ and then rank. Although in garrison the troops usually wore Holzmütze (forage caps), all drill was conducted wearing a cartridge box slung from the left shoulder, and Grenadiers had to wear bearskins. Learning to keep his body balanced, under the usual verbal encouragement from the NCOs, the recruit was taught the basic turns and then put into a small group. Drill was then conducted by numbers, running through the process slowly at first and then increasingly quickly as his proficiency improved, taking each process in groups of moves. Having hopefully mastered the basics, the recruit was taught to march. The troops marched at a formalized ordinär pace, using the faster starker for deploying. ‘Marsch! Marsch!’ sent the troops to dublir (quick pace), required for assaults and advancing while volleying, but for no more than 400 paces. An oblique step was used to gain ground, when moving forward and sideways.

Continuous drill, along with improvements in weaponry and ammunition, enabled capable troops to fire three rounds a minute, and with the 1784 pattern
Austrian Volley Fire

Volley fire and Exercier (manoeuvre) drill were conducted in three ranks, in units from Zug up to regiment. With the firing line halted, the rear two ranks closed up as far as possible, to reduce the blast for the first rank. At 'Fert!', the front rank man put his right foot back and knelt down in line with his left foot, bringing his weapon down to the ground in line with the left thigh. The second line moved the right foot sideways hard on to the next man's foot to make room for the front man's foot. The third rank moved as necessary to get their left shoulder in line with the second rank man's right. At 'An!', the front rank leaned back slightly. The second rank aimed close alongside the heads of the front rank, moving the right foot slightly back; the third rank aimed close up to the second line muskets and moved the right foot back, so that its toe was in line with the left heel. After firing, the first row stood up and all the ranks loaded together, the two rear ranks moving back left. Firing early was severely punished, there being 'no excuse when the next man starts to fire, because the unit's steadiness must not be lost'.

musket up to six. The last stage of Abrichtung (basic drill) formed troops into ranks and Zugcn (platoons) with a frontage of 0.75 Schritt (steps) per man: the tallest stood in the front rank, the shortest in the second, each man's elbows touching the next man. Within each battalion the height fell away from the flanks to the centre, although each Zug's flank files comprised the ablest troops irrespective of height. The distance between the ranks was one pace, opened to four for weapons drill.

When the unit was advancing or retreating using the normal or oblique step, fire was by half-company or smaller. On the command 'Peleton' or 'Halbcompanie', a sub-unit moved with large paces forward from the line at dublir, followed by 'Halt!' and the firing drill. The others moved at the shorter and slower 'Chargierschritt', so if advancing, when the volley was fired, the main line would have caught up and the next unit moved forward.

As well as rank fire, the troops could maintain a continuous rolling fire by file (Lauffeuer). By the time the last file of the fourth Zug of a company had fired, the first Zug had loaded and was ready to fire again. There were separate drills for fire in squares by Zug and in narrow defiles. Firing by Zug to the left flank, while marching obliquely or by file, required pulling the trigger with the left finger while the right hand supported the musket.

The infantry retained a firm belief in cold steel. Ordered to dublir, the Sturmmestreich (attack drumbeat) was beaten or the command 'Fällt das Bajonett!' shouted and bayonets lowered at about 50 paces from the enemy. The weapon was snatched quickly from the shoulder to the horizontal position with the right
Austrian recruits firing muskets. For target practice, a sand-filled barrel with three black targets representing the head, chest and lower body was placed down range. The soldier was taught to aim at the target’s chest, at varying distances – 150, 200–250 and 300 paces. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)

hand, and thrown into the open left hand with elbows close into the sides and the lock moved up under the shoulder. Keeping their muskets at *Hahn in Arm*, the reserve line would follow the main lines at 150–200 paces, halting as the others went to *dublir*. Once in melees, the musket butt and sabre were deployed.

Major drill changes came in new regulations in May 1805 (refined into the 1806 *Abrichtungs Reglement*). The musket was carried with the arm extended and the *ordinar* speed was increased. The gait became ‘natural, unrestricted and unforced’, making marching ‘the normal ambulation [which] will not tire any soldier, as soon as he equates marching merely with walking’. The *dublir* was to be used for all changes of formation and assaults. However, lack of training forced many troops to change formation at the intermediate *Geschwindshritt*.

From 1806–7 superfluous ceremonial and drill, including firing while advancing at the oblique step, was sagely abolished. The front rank remained standing, and the second moved both feet to the right to fire so that each man’s left shoulder was behind the right shoulder of the front rank man. The ranks remained at 1 pace distance, as musket barrels were long enough to avoid
AUSTRIAN INFANTRYMAN, 1798–1810

He is wearing the 1798 uniform and hairstyle; helmets were phased out from 1806 on grounds of cost and weight, many becoming unwearable with head wounds. The items around him were typical equipment, including the 5/4 Löth calibre 1798 musket (the long gun on the right of the pair), the 1807 musket and officer's 1809 pistol. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)
damaging the front rank, but were opened out to 2.5 Schuh for all training. The ablest men formed the third rank, which didn’t fire. As the drums beat, they took their weapons to ‘Hahn in Arm’, so that the lock rested in the crook of the left elbow after loading. The minimum fire from larger units was by half-company, not Zug. The widest frontage for evolutions remained the division, but enlarging or reducing frontage was now done in one change, instead of by stages. When advancing and retiring, volleys were by companies. *Lauffeuer* continued to be conducted in three ranks, the rear rank aiming high. From 1806 more accurate shooting was emphasized, rather than a random blazing away. The musket was held so that the soldier could actually see down the barrel to the sight. Each man only received 10 live rounds per year, although designated *Schutzen* (Sharpshooters) fired 25.

In 1790 losses in the Turkish wars had reduced many battalions to below 200 men, which forced units to draw off officers and NCOs to train new recruits in the third battalions. Insufficient time to drill the troops and a shortage of NCO cadres for reserves and reinforcements remained a constant problem. By 1797 recruits were being despatched virtually untrained. Four Hungarian battalions consisted ‘of peasants loaded on to waggons… none can handle a musket … three-quarters of the men, unused to a soldier’s life and in part not clothed properly and not equipped with mess-tins, arrive in the hospitals; the rest throw their muskets away out of fear and ignorance when they see the enemy’ (Archduke Charles).

In December 1801 regiments were reduced to 80–100 active men per company, and by August 1803 some were down to 25. At that stage new recruits were being called in, given basic training and then placed on *Urlaub* (lit. ‘holiday’). This system formed the basis of the Reserve system planned in 1808: reserve battalions composed men liable to call-up or recently released, who were to be trained by the depot for four weeks in their first year and three weeks in their second.

**Leadership and organization**

A 1790 company comprised: Hauptmann (captain), Oberleutnant (1st lieutenant), Unterleutnant (2nd lieutenant), Fähnrich (ensign), Feldwebel (sergeant), four Korporals (corporals), two Tambours (drummers), eight Gefreite (lance corporal), a Zimmerman (pioneer) and 91 Gemeine (privates); Grenadiers were to maintain full strength at 99 Gemeine (no Fähnrich nor Gefreite), taking infantry as required— in 1795 the 4th Infantry Regiment’s grenadiers received 50 veterans from the 3rd Battalion.

The Feldwebel was effectively the company adjutant, a typically tough-minded, loud-voiced individual responsible for internal discipline, administration and drill. He organized distribution of bread in the rear tent line or at a convenient
HUNGARIAN GRENADIER AND ZIMMERMAN (PIONEER), 1798–1816

The Zimmerman (A) wears the 1811 shako. (1) Axe and Zelthacke. (2) Axe carrying cases. (3) Zimmerman's apron. The grenadier (B) wears the post-1801 bearskin with peak and side flaps. His hair is one Zoll overall, decreed on 30 July 1805. (4) Match case. (5) Grenade badge. (6) 1777 Sabre. (7) 1802 iron-mounted sabre. (8) 1807 musket of polished walnut. (9) 1769 backpack. (10) 1771 Infantry Zelthacke, carried in the pouch on the backpack. (11) Old-style wooden water bottle. (Jeffrey Burn © Osprey Publishing)
place in the garrison. The 1807 Regulations permitted him to beat men with his cane (Hazelstock; from 1803, Spanisches Rohr), but in a wise afterthought directed that he should be ‘more concerned with positively influencing the men by his example’.

Companies were divided into two half-companies and subdivided into two Zug en, each commanded by the senior Korporal – one of the most tiring jobs in the army. Amongst the endless responsibilities were included: correct drill and discipline; ensuring compliance with regulations; and checking cleanliness, uniform and kit. Every day he reported to the Feldwebel on the state of his command. As the company size and the number of Korporals increased, Zug en were broken down further into small Korporalschaften, headed by Korporals.

In wartime each company expanded to six Korporals, 12 Gefreite and 160 men (raised to 200 men late in 1792), although many companies had three officers and 120 in the ranks. All command places had to be filled, so where no supernumeraries were available, the army operated a Stellvertreter (deputy) system. In peacetime Vize (temporary) rank holders were nominated – these individuals would then bring the company to wartime strength. Officers’ places could be filled by Kadetts or NCOs, although Feldwebels had to remain in place, with Gemeine filling vacated NCO posts. This system created a training school for both NCOs and officers to assess whether a temporary rank holder was suitable for holding it permanently. Two Vize-Korporals were nominated from Gefreite, one Vize-Gefreiter from among the Gemeine. The Grenadiers nominated one Vize-Korporal from the Gemeine, filling additional posts with supernumeraries or able soldiers.

Originally a man of at least 12 years’ service, freed from routine tasks, a Gefreiter supervised Kameradschafts of men and helped newer recruits, collecting the mess food money. In the field, Gefreite led the pickets and patrols. Having the primary role of setting an example to the men under them and keeping discipline, the post became the first stepping-stone to promotion for able Gemeine.

The 1807 organization increased the company strength to: one Feldwebel, six Korporals, seven Vize-Korporals, two Tambours, a Zimmerman, eight Gefreite and 153 Gemeine (173 Hungarian). In wartime 20 Gemeine and two Korporals were added, the latter as supernumeraries. One peacetime Korporal became an additional Feldwebel and all seven Vize-Korporals took full rank. Another Zimmerman and four Gefreite were also appointed, and the command had to designate at least two Gemeine or Kadetts to fill vacant posts in action. The Grenadiers had 13 Korporals (having an extra peacetime Vize-Korporal) but no Gefreite with 120 Grenadiers.

Officer cadets came from three main sources: Fahnen Kadetts (Fähnrich from 1798); graduates of the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy or the Ingenieurs
School; and *kk ordinäre* and regimental ‘ex propris gestellten’ Kadets. The *ordinäre* cadets were sons of serving officers, but *ex propris* included ordinary soldiers appointed by the Oberst (colonel). These cadets could become NCOs or officers depending on their ability (taking interim NCO positions). A shortage of graduates from the academies prompted Charles to found subsidiary cadet schools in 1808, taking pupils from the middle and lower classes. Once commissioned, officers received further training in the regimental *Erziehungshaus* (training school) in the garrison.

Although Hungary’s feudal system meant a peasant was unlikely to rise above Korporal, western regiments were flexible. Both losses of officers and insufficient numbers emerging from the academies meant that *ex propris* cadets steadily increased, with Feldwebels being promoted for bravery. Regimental adjutants (senior Feldwebel) were automatically promoted, when the rank became commissioned in March 1803.

Combined with improved officer training – namely the *Beiträge zum praktischen Unterricht im Felde* (Essays on Practical Field Instruction), junior

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**NCOs and Promotion**

The Landwehr of 1808 required the commissioning of many serving NCOs. Battalion commanders could appoint officers from capable recruits; one was Rzieb, a minor official who was appointed a Fahnrich after conscription into 2nd Bunzlau Landwehr. When the Landwehr was disbanded, these former civilians were allowed to join the army, Rzieb joining the 63rd Infantry Regiment. Other volunteers were commissioned directly, including von Ense, appointed a Fahnrich in the 47th Infantry Regiment by its Oberst, despite lacking the linguistic knowledge – ‘Most of the men spoke only [Czech].’ A north German, he ‘bought the equipment of an officer killed at Aspern and exchanged my hat for a shako’, but felt that most officers were culturally ignorant.

More NCOs were drafted to officer Landwehr battalions of 1813, and instant promotion became possible: at Valeggio on 8 February 1814 a battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment marching off by Zug was struck by canister. For behaving bravely and steadying the disordered Zug, Feldwebel Eisen of 15th Company was promoted to Fahnrich on the field. Once commissioned, soldiers could gain a Patent of nobility as a *Freiherr* (landless noble) for long service, outstanding bravery or on reaching the rank of general. Although few commoners (including Mack, Hiller and Brady) became generals, junior officers included relatively few nobles; most Freiherrs had gained a Patent for bravery or were sons of ennobled fathers. Even in the fashionable 4th Infantry Regiment, of the 80 junior officers in 1788, two were Barons and 11 were Freiherrs; of the 134 serving in 1813, two were Grafs (counts), 17 were Barons and 15 were Freiherrs.
officer leadership improved markedly in the later army. Archduke Charles certainly appreciated its capabilities by 1809: ‘The best possible spirit prevailed amongst the troops. They were well ordered, disciplined and more manoeuvrable than previously… But this was certainly limited in its effectiveness to the individual regiments and their commanders. Large troop formations had not been assembled nor trained in acting together.’

**On campaign**

The launch of a campaign sparked a feverish bout of activity amongst Austrian soldiers. Once orders were received, companies formed up over three days, and most regiments were ready within 35 days. To gather the 40 *Urlauber* per company and extra equipment required two to three months. Until 1798 they had to provide one Korporal and 29 men as *Handlangers* (hands) supporting the gun crews.

Being an infantryman meant marching, and lots of it. Moving out in the 1790s, the troops marched about six hours a day. By 1800 in Italy, this had risen to 10 hours. Marching was a shock to newer recruits: in home territory Major Mahler of 6th Battalion, 49th Infantry Regiment found in 1805: ‘During this strenuous march, I lost many men, some of whom had been left behind because of fatigue, some out of fear, as most were still newish recruits who headed off home.’

In 1792 each regiment had 14 Proviant wagons, a Feldschmeide (field smithy) and six four-horse ammunition wagons and 54 packhorses per company;

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**Clothing Shortages**

The worst problem on campaign was clothing shortages – only half of what was paid for was supplied. As the weather worsened in 1793, Prince Coburg noted: ‘Two thirds of these poor brave men are without greatcoats.’ Embarking on the 1796 German campaign, the army lacked 69,127 pairs of trousers, 267,228 pairs of underpants, 337,337 shirts, 49,014 pairs of gaiters, 14,313 pairs of shoes and 30–40,000 greatcoats. At Emmendingen 3,000 troops fought barefoot; many lacked trousers and gaiters. The quality of clothing and shoes was often so bad that two articles had to be worn together. Regarding shoes and other items of uniform, Archduke Charles commented: ‘In many shoes, the sole is made of cardboard, so that in the first rain; the shoe separates; the jackets and shirts are full of loose threads and the trousers often so short that I myself can hardly wear them’ (he was only 1.53m/5ft tall). Footwear was in such short supply in 1809 that the Austrian forces had to requisition 50,000 pairs in Munich. Frequent rest days were required, both to allow supplies to catch up and to repair footwear and clean equipment.
reduced by 1809 to the Feldschmeide, ten four-horse waggons and 26 packhorses per regiment. Packhorses kept to the side of the march column, carried tents, food and the first ammunition reserves. The Proviant waggons carried provisions back and forth from the main supply column to replenish the regiment’s uniforms and shoes (200 pairs of shoes, 75 pairs of gaiters, 200 trousers, 200 pairs of underpants and 800 shirts). At the rear of the column came a collection of contractors, sutlers and meat sellers, who were naturally reluctant to get close to the frontline.

The more mobile warfare from 1809 forced more requisitioning, but often the terrain did not offer much and the troops did not really know how to exploit what was available. With continued reliance on the trains, they ran short of many supplies. In 1809 the troops drew three days’ bread and one day’s biscuit from the magazine waggons, supported by two days’ supplies on the Proviant waggons. Food was cooked some days in advance; the soup was consumed and leftover meat carried with them. Shortages were then exacerbated because the cumbersome supply trains could not keep up over awful tracks, which continuously climbed and descended, causing frequent halts on the march.

On campaign each regiment had 534 tents. Each was allocated two bundles of 16 Pfund of straw to last two weeks, then one bundle for the next two, although new straw was obtained as required on the march. Wood and straw were bought in, but the army relied on sympathetic locals. On 3 December 1805, after Austerlitz, two grenadier battalions (from Merveldt’s force) held the outposts and skirmished with enemy cavalry. Only around 2100hrs, in exceptional cold and stormy weather, did the troops receive wood and some straw, and around midnight local peasants brought food for the troops.

The weather caused major problems, especially with the tents, which could become prematurely damaged. With continuous marches and the camps not erected for weeks in the unceasing rain of 1792, the tents rotted on the animals, and the troops were lumbered with a long train carrying unusable equipment. Archduke Charles surveyed the damage in September: ‘You can have no idea what our troops look like. It’s rained every day for a
month, so that the rain penetrates the tents. Many of our men have no shoes, all the uniforms and tents are full of holes and begin to smell.’

If the enemy were not close, the troops would scatter into cantonments. Mack decreed tents for only half the men in 1805, and four years later Archduke Charles forbade the erection of tented encampments in Germany. The troops had to bivouac or seek quarters: ‘Officers were sent on ahead to allocate the billets and bivouac sites on the Vils river... To get the troops under cover as quickly as possible, a cantonment had to be worked out promptly with the aid of men familiar with the area... the Korps had to be accommodated within a [one-and-a-half mile] radius of Aich (the forming up point). In this encampment, each regiment had about 10 houses at its disposal, and it appeared to have very little in the way of life’s requirements.’ After little restful sleep on the soaked sites, the marches continued.

**Infantry in battle**

In the war against the Ottoman Empire, each battalion had its artillery, 78 Spanische Reiter (‘Spanish horsemen’) and 15 Jagers. Fighting the mobile Turkish Army meant the Austrian infantry could form square quickly and often closed up the columns to solid Masses (which were unlikely to suffer from inadequate Turkish artillery). Positions were held in squares of up to ten battalions, but usually single battalions. Attacks were mounted in close order at a slow pace, employing steady fire. ‘As soon as the Turks are heard approaching, the troops move against them, irrespective of any superior numbers, for this mob only induces confusion’ (1787 Field Instructions).

The formal warfare of the 18th century was based on manoeuvre and on maintaining the alignment of long lines with correct intervals. The troops marched in columns on the widest front possible, fighting battles deployed in two Treffen (lines) of regiments, usually with a third reserve force. Linear tactics emphasized attack in line – usually parallel to the enemy – although each side tried to advance obliquely against the other. Endeavouring to outflank the opposition, the 1769 Exercitum Reglement provided for the first Treffen to be extended with battalions from the second, moving forward in Masses (closed columns).

Fighting in long lines made command and control difficult and reduced army manouevrability. The main control problem was caused by the eye-watering smoke, as the troops could not see signals nor what their colleagues were doing. The first volleys were controlled, but gradually fire became less cohesive. To maintain effectiveness, volley fire was limited to 300 paces, and the artillery, moving up to 100 paces ahead of the line to permit a wider angle of fire, handled more distant targets. Once the infantry opened up, guns were manhandled back to their line positions, firing after each volley as the men
reloaded. When infantry were in a defensive position about 100m (109 yards) behind the guns, they would only start firing if the artillery came within enemy musketry; then the infantry would advance, firing on the flank of the gun line. If the line was moving forward, the guns went forward to lay down fire for the battalion to take the ground.

AUSTRIAN AUXILIARIES, 1790s

(From left to right): Tyrolean sharpshooter, 1792, in the archetypal Jäger uniform, with the Giradoni air rifle; Degelmann Uhlan, 1792, wearing the early Uhlan uniform of yellow Polish czapka and short-tailed green kurtka jacket; Croatian-Slavonian sharpshooter, 1794, in a peakless klobuk; Officer, Wurmscher Freikorp. His klobuk has an upturned back peak and silver rings to designate his rank. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The attack was conducted by volley and advance, with the troops carrying their weapons at the shoulder, or *Hahn in Arm*, while marching. The number of infantry projectiles fired at less than 100 paces was increased with *Flintenkartasche*—three small balls fired together against both infantry and cavalry. Defence against cavalry was in three-rank-deep squares (or an oblong with divisions at front and rear, and one company each side). If cavalry approached within 10 paces, the first two ranks were to level their bayonets, while the third rank continued to blaze away over their heads.

The Revolutionary French enjoyed advantages in number and guns, and in response to their skirmishers, Coburg’s 1793 Instructions despatched small groups from the third rank. Believing three lines to be unnecessary against poorly trained opponents, in 1794 Mack recommended using the third rank to form multipurpose reserves that could be used to reinforce points threatened by heavy columns, for plugging gaps, flank protection and skirmishing. Mack also maintained that the Austrians’ superior discipline would allow an attack in fog or at night with unloaded muskets, to throw the French into confusion.

By 1796 the long lines were being broken down into brigades, but closed up formations formed the basic tactic, reflected in Archduke Charles’ *Observationspunkte* (Observation Point): ‘Regular drilled and solid infantry, if they advance in lengthened paces courageously under artillery protection, cannot be hindered by scattered skirmishers. They must charge neither with skirmishers nor Zug fire against the enemy line, except when the latter can be most effective, and with the greatest speed while maintaining good order, attack the enemy hard and overthrow them.’ In 1800 the commander Baron von Zach decreed: ‘Only a few skirmishers are necessary to the front, but behind them closed-up troops.’ However, on 17 July drumbeats were introduced to control them.

The greatest changes arose from the Italian campaigns, where bad roads, waterlogged meadows, ditches and trees made control of the troops more difficult, so formations became more compact. Although the 1807 Regulations emphasized that ‘The line is the proper formation for infantry permitting the best use of its weapons’, there was increased use of Masses as battlefield formations. Based on having lost cavalry superiority, the 1807 *Exercier Reglement* reintroduced Division Masses—two companies in six-deep formations—instead of squares. A revival of Prince Eugene’s tactics against Turkish cavalry, they were the means to form a compact defence quickly from line in battle.

However, the ever-larger formations and numbers of troops increased battlefield use of columns. Approaching the enemy, march columns closed up to half-company intervals and then fully (with two paces separating each company), creating a ‘Battalion Mass’ as action became imminent. Closed-up columns had always been used for moving columns in restricted terrain, but the 1807 *Reglement* emphasized their use to facilitate any advance by making
control easier, to defend against cavalry and to concentrate large numbers of troops in restricted terrain or against a specific point. Formed at Aspern, Masses made short advances against cavalry and shattered the charge of six Cuirassier regiments.

Battalion Masses were vulnerable to artillery, and after Aspern Archduke Charles ordered: ‘In the plain, the order of battle of the infantry is ... Masses by companies; in the direction of the enemy a small screen of skirmishers can be deployed. Should a Mass suffer too many casualties from artillery fire, then I leave it to the brigade commander to reduce the depth or, if not threatened by cavalry, to deploy into line.’ Where a large frontage had to be held or the Masses were likely to be hit by artillery, Battalion Masses were divided directly into Division Masses, and this became the preferred formation.

In 1812 tactical philosophy still directed that the troops should advance and close with the enemy in column. ‘The change from column to line should not happen before the moment when the latter can get into range.’ Schwarzenberg’s Instructions of August 1813 brought a clear shift from lines to Masses as offensive formations. The second Treffen and all reserves had to remain in these formations throughout.

The grenadier battalions, formed into divisions in 1796, were the army reserve. Although many of them were drawn from the capable men who formed the third rank, the 1807 Regulations specifically forbade them to fight as skirmishers, since ‘they represent the main strike force or could determinedly defend a threatened point’, to be committed only when required. ‘Muskets at Hahn in Arm’, said one soldier at Aspern, ‘these old battle-hardened soldiers advanced without firing a shot’ against French batteries on 22 May. Frequently they formed rearguards on difficult retreats. Four battalions put up fierce resistance as Massena tried to force the Durnstein pass near Einod in 1797. They stood for several hours ‘unmoved under a hail of cannonballs and canister, although they lost many men’, long enough to allow the main body to negotiate the valley. Testimony indeed to the bravery, and the appalling lot, not only of Austrian infantry but of infantry in general during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras.

ARTILLERY
The Austrian artillery of our period was a creation of the Lichtenstein system of the 1750s. Known for its economy and standardization of equipment, this system of guns and equipment would remain in use until 1850. The system produced a series of 3, 6, 12 and 18pdr calibre guns, together with 7 and 10pdr howitzers, based around standardized carriage and wheel designs. In the 1780s more mobile cavalry artillery guns were added with their Wurst seats, on which sat most of the crew. Heavier 12, 18 and 24pdr were divided into two types: Batterie Geschütz (siege guns) and Verteidigungs Geschütz (defence artillery). In 1811 Austria even
An Austrian regimental 3pdr being moved forward with its ammunition box. The 3pdr was essentially a smaller version of the 6-pdr, although its limber box differed slightly in its fittings. For the main power, a horse was taken from the limber, but it was normally connected to the limber bar attached to the limber cross-piece. This bar could not be unhooked, so the Deichselstangen-Tragstrick (drag rope), which connected up to the hook on the Stirn (front of the carriage), also had its own limber bar, to which the horse's chain harness could be attached. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)

began the establishment of rocket units and in the same year, improved the howitzers by reducing their windage and slightly lightening the 7pdr barrel. As far as tactics were concerned, Austria’s gunners, notably Army Artillery Directors Smola and Perczel, were in the forefront of developing mobile artillery tactics and the increasing use of concentrated batteries, creating a 192-gun battery, the second largest of the period, at Aspern in May 1809.

Training and Organization

The artillery was a single force within the army under the Director General of Artillery. From 1772 it was organized into the Feldartillerie (field artillery), the Garnisonsamt (garrison force) and the Feldzeugamt (administrative organization with responsibilities across the artillery service).

The field artillery was mustered in three regiments (increased to four in 1802), each comprising four battalions that subdivided into four companies, expanded to a total of 22 in wartime (18 for the Wars of Liberation). In 1805 an artillery company was composed of 4 officers, 14 NCOs, 159 gunners and 5 others. This was expanded in 1808 to 5 officers, 14 NCOs, 2 musicians and 180 men (increased to 200 in wartime).

The garrison artillery was formed from men unfit for field service and organized in 14 districts, manning the fortresses and other key places, the siege
guns and, where necessary, with the additional task of reinforcing the field crews. The cavalry guns (see below) came under the authority of the Feldzeugamt / Zeugwesen, which also directed manufacture and repair of guns and equipment, together with powder supply and testing. A detachment would accompany each

AUSTRIAN AUXILIARIES, 1790s

Austrian artillerymen, c. 1799–1800. (2nd left) NCO. This shows the ‘old’ uniform, without the black leather 1798 helmet that had already been authorized. (Left) Company officer. This company officer wears the typical officer’s coat, which did not have turnbacks at this time. (2nd right) Gunner. The jacket is of Austrian infantry style, but features the colours of the artillery. (Right) Gunner. This gunner is wearing the full regulation uniform of 1798, but with the red wool helmet crest and brass front plate of the artillery on the helmet. (Philip Haythornwaite © Osprey Publishing)
army reserve artillery park on campaign. The main arsenals were at Vienna, Prague, Olmutz and Budweis with many smaller reserves distributed across the Habsburg Lands.

By 1790, Austria's artillery was considered the best in Europe, primarily because of its technical specialists, the bombardiers. No other army possessed similar artillery personnel. Prince Lichtenstein had established a specialist Artillery Korps school near Budweis (Bohemia) in 1744, which also included depots and laboratories. Officers together with able NCOs and gunners were instructed in both the theoretical and practical aspects of artillery subjects. After a move to the Artillerie Lyceum in Vienna in 1778, the Bombardier Regiment was established as the elite of the artillery in 1786, when its home was renamed the Bombardier Korps school. The Korps was composed of four companies, expanded to five in 1802. The bombardier companies were commanded by the lecturers and comprised 1 Hauptmann, 3 Leutnants, 24 Oberfeuerwerker, 36 Feuerwerker, 6 Kadetts and 108 Bombardiers.

This unit was the main training school for the NCOs and officers, drawing on the most intelligent and able recruits, who were trained for up to seven years in a mix of advanced academic and military subjects. Winter work focused on theory, summer on practical exercises. They would join military exercises and perform garrison duties. The first five years focused on arithmetic, geometry, two years of advanced maths, mechanics and ballistics. Throughout, they undertook the same general artillery training as gunners, with additional classes in geometric drawing, topography and surveying, fortress warfare, tactics, logistics, staff and adjutant work. After five years, most were appointed as Feuerwerkers or Korporals and joined the regiments, particularly the howitzer crews. The best candidates were promoted to Oberfeuerwerker and stayed for a further two years, focusing on physics and finally, chemistry and technology, after which they would join the regiments. Most would be commissioned within an additional four years.

Gunners were paid one-third more than the equivalent ranks in the infantry and this, together with the humane conditions prescribed by the 1757 regulations, enabled the artillery to recruit freely amongst the more intelligent men in the rest of the army and to seek civilian volunteers, especially skilled tradesmen, across the Austrian Empire. Volunteers, who had to be Imperial subjects, were chosen for their self-reliance and decisiveness, alongside the ability to absorb the technical details of the arm. The training and knowledge required meant that service was for life, reduced to 14 years under the 1802 reforms. Part IV of the regulations required the men to be strong and solidly built, and fully literate in German; they had to be unmarried and more mature men, especially from rural areas, were preferred. Many gunners came from Bohemia (western Czech Republic), where much of the artillery was based.
Under the 1786 regulations the ordinary recruit, often as young as 15 or 16 years old, spent one year as a gunner in the Elementary School. The recruit was to be subjected to the minimum corporal punishment and educated. He would first be taught basic musketry and infantry drill in small formations, before moving on to artillery training. The gunners would practise twice a week with special 1pdr training guns. Then, in the peacetime Campementer (training camps), gunners would train in all the wartime drills in small Korporalschaffler (groups under a Korporal) and then move up in steps to the summer field camps, which conducted exercises on a regimental scale. As trained crewmen, they would then join the Regimental School to take a practical and theoretical one-year course, including maths, range calculation, elevations and charges, battery construction and manning/working the different types of ordnance. To improve teamwork and efficiency, individual gunners were attached to a specific gun throughout a campaign, developing a pride in its care. The guns would then be allocated to the armies as required, when the campaign began.

In 1757 Lichtenstein established an Artillery Fusilier Battalion both to guard and assist with handling the guns. Disbanded in 1778 and re-established in 1790, it comprised eight companies, and provided Handlanger for the reserve guns until 1802, while the parent infantry units supplied the unskilled labour for the battalion guns. The failure of ad hoc arrangements in 1805 for Oberst Smola directing his cavalry artillery battery at Neerwinden in 1793. Part of the advance guard, his battery plus two 3pdrs blocked Miranda's French division for several hours. Forced eventually to pull back, Smola added ten 12pdrs, two 3pdrs and two howitzers to his force and put the French to flight. His cavalry guns then joined a counterattack. One gunner has his thumb, protected by a leather guard, over the vent to prevent the emission of gas and burning powder through the vent while the round was being loaded.
the reserve guns led to a new Handlanger Korps being formed in 1808 to provide labour to all the guns as required, which was expanded quickly to 40 companies during the 1809 war and 38 in 1813, each company servicing two or three batteries.

**Tactical Strength**

The Austrian Army had begun the Seven Years War in 1756 with 203 field pieces and the total number of guns rose steadily to 1,060 by 1780. Before the Turkish War of 1788–91, the number of cavalry guns (broadly equivalent to the horse artillery of other nations) had been increased to 64 and howitzers to 32. By the end of that war, 72 cavalry guns were in service and this number had reached 120 by 1800. In 1790, the field establishment stood at 948 field pieces - 798 guns, 86 howitzers and 64 cavalry pieces. The siege park numbered 248 pieces in 1800 - 128 heavy guns, 32 heavy howitzers and 88 mortars. Of the 1,257 field guns in service in 1805, 184 were cavalry pieces. Following reforms in 1808, many 3pdrs were left in the depots, so the Austrian field force comprised 742 guns in 108 batteries. The calibres also became heavier: the 1813 Army of Bohemia’s 52 batteries included 11 12pdr and two 18pdr batteries with just three 3pdr batteries for light brigades.

Until 1808 the line infantry battalions were supported by their own light guns. These guns were manned by a combination of artillery specialists and *Handlanger* (unskilled labour supplied by the infantry unit). The allocation of guns depended on the terrain and likely opposition. In Italy, most regiments used six 3pdr weapons (as this usage was experimental, exact deployment is
unknown), whereas four 3pdrs and a 6pdr were more usual in Germany. Some 7pdr howitzers were added in the early years of the Revolutionary Wars, but were quickly phased out.

The remaining guns were located in the reserve, where they were organized into batteries, which could either act on their own, especially with the advance guard, or in support of the main gun line. Lighter guns were allocated for battlefield support as required and heavier guns already placed in position at the commencement of a battle. Some 200–400 gunners, depending on the size of army involved, were held with the reserve to prepare the reserve guns for movement and replace casualties. In the early 1790s, 18pdrs and 10pdr howitzers were formed in position or reserve batteries. The reserve had at least a third of all the guns, although this rose to about half in Italy where lighter

Fire Concentration

The emphasis of Austrian artillery in battle was on all three arms working together. Lighter guns would support the infantry; howitzers and heavier pieces would be on the flanks to counter enemy cavalry and pour crossfire into enemy lines. The reserve guns were assigned by the Artillery Director, who would remain with the C-in-C throughout a battle. He would give general objectives both for placing guns and their initial fire, but as orders continued to come down the chain of command, the emphasis was on individual officers directing their guns effectively.

The start of a battle was usually marked by concentrated fire against several key points in the enemy line. This fire also helped to screen the initial development of an attack. Although the guns would focus on specific targets, the battery commanders were cautioned to try not to reveal the main axes of an attack with their fire. Artillery fire was thus opened up slowly at 1,800–2,000 Schritte (1,135–1,265m). Musketry was limited to 300 Schritte, so prior to 1808, the battalion guns provided longer range fire and supported the infantry in between volleys. During an advance, battalion guns were usually dragged about 15 Schritte in front of the infantry line, moving up to 100 Schritte ahead as they approached the enemy, which allowed them a wider angle of fire as they engaged their targets. Here they would lay down a sustained fire to soften up the enemy as the infantry moved up. Once the infantry came within the 300 Schritte range of the enemy, the guns were manhandled back to the main line and opened fire from the gaps between the units. Once the infantry closed, the guns were moved to the flanks to enfilade the enemy or fire on their reinforcements. The guns would also support the infantry by firing while muskets were being reloaded. If the infantry were static in a defensive line, they would only open fire if the guns came under enemy musketry. Then the guns would either be withdrawn or the infantry would advance to engage their opponents. Battalion guns were usually deployed in no more than two openings in the regimental line and four guns per gap.
battalion guns were employed. The proportion of heavy guns in the reserve depended on the nature of the terrain and likelihood of fortress warfare. As a rule of thumb, one gun per thousand men was kept in reserve for key attacks, especially cavalry 6pdr and some howitzers.

The guns operated on a minimum frontage of 10 Schritte per gun. Lichtenstein had begun the use of ad hoc batteries by massing most of the 3pdrs in groups of four to six with their parent units, where they came under the direction of a senior NCO. In the early 1790s, every third battalion in the Treffen was assigned two 7pdr howitzers in place of its light guns. Infantry detachments would guard guns attached to cavalry. The army reserve guns, which would remain between the second Treffen and the reserve in two or three groups, were divided into batteries of six guns and two howitzers, together with cavalry batteries of four guns and two howitzers. The 3 and 6pdr usually formed small batteries, but the 12pdr would remain in a single central battery or, along with the 7pdr howitzers, be placed on the flanks to handle hostile cavalry. The heavy artillery reserve was formed into position batteries, either of six guns or four guns and two howitzers, and were often deployed to add weight to the battle line at key points—a tactic that had proved successful in the War of the Bavarian Succession (1778–80). On the march
and in camp, light and cavalry guns were also attached to both the advance guard and rear guard. Light guns would cross rivers with the first battalions. The 18th century view continued to prevail that each gun represented the equivalent of a flag in the rest of the army, although this might have made the Austrians more cautious in deploying their guns.

A major change came under an Imperial Order of 3 June 1808. Joseph Colloredo, the Artillery Director in 1808–09, abolished the battalion guns of the infantry and allocated all pieces to three types of permanent battery –

A tactical advance, based on Plate 45 of the 1807 Kavallerie Reglement. Cavalry guns move up to attack a French line from the flank, while two 12pdrs remain in position and 3pdrs lead the infantry advance. The Austrian line has begun its advance from a position protected by a couple of 12pdrs in a temporary fortification. A 3pdr is up ahead, but has come under enemy skirmish fire and is now pulling back. Coming up on the flank is a Cavalry artillery battery, which has its first half (3 × 6pdrs) in action and the second half coming up (1 × 6pdr and 2 × 7pdr howitzers). The 6pdrs are firing across the French line to maximise their effect. Behind the 12pdrs are the limbers with six-horse teams and two ammunition waggons. (Brian Delf © Osprey Publishing)
designated as brigade (eight light guns), position (six heavier guns and two howitzers) and cavalry batteries (four guns and two howitzers). Only the Grenzer battalions retained their battalion guns. At the same time, a separate Handlanger Korps was created to provide the labourers and the Fuhrwesen (Transport) service was militarized. The brigade batteries would accompany their respective formations and the others would make up the reserve, many of the 12pdr guns being emplaced at the start of an action. The new permanent batteries were led by the specialist NCOs (Oberfeuerwerker and Feuerwerker) under the direction of junior officers. Brigade batteries would march, camp and fight with their parent brigades and could be divided into half-batteries if required, and by 1813, brigade batteries were mostly comprised of six 6pdrs and two 7pdr howitzers. Using eight-gun batteries allowed the guns to fire by half-batteries or in pairs to offer cover while others were being loaded, although reserve batteries were specifically forbidden to subdivide. Once they had achieved their objective, they were returned to the army reserve.

The term ‘cavalry gun’ referred to the speed at which these weapons could move and the fact that they would require cavalry detachments to protect them. Cavalry batteries were kept together to act at key points – using their swift
movement to launch surprise attacks and batter the enemy front. On the advance they would be positioned on the lead flank. Consequently, on the march they usually accompanied the advance guard or remained in the reserve. These batteries were assigned to light brigades, comprising light infantry and cavalry. The cavalry guns would move forward and seize good positions to hold them until the infantry could advance, or cover a retreat, supporting infantry units under threat by firing into following enemy. During a pursuit they would move ahead to sow disorder in enemy ranks. The cavalry gun teams could be moved forward into the forward line of Masses in the big battles and, if threatened with attack, could limber up and withdraw quickly. Contrary to popular belief, horse batteries did not charge with cavalry. The rationale was straightforward – each artillery horse dragged about four times the weight of a cavalryman and the guns would bog down on soft ground. The guns could also be lost, once the cavalry had engaged and they were vulnerable to counterattack.

With the introduction of permanent batteries, the tactical focus turned to their deployment in support of the brigades with the emphasis both on overlapping arcs of fire and the use of cavalry guns in support of large formations. The preferred style was to maintain a slow, steady and well-aimed fire. Long-range fire was discouraged as it used up ammunition and caused the barrel to heat up. The best angle was across the enemy line or, if possible, enfilading it or striking at narrow chokepoints where enemy forces were concentrated. This had proved more effective against infantry than close-range canister. The guns were not to move beyond infantry support, so that these troops could arrive before enemy cavalry, and never more than 200 Schritte away, unless supported by light cavalry or infantry detachments.

CAVALRY
The Austrian cavalry had started the French Revolutionary Wars as completely dominant over their French counterparts. By 1801, they still believed themselves to be the best horsemen in Europe, and in March 1809 there was a total of 44,490 cavalrymen and 42,791 horses in the forces of the Hapsburg Empire. By this time, however, any notions of supremacy had received a nasty shock. While the Austrians' tactics and training remained stagnant, their French counterparts had creating cavalry that could function en masse. The majority of the Austrian cavalry was parceled out in 'penny packets' to the various infantry formations, which led to occasion after occasion where they would be thrown over by superior enemy numbers at the point of attack. Individually their cuirassiers, dragoons, chevaulegers and Uhlans were still good, but coordination was all but nonexistent. The limitations in the command system employed prevented the cavalry from reaching their full, lethal potential, and successive reorganizations did little to correct the problems.
AUSTRIAN CAVALRY COMMANDERS

(Left) Feldmarschall Peter Karl, Freiherr Ott von Bartokez (1738–1809). Ott is wearing the stylish hussar parade uniform of a Hungarian FML in 1800. (Centre) Oberst Johann Frimont. Frimont is shown wearing the hechtgrau uniform and silk Feldbinde as colonel of the Bussy Jager zu Pferd, which he wore in 1800 when destroying the Consular Guard at Marengo. (Right) Oberstleutnant Furst Johannes von Lichtenstein. His white frock coat is the same style as that worn by junior officers of all arms. (Christopher Rothero © Osprey Publishing)
AUSTRIAN CAVALRY, 1798–1802

(Centre) Field officer, 10th (Meszaros) Hussars, wearing the full dress of 1798. (Right) Trooper, 8th Cuirassiers, 1798. This uniform was very much like that of the dragoons, but retained the earlier white collar with facing-coloured patch. (Left) Officer, 5th Chevauxlegers, 1802. Those regiments of Chevauxlegers that retained white jackets, were only distinguished from dragoons by their button colour. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
Cavalrymen were recruited in much the same way as infantrymen. They were supposed to come from the ranks of those who had already completed their infantry training, but this stipulation was largely ignored. Cavalry regiments (especially Hungarian units) were rarely short of those wanting to join their ranks. This was reflected in the bounties paid to men enlisted in the smaller south German states, which provided so much of the Austrian army’s manpower: an infantry recruit received 35 florins, whereas a cavalry recruit took only 29 – such was a clear indication of the preference for the mounted arm amongst the mass of potential recruits.

The rank system used in the cavalry was much like that of the infantry, and as in the infantry the quality of the officer corps was critical to the efficacy of the regiment. Such was apparent in the 1806 regulations, which claimed that poor-quality soldiers with good officers had a combat superiority over well-trained soldiers with poor officers. Yet finding fine officers amongst a higher command influenced by nepotism and politics was no easy business. Many commanders went into battle lacking experience of active service. As Archduke Charles reported from the Netherlands in 1794, so dissatisfied with their commanders were the officers of the Kinsky Chevaux-légers that ‘they have sworn that the first such gentleman who delivers an order to attack will be forced to take part in the charge!’ As with the infantry, the Inhaber (colonel-proprietor) had an unusual amount of control over the regiment, dictating everything from general orders through to who received a regimental commission. Each regiment actually bore the name of its Inhaber, meaning that there was a regimental name change with the appointment of a new commander.

Again as with the infantry, there were distinct differences between those regiments formed in ‘German’ and ‘Hungarian’ areas of the empire; the former included all non-Hungarians such as Walloons and Italians, and the latter Croats, Slovenians and Transylvanians. Hungarian cavalry were all hussars, and therefore acted as the light cavalry. The other ‘German’ cavalry regiments provided the heavy and medium cavalry, although the chevauxlegers were classed as light cavalry but had more in common with medium dragoons. Cavalry took more time to train than infantry, and this led to little difference between peacetime and wartime establishments. A ‘Reserve Division’ was also kept active, this serving as an emergency resource during times of war.

AUSTRIAN CAVALRY, 1799-1801 (opposite)

(Centre) Trooper, 1st Uhlans, 1801. He wears the 1798 uniform, including the czapka headdress. (Left) Trooper, 3rd Hussars, 1800. This hussar is seen in campaign dress, and he wears the pelisse as a jacket, storing the dolman. (Right) Trooper, dragoons, 1799. The uniform here is of a ‘transitional’ style, with elements of both pre- and post-1798 regulation dress. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
In 1792 the Austrian cavalry had numbered 40,000 troops. These men were organized as follows: two regiments of carabiniers; nine regiments of cuirassiers, six regiments of dragoons; seven regiments of chevaux-légers, one ‘Staff-Dragoon’ regiment; nine regiments of Hungarian hussars; one regiment of Skékler Grenz (border) hussars; and one regiment of Uhlans. Regiments were organized into ‘divisions’, these comprising two squadrons, with two Flügel (‘wings’) per squadron and two Zugens (platoons) each. Carabinier and cuirassier regiments had squadrons numbering around 150 men all ranks, while the medium and light cavalry regiments had 170–180. Carabinier and hussar regiments had four divisions totalling eight squadrons; the Skékler Grenz hussars had five divisions; the Uhlans had two divisions; and all other regiments had three divisions. There was also a standard-escort, which totalled 24 men in the carabiniers and hussars and 18 men in the other regiments.

In 1798 structural changes swept through the Austrian cavalry, mainly affecting the German regiments. The number of cuirassier regiments was taken up to 12, this being achieved by creating a new formation, the 12th Cuirassiers, and by converting both of the carabinier corps. Dragoons and Chevauxlegers
were compressed into 15 light dragoon regiments, and the hussars were expanded to 12 regiments. An additional Uhlan regiment was created, as was a new corps of mounted Jagers (Jager Regt. zu Pferd ‘Bussy’). Also, from this date Austrian cavalry regiments were numbered consecutively across all their types.

Further organizational rejigging took place in 1801 after the Treaty of Luneville. This time the focus was reductions, taking down the cavalry regiments from 42 to 35. The disbanded outfits were cuirassier regiments 4, 5 and 11; light dragoon regiments 2, 5, 6 and 9; the mounted Jagers and the 12th Hussars. The principal reason behind these cuts was the deployment of Austrian forces to mountainous theatres in which the applications of cavalry would be more limited. In mid 1802, therefore, the establishment of Austrian cavalry consisted of eight cuirassier, six dragoon, six Chevauxleger, 12 hussar and three Uhlan regiments, and this remained so until 1813, when a fourth Uhlan regiment and the 7th Chevauxlegers were created. Reforms pushed through at speed in 1805 set all regiments to a strength of eight squadrons, with 131 and 151 men per

### Cavalry and Cuirassier Uniforms

As with all cavalry of the age, the Austrian cavalry cut a dash on parade, march and battlefield. The various regional and national origins of the cavalry resulted in a wide variety of appearances. A signal change to appearance in many cavalry units came in 1798, when new regulations introduced the crested black leather helmet as standard wear, although the hussars and Uhlans retained their own distinctive brands of headdress. A good example of the 1798 uniform regulations can be found in a typical cuirassier of the period. The 1798 coat was white and single-breasted with ten large buttons on the front and two at the rear. There was a facing colour patch on the standing collar and were also on the cuffs and edging of the turnbacks. A white-sleeved waistcoat was worn under the coat. The black stock, white breeches and stockings were of a similar type to infantry uniform, while the riding boots extended to 5cm (2in) below the kneecap. The half-cuirass was deficient in terms of protection, as it gave no coverage to the back, and battlefield experience demonstrated that when pitted against other cuirassiers with full body protection the Austrians were likely to come off worse.

In terms of equipment, a tubular red cloth valise known as a Mantelsack was located in the lambskin at the rear of the saddle, and this carried shirts, cleaning materials, shaving kit and other day-to-day essentials. A haversack held two day's worth of bread, and a wooden canteen held water. A hide knapsack thrown over the horse contained horse grooming equipment, messin and field kettle handle on the right side, and more bread, forage oats, comb, tent pegs and additional straps in the left side. Two leather cases also on the saddle held horseshoes and nails, plus a fatigue-smock and picket ropes.
squadron in the heavy and light regiments respectively. Combined with problems in mobilization, these reforms meant that many cavalry squadrons went into action in 1805 woefully understrength, something that contributed significantly to the defeats of that year. Archduke Charles responded to the issues with reforms of his own, setting heavy regiments at six squadrons of 135 men each, and light regiments at eight squadrons of 150 men each (apart from the Skékler Grenz regiment, with six squadrons). Each regiment also had a reserve force on its books, this consisting of a number of dismounted troopers that could be formed up into a reserve squadron when necessary. A further reorganization occurred after the 1809 campaign. The heavy regiments were reduced to four squadrons and the light regiments to six.

Tactically, the Austrian cavalry of the early Napoleonic period relied primarily on the drawn-sabre charge, the troops arranged into three lines. Martial regulations were updated frequently, however, and those of 1804–06 advocated the two-squadron ‘division’ and the two-deep line and the central tactical elements. The 1806 regulations stated that cavalry should act offensively whenever possible, and the troops were forbidden to receive a charge at a halt. The regulations also emphasized the importance of maintaining the reserve in readiness.

There were some problems within the cavalry regulations. First, Austrian cavalry only used mass and column for manoeuvre, resorting to the two-deep line for attack – this formation was often at a disadvantage when dealing with French forces attacking in column. Also, the Austrians neither regulated nor trained for multi-regiment charges, meaning that battlefield coordination between regiments was poor, and something their opponents could easily exploit. Therefore instead of being a decisive assault force, Austrian cavalry increasingly acted simply as support elements for the infantry, reducing its shock value. Nevertheless, enemy commentators observed that Austrian cavalry were competent and professional soldiers, who made a valuable tactical contribution within the limits of their own regulations and training.

AUSTRIAN ARMY CUIRASSIERS, 1805–14 (opposite)
(Centre) Officer, 1st Cuirassiers, 1805–14. He wears full dress, including the taller cavalry helmet worn from around 1805. (Right) Trumpeter, 4th Cuirassiers, c. 1805–14. This trumpeter wears campaign dress, here the same style of ‘German’ cavalry uniform worn by cuirassiers. (Left) Trooper, 3rd Cuirassiers, c. 1814. The rear view shows how vulnerable the cavalryman was without a rear plate to the cuirass. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
RUSSIA

OVERVIEW

The Russian Army was a typical ancien régime army, organized upon the regimental basis. There was no standing formation above the regiment and regiments were switched from one brigade to another on a moment’s notice. The Inhaber or commanding officer rarely took to the field. The drudgery of command was left to his subordinate. The Russians, once committed to war against the French, were fierce but fairly lumbering opponents of Napoleon. They defended well, but had been unable to match the French in a battle of manoeuvre. Following the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, it was clear that the organization inherited from the Seven Years’ War needed to be overhauled.

This task was originally given to Alexei Arakcheev, a sadistic martinet who showed little interest in reform except in his artillery. He replaced the old, slow-moving artillery with lighter, better, 12 and 6pdrs and improved the Licorne, the Russian answer to the howitzer. These new models still lacked the mobility and hitting power of the French, but they were a marked improvement.

Arakcheev did little else to change the army other than terrorize his contemporaries and give his favourites positions of power. In almost all matters he was a reactionary and a xenophobe, so he did the Tsar a great service when he resigned in 1810 over a power struggle. His replacement was Barclay de Tolly, who reorganized the army and introduced a corps structure similar to that of the French. He also tried to install a staff system like Napoleon’s but with less success.

The army of near a million men was scattered over the vast Russian empire. Many were in depots and many more were levies waiting to be called up. In the field at the start of 1812, that most critical year in the history of the Napoleonic Wars, there were over 600,000 men, equal to Napoleon’s entire force, with another 500,000 men waiting to be called up. However, mobilizing this army would prove to be a lengthy process, so initially Russia faced Napoleon with only a third of his force.

The Russian infantry was obedient and stalwart. The officers lacked imagination and initiative, but the peasant infantrymen, used to hardship, had few complaints about a military lifestyle that was often draconian, plus they
The charge of the Russian Imperial Guard, battle of Austerlitz, 2 December 1805. The leading Russian squadron received a close-range volley and veered away, but the second squadron charged home and slashed their way into the disintegrating square. The prized Eagle of the French 4th Line Battalion drew Russians like moths to a candle. The Guard cavalry eventually hacked the Eagle from its holder, the blood-soaked NCO slumping to the ground having sustained numerous cuts to his arms and head. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)

fought hard when put into battle. The infantry was particularly adept at digging in when in defence, offering tenacious resistance, and enduring a heavy pounding from the superior French artillery.

The infantry was divided into three types: line, Jägers, and grenadiers. The line and Jägers were essentially the same, designated for light infantry duties but ill-trained for the job (although at Borodino almost all the Jäger regiments broke down into skirmish formation). The grenadiers were sub-divided into two types: grenadier regiments and converged grenadier battalions. The regiments were true elite formations that had earned their title on the battlefield and continued to justify this honour. The converged battalions were a merger of companies taken from the line regiments and elevated to elite status. These men were good, reliable troops, but not markedly better than their brethren in the line.

The cavalry, the most aristocratic of the Russian arms, had needed least by way of reform. It was organized into permanent divisions and had begun to practise large formation manoeuvres when the war broke out. The cavalry was steady if unremarkable. It performed well against many of the allied troops, but usually gave way when matched against an equal number of French. In these encounters, their lack of training above the squadron level proved costly.
The one cavalry force that made a real difference on campaign was the Cossacks. These steppe horsemen could outmarch any of their rivals and they were mounted on sturdy ponies which could withstand the hardships of the Russian weather and terrain. While rarely useful against anything approaching an equal number of cavalry, they were a nightmare to stragglers and scouts, and could occasionally destroy smaller isolated enemy units. The lure of booty made them lose discipline, but they were ready to attack to find their loot if the odds were good. In 1812 Cossacks appeared in great, destructive numbers.

The artillery was the backbone of the army. The Russians were the first to recognize the changing role of artillery on the battlefield and amassed as much as possible for the battle of Eylau in 1807, providing a frightful example of the carnage Russian cannon could inflict. While Russian officers had not developed Napoleon’s skill in deploying huge batteries on the move, they firmly believed in pounding an opponent into submission.

Finally there was the Russian Guard. This combined arms formation, modelled upon Napoleon’s Guard, was made up of elite formations. They received the best of everything Russia could provide and were the Tsar’s shock troops. None in the world could match them, save the French. They were used more liberally than Napoleon’s Guard, because to do so never risked the entire regime.

It was in command that the Russians failed most. Rivalry and bickering led to a series of near-disastrous appointments. Often generals were put in place more for their political acumen than their military skills and were replaced because of a loss of political influence rather than for any failure. The responsibility for this lay with the Tsar, but even he was often looking over his shoulder, fearful of a coup.

As with all armies of the Napoleonic era, the strength of the forces depended much on losses sustained during campaign. The theoretical strength of the regiments mobilized for the 1812 campaign, for example, was 1,476 men in two field battalions. The Russian battalions present at the Battle of Bautzen in May 1813, however, averaged 150–200 men each. Even though 70,000 reinforcements arrived in Germany during the summer of 1813, this was insufficient to bring the battalions up to strength. Most battalions were brought up to 500 or 600 men, but many regiments could muster only one battalion. The vast losses sustained in 1812 were replaced by calling up men of the older classes. They marched from their depots in Russia to the front in Alexander I of Russia.

The Tsar's formidable forces opposed the French in 1805 and 1807, before Napoleon finally decided to invade Alexander's vast empire. Despite the occupation of Moscow, Alexander not only refused to negotiate, but pursued the French out of Russia and across Germany in a relentless campaign to reach Paris and overthrow the Bonaparte dynasty. Russia's major contribution to victory and Alexander's considerable influence on affairs at the Congress of Vienna established Russia as the most powerful nation on the Continent until the Crimean War. (Philip Haythornthwaite)
Germany, thereby accustoming themselves to life in the open and the hardships facing a soldier. They were well-clothed and equipped, but apart from the Jager regiments, who would have had some talent in skirmish tactics, they lacked the tactical subtleties of Western armies.

INFANTRY
The Russian infantry was a relatively crude, but nevertheless potent force, with a potential manpower of over one million men. At its height in 1812, the infantry consisted of 170 regiments containing 511 battalions (there were three battalions to every regiment), although mobilization admittedly reduced the number of active field battalions to 401. This was an effect of the second company being tasked with delivering reinforcements to the first and third companies to bring them up to full combat strength – what remained of the second company became a depot company. The second battalions also had to relinquish a company of elite troops that were then formed into grenadier battalions. At war strength, a Guard battalion had an establishment of 764 men, and a line battalion a strength of 732 men. Structurally, the 170 first-line infantry regiments – delivering 284,000 men – were assembled into 28 divisions, each division having six regiments. The 170 regiments consisted of 6 Guard regiments, 14 Grenadier regiments, 96 fusilier regiments and 50 light infantry regiments. There were also 18 reserve divisions that had 103 garrison infantry battalions and 216 infantry battalions of the reserve.

Such a mighty force, however, had a very humble source. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the backbone of the Russian infantry was the peasant and serf population. A few select statistics from the Azimov Regiment clearly show how
The working man shouldered the burden of military service: in 1795, 74 per cent of the recruits sent to the regiment were serfs (although this decreased to 37 per cent by 1811), and 24 per cent were state peasants (increasing to 53 per cent in 1811). The remaining 2 per cent were either townsmen (who consisted of artisans and tradesmen), or minorities, like Tartars. Both peasant and serf had to pay a poll tax that formed the basis of conscription, but Jews, the clergy and other members of society (such as the nobles and merchants) were exempt from military service.

Conscription

During August or September each year, a Ukaz, or decree, was issued by the Imperial authorities to the Kazennaya palata (local government officer). He would set up a recruiting board with both civilian and military officials, headed by a military receiver or voyennyy priemschchik. The Ukaz was accompanied by an Imperial writ stating how many recruits were needed — usually one to eight ‘souls’ from a serf’s district of 500 men. In 1812, three levies, equivalent to 20 souls in 500, were imposed: the country that had been overrun by the enemy was exempt from conscription, but was charged at an increased rate in 1813.
Vagrants, criminals and servants (sent by their masters) were often sent to the army as punishment. The recruiting board, or rekrutskoye prisutstviye, would make up the levy required from the poll tax population of peasants and townspeople. Lots were drawn to see which families would supply a recruit, and the family had the miserable job of choosing a member to become a soldier. This Hobson’s choice usually fell upon the person with the least responsibility within the household. The authorities were careful not to ruin a family, as they still had to work the land and pay the poll tax; a household with two or more males, for example, would be chosen in favour of a family with just one. In areas like Siberia, conscription was kept to a minimum in order not to depopulate the district. Payments could be made in lieu of recruitment or an official bribed not to choose them. Richer peasants frequently ‘bought’ poorer ones to take their place. This practice is known to have taken place on the Lieven estate at Baki, Kostroma province; in 1816 the inhabitants contributed between 2,000 and 10,000 roubles to buy substitutes. The price of a substitute was fixed at 360, and later 500, roubles.

Substitute conscripts advertised in newspapers like the St Petersburg Gazette; an advertisement in 1793 offered ‘for sale as surplus, a 22-year-old man, trained in women’s dressmaking, who is suitable also as a recruit.’ There also appears to have been a trade in substitutes; merchants bought serfs from their masters and sold them on to would-be conscripts. To reduce such abuses, merchants could only buy one serf at a time, no serf could be sold within three months of the Ukaz being issued, and all had to be registered.

Although families preferred their single men to enlist, this was not always possible. In From Serf to Russian Soldier, historian E. K. Wirtschafter notes that 50 per cent of recruits sent to the Azov Infantry Regiment in 1795 were

Recruits drilling as shown by Wilhem Von Kobell in 1799, some of whom have not been shaved and they still wear their peasant clothes. To their front is a group of musketeers; one has the regulation calfskin knapsack while two others have linen bags instead. Note also the long queue on the soldier with his back to the reader. The officer by the side of the recruits has a cane used to beat them. This cane was abolished in 1808. (The Royal Collection © 2008, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II)
married and this rose to 56 per cent in 1811. In addition there were height and age requirements for recruits; in 1766 the minimum height was 1.6m (5ft 3in) and age limits 17 to 35. In 1808 the minimum age increased to 19; then because more recruits were needed the height limit was reduced to 1.51m (4ft 11in) in 1812, and age limits were 12 to 40. In 1815, with the Napoleonic Wars over, the height and age limit returned to their 1766 levels. In the first decade of the 19th century the shortest recruits were posted to the light company and tall ones to the grenadier company. From 1811 the elite companies, e.g. the light and grenadier companies, were open only to soldiers with good character and discipline who had proved themselves in battle.

Conscripts were taken to the recruiting officer; if they were found fit for service they had their foreheads and beards shaved off to identify them as recruits. Foreheads had to remain shaven for the next six months. They were also put in irons to prevent them running away. Those found unfit for service

In October 1808 Replacement Recruit Depots, each consisting of six companies, were set up. Here we see some new recruits arriving at a depot in 1808. These serfs in the foreground are shown in peasant dress, though it was common for new recruits to be issued uniforms at the time of recruitment. In the background to the right, a detachment of recruits practises marching under the watchful eye of an NCO: they are wearing the issued grey recruits' clothing. To the left, two ranks of men stand in dress uniform, whilst in the centre a field officer and a company officer (in the longer coat) are observing proceedings. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Training

The training for an infantry recruit differed throughout the Napoleonic Wars, but can be divided into three distinct periods: pre-1808 training, training between 1808 and 1812 in depots, and post-1812 training.

Pre-1808 training

Training began immediately. On their journey to their regiment or recruit depot, the recruits were taught how to stand and march correctly. The conscripts’ journey could last up to three months, and they marched between 20 and 30km (12.4 and 18.6 miles) a day (half that distance in bad weather), and inspections took place twice a day. They were allowed to rest every third day, when they would clean and repair their clothes and might try to spend part of their allowance; public houses were to be avoided. This was also the best opportunity to desert, although with shaven forehead and, from 1808, a recruit’s uniform, they were easily recognizable.

The long march was the least of the recruit’s worries; from now on disease was rife; corporal punishment was meted out for any minor offence; pay, provisions and uniforms were sometimes withheld by corrupt officers. Suicide was not unknown. To guide the new soldier through his first two years of service and make the transition to military life easier, a diad’ka, or uncle, was appointed by the regiment.

The diad’ka was a soldier of at least ten years’ service. It was his duty to teach the recruit-soldier how to care for his equipment, dress properly, obey the martial rules, and to understand commands and order of service. Since the recruit-soldier was often homesick the diad’ka was supposed to be patient, understanding and care for him; the diad’ka did not always perform his duties towards the conscript. After two years the recruit-soldier was considered responsible for his own actions.

Training between 1808 and 1812 in depots

The War Ministry was aware of the physiological transition that the recruits had to go through, from tilling the fields one month to being in a regiment with its harsh discipline the next. On 30 October 1808, 27 Zapasnyya Rekrutskiya Depo (replacement recruit depots) were established, ‘in order to avoid the deficiencies connected with the hasty distribution of recruits to regiments after their enlistment.’ The depots were hundreds of miles from the recruits’ homes – to prevent them deserting – and here the conscript would learn the ‘basic rules of military service’. Each catered for about 2,280 recruits, divided into six companies, there being six regiments to a division. It was not until 16 March 1811 that the recruit depots were assigned to a specific division that was required to provide six officers, 24 NCOs and 240 men to train the conscripts. In November 1811, the recruit depots were formed into between four and six three-company battalions and assigned to a regiment within the division, becoming its fourth or reserve battalion of the renamed infantry regiments.

Continues overleaf
Once the recruits arrived at training camp, they were divided into small groups and began a nine-month training course in which they were introduced to army discipline. During the first two months the recruit was taught how to manoeuvre without arms; the next two with arms; in the fifth month military regulations and marching in formation; the next few months repeated what the recruit had already learnt, plus target practice; and in the final six weeks the recruit was taught how to survive on campaign, how to build a bivouac and to forage. At the end of the nine months he was ready to join his regiment.

Post-1812 training

On 27 June 1812, with the outbreak of the Patriotic War, the recruit depots were disbanded and the old system of training a recruit with a regiment was resumed. Those recruits who were free to return home, to the delight of their families, but this meant another serf had to be chosen.

The recruit was issued with a peasant’s caftan, trousers and a pair of shoes, which was to last him until he received his first uniform. From 23 May 1808, each recruit received a grey or white soldier’s coat, pantaloons, a forage cap, a black cravat, a pair of lacquered boots, and a knapsack in which to put his belongings. The recruit’s village paid for his uniform, travelling expenses, and 1.50 roubles per man which was issued on the journey to his regiment. Recruits were handed to an escort who divided them into artels (sections, the lowest administrative unit within a regiment) of eight to ten men; members of the artel supported each other in the long march that followed. In theory each recruit also received six measures of flour, three pecks of croup per day and 2.7kg (6lb) of salt per month.

Drill

In 1796 Paul I issued a new drill book, Military Code Concerning the Field Service for Infantry, and the following year Tactical Rules for Military Evolutions, both based on the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great. Each
morning and evening the roll was called and on Sundays the recruits listened while military regulations were read out.

Despite being derided by Field Marshal Suvarrov, Russia’s leading commander, the drill book was a great leap forward in the training of the soldier. It aimed to standardize the instructions to the officers and men of the infantry and replace the individual regimental drill manuals. It not only laid down the arms drill of an infantryman, but also acted as a guide for his religious, camp and garrison life. In theory it remained in force until 1809, but like many of Paul I’s reforms it was largely ignored, and after his assassination the majority of regiments resorted to their own drill book again. Regimental commanders preferred to send an officer to observe the Russian Imperial Guard drilling and manoeuvring and to record the drill movements as he perceived them. Many regiments probably preferred Field Marshal Suvarrov’s *Discourse under the Trigger*, based on the regulations he wrote while colonel of the Susdal Musketeer regiment.

In 1811 the new Minister of War, Barclay de Tolly, introduced new infantry regulations which divided the recruits’ schooling into three parts. The first consisted of instruction without arms, i.e. bearing, turning, marching (without bending their knees and keeping their head straight) in ordinary time (75 paces per minute) and quick time (120 paces per minute), and oblique marching. Much of this stage occurred while the recruit was marching to his new regiment or training depot. The second part of their training was arms drill, i.e. shoulder arms, order arms etc. and the third part of the training was the manoeuvring in formation. In 1811 Instructions for Target Practice prescribed that each regiment was to carry out target practice every year. Every company was to keep a list of the best marksmen.

In 1812 Alexander I tried to issue a new drill book – based on French style drill – but this seems to have been largely ignored; it was not until after the Napoleonic Wars that Russian drill became standardized.

**Pay and provisions**

The soldiers were paid in advance three times a year; in theory on 1 January, 1 May and 1 September. A private soldier in a field regiment during peacetime was paid nine roubles and 50 kopecks a year, a grenadier 14 roubles. During wartime a soldier would also receive a bonus for active service and acts of bravery. Despite these bonuses he was poorly paid by European standards; a Russian lieutenant received the equivalent to a private soldier in the British Army. From 1808 soldiers’ pay was reduced for payments to buy medicine and support the hospitals.

Each company was divided into four artels. Each artel mustered about 35 men if the company was at full strength, was headed by an NCO who was assisted by five desyalki, and one or two of the most experienced diad’ki,
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who were ‘of good morality’. In theory the company commander would appoint an artelshchik who would buy and distribute provisions and money to the members. However, in practice the members of each artel appear to have elected the artelshchik, usually for a term of six months.

Part of the soldiers’ pay, munitions money, and any extra money they received by working or as a reward, would go towards the artel’s common fund; this was like a type of savings bank where the soldiers could save up for extra food or carts to carry their baggage, but they had to obtain permission from the company commander to spend it. The money was held by the company commander on trust, but there are a few cases where a dishonest commander ‘borrowed’ the money for his own purpose.

As well as receiving their provisions a soldier would receive 72 kopecks for meat and 24 kopecks for salt per year, which was deducted from their pay. On the march a soldier had to carry enough food for four days. In theory a daily ration was about 1kg (2.2lb) of grain and about 750g (1.7lb) of sukhari (a type of hard tack biscuit); bread and salt were issued on campaign. This was washed down with kvas, a type of beer made from bread ‘steeped in hot water until it becomes acessenct [sour] by fermentation’, which was their favourite drink. It is known that vodka or rum was issued on occasions to keep up morale. Taking into account the religious fast days, the commissaries only ordered food for 360 days per year. However, when not on campaign or in winter quarters soldiers quartered on civilians ate what their hosts did. On campaign the soldier often went hungry or lived with the aid of the local inhabitants.
UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT

A regiment was provided with or given enough money to buy cloth and leather to produce its own uniforms by the state. Soldiers usually made their own, as tailors and artisans could be found in the ranks. The men had to pay for any lost items. This system was open to abuse: in 1810 an officer of the Kexholm Musketeer regiment issued second-hand uniforms to his men, and soldiers had to buy new uniforms from their regimental savings. There are also instances of officers either using money from regimental funds or paying for uniforms out of their own pocket when governmental issue was not forthcoming. According to the 1797 drill book, uniforms were issued on 1 May each year; however, there is some evidence to suggest that this was later changed to 'the end of the year' or 24 December.

A COMPANY OF THE NARVA REGIMENT, 12TH DIVISION, ADVANCES INTO BATTLE, 1812

Column formations were adopted by the Russians during the campaigns between 1812 and 1814, mainly because many of the soldiers who had been trained to manoeuvre in line were either no longer alive or unfit to serve. The infantry column shown consists of sections 23 men wide, and three ranks deep. At the far right of the first rank of men (nearest to the viewer) is the 2nd Lieutenant, who wears a gorget and sash. Behind him on the far right of the third rank, is a sergeant, distinguished by a quartered pompom on his shako. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Coats were issued every two years and greatcoats every four years. The greatcoats were single breasted made from undyed or white cloth during Paul I's reign and during Alexander I's (1801–1825) beige, dark or light grey cloth was also introduced. However, whatever the shade each regiment was to have the same colour, with the collar and shoulder straps the same as the coat. According to A. V. Viskovatov on 14 July 1808 it was ordered that in:

the warm or good weather, the soldier was to have his greatcoat rolled over his left shoulder, with the ends low on his right side being tied with a whitened deerskin strap. In cold weather it was ordered to wear the greatcoat with all its buttons fastened and to take off the coat and place it behind the back above the waist, between the skirt and greatcoat. But in frosts, the coat was to be worn in addition to the greatcoat.

On 20 April 1809, additional regulations laid down that the greatcoat should be rolled 16cm (6.2in) wide and tied 8cm (3.1in) from the ends with a strap.

Soldiers were issued with a new pair of pantaloons and a pair of linen trousers every year; their trousers appear to have lasted on average six months. During the summer this was inconvenient, but in winter, especially that of 1812, the lack of trousers could prove disastrous, as Sir Robert Wilson (a British general seconded to the Imperial Army in 1812) notes:

out of 10,000 recruits afterwards marched on Wilna as a reinforcement, only 1,500 reached that city; the greater part of these were conveyed to hospitals

The Satschen Ponds, at Austerlitz, where according to French propaganda 20,000 Russians drowned while trying to escape over the frozen lakes. However, the exact figure will never be known: a letter in the Austrian Archives states that just two or three bodies were found in the lakes and they had died from wounds rather than from drowning.
PRIVATE, MOSCOW GRENADIERS, 1812

The central figure shows a soldier in the uniform of 1812; the coat has a closed red collar, lower than before. His red shoulder straps have the letter ‘M’, signifying the Moscow Grenadiers, and he wears the summer gaiter-trousers. The surrounding kit and uniform includes (1 & 2) his shako; (3) knapsack with water flask; (4) 1808 pattern musket; (5) greatcoat; (6) forage cap; (7) a shako plate fitted under the pompon, awarded ‘for distinction’; (8) grenadier’s shako and cartridge box badge; (9) musketeer’s shako and cartridge box badge; (10) grenadier’s cartridge box. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
as sick or mutilated. One of the chief causes of their losses was that the trousers becoming worn by the continued marches in the inner part of the thighs exposed the flesh, so that the frost struck into it when chafed and irritated it with virulent activity.

On campaign, despite repeated protests from the high command, some soldiers wore baggy linen overalls to protect their trousers. Although recorded by artists like Johann Adam Klein, it is not clear how common this practice was. The soldiers were also issued with two pairs of black leather boots with two extra pairs of soles, three pairs of linen or woollen puttees or stockings, and three linen shirts with a small detachable collar and cuffs fastened by buttons or tape.

In July 1813 Colonel (Sir Hudson) Lowe, a British liaison officer with the Prussian General Blücher’s staff (who later became Napoleon’s gaoler at St Helena), described the accoutrements of the infantry as:

in general of bad leather without any proper inside case to hold the cartridges and keep them dry, and not holding conveniently more than 40 rounds, but the men were accustomed to keep the cartridges rolled up in packages of ten each and to put up what the pouch did not hold in their packs. The packs are of leather, small and not ill made, if they can be rendered proof against the rain.

The cartridge box was also designed to carry spare parts for the musket and flints; it was waterproofed with wax to prevent the cartridges becoming damp.

In 1802 cylindrical black leather knapsacks replaced the calfskin one introduced by Paul I in 1797. On 14 July 1808 a rectangular one was introduced, which continued in service until the end of the Napoleonic Wars. However, the knapsacks were not waterproofed, and often captured French knapsacks of calfskin were worn. Linen bags were also used as a substitute for the leather knapsacks. On the back of the knapsack was a tin canteen for carrying liquor.

According to A. V. Viskovatov, a knapsack was meant to carry:

two shirts, a pair of trousers, a pair of foot wraps, a forage cap, material for a pair of boots, a frizzen cover, 12 flints, three brushes, two scrapers, a small board for cleaning buttons, a small quantity of chalk and polish, a small valise with threads, soap, glue, needle case with needles, moustache dye, dye comb, sand and a brick, and rusks for three days, so that the valise with the canteen and summer trousers weighed 25 pounds, but with the winter trousers (instead of summer) 26.25 pounds.
During the reign of Paul I musketeers and Jägers wore the bicorn hat, while the grenadiers and fusiliers wore the mitre cap, with a metal front in the colour of the regiment's buttons.

In September 1802 shakos were introduced into the Jäger regiments. They were also issued to the musketeers in August 1803, replacing the bicorn hats. In 1805 a new style of shako was introduced to all three branches of infantry, e.g. Jägers, musketeers and grenadiers. However, some musketeers still wore their bicornes at the Battle of Austerlitz and many grenadiers their mitre caps. The Pavlov regiment were still wearing mitres in 1807; during that year the regiment showed such bravery at the Battle of Friedland, that Alexander I allowed them to continue wearing them.

In June 1809 shako cords were issued, but they were usually removed on campaign. In 1812 a new type of shako was introduced, being issued straight away to some, as the 5th Tirailleurs observed at the Battle of Smolensk: 'Russian grenadiers, [were] recognizable by the three copper flames on their very low and concave shakos.' The Elberfeld manuscript, produced during 1813 and 1814, shows a Russian grenadier wearing an 1807 style shako (a restyling of the 1805 type, to include black leather top bands, and V-shaped reinforcements on the sides). Shakos were issued every two years; those who were issued one in 1811 would have to wait until 1813 for their new shako. In theory new recruits would be issued with the new form of shako, so there were two types of shakos present in each regiment between 1812 and 1814.

Protective shako covers were officially introduced in May 1817; black or butternut coloured ones of linen soaked in wax, are known to have been worn in 1814, and probably much earlier. After chinstraps were introduced for the shako it was often used as a bucket to gather provisions, and soon became deformed.

**Campaign Conditions**

On 22 February 1803, ordinary time march rate of a Russian infantryman was set at 75 paces per minute, and quick time at 120. These rates, however, were slower than their French counterparts (whose ordinary time was 76 paces per minute), which resulted in the French out-marching the Russians. To prevent
the French catching the Russians on the march, rearguard actions were necessary; most notably at Schongrabern on 16 November 1805, when Bagration gave Kutuzov's main body a chance to escape. By 1807 two more steps had been introduced: triple time, of 200 to 250 paces per minute, and a fourth step used on campaign when soldiers could relax and march at their ease.

An infantryman was more likely to succumb to disease rather than become a casualty in battle. During 1799 and 1800 the Edinburgh Military Hospital treated 243 Russian patients from the Helder campaign where disease spread rapidly due to wet weather. None of the soldiers were wounded in battle: 112 had a fever (probably typhus) from which 24 died; 45 had scurvy; 13 had diarrhoea; two had sexually transmitted diseases; others had various complaints like pneumonia and leg injuries.

A Soviet demographer, B. C. Urlanis, believed that the Russian Army suffered 110,000 deaths from the effects of battle during the campaign of 1812, whereas 140,000 were wounded or died of disease, almost a quarter of a million men. Other estimates vary between 660,000 to two million men who were killed, died of wounds or sickness. It was reported to Alexander I that, due to disease and casualties, the army renewed its personnel every five or six years. Kutuzov rejoins the army, 1812. Soldiers from the Pavlov Grenadier Regiment (in their mitres) and the St Petersburg Grenadier Regiment (in shakos) cheer Mikhail Kutuzov on his visit to the 1st Division of III Corps midway through the 1812 campaign. Kutuzov was brought back to overall command of the Russian forces in August 1812 after Napoleon had had the better of the early stages of the campaign. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The constant state of war between France, Turkey, Persia and Sweden took its toll on the effectiveness of the regiments. Over the years the quality of recruits gradually declined. In his memoirs Captain Friederich von Schubert compared the army of 1807 to that of 1812:

every man knew one thing only ... his duty was to hold any position allotted to him to the death. The feeling of invincibility pervaded in the Army like a creed, and every misfortune, every lost battle was ascribed to treachery ... A division or regiment which has had the same commander for a long time, which has been through difficult times with him and won victories, is proud of him and will, out of attachment to him gladly endure privations, which would not be tolerated out of mere obedience; with him the division or regiment will easily overcome obstacles which they would not even have attempted to overcome under anyone else’s command. The state of the Russian Army in

BORODINO

1. Bagavout marches from right to left flank.
2. Platov and Uvarov’s diversionary advance threatening the French left flank.
1806 lasted more or less until the war of 1812–1814, at which point it was substantially altered. The constant wars had taken away many of the old soldiers, and the young ones did not have the same traditions; nor could they feel the same attachment to their corps as the old ones did.

Barclay de Tolly, also had noticed the decline in the Russian Army, writing in 1810: ‘In place of strong and brave troops, our regiments consist in large measure of green soldiers, unaccustomed to the rigours of war. The present prolonged war has smothered their traditional heroic virtues. Their patriotism, as well as their physical strength, have begun to weaken with the beginning of this intense and useless war.’ While on St Helena Napoleon agreed with these statements: he was reported as saying ‘the Russian Army which fought at Austerlitz would not have lost the Battle of Borodino’.

**Battle Formations**

In November 1796 infantry regiments were divided into two battalions, each with a grenadier company and five musketeer companies. In grenadier regiments the musketeer companies were replaced by fusiliers. In 1798 the Jager battalions were formed into regiments of two battalions each of five Jager companies. On 30 April 1802 all infantry regiments were ‘ordered to consist of three, four-company battalions; the Life Grenadiers of three grenadier battalions, other grenadier regiments of one grenadier and two fusilier battalions; Musketeer [regiments] of one grenadier and two musketeer battalions; Jagers of three jager battalions.’ Each company was divided into two sections or platoons.

When Barclay de Tolly became Minister of War, he reorganized the army along French lines. In October 1810 he ordered that the infantry regiments, like grenadier regiments, were to have three battalions each of one grenadier and three fusilier companies. The musketeer regiments, (renamed infantry) were to have three battalions of one grenadier and three musketeer companies. The Jager battalions were to have one Jager-grenadier and three Jager companies. Another French innovation introduced at this time was the corps system, which grouped two divisions together. The divisions were usually formed of three brigades each of two regiments.

Before 1810 all battalions of a regiment had taken the field, but now only the first and third were to serve in a campaign. The centre companies of the second battalion were used to bring the other two battalions up to strength. To mark their new role the second battalion was renamed a Zapasni (or replacement battalion). The grenadier companies from these battalions were united with the other grenadier companies of the second battalions of their division to form a Combined Grenadier battalion each of three companies. These battalions formed a Combined Grenadier Brigade used as the reserve.
The camp at Taruntino, 1812. The camp of Taruntino, south of Moscow, was where Kutuzov gathered his army while waiting for the Grande Armée to leave Moscow. The regiment arriving to join the soldiers of the Vilna Regiment of the 27th Division is one of the many Opolochenie (or militia) regiments, ordered to be raised in July 1812: the majority of the recruits were conscripts. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)

The grenadier company’s first platoon consisted of grenadiers and the second platoon, Jagers or light infantry. From 1811 the grenadiers and riflemen were men chosen ‘despite their height, for excellent behaviour, constancy and endurance in work, courage and bravery’. The smaller men went to the jagers, the taller ones to the grenadiers, and the weaker ones, whatever their size, formed the centre companies.

The 1811 new infantry regulations introduced by the War Ministry described the drawing up of a regiment as follows:

Infantry regiments consist of three battalions, which are numbered 1st, 2nd and 3rd, when the regiment is drawn up in battle order, the first battalion is on the right flank, near it is placed the 2nd and then the 3rd battalion. Each battalion consists of four companies ... Each company is divided into two Platoons (Vzvod). In the grenadier company the first platoon consists of grenadiers and the second of riflemen. The other companies are also divided into two platoons, of which one is called the first and the other the second.

When the battalion is drawn up in battle formation, the grenadier platoon forms up on the right flank of the battalion, by it ... the three musketeer companies and finally the platoon of riflemen which stands on the left flank of the battalion. The Platoon is divided into half platoons and by sections. In the section is found not less than four and not more than six files.
It was prescribed that the most experienced and brave men were to be in the front rank, the rear rank was to be formed from the old and reliable soldiers and the middle or second rank to be formed of new soldiers of doubtful quality. Those on the flanks were to be the best within the company.

Paul I's drill book recommended linear formations of three ranks. Although linear formations were good for defensive actions, they quickly became disordered once the line advanced. If ordered to advance the regiment would quickly form a column. As well as the official manuals for drawing up a regiment in battle formation there were also unofficial guides. Baron Antoine-Henri de Jomini (a general in the French Army who subsequently became a general in Russian service) published *Traite des grandes operations militaires* in 1804, while A. I. Khatov's *General Survey of Tactics and Basic Principles of Military Tactics*, published between 1807 and 1810, was largely based on

The fierce and bloody battle for the Pratzen Heights, at the battle of Austerlitz in December 1805. Kamensky's Russians and Jurczik's Austrians engage St. Hilaire's Division at close range. (Collection Alfred and Roland Umhey)
Guibert's 1773 *Essai général de tactique*. Both Jomini and Khatov recommended the use of column formations in 'battalions by divisions of two companies' rather than linear tactics. In a later edition of his work Jomini recorded the Russians 'formed columns of four divisions in three ranks... the skirmishers are taken from the third rank of each division, which makes a column of eight men in depth instead of 12 and gives move mobility'. Kutuzov favoured columns. On 18 October 1805 he wrote that 'it will often be necessary to form battalion columns, whether to pass through a line, or to deliver an attack more effectively in difficult terrain'.

Another formation was *l'ordre mixte* whereby one regiment or battalion would be drawn up in line with two others drawn up in column behind the flanks of the line. Bennigsen used this type of formation at the Battle of Friedland in 1807 and by some units at Borodino in 1812. According to General Jomini this formation 'might, according to circumstances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive'.

Whatever the formation adopted on the battlefield it was covered by a screen of light infantry. Little was officially written on skirmishing tactics during the Napoleonic Wars. A document from the Russian War Ministry entitled *Instructions to the Infantry Officers on the Day of Battle*, dated 29 July 1812, states:

> An officer commanding the skirmishes sent in front of the troops may not move his chain forward without permission from his regimental or battalion commander; his duty is to hide his men if possible, but he himself must move incessantly along the chain as much for the supervision of the enemy movements and enemy mounted skirmishers charging at him. Having let them come within 150 paces the officer must fire and, if he sees that he has not stopped them by fire, at a signal he will get his men together in groups of ten back to back. In this position he will continue to fire and stab the approaching horsemen with bayonets in full confidence that his battalion or regiment will rush forward to help them.

It was not until 1818 that skirmishing was officially referred to in training manuals. The Regimental training rules (1818) suggested that the chain of skirmishes should be 300 paces from the battalion. Before there were unofficial regulations within each regiment which suggest how to deploy a skirmish line.

The Russian soldier was stubborn in defence and aggressive in attack; all who witnessed the Russians in battle admired their courage, whether friend or foe. Diplomat, and Napoleon's Master of horse, General Armand Caulaincourt, recorded in his memoirs that while on St Helena Napoleon declared, 'These Russians let themselves be killed like automatons; they are not taken alive.'
RUSSIA

COSSACK TACTICS.
There were various tactics used by the Cossacks. Tactic A (top) shows the Cossacks extended in line so that they can outflank the approaching enemy cavalry unit. Tactic B (bottom) is a similar tactic except that a regular Russian cavalry regiment is drawn up in the centre and two Cossack units are on its flanks, so that the regular unit engages the enemy in the front, while the Cossacks can wheel round and attack the enemy cavalry on its flanks and rear. (Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Moreover Wellington wrote on 14 February 1813, after Alexander I had offered to send him some Russian troops to serve in Spain, ‘There can be no doubt that this number [15,000] of troops (of Russians particularly) would have the most decisive effect on the next campaign. Even if 1,000 or 2,000 only were sent it would show the power of the Russian Empire.’

While the Russian soldier was brave enough in formation, once he was separated from his comrades or the formation disorganised, he was at a loss to know what to do next. Sometimes the soldiers could be rallied, as at Austerlitz when Prince Wolkonski of Kamenski’s brigade grabbed a colour of the Fanagoria Grenadier regiment and three times led the brigade in a counter-attack on the right flank of the enemy. If they were not rallied the soldiers would flee the field like a disordered mob.

**ARTILLERY**

During the 18th century, Russia’s artillery arm underwent a rapid development. In 1757 each Russian artillery regiment consisted of two battalions, each battalion with a company of bombardiers operating howitzers and mortars and four companies of cannoniers manning the regular field guns. In total, a regiment had over 90 artillery guns. There was also an assortment of specialist artillery units, principally dealing with siege warfare. Pontoon regiments were part of the artillery, not the engineers. In all likelihood this was because the pontooniers worked in tandem with the artillery more than any other branch of service, aiding the gunners in their deployment across rivers and other landscape features.

During the reign of Catherine the Great, artillery was expanded to a strength of five regiments – one of bombardiers, two of cannoniers and one of fusiliers, plus the units of pontooniers. In 1793, with war underway with France, the artillery acquired seven more battalions of bombardiers and, the following year, even its first company of horse artillery.

Sir Robert Wilson once noted of Russian artillery: ‘No other army moves with so many guns and with no other army is there a better state of equipment, or more
Russian artillery batteries normally contained twelve pieces. ‘Position’ batteries contained 12pdrs, light and horse batteries 6pdrs. In 1805 Russian field artillery went through a process of re-equippping, the result being designated the System of 1805. Its arsenal consisted of 3pdr, 6pdr, 10pdr, 12pdr and 20pdr pieces, the 10pdr and 20pdr guns being howitzer types known as ‘unicorns’ or ‘licornes’, so-called after the unicorn-shaped lifting handles.
Russia had now stepped into the modern artillery age, but the battlefield performance of the new artillery when first tested at Austerlitz was disappointing. The guns were fine, but problems in organization and the tactical use of the guns meant that they were poorly employed. Following various investigations, the only change to the arsenal itself was to remove the 3pdr as a field artillery piece from 1807, it being deemed too light to be of any significant use.

The Russian military authorities again played around with the organization of the artillery in 1808–10, and they established three types of artillery battery that would be the set format of Russian artillery units for the next 30 years. First came the horse batteries. These had an arsenal of six 6pdrs and six 10pdr howitzers, with 160 personnel. (Howitzers in horse batteries were lighter and of smaller dimensions than those used by foot artillery.) Light batteries had the same guns, but in different ratios - eight 6pdrs and four 10pdrs, or six of each, with the same number of personnel as the horse batteries. At the more muscular end of the scale were the heavy (position) batteries. With a complement of 240 personnel, these batteries had four 6pdrs, four 12pdrs and four 20pdr howitzers.

Loading a Russian 12pdr gun. At the front we see below the loader pushing a round shot and charge into the muzzle, for the rammer to push down into the breech. Standing at the breech, the ventsman has his thumb over the vent hole to stop the air from the compacting of the charge fanning embers from the previous charge, and possibly causing a premature explosion. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Russia recognized the importance of a strong artillery arm early on. In terms of their broader structure, the Russian artillery batteries were formed into brigades in 1811-12. This resulted in 27 field brigades, with each brigade normally consisting of one heavy and two light brigades. Each infantry division would typically have one brigade of artillery attached for its order of battle, while cavalry divisions tended to receive one battery of horse cavalry each. There were a further ten reserve brigades of four batteries each, and four depot brigades of eight batteries each.

In 1808 the Russian artillery force had 139 batteries with 1,550 guns, but within four years the figures had increased to 161 batteries with 1,699 pieces. These batteries broke down as follows: 44 heavy, 58 light and 22 horse, with the remainder being siege or depot batteries. Each company of foot artillery had 250 personnel manning 12 guns. Regarding horse artillery, the heavy batteries had four 20pdrs and eight 12pdrs, while the light batteries had four 12pdrs and eight 6pdrs. Divisional artillery brigades usually comprised one heavy and one light company. There were some additional artillery units scattered throughout the Russian army. The Guard, for example, had two heavy, two light and four horse batteries, and even the Cossacks had their own branch of artillery, although details of it are sketchy. Sir Robert Wilson, who witnessed the 1806-07 campaigns in Poland, noted: 'The Cossaque artillery, worked by the Cossaques, which is a late institution, consisted of 24 pieces, extremely light, and the carriages were fashioned with a care and nicety which did great credit to Russian workmanship.'

The large number of guns and the high gun-to-infantry ratio gave the Russians a powerful artillery advantage in several engagements, although again this advantage could be squandered by poor leadership and plodding tactics. Nevertheless, while Napoleon aimed towards, but frequently missed, an artillery ratio of five for every 1,000 men, in some engagements the Russians actually achieved ratios of six for every 1,000 men.

CAVALRY

Russia's cavalry force formed a far greater percentage of the army than that of most European armies. Partly this is on account of the comparatively small cost of supporting a Russian cavalryman – the cost of maintaining a dragoon for a year was 35 roubles (12 for maintenance, 13 for clothing and ten for horse furniture); even with forage and rye-meal costs added this was an incredibly small sum when compared to the expenses of other armies. Thus it was in 1805 that the Russian cavalry force numbered some 3,316 men in the Guard, 49,738 in the line, and over 200,000 irregular cavalry.

On the accession of Catherine the Great, there were 52 regiments of cavalry, containing 256 squadrons, plus 38 regiments of regular or territorial Ukrainian cossacks. (There were also an assortment of irregular cavalry forces, from various
RUSSIAN LIGHT CAVALRY, 1805–07

(Left) NCO, White Russian Hussars, wearing the full dress of 1805. (2nd left) Officer, Pavlograd Hussars, 1807. He wears the officer's variant of the 1803 shako. (Right) Trooper, Soum Hussars, 1805–07. This cavalryman is seen in campaign dress, hence the shako has had its plume removed. (2nd right) Trumpeter, Lithuanian Uhlans, 1805. The red plume, 'swallow's nest' wings and lace distinguished the man as a trumpeter. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
During the first two years of her reign, Catherine set about reforming the cavalry alongside the rest of her army. In 1763, she introduced carabiniers into her mounted army, doing so by converting five dragoon and six horse grenadier regiments. The dragoons received new units to make up for the losses; using troops principally from the Ukraine, the number of dragoon regiments climbed to 23. Catherine also formed 11 new hussar and four new Uhlan lancer regiments through converting the five ‘town Cossack’ regiments (also called the Cherkassy or Dnieper Cossacks) and all 12 regiments of hussars. Three privately commanded cavalry regiments under the Hetman of the Ukraine Cossacks also became official Russian formations.

The composition of the regiments changed slightly with the reforms. All heavy cavalry and dragoon regiments had five squadrons apiece, and the light cavalry had five squadrons. Each squadron was divided into a company or ‘half-squadron’. Excluding irregular militia forces, Catherine’s reforms created a regular cavalry force of 60 regiments totalling 311 squadrons and 50,000 soldiers. Nor did she rest there. From 1775 the strength of guard cavalry regiments was increased to six squadrons, and dragoons to ten squadrons. Cossack regiments had eight sotni (independent squadrons).

Catherine’s reign took her into the Napoleonic era, although during the early 1790s there was a slight contracting in the number of cavalry regiments,
ASSORTED RUSSIAN CAVALRY, 1805

(Centre) Trooper, Chevalier-Guard. Under the reign of Alexander the Chevalier-Guard had the same uniform as line cuirassiers, but with petlitzi lace and ‘Guard star’ device. (Right) NCO, Little Russia cuirassiers. This NCO wears the typical cuirassier uniform of the time. (Left) Officer, Smolensk Dragoons, wearing the 1803-pattern dragoon uniform, including a double-breasted jacket with standing collar. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
RUSSIA
despite the growing tensions within Western Europe. In 1790 the establishment of 50 cavalry regiments ran as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regiment</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horse Guards</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Grenadiers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse-Eger</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragoons</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuirassiers</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabiniers</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hussars</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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The immersion in war during the first decade of the 19th century, however, once more resulted in an aggrandized cavalry arm. In 1811 there was a total of 70 regiments of regular cavalry numbering 440 squadrons, of which 359 were field formation squadrons operating 49,000 horse. (Eighty-one squadrons acted as depot squadrons.) The regiments consisted of six guard regiments (Gentlemen of the Guard; Horse Guards; Hussars; Dragoons; Lancers; Cossacks) and 64 line cavalry regiments (11 hussar regiments; 36 dragoon; 8 cuirassier; 5 lancer; 4 Ukrainian Cossack). Furthermore, if push came to shove the Russians could generate another 100,000 cavalry from the Cossack hosts – at least 82 regiments from the Don, 15 from the Ukraine and 10 from the Black Sea alone.

It was this huge force that became so critical in the war of 1812. Although the cavalry suffered vast losses alongside the Russian infantry, it more than compensated in the horrors it visited on the French Army on its retreat from Moscow. The Cossacks in particular gained a reputation for opportunistic Cossacks training, trying to spear the ring with their lances. Unfortunately, there is no known Cossack drill book for the Napoleonic times. Certainly Paul I’s regulations for cavalry do not mention them, although as we can see from this print the Cossacks did practise with a lance.

(Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library)
brutality, their raiding tactics chipping away constantly at the French manpower, and ensnaring many a man who wandered away from the main column in search of food.

The cavalry was subsequently reorganized at the end of the 1812 campaign, each branch being mustered in divisions. Including the Guard Cuirassiers, there were three cuirassier divisions, two of chasseurs, three of hussars and three of lancers. Each division consisted of two brigades, each having two regiments. The Guard Cavalry (excluding the Guard Cuirassiers) formed a separate division.

At this time, the theoretical strength of a cavalry regiment was seven squadrons of 208 men and 179 horses, the 7th squadron acting as a reserve for the others, but despite having received 14,000 reinforcements, most regiments consisted of only two to four squadrons of 120 horses, although of the best quality, well trained and with good kit. Together with the sabre, the dragoons and chasseurs were armed with muskets, the cuirassiers, hussars and lancers with pistols and 16 men per squadron were armed with short carbines so that they could be used as flankers or skirmishers.

Cavalry types

As we have seen, the Russian cavalry was divided along the similar ‘light’ and ‘heavy’ cavalry types of most armies of the period. The cuirassiers were heavy cavalry, the Russian Army’s ‘shock troops’, with each regiment comprised of five field squadrons. At the end of Paul’s reign in 1801 there were 13 cuirassier regiments. Tsar Paul also presided over 11 dragoon regiments; each regiment was also built around five field squadrons, although the staff composition within was somewhat different to that of the cuirassiers. At the time of Paul’s accession in 1796 there was only one regiment of hussars, but the Tsar took this figure up to one line and eight Guard regiments during his reign, and another two were added in 1803. Hussar regiments featured ten field squadrons. In 1803 the existing light horse regiments (Polish and Lithuanian Tartars) were converted to lancers, the latter being divided into regiments of Lithuanian Horse and Tartar Horse, each of five squadrons; the Polish regiment remained at ten squadrons. After 1803 many more regiments were converted to lancers.

In terms of Mounted Jagers (chasseurs), this form of cavalry was disbanded by Paul, but reintroduced on 10 November 1812 through the conversion of eight dragoon regiments, each regiment to have six field and one depot squadron. Upon his accession Paul also formed his own bodyguard squadron, the Lifeguard. After once disbanding it, he re-created the unit in 1799, and enlarged it in March 1800 to three squadrons. From that date the Chevalier-Guard of his mother ceased to be the ceremonial bodyguard and became an active cuirassier regiment. The Lifeguard cavalry went through numerous
COSSACK ARTILLERY

This example shows the Cossack wearing the summer or short jacket or coat worn between 1 May and 31 August by all Cossacks. The equipment used by a gun crew is (1) linstock, (2) powder scoop, (3) worm screw, (4) sponge and rammer, (5) priming wire, (6) portfire case (this held the match used to ignite the fuse or firing tube), (7) a tube pouch, (8) leather pouch for holding the charges, (9) canister round, and (10) round shot.

(Adam Hook © Osprey Publishing)
A detachment of soldiers under Cossack attack. Irregular Russian cavalry were a constant irritation to the French, attacking detachments and disrupting supplies. They made the scavenging of food and supplies from outlying areas a particularly perilous business. (Collection Alfred and Roland Umhey)

structural mutations during the Napoleonic period, but on a regimental level each regiment was organized into five squadrons.

The irregular cavalry formations that accompanied the Russian army – Cossacks, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, Tartars etc. – were somewhat controversial. German eyewitnesses describe them as well-mounted and armed but undisciplined; incapable of carrying out an orderly attack on formed troops, lacking proper military training, and unreliable as scouts. In 1802 a report stated that the total number of Cossacks on active service was estimated to be around 100,000, or 22.62 per cent of the entire Russian Army. In theory a Cossack regiment mustered between 500 and 1,000 men depending on the Host the regiment was raised in. However, during the campaigns of 1812–14 the regiments usually mustered between 80 to 120 men, with the strongest mustering just 320 lances, the rest having become casualties or being used for escort duties or guarding prisoners.

These regiments or Pulks were commanded by a voskovois ataman or Poloniski and were divided into between five and ten squadrons or sotnias of 100 men armed with lances. Each squadron was commanded by an esaul or captain, a sotnik or senior officer (for example, lieutenant), a cornet, who carried the colours and two or three charungii or junior officers. To help them were ten uradnik or NCOs, all of whom were armed only with a sword. Each Cossack regiment usually had ten tirailleurs in each squadron, whose role it was to skirmish with the enemy. There were no trumpeters in a Cossack regiment.

Cossacks hailed from a variety of Russian regions, each making its own military contribution and adding its own distinctive characters. Looking at the Don Cossacks, for example, in 1802 there were 14,313, including 77 Kalmucks (a race of Mongols who had settled between the Urals and Volga and their
ancestors had ridden with Genghis Khan), serving in the Host’s regiments, of whom 466 men were allocated to the two companies of artillery and those on home service mustered 2,044, a total of 16,357 men. Besides these regiments a large detachment of Don Cossacks formed the Lifeguard Cossack regiment, which consisted of three squadrons. Unlike the other Cossack Hosts who numbered their regiments, the regiments of the Don were known by the name of their commanding officers, and at least four regiments, and probably a great many more, could trace their history back to 1570 when the Don Cossack Host was officially established.

Like their Russian counterparts, the Cossacks answered the call to arms in July 1812, and although there were some Opolchenie regiments designated as Cossacks, these were nothing more than irregular militia regiments. There were 26 Don Cossack regiments which joined Kutuzov at Tarintino, 22 of which were Opolchenie regiments (raised during the war of 1812 for the defence of Russia), a total of 12,695 men, of whom 8,752 were volunteers, and the remaining 3,943 were serving Cossacks used as a nucleus for each regiment.

The Black Sea Cossacks, by contrast, believed they were better than the Don Cossacks. They had a saying: ‘A Cossack from the Black Sea is equal to three Cossacks of the Don.’ As the Zaporogi Cossacks, they had been forcibly removed from their homeland for showing disloyalty to the Russian crown and so they hated the Russians and chose to be known by Polish names. However, after that, they distinguished themselves fighting for Russia, though a proportion of these Cossacks emigrated to Turkey, settling on the Danube, where they were known as the Cossacks of Nekrassa and fought with the Turkish Army against Russia.

The 1802 census of the Black Sea or Chernomorski Cossacks found that there was a total of 32,657 people living in 40 Stanitza or large Cossack villages. They were formed into 10 regiments of horse and ten regiments of infantry, each consisting of: 483 Cossacks, 1 clerk, 11 quartermasters, 5 standard-bearers, 5 sotniks, 5 regimental esauls and 1 colonel, totalling 511.

In addition to these regiments there was also a detachment of artillery mustering 20 3pdr guns manned by 159 cannoniers and even a small navy made up of rowing vessels manned by 406 Cossacks. Other Cossack bands include those of the Churguevski, Orenburg, Caucasus and Asiatic bands.

Although the Cossacks were particularly renowned for their savage form of attritional warfare, the entire Russian Army was treated with respect by their opponents, if not for their battlefield tactics then at least for the ferocity with which they fought.
OVERVIEW

The Prussian Army of the Napoleonic Wars was the direct descendant of Frederick the Great's. Perhaps no army has been so undeservedly maligned throughout history, and one is often required to examine the motives and perspectives of the authors of these attacks.

The Prussian cavalry, for example, was considered by many to be the best in Europe. Certainly their mounts were of the highest quality, and the troopers were brave and skilled in personal combat. If they lacked anything, it was the ability to coordinate multiple squadron charges efficiently. The infantry, which had won such high renown during Frederick's early campaigns, retained the impressive level of fire discipline of their forebears. These battalions could pour out a devastating level of fire, and maintain this pace until their ammunition ran out. This meant that when the French met the Prussians in a stand-up firefight, as history would verify, huge casualties could be expected for both sides.

The catastrophic defeats at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 had focused attention on the need to continue a painful process of reform through to its end. One of the stipulations of the peace treaty between Prussia and France after the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 was that the size of the Prussian Army be restricted to 42,000 men – in 1806, the Prussian Army had numbered over 200,000 men. Mainly because of a general lack of funds at this time and partly as an attempt to overcome these restrictions, Prussia had developed the so-called Krümper System. (Krümper has a complicated etymology which literally means ‘shrinkers’: early thought had been that in times of war they would replace losses and as such prevent the units’ strength from shrinking.) Under this system, new recruits were brought into the army, replacing trained soldiers. The latter were placed on furlough, with the new recruits then being trained in their place. By this method, a reserve of trained soldiers was established. These, together with the regular army, formed the core around which the national uprising of 1813 occurred. This core consisted of 33,000 infantry of relatively high quality, 12,000 well-trained cavalry and 6,000 gunners, as well
as various fortress garrisons and engineer units. The total of 56,000 men was the nucleus around which the Prussian Army of 1813 expanded to meet this national emergency.

By calling up the reserves established through the Krumper System, a further 41,600 men were available to form 52 reserve battalions of infantry. Experienced officers who had been placed on half-pay in 1807 led these battalions. Volunteers from the middle classes who provided their own uniforms and equipment, along with so-called National Cavalry Regiments and Freikorps then augmented the army. A militia (Landwehr) was called into being by a Royal Decree of 17 March

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A GROUP OF SOLDIERS OF THE FUSILIER BATTALION OF THE COLBERG INFANTRY REGIMENT ON SHOOTING EXERCISE, SUMMER 1811

On 1 December 1809, the light battalions of the infantry regiments were renamed fusilier battalions. In 1811 the battalion received Prussian M1809 muskets. In this illustration, the Unteroffizier has put his rifled sharpshooter musket M1787 on the ground and has taken the musket of one of the men, explaining why it has misfired. (Steve Noon © Osprey Publishing)
1813. This militia did not start to play an effective role in the hostilities until the autumn of 1813, when those Prussian formations ready to take the field included Yorck's Corps (19 battalions, 16 squadrons, 9 batteries, 3 sapper coys, 19,850 men, 72 guns), Bülow's Reserve Corps (11 battalions, 8 squadrons, 3 batteries, 10,600 men, 24 guns), Borstell's Pomeranian Brigade (4 battalions, 6 squadrons, 2 batteries, 1/2 sapper coy, 4,500 men, 16 guns), Blücher's Corps (The Royal Guard and those parts of the Brandenburg and Silesian Brigades that had not formed part of the Auxiliary Corps of 1812, 21 3/4 battalions, 42 squadrons, 12 1/2 batteries, 1 sapper company, 28,300 men, 100 guns) and

**PRUSSIAN STAFF**

(Left) Flugel-Adjutant of cavalry, 1790s. This officer is wearing campaign dress, and this pattern of hat was introduced in 1787 and worn until 1798. (Centre) Generalleutnant of cavalry, 1790s. The general is also in campaign dress, his Prussian blue frock coat faced with red on the collar and Brandenburg cuffs. (Right) Feldjäger courier, 1790s. This uniform was introduced in 1787 and worn until 1798. The black tricorn hat has a black cockade, a brass clasp, and – hidden here – black and white pull cords. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Lützow’s Freikorps (1 battalion, 2 squadrons). By the end of March 1813, the field army consisted of around 65,000 men and 212 guns.

Besides the field army there were a number of second-line formations with a total strength of 47,000 men and 60 guns. Of these, 15,000 men with 24 guns under Generals Tauentzien and Schuler were besieging Stettin and Glogau. The remainder joined the field army during the spring of 1813. Furthermore, there were 23,000 third-line troops in the fortresses and depots. Their mobilization was completed during the Spring Campaign. In total the Prussian Army raised around 135,000 men and 272 guns that fateful spring.

Following the post-Jena reforms, a Prussian infantry regiment consisted of three battalions – two of musketeers (line infantry) and one of fusiliers (light infantry). The two companies of grenadiers were amalgamated with those of another regiment to form an independent grenadier battalion. The theoretical strength of a battalion was around 800 men, and the preferred battlefield formation was the column by the centre with the men of the third rank providing the skirmish element. At brigade level, the fusilier battalions provided the skirmish element, a Prussian brigade being the equivalent of a division in most other armies.

The cavalry consisted of heavy cavalry (cuirassiers), medium cavalry (dragoons) and light cavalry divided into hussars and lance-armed Uhlans. Unlike particularly the French cuirassiers, the Prussian heavies did not wear body armour. They were armed with a straight sword, as were the dragoons, while the hussars carried the traditional, slashing curved sabre. All troopers carried a brace of pistols and a number of men were armed with carbines to be used in skirmishing and when on picket duty. Each regiment consisted of four squadrons.

The Prussian artillery was organized into batteries of eight pieces, normally six cannon and two howitzers. The foot artillery consisted of heavy, 12pdr cannon and 10pdr howitzers, and light, 6pdr cannon with 7pdr howitzers. The horse artillery used the lighter pieces.

Although, as we have noted, the Prussian military reputation has not been favourable, there is no doubt that this massive body of men had a salient impact on the balance of power in the Napoleonic Wars.
included the critical effect of 50,000 Prussian soldiers at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, where they were essential in the final crushing of Napoleon's ambitions.

JENA CAMPAIGN

OPPOSITE
Frederick William III, King of Prussia. Indecisive and undistinguished, he doomed his country to eventual disaster by declining to join Austria, Russia and Britain in the War of the Third Coalition in 1805. When he finally confronted France in 1806, he did so before the Russian armies could participate in the opening campaign. Even in the wake of the disastrous retreat from Moscow, Frederick William hesitated to throw in his lot with Russia until domestic political pressure and increasingly strident calls from the army obliged him to join the Sixth Coalition in 1813. (Getty Images)
INFANTRY

Each Prussian infantry regiment consisted of two musketeer and one fusilier battalion of four companies each. There were two grenadier companies. The Garde-Regiment zu Fuß (Guard Foot Regiment) did not have any grenadiers, but the Leib-Infanterie-Regiment had one complete Grenadier battalion of four companies instead, named Leib-Grenadier-Bataillon. The denomination 'Fusilier-Bataillon' replaced the name 'Leichtes Bataillon' (light battalion) following an AKO of 1 December 1809.

The musketeer companies in each regiment were numbered from 1 to 8, while the fusilier companies were numbered separately from 1 to 4: in 1815, they received the numbers 9 to 12 instead. The grenadier companies of the two regiments from a province were permanently grouped together in one battalion under a single commander. The six battalions of the Prussian army were named I. Ostpreußisches Grenadier-Bataillon (from the 1st and 2nd East Prussian regiments), Pommersches Grenadier-Bataillon, II. Ostpreußisches Grenadier-Bataillon (from the 3rd and 4th East Prussian regiments), Westpreußisches Grenadier-Bataillon, Leib-Grenadier-Bataillon and Schlesisches Grenadier-Bataillon.

On 14 and 19 October 1814 the six grenadier battalions were separated from their regiments and formed into two independent grenadier regiments. The Russian Tzar and the Austrian Emperor were invited to be the Regiments-Chefs of these regiments and the new units became Grenadier-Regiment Kaiser Alexander and Grenadier-Regiment Kaiser Franz.

In early 1813, 52 new reserve and depot battalions were formed and were (at least technically) attached to the existing 12 regiments. These battalions changed their designation several times, and tracing their development is beyond the scope of this book. Each regiment had a garrison company too, which was filled with those soldiers who were no longer fit for field service.

All infantry recruits received the training in drill, etiquette and operating procedures common to infantry the world over, but great importance was also given to the training of skirmishers. The third rank of all companies was used for skirmishing, and in the fusilier battalions, all three ranks were used for this purpose. Field service was practised every year in autumn manoeuvres.

PRUSSIAN STAFF AT LIGNY, BELGIUM, 16 JUNE 1815 (opposite)

(Left) Stabskapitan (Staff Captain) Stoch, an officer of the General Staff. On campaign, the black felt bicorn hat was normally covered with an oilskin to protect it from the elements. (Centre) Generalleutnant von Gneisenau. By now, generals of all ranks wore the same uniform distinctions: a blue coatee with gold buttons, the poppy-red collar and cuffs edged with narrow double gold braid and with inner borders of foliate lace. (Right) Cavalry ADC. The white uniform typical of cavalry ADCs was based upon the uniform of the cuirassiers. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
After the wars, Max von Busse, an officer in the 11th Reserve Infantry Regiment, summed up his experiences of training recruits in wartime as follows:

The recruits will receive their muskets on the first day of training, ready to start immediately with the first movements of charging arms. These will be continued in the following days, and, being the main focus of exercise, will be continued daily, so that after 14 days they can move on to firing, first with blanks, and then at a practice target. Instruction in other movements will have but little time devoted, and should be left completely until the men are sure in the movements of charging their arms. Instruction in skirmishing, including the signals, and the details of daily service will also start on the first day, to be followed within the first eight days by instruction in field service. Training in marching, including the movements, is to be used only for variety and should not have much time invested in it; the time spent on their way to the army shall be used for this instruction.
When the recruits, who have been trained in such a hasty manner, are integrated into the rank and file, they should be placed in the middle files of the Sektionen, regardless of their height, and the flank files of the Sektionen and Züge should be filled with men who have served for a longer time.

Prussian infantry in battle

The most important procedure for the Prussian infantryman before battle, and indeed any infantryman the world over at this time, was to inspect the musket and check it was working, to put a new flint in the cock and make the cartridges ready. The cartridges were transported in paper packages of 20 each (in three rows, of seven, six and seven). They were untied just before they were needed, as, due to the constant shaking caused by the soldier's movements, single cartridges in the cartridge box would lose part of their powder in the course of time. If available, bandages and linen for first aid were distributed to the men. Some of the men would throw them away, possibly in the hope that if they did not think about being hit, they would escape.
On 27 September 1812 Karl Renner, musketeer in the 1st Battalion, 2nd West Prussian Infantry Regiment, saw combat for the first time:

About a quarter of a mile south of Eckau our infantry formed up behind a small piece of rising ground. When this had been done, we put the muskets together and we were allowed to rest a while, as we had been marching all the night until then, shortly before noon. In front of our battalion, on the rising ground a battery had unlimbered. In order to watch the deployment of the enemy, many curious soldiers ran to the top of this rising ground, I among them. We had been looking for only a few minutes, when we saw in the distance some smoke rise up, and almost at the same moment a cannon ball passed above us with a loud buzzing. Our artillery, which had been waiting ready for action on this rising ground (which we immediately vacated), replied to the kind invitation of the enemy. The command ‘Gewehr in die Hand!’ [Take up arms!] was given. ... But the enemy cannon continued as before, starting to bring death and destruction among us, which caused fear and terror among the young soldiers, who tried to escape the imminent danger by ducking down. As soon as our brave battalion commander, Major von Löbell (now [in 1829] General-Major), saw this, he coolly rode up and down our front, as if on the parade ground. Several other officers showed the same calmness and fearlessness, especially our brave company commander, Kapitain von Rohr (now Oberst and commander of the 26. Infanterie-Regiment), and the adjutant of our battalion, Lieutenant

French and Prussian infantry contesting possession of the cemetery at Grossbeeren, 23 August 1813. General Reynier, with a corps of 27,000 men, advanced against the flank of the Prussian main body, seizing the village of Grossbeeren and the heights behind it by late afternoon. The tide soon turned, however, when Bulow arrived with 38,000 troops, smashing through the Saxon contingent to recapture the village and obliging Reynier to withdraw after a failed counterattack. (AKG Berlin)
von Legat (now Oberst in the Ministry of War). This display made us so proud that nobody thought any more of ducking, even though the buzzing of the balls became more and more intense.

We had stood there a few minutes, and the command was shouted 'Tirailleure vor!' [Skirmishers advance!] The bugler blew for the first section to deploy as skirmishers. In front of us there was a thicket of birch and alder trees, encircled by a shallow and dry ditch with a thin fence, which we used for cover. We had just arrived at this place, when the enemy bullets began whizzing above us in massed volleys, and here and there one of them punched through the tiny fence, oblivious to the fact that it was our sole protection. We couldn’t not respond to the enemy, so we sent bullets back to them, but were not able to make out if a few of them achieved their aim. The enemy skirmishers who were hidden in the undergrowth were most discontent with our counter-greeting, they came out of the forest, shouting ‘Hurrah!’, and in a number so superior to ours that they forced us to leave our position. The retreat was performed with the greatest precision, and as only a few were wounded, the whole affair seemed to have been but an exercise on the parade ground. Now, in our first engagement, we had convinced ourselves that the banging and whizzing of bullets would not bear inevitable death, but that above us, in front of us, at our sides and behind us there was plenty of space to cause them to miss us.

The most important means of transferring orders on the battlefield was the voice of the commanding officer. It was important that he could speak loudly and clearly enough to be understood with ease, and that he was calm, to breed confidence in his men. Usually the men could recognise and distinguish the voice of their commanding officer. If they did not, the results could be fatal.

FUSILIER OF THE LEICHTES BATAILLON (opposite)

(Light Battalion) of the Colbergsches Infanterie-Regiment (Colberg Infantry Regiment), December 1808. An AKO of 23 October 1808 introduced new uniforms for the whole army, but due to the financial exhaustion of the state the changes could not be immediately implemented and many old uniforms and equipment or parts of it continued to be worn for some time. As a first step, on 6 August 1808 the king ordered that all the light battalions of the infantry regiments should receive the regular blue uniforms by 1 June 1809. The soldier we see here still wears the basic uniform of the Fusilier-Bataillon von Möller. The felt shako still bears the eagle, the emblem of the Fusiliere of the old army, of which they were particularly proud. It was replaced by the above-mentioned AKO of 23 October 1808 with the cockade with a white woollen clasp. This was not popular with many Fusiliere, but the King’s will had to be obeyed. The former coloured pompon has already been replaced by the black and white national pompon. Kit and equipment: (1) Infantry musket M 1780/87. (2) Fusilier musket M 1787. (3) Rifled sharpshooter musket M 1787. (4) New Prussian musket M 1809. (5) ‘Old Prussian’ sabre M 1715. (6) Fusilier sabre M 1787. (7) New Prussian sabre M 1816. (8) Sabre belt for grenadier and musketeer. (9) Sabre belt for fusilier. (Steve Noon © Osprey Publishing)
During skirmishing, when the men were too widely spread out to be commanded by voice, the bugle was used for giving commands. The 1812 regulation prescribed short signals for each different part of the battalion (deployed skirmishers, supporting troops, each of the four companies and the whole battalion) which were to be combined with signals for all the basic movements, e.g. ‘skirmishers – cease fire’ or ‘3rd Company – deploy as skirmishers’. One should add that most soldiers would follow what the majority of their comrades did, if they realised that they had not heard the command.

Moving from personal combat to overall tactics, the Prussian Army is notable for its use of a new set of drill regulations, the *Exerzir-Reglement fur die Artillerie der Koniglich Preussischen Armee* (Drill Regulations for the Artillery of the Royal Prussian Army) of 1812. One unique feature of this document was the section on the use of the combined arms, and it is worth some consideration here to show how the infantry connected in battle with the other arms of service. As the lack of coordination of the arms in combat was one of the major causes of defeat in 1806, this Instruction can be regarded as the most significant of the reforms achieved. The origin of this part of the Reglement goes back to an Instruction on the use of the brigade in combat written by Frederick William III in 1809.

The Reglement specified brigade formations for normal use, for the advance to contact, for the bayonet charge and for defence against cavalry.

Restoring Order

In the action at Zahna on 5 September 1813, the 1st battalion of the 3rd Reserve Infantry Regiment had to retreat in line for a short distance, being pressed from behind by enemy skirmishers. Several soldiers broke rank and started running. The battalion’s commander, Major von Welling, realized such an example could spell danger for the inexperienced men of his battalion. He ordered the battalion to make front towards the enemy again (an orderly retreat was usually done by ordering a ‘turn about’) and had a battalion volley fired. The enemy stopped their pursuit, and Major von Welling explained to his men that they were retreating and not fleeing, and that he would shoot the next man to leave his rank through the head. He pulled out his pistol and ordered ‘turn about’ and ‘march’. The enemy pressed on, one musketeer broke ranks and was shot by von Welling. This had the desired effect, and the battalion slowly continued on its retreat without any more disorder arising. Major von Welling was entitled to do so by paragraph 16 of the Articles of War: ‘The soldier who first takes to flight in the face of the enemy, under any circumstances whatsoever, may be shot directly. The same punishment will befall him later, if it cannot be done at once.’
Normally, the brigade’s infantry would be drawn up in three lines. The front line would consist of its two fusilier battalions, which would be used to form the skirmish line. Three musketeer battalions stood 150 paces behind them, ready to attack or defend. The final line consisted of the grenadier battalion formed from the grenadier companies of the four musketeer battalions, and the brigade’s senior musketeer battalion, the first of the first regiment. The foot battery would be drawn up to the rear of the infantry, the three cavalry regiments and horse artillery to their rear. If necessary, a light cavalry regiment could support the fusiliers. The foot artillery was generally deployed with a half-battery on each flank.

Depending on the terrain and circumstances, either the fusiliers or the cavalry would start the attack. Certainly, one cavalry regiment was designated to cover each flank of the brigade. They would form up in columns by troops (Züge). The fusiliers would form a skirmish line to commence the attack. If no fusiliers were available, then the third rank of the musketeer battalions would perform this service. If the skirmish line ran low on ammunition, it would be replaced by fresh
troops. Next, the three musketeer battalions in the first line would advance while the fusiliers fell back, forming a column on each flank of the second line. The brigade general would then decide if he would use the fusiliers at the same time as the reserve or if he would pull them back to use as a new reserve. He also decided whether to form columns or lines. The column was always used when withdrawing, to facilitate the speedy formation of closed squares should enemy cavalry attack. If the fusiliers were not able to force the enemy to withdraw, the first line would prepare for the bayonet attack. Its third rank would deploy as skirmishers, while the fusiliers fell back to the second line, forming columns. The artillery would be used as needed.
For defence against cavalry, the battalions would form closed squares from column in a chequer-board formation, at 100-pace intervals, to deliver mutual covering fire. The cavalry would move around the infantry to engage the enemy cavalry. They would do this only after the enemy cavalry had engaged the squares and had their formation disrupted. The cavalry attacked by squadron. Again, the artillery was used when and where it could be of greatest effect.

The new brigades were heavily involved in the fighting of spring 1813. Some errors were made, and in his Instruction of 10 August 1813 Frederick William pointed out the lessons to be learned. He complained about the failure to coordinate the three arms properly, particularly that the cavalry tended to be used to open the fight, when that was the role of the infantry. The French, he noted, made better use of their infantry, deploying it well in broken terrain. He also complained that the artillery was being used too early, so he suggested dividing it into three sections. The smaller was to be used to open the fight, the larger part to support the main attack while the rest were to be held in reserve. He pointed out that the cavalry must not be used too early, but rather in mass at the right time. The horse artillery should be used to disrupt the enemy’s formation before the cavalry attacked.

A large number of rifle-armed volunteers had joined the army in 1813; Frederick William recommended that they be used in defensive positions in woods, or behind other cover, to take full advantage of the ballistic superiority of their weapons. In feint attacks, the artillery should be spread out to give the impression of larger numbers. In real attacks, it needed to be concentrated to give strong supporting fire at the appropriate point.

Frederick William’s Instruction also outlined how a corps of four brigades was to be used. A skirmish line formed from several battalions would tease one of the enemy’s flanks, and artillery would support this feint. Once the enemy sent in reserves to support the point attacked, the main attack would commence using the main mass of infantry and artillery, supported if possible by a flanking attack elsewhere. The corps artillery would be formed into a grand battery. One brigade supported by 12 to 20 guns would undertake the feint; two brigades with 40 guns would stage the main attack, while the final brigade with 40 guns would form the reserve. The cavalry would be held in

Prussian infantrymen resting on the march, between 1810 and 1813, in a contemporary print by Ludwig Wolf. They have found some straw to lie on: in the background one man seems to have made a fire. Note the stuffed backpack of the man sitting in the front. (Kupferstichkabinett Berlin)
reserve until the appropriate time. The feint would last about one hour. The main attack, preferably a flanking move, would then follow. If the enemy was holding a village or wood, howitzer fire was to be used to force them to retire. The main attack was to be made at bayonet point. If the enemy wavered, the attack would be pressed home; if he resisted, reserves were to be brought up.

The expansion of the army in 1813 and the inclusion of the reserve and militia battalions led to brigades being of different sizes. The general principles of the brigade tactics outlined above were retained – a skirmish line, the main body and a reserve – but alterations were made to the numbers of battalions...
in each wave. In 1813, some brigades were internally divided into two elements, also confusingly called ‘brigades’ – one of regulars and reserves, one of militia. A so-called brigade commander (Brigade-Commandeur) would lead the militia brigade, while the brigade general (Brigade-Chef) would command the whole formation. In 1815, the nine battalions of the brigade also fought in three waves. The first consisted of two light battalions (from the line regiments), the second of four musketeer battalions, the third of one light and two musketeer battalions.

This section of the 1812 Reglement shows very clearly that the Prussian General Staff had learned the lessons of Napoleonic warfare. Taken as a whole, this Reglement represents the epitome of Napoleonic tactics and grand tactics.

ARTILLERY

In 1787 the Prussian Field Artillery Corps went through a major shake-up, just prior to the era of the Revolutionary Wars. All four regiments were brought to the same establishment of 53 officers, 40 sergeants, 100 corporals, 220 bombardiers, 1,600 gunners, 10 surgeons, 8 oboists and 10 drummers (11 in the 3rd and 4th Regiments). The Horse Artillery was amalgamated into three companies, with a total of 16 officers, 12 sergeants, 30 corporals, 66 bombardiers, 480 gunners...
and 3 surgeons. The Pontonier Corps was attached to the artillery, and in 1787 consisted of 4 officers, 6 NCOs and 48 men. In time of war their numbers were increased. In 1790 a total of 153 pontoons were available along with a number of bridging trains.

The equipment of the artillery was also reorganized in 1787. The light 12pdrs were recast as heavy 6pdrs, and the howitzers were withdrawn from the battalion guns, i.e. the artillery elements attached directly to infantry units. The all-howitzer batteries were disbanded, and all howitzers were transferred to the gun batteries: the number of pieces per battery was reduced from ten to

PRUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AIDES, 1812–13

(Left) Infantry ADC, parade dress, 1813. This captain's uniform is typical of the latter part of the Napoleonic Wars. (Centre) Cavalry ADC, campaign dress, 1813. Also a captain, this officer wears the less elaborate field dress with a covered bicorn. The single-breasted undress coatee has gold buttons. (Right) Sergeant of Feldjagers, campaign dress, 1812–15. The staff couriers or guides adopted the new style of uniforms along with the rest of the army in 1808, but still kept their traditional huntsman's green. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
eight, comprising six cannon and two howitzers. In the same year, it was planned to maintain a strength of 66 batteries. These were to include six ‘bombardment batteries’ each of six heavy 12pdr and two heavy 10pdr howitzers; 22 ‘normal’ 12pdr batteries, each of six medium 12pdr and two light 10pdr howitzers; 16 heavy 6pdr batteries, each of six heavy 6pdr and two light 10pdr howitzers; 16 light 6pdr batteries, each of six light 6pdr and two 7pdr howitzers; and six horse brigades, each of eight light 6pdr and one light 7pdr howitzer, the latter being introduced in 1790. Attached to the infantry were 188 6pdr and 132 3pdr battalion guns with the line infantry;

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Men of the Fusilier Battalion of the 21st Infantry Regiment during the storming of Medy-bas, 15 September 1815. This illustration shows what were probably some of the last shots fired in the Napoleonic Wars. The town in the valley at the foot of the fortress Montmedy was stormed by 400 men of the 21st Infantry Regiment and 100 infantrymen from Sachsen-Weimar in the early morning hours of 15 September. (Steve Noon © Osprey Publishing)
20 light 3pdrs with the fusiliers (light infantry); and 46 reserve guns. The field artillery reserves in the depots amounted to 894 pieces. In 1788, including fortress and siege artillery, the Prussians had 6,409 pieces at their disposal. In 1790, two batteries each of eight light 10pdr mortars were added to this complex total.

An Order-in-Cabinet of 1 October 1791 decided the artillery was a bit heavy, and reduced the number of batteries to 60. These were ten batteries of medium 12pdrs, 16 of heavy 6pdrs, and ten of light 6pdrs in the line; six batteries of light 6pdrs in the horse artillery; four 'bombardment batteries', four batteries of medium 12pdrs, four of heavy 6pdrs, four of light 6pdrs, two of 10pdr mortars, and ten 3pdr cannons in the artillery reserve. The number of guns available for use in the field totalled 162 3pdrs, 320 light 6pdrs, 120 heavy 6pdrs, 84 normal 12pdrs, 24 bombardment pieces, 34 7pdr howitzers, 76 10pdr howitzers, and 16 10pdr mortars. This gave a total of 836 pieces. The batteries were numbered consecutively, i.e. 6pdr Heavy Batteries Nos. 1 to 20; Horse Batteries Nos. 1 to 6; Bombardment Batteries Nos. 1 to 4, etc. There were also 13 Garrison Artillery Companies in the fortresses.

The size of the artillery and engineer corps following the Convention of Paris of 1808 was set at 6,000 men. Three artillery brigades were formed, each consisting of three horse and 12 foot companies; these were the 1st or Prussian, 2nd or Brandenburg and 3rd or Silesian Artillery Brigades. The artillery companies were designated 'batteries' only when serving their pieces. An artisan company was attached to each artillery brigade.

In time of war, a 6pdr foot battery was attached to each of the brigades of all arms, while each army corps had an artillery reserve of one 6pdr and one 12pdr battery. Each battery consisted of six cannon and two howitzers; the 6pdr batteries had 7pdr howitzers, the 12pdr batteries 10pdr howitzers. The infantry battalions were no longer equipped with artillery pieces. Six horses were used to draw the 6pdr pieces, eight for the 12-pounders.

Much of Prussia's artillery was lost in the campaign of 1806. Great efforts were made to replace it in the ensuing years, and by the autumn of 1812 a total of 1,659 pieces
OPPOSITE

Gunner, 1806. His uniform includes white hat trim; Prussian blue coatee with black facings and yellow buttons; red neck stock, white belts, waistcoat and breeches. Note the chained brass prickers attached to his cross belt; the sword's fist strap is shown as brown leather with a green knot. (Peter Hofschroer)

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PRUSSIAN GUN REPAIRS

(Top) The gunners use a gyn to resite the barrel of a 7pdr howitzer back onto its carriage. (Bottom) A gun wheel is being replaced by one from the nearby limber. In action, all these procedures had to be performed in lightning quick time to get the gun back into the ranks of fire. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Artillery uniforms

1792–1807
Foot artillery uniforms were similar to those of the infantry. From 1787, a Prussian blue frock coat was worn, with blue facings and yellow buttons. The waistcoat and breeches were white. The field artillery wore red neck stocks, the garrison artillery black. The headgear consisted of the newly introduced ‘casquette’ cocked hat, which bore a flaming grenade badge. The sidearm was the ‘Pallasch’ straight sword. Officers had laced coats; NCOs wore gold buttonhole lace; and drummers wore 22 bars of woollen lace, 16 of which terminated in tassels.

In 1798 the artillery was given its characteristic black facings, and at the same time a tricorn replaced the casquette. The officers’ facings were made of velvet; they had ten buttons on their lapels along with 18 bars of lace. The Feuerwerker had 12 narrower bars of lace; bombardiers had woollen lace, and sergeant’s lace had terminal tassels. In 1799, the eight Silesian garrison artillery companies replaced their black neck stocks with red, officers with white.

The horse artillery wore largely the same uniform, but with typical cavalry distinctions with regard to the hat, legwear and boots. Plumes could only be worn in the field. In 1801, dragoon-style coatees were introduced. The hat had a cockade and feather plume. Cavalry overalls were worn with hussar boots, and a short sword was carried on a dragoon belt. All the black facings were piped red. From 1802, officers’ hats lost their lace, but had a feather plume held in place with a cavalry clasp. NCOs wore gold lace on their collars, cuffs, shoulder straps and cartridge box belt; the Feuerwerker had a gold clasp on their hats. The blue saddlecloths were rectangular and edged in black, the black stripe being piped in yellow along both edges; The royal monogram was displayed in each corner. Greatcoat covers were blue.

1808–1815
Artillerymen wore the standard coatee of the period, officers the long-tailed coat. The foot artillery wore infantry-style clothing, the horse artillery that of the cavalry. The coatee was Prussian blue with red tail turn-backs for the foot artillery, black with poppy-red piping for the horse artillery. The collars were black piped poppy-red along the front and lower edge until 1815, when the new, lower collar was introduced; thereafter the piping ran along the top edge and front. The guard artillery had yellow guard lace on their collars and cuffs. Buttons were yellow. The Prussian Brigade had white shoulder straps, the Silesian yellow, the Brandenburg and the guard poppy-red. The guard and horse artillery had Swedish cuffs; the foot artillery had Brandenburg cuffs with a blue flap. Bombardiers had gold lace on their cuffs, sergeants on both their collars and cuffs. Musicians wore black ‘swallows’ nests’ on the shoulders of their coatees; the guard had yellow lace and
fringes on theirs, the line white lace alone. From 1809, the horse artillery was also permitted to wear the longer ‘Litewka’ coat. Officers had the usual officers’ distinctions as described earlier.

The shakos of the foot artillery were as for the infantry. Those of the horse artillery had brass chin scales (officers, a gilded chain), a black and white cockade (black and silver for officers), and a brass Guard Star for the other ranks of the guard artillery; officers of the guard artillery had a silver star with an enamelled badge. The other ranks of the line artillery had a brass grenade badge. Shako cords were yellow for the rankers, black and white for NCOs; in 1814 the guard received red cords. Officers could also wear a black cocked hat with a silver and black cockade for the horse artillery, and a plain gold cord clasp for the foot artillery. The horse artillery had a mixed black and white feather plume, the foot artillery black.

were available. This was more than adequate for an army restricted to 42,000 men, but additional pieces had to be obtained from elsewhere during the mobilisation of 1813. The equipment of one of the 11 horse batteries in March 1813 was from Britain; in the Autumn Campaign, four of the 30 foot batteries were using British guns, as was one of the 12 horse batteries. One of the six 12pdr batteries used captured French pieces. It is remarkable that a virtually bankrupt Prussia was able in such circumstances to supply much of its own artillery.

Artillery in action
By reducing the number of types of pieces used in the field from 1787, Frederick William II helped to make the artillery more efficient. However, the experience of the Revolutionary Wars, when the heavier French 8pdrs made an impression on Prussian gunners equipped with 6pdrs, focused attention on the issue of artillery calibres. The Duke of Brunswick and other senior officers saw the situation differently: they believed that it was not the calibres or even the numbers of cannon used that decided the issue, but rather their tactical handling. This view was supported by Major-General Georg Friedrich Ludwig von Tempelhoff, the most experienced artillery officer in the Prussian Army. He also called for the abolition of the battalion guns attached to each infantry unit, instead attaching a battery of artillery to each brigade of infantry.

Scharnhorst also supported changes in the use of artillery, calling for an increase in the number of horse batteries in a memorandum of September 1802. He wanted each of the planned 18 divisions to have a battery of 12pdrs and a horse battery attached to them. Furthermore, he called for six horse batteries to be allocated to the reserve cavalry, and for the formation of an artillery reserve of at least six batteries.

NEXT PAGES
Prussian 6pdr gun crew, 1790s. We look here at the period of the Revolutionary Wars, when greater wealth than was available after 1806 allowed the use of more elaborate uniforms. The crew depicted has only a sergeant and five men, instead of the regulation six or eight gunners, but this is quite enough to serve the piece – the full crew allowed for casualties and replacements. The gun is a brass 6pdr; originally the wooden parts were painted a dull matt mid-blue, but this has faded in prolonged field use – wet gunpowder slurry had the same effect as dirty grey paint. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
On the outbreak of war in 1806, much of the heavy artillery was not taken on campaign in an attempt to increase the mobility of the army. In the summer of 1806 it had been decided to replace 16 of the 12pdr batteries with 6pdrs; however, this decision was not implemented in time for the Jena campaign. The Prussian vanguard at the battle of Saalfeld had an artillery reserve, but its 12 guns were difficult to manœuvre and one of its batteries was captured. The increase in the size of the horse artillery recommended by Scharnhorst had taken place, and in 1805 it consisted a regiment of ten companies – one fifth of the total field artillery. This branch was also better trained, having more equipment available for that purpose in peacetime.

From 1796, each battery was divided into three divisions that were deployed 50–60 paces apart. One howitzer was placed on each flank; and each gun was placed 12 to 20 paces apart. Until it reached a distance of 800 paces from the enemy (effective canister range) the battery was to advance by division so that firing was uninterrupted. Fire was to be concentrated on the enemy’s infantry and cavalry; enemy artillery was to be engaged only if the fire could be effective.

Movement was made in a column of one, two or three divisions. Turning, wheeling or deploying in the direction of march were used to form line. The battery in line manoeuvred and made changes of front. Advancing and retiring was to be by division. The horse artillery practised moving at speed, unlimbering and limbering up quickly. The Prussian artillery at this time had a high esprit de corps and its tactical doctrine was good for the period.

As the field batteries kept the best men for themselves, only the battalion guns left something to be desired. Their gunners received only four to six weeks’ training every two years, which was hardly adequate. In the field they had problems keeping up with the advancing infantry, and were often unable to provide adequate fire support at the critical moment. The propensity to place the artillery on the nearest high point led to it firing over the heads of the enemy, especially at close range. When the elevation of the piece was lowered, the ball tended to land short and then bounce high over the enemy. Canister rounds spread their load over a wide area, but about half of the balls struck the ground in the first 50 paces, either burying themselves or bouncing over the heads of the enemy.

To sum up, in the early part of this period the Prussian Army benefited from a numerous, excellent and mobile horse artillery. The well-trained foot artillery was armed with heavy pieces that lacked mobility; however, the battalion artillery was poor. Furthermore, there was no large central artillery reserve that could be used to form grand batteries.

A new set of drill regulations was issued for the artillery in 1812 along with the rest of the army. These were based in part on earlier instructions; Major-General Prince August of Prussia (1779–1843) had a particular interest in the
artillery and influenced much of its training. This *Reglement* was divided into two main parts. The first covered the basic training of the artilleryman. The foot artillery was trained in the use of small arms, the horse artillery with swords and pistols and in the use of the horse. However, arms drill was reduced to a minimum, as the main role of the gunner was of course to serve artillery pieces.

The artillery was trained to form up in two ranks, the foot artillery 0.6m (2ft) apart, the horse artillery two paces, like the cavalry. When mounted the horse gunners formed in two ranks 0.6m (2ft) apart. They rode in files of four to facilitate turning. An ‘about face’ was always made with two left turns. Wheeling was done by troops in sections of twos and fours.

When formed in two ranks, the foot artillery companies stood with their NCOs at regular intervals two paces to the rear of the second rank. When two–five companies formed up together they were considered a battalion; six companies were divided into two battalions. These formations were used when on parade. The musicians stood behind the centre of the battalion, two paces behind the officers, with oboists to the right and drummers to the left. The trumpeters of the horse artillery drew up in two ranks four paces from the right flank of the line. The horse artillery normally paraded with its pieces.

A further section of the *Reglement* covered the use of siege and fortress artillery. The field pieces described above could be used in fortress warfare and were served as above, except that five men sufficed to crew them and two guns were placed under the command of a sergeant or bombardier. Six men served the heavy guns and seven the howitzers. Three men served the light mortars, at least one of whom had to be a bombardier. One Feuerwerker commanded two to three mortars, and a bombardier was responsible for weighing the charges in a powder chamber. The piece was laid with trail-spikes, the elevation set with the screw and checked with a gunner’s quadrant. The charge was poured into the barrel with a measurer and a gunner winched the round into place. The fuze was positioned, the muzzle covered, and the cover removed on the order: ‘Mortar – Fire!’ Five men served the heavy mortars. One Feuerwerker commanded two mortars, with one bombardier weighing their charges; two men were needed to carry the rounds.

*Prussian 6pdr on a limber. This photograph of an original piece was taken before World War I. The world wars of the 20th century played havoc with German archive material; surviving Prussian artillery pieces of the Napoleonic period are few and far between, as are drawings of them. (Peter Hofschroer)*
This Reglement ensured that all Prussian gunners received the same training in serving their pieces. The orders and movements were relatively simple, making it possible to train the inexperienced quickly; and casualties could be replaced by reserves immediately. This facilitated the expansion of the artillery arm in 1813. In the foot artillery signals were given by drum, in the horse artillery by trumpet. However, the Reglement emphasised that verbal orders were preferable. The signals were divided into two categories: 'manoeuvre' signals and 'quarter' signals. The manoeuvre signals included 'Walk', 'Trot', 'Gallop', 'Stop' and 'Make front'. Just one signal was used in combat situations – a long drum roll indicating 'Cease fire'. The quarter signals of the Foot Artillery included 'Reveille', 'Fire alarm', 'Alarm', 'Lights out' and 'General march'. Those of the horse artillery also included 'Retreat', 'Saddle up' and 'Guard parade'.

The final section of the regulations covered the use of artillery as part of the brigade of all arms. Here, the artillery played a supporting role to the infantry, being deployed on the flanks of the battalion columns.

The Reglement of 1812 was, taken as a whole, a welcomed change. It replaced a whole series of Instructions and established practices that had developed over the years. One of its few faults was the inclusion of howitzers in the field batteries, as their rate of fire was slower than that of the cannon, and the smoke from the latter often blocked their line of sight. Despite these shortcomings, this Reglement was a most useful document and the training it gave was exemplary.

CAVALRY

Around 1806, the time of the battle of Jena, the Prussian cavalry were the best-mounted in Europe thanks to the East Prussian horse studs, and came in the standard three types: heavy, dragoon and light. The aristocratic Garde du Corps was, with the Gendarmes, the elite heavy formation. With five squadrons apiece, they mounted 779 and 845 officers and men respectively. The 11 cuirassier regiments also had five squadrons, with 31 officers, 75 NCOs, 15 trumpeters and 720 other ranks. The 14 dragoon regiments (five squadrons each in all but two elite instances) totalled 841 officers and men apiece. The nine regiments of hussars had ten squadrons apiece (45 officers, 178 NCOs, 28 trumpeters and

PRUSSIAN ARTILLERYMEN, 1808–15 (opposite)

Engineers and medical, 1808–15. (Left) Engineer private in campaign dress, 1808–14. The engineers, being part of the artillery, also wore black facings piped with red. (Centre) Field surgeon, 1808–15. Field surgeons tended to favour the soft peaked cap, as the regulation bicorne was considered impractical. (Right) Stretcher-bearer, 1814. Note that this figure is armed with a French sabre-briquet. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
1,320 troopers). An exception was the Hussar Battalion Bila, with five squadrons and an establishment of 771 officers and men. All cavalrymen carried swords or sabres, pistols and a carbine piece. One unit – the five squadrons of Towarczys, 626 men in all – wielded lances.

As with any cavalry of the Napoleonic era, the Prussian cavalry were visually set apart by the grandeur and dash of their uniforms. Some uniforms, however, were plainer than others. A dragoon of the 1790s, for example, tended to wear a relatively plain light blue tunic of similar style to that infantry, with regimental distinctions provided in the form of facing and button colours, typically set off by the tricorne hat. During the first decade of the 1800s, however, the infantry tunic was replaced by the cavalry kollet and the felt shako took over, as it indeed did amongst most of the Prussian cavalry forces during this period. In a similar manner, the cuirassiers had a toned-down appearance, although still had a great deal of presence when compared to the average infantryman. The defining cuirass was actually phased out from 1790, and after 1794 they were not seen again on the battlefield, apart from some fleeting appearances in 1814–15. During the 1790s and early 1800s, the classic cuirassier uniform was a off-white Kollett tunic (yellow for Regiment No. 2) worn over a chemisette jacket and capped with a tricorne hat. In 1808 this headwear was replaced by a tall black leather helmet decorated mainly with a black plume.
PRUSSIAN CAVALRY TROOPERS, 1809-13

(Left and right) Troopers, Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment (No. 4), 1809. The hat worn by the soldier on the left was replaced by August 1809 with the Russian-style helmet on the right. (Centre) Trooper, Regiment Garde du Corps, 1809-13. This cuirassier uniform was introduced in 1809; the double white lace at collar and cuff distinguish the royal bodyguard regiment. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
The hussars, by contrast, wore a typically ebullient dress throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. Hussar headgear was the colpack or mirliton until 1804, when shakos were introduced, and from that date a variety of headwear was evident amongst the Prussian hussars. The classic hussar elements were the ornate dolman, highly decorated with bright frogging, the fur pelisse worn on the left shoulder on parade and the waist sash, a bundle of cords fixed together and wrapped around the waist several times. Such displays were not entirely the preserve of the hussars, however – regiments such as the Silesian National Cavalry and Elbe National Cavalry had similar uniform styles.

**Fighting Styles**

The fighting reputation of the Prussian cavalry was formidable. Each squadron formed up in two lines 48 files wide, any extra men forming a reserve third line; they were trained to charge in staggered waves, with columns of hussars on each flank of the attack ready to exploit success. When attacking retiring infantry formed in squares, flankers (cavalry in loose order) were used to draw the enemy’s fire before the main squadrons assailed the corners of the squares. Reconnaissance, exploitation and pursuit were the main tasks of the hussars, supplemented by dragoons.

The reputation of the Prussian took a severe knock in 1806 at Jena and Auerstadt. While mishandling of terrain, plus the strengths of the French infantry (who fought in deep, mutually supporting squares with sharpshooter support), accounts for some of the problems, of greater significance was the way that the cavalry was scattered amongst the wider army divisions. Each Prussian division received ten ‘battle’ squadrons and five hussar squadrons. Therefore the Prussian cavalry was committed in numerous uncoordinated attacks that frittered its energies. Professionalism, although not morale, had also been degraded by reductions in training times, and the availability of good horses became a significant issue for many cavalrymen – some 50 per cent of Prussia’s cavalrymen never saw a horse for over 10 months of the year.
By June 1808 the Prussian cavalry numbered 12,871 men in total, out of an army that was just over 50,000 strong. At this point the cavalry had just emerged from an extensive reorganization of its units and formations, and the cavalry establishment was as follows:

**Cuirassiers**
- Silesian Cuirassier Regiment
- East Prussian Cuirassier Regiment
- Regiment Garde du Corps
- Brandenburg Cuirassier Regiment
Two years later, the Prussian cavalry was issued with a new drill instruction, and this informed the subsequent regulations of 1812. There were some important distinctions between these regulations and the ones that had been previously issued in 1796. In 1796 different sets of regulations had been issued for the line cavalry (cuirassiers and dragoons) and for the light cavalry (hussars and Bosniaks). The regulations of 1812 instead created a single set of regulations for all cavalry, thereby moving more towards the idea of the 'universal cavalryman', in the same way that the 1812 Infantry Regulations attempted to define the 'universal infantryman'.

In the early years of the Napoleonic era, the Prussian Army contained three types of cavalry: line, dragoons and hussars. The line cavalry, later defined as cuirassiers, acted as the principal arm of decision in terms of a cavalry attack. The dragoons operated in a typical 'medium' cavalry capacity. They were musket-armed troops, and essentially operated as mounted infantry. The hussars were, as in every other army, the light cavalry, used for a variety of duties including skirmishing and reconnaissance. In 1743 each of the separate elements had their own drill manual, but this situation became untenable as the century wore on. The distinctions between the cuirassiers and dragoons became ever blurred, and the hussars began to operate in more regular roles on the battlefield. Such was true of many armies in the Napoleonic era, and
PRUSSIAN HUSSARS, 1809–13

(Centre) Colonel, 2nd Life Hussar Regiment (No. 2), 1809. His uniform keeps some features before the Life Hussars split into two regiments in 1808, such as the silver shako trim. (Left) Major von Schill, the famous cavalry commander, seen here in 1809. (Right) Trooper, Brandenburg Hussar Regiment (No. 3) 1809–13. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
Prussian Landwehr cavalry charging at Dennewitz, 6 September 1813. While approaching Berlin, Ney, with 55,000 men, attacked 80,000 Prussians led by von Bulow, while a further 30,000 Swedes remained in reserve under Bernadotte. At a critical point in the fighting, Ney's Saxons deserted, leaving a massive gap in his line through which rode a large body of Prussian cavalry, severing Ney's command and forcing him to retire to Torgau. (AKG Berlin)

was not always inspired by battlefield practicality. Often a particular brand of cavalry simply wanted to increase its share of battlefield glory. Hence by the time the Prussian Army reached 1812, it became far more accessible, at least on administrative point of view, to treat all cavalry roughly the same.

One problem the 1812 regulations did not address was the way that the cavalry played second fiddle to the infantry on the battlefield. The regulations actually presented the cavalry more as a support arm to the battle-winning infantry. Such a perspective was shortsighted. Napoleon, for example, used large cavalry reserves to provide a critical offensive capability during a battle, and he knew that cavalry could be used to turn the tide of an engagement as long as they were properly supported by infantry fire and artillery. In balance, however, during the Wars of Liberation the actual number of cavalry regiments attached to a brigade was reduced down to one. Those regiments that were left over were used to form a reserve held at corps level, so at least there seems to be some appreciation of a tactical, independent cavalry force.

In a sense, therefore, the 1812 regulations actually restricted the battlefield potential of the Prussian cavalry. Furthermore, elements of the regulations were positively dangerous to the cavalry in action. For example, one element of the regulations reduced the speed at which manoeuvres were meant to be executed, while other elements focused on pointless tactical manoeuvres, such as turning a cavalry column by pivoting in the centre of the line. A typical column of march was by threes, but deployment could be by twos. Generally three regiments of cavalry were attached to each brigade of all arms, and these
regiments would form up in columns behind the infantry battalions. Tactically, the Prussian cavalry often played a waiting game, holding out until the enemy cavalry attacked. If, however, there was a definable point of weakness in the enemy ranks, the cavalry might be launched on offensive strike. Such attacks were carried out over a distance of between 600 and 800 paces, with the final full charge taking place only in the last 80 paces. Pursuit actions were carried out only by the fourth platoon of the squadron, while the other three platoons had to rally and reform after each clash.

In his training, the cavalryman was first instructed in dismounted duties in a similar way to the infantry, although he received no instruction in infantry-style firearms drill. (Note that there was nothing in the 1812 regulations about dismounted combat.) Once he had gained some skill in dismounted combat, the cavalryman then received training on horseback, with eventual instruction in the use of weaponry from horseback. This included the firing of carbines and pistols from a mounted position, a procedure demanding much dexterity and a well-trained horse.

The formations for manoeuvre and attack could be fiendishly complicated in principle, and many were thus completely unsuited to applications on the chaos of the battlefield. The troop formed itself into two parallel ranks, with all turn and changes of front made to the right. The squadron was also drawn up in two ranks, and each squadron consisted of four platoons, all of equal strength, although if the squadron had less than 36 files, then only three platoons were formed. Each squadron was also to have 48 flankers or skirmishers, and 12 riflemen. The entire fourth platoon was comprised of flankers, with six of

Presenting the standards to Prince William's Dragoons Brigade in 1808. This regiment is wearing the old uniform of 1806; the new shakos and coatees were issued shortly afterwards. This provisional brigade later became Dragoon Regiment No.2. (Peter Hofschroer)
the riflemen riding in the second rank and the remainder divided equally amongst the other three platoons. The function of flankers, according to the 1812 regulations, was to keep watch on enemy movements and to stop any enemy penetrations, and they were never meant to stray more than 200 paces from squadron. In battle the files of cavalry discharged their own personal firearms alternately (the hussars and riflemen had carbines, and the remainder of the cavalry had pistols).

THE PRUSSIAN GUARD FUSILIERS STORM KAJA AT THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN, 2 MAY 1813

On a direct order from Blucher, Major von Block of the Prussian Guard Fusiliers led his men in a bayonet charge on the village of Kaja. The French battalion defending it held their fire to point blank range. When their volley did not halt the Prussian advance, the French infantry abandoned their positions rapidly, and fierce hand-to-hand fighting followed as they fell back through the village. A counter-attack by the Young Guard threw the Prussians back and recaptured the village. (Christa Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Regarding the use of regimental and even larger formations of cavalry, the 1812 regulations stipulated a regiment of four squadrons. When multiple regiments came together, each regiment had to maintain a distance of 12 paces from the next. There was also a strict order for how the types of cavalry were to be arranged within a regimental structure on the battlefield. From right to left, the cavalry were to be deployed as: cuirassiers, dragoons, Hussars and finally, on the left, the Uhlans. Attacks by the regiments could be delivered in either line, column or echelon, and when more than one regiment was attacking in one line the most senior officer was the formation’s leader.

The rules and regulations for these attacks could be fiendishly complicated, and it took an experienced cavalry officer to sort the wheat from the chaff. Training became a vexed issue, and in 1813 a massive expansion of the Prussian army in general – to over 200,000 men – simply exacerbated problems in delivering training and also made the shortage of horses that much worse. Nevertheless, it is undoubted that the cavalry remained one of Prussia’s finer fighting elements. Prussian cavalry would add their weight to the final blows against Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, and individual regiments would distinguish themselves on thundering hooves throughout the Napoleonic period.
SPAIN

OVERVIEW

Spain entered the Revolutionary period as a politically weak and vacillating nation, initially allied to France, but quickly switching over to support the First Coalition then attempting to back-track to neutrality when matters didn’t go to plan. France declared war on Spain in 1793, and despite an initial spirited invasion of south-western France, Spanish forces were steadily driven back and Spain was forced once again to swap sides at the Treaty of Basle in 1795. Spain was subsequently dragged into war with both Britain and Portugal. Yet aware of the fickle and opportunistic nature of Spanish politics, Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, and so began the blood-soaked saga of the Peninsular War.

The Spanish Army prior to this point was badly organized, poorly led and suffered from low morale, all common features amongst an army representing a corrupt and partisan government. During the 1790s it comprised an infantry force of 47 regiments (35 line and 12 light) arranged into eight regional brigades, backed by 12 regiments of cavalry (eight dragoons, two chasseurs and two hussars). From 1804 a Milicias Provinciales (Provincial Militia) souped up the numbers considerably with 50 battalions, mostly arranged on a district basis, although eight of the regiments were divided equally into four regional ‘divisions’. There were also 114 companies of the Milicias Urbanas (Urban Militia), these companies connected to prominent towns and cities, plus a 42-company strong veteran reserve.

Add Spain’s four regiments of artillery, and the on-paper army sounded quite impressive. However, standards of training and leadership were shocking, and most of the regiments were massively understrength and armed with hopelessly outdated or insufficient equipment.

When the Peninsular War began, the army stood at slightly over 100,000 men and about 30,000 troops mobilized from the militia. As we have already noted, the regular Spanish forces were divided into regional armies. In October 1808 the frontline armies were the Army of Galicia, the Army of Aragon, the Army of Extremadura, the Army of the Centre, and the Army of Catalonia. The reserve armies were the Army of Granada, the Galician Reserves, the Asturian Reserves,
the Army of Reserve of Madrid, the Extremadurian Reserves, and the Balearic Islands, Murcian, Valencian and Andalucian Reserves. There were many changes thereafter, but the regional identification remained until December 1811. Although the Spanish forces were by then organized into Armies of the Centre, the Left and the Right, these grouped the armies of Catalonia (much of it destroyed at Tarragona in July), Valencia, Murcia, Extremadura and Galicia plus various formations such as the Majorca Division.

Spain's regular forces were amongst the worst in Europe at the start of the Peninsular War, but by the end of the conflict they had actually improved on their appalling record. Administered by corrupt and incompetent officials, the infantry was severely lacking in officers, who themselves received virtually no training. Surtees, a soldier in the 95th Rifles, called them "the most contemptible creatures that I ever beheld ... utterly unfit and unable to command their men." Leith Hay, another British soldier, described the army as "... ill-commanded, ill-appointed, moderately disciplined and in most respects inefficient ..." Units were composed of volunteers and of conscripts, who came from the lowest classes. Promotion was all but impossible in a system where rising through the ranks effectively ceased at the rank of captain. Higher ranks were held by aristocrats and landowners who had neither knowledge of nor interest in
soldiering. Not only were the officers deficient in training or motivation, the army authorized no official drill, leaving every unit commander to devise his own field instructions as he saw fit. Unit effectiveness was further undermined by insufficient numbers, equipment and food, and the cavalry suffered from an acute shortage of mounts, with fewer than one third of its troopers supplied with a horse.

The most respectable units of the Spanish Army were those of the Marquis de la Romana, whose division had been sent to north Germany to serve with Napoleon's troops. On hearing of the uprising in Madrid, Romana's men revolted, were evacuated by the Royal Navy, and returned for service in Spain. Even these relatively well-led and well-equipped troops were described by one British soldier as having ‘... more the appearance of a large body of peasants ... in want of everything, than a regular army.’ During the retreat to Corunna, Surtees found them ‘... even in their best days, more like an armed mob than regularly organized soldiers.’

If the soldiers were bad, the commanders were beyond contempt. With few exceptions they were a liability in the field, not merely to their own troops but to the British as well. They provided erroneous information to Moore, which led to the disastrous retreat to Corunna, they failed either to support or to supply Wellington after Talavera and they were widely known for their corrupt practices. Eventually Wellington took personal command of the Spanish armies, and only then was he able to rely upon them.

The cavalry consistently performed so badly that any success was seen with astonishment. The infantry was prone to panic and flee, casting away their weapons in the stampede for the rear. Contempt for such men in the British ranks was not surprising, though it must be remembered that low morale was the natural result of poor leadership, irregular pay and food, and a chronic lack of equipment and clothing. When properly led and supplied the Spanish could perform well, as at Vitoria and in the Pyrenees, and toward the close of the war standards had improved sufficiently to allow a small number of Spaniards to join the ranks of British regiments.
If the regular forces were abysmal, the civilian defenders of cities like Saragossa and Gerona were an entirely different breed, demonstrating immense courage in the face of French troops and heroic feats of resistance.

SPANISH INFANTRYMEN, 1808–09

(Left) Militiaman, Zaragoza. (Centre) Fusilier, Extremadura Infantry Regiment. At this time most of the older regiments in the army still wore the 1805 regulation uniform, which for Extremadura was white with crimson collar, cuffs, cuff flaps, lapels and piping with brass buttons, a bicorn with red plume and black gaiters. (Right) Fusilier, Batallon Ligero de Zaragoza. The uniform was a blue coatee with a scarlet collar, blue breeches, and a round hat with a white band. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
SPANISH SOLDIERS, 1810–12

(Left) Fusilier, Mina's 1st Battalion of Alava, 1810. Don Francisco Espez y Mina's three guerrilla battalions wore a black round hat with a scarlet cockade, a brown jacket with collar, cuffs and lapels of crimson for the 1st, green for the 2nd, and yellow for the 3rd. (Centre) Guerrilla chief, c. 1812. Guerrillas might be ragged, but often dressed in dashing styles if they could. The figure has a green jacket with black collar and cuffs, silver piping, lace, and death's-head collar badges, silver buttons, black trousers with small silver buttons, and a greyish round hat with a silver plate and badge. (Right) Trooper, Navarra Hussars, 1811–12. The Husares de Navarra were raised from 1 January 1811 by Espez y Mina, with an establishment of four squadrons totalling 480 men. The uniform was an emerald green dolman with scarlet collar and cuffs, white cords, pewter buttons, blue overalls with a red stripe and black leather strapping, and a shako with white bands. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS

TALAVERA

and hardship under siege. The Church and landowners supported all such forms of resistance as well as the guerrillas, who were infamous for their cruelty. The French retaliated in kind with revenge on a grand scale.

The Spanish Army was organized much like other Western European armies of the later 18th century, and was modelled mainly on the French Army. There was a General Staff led by capitán general (captain-general), a rank equivalent of field marshal, and a sizeable administrative body of staff officers, intendants and auditors.

The infantry and cavalry regiments of the army were divided into the Royal Guard and the line. These were mostly recruited from native Spaniards, but there were foreign regiments, the most important being the Swiss contingents, which amounted to about 13,000 men. The regulars were assisted by battalions of provincial and urban militia. Then followed the specialist corps such as the artillery, the engineers and other auxiliary corps. Outlying areas such as Ceuta in Morocco or the Canary Islands also had their own troops. In 1808, the army numbered about 7,000 officers and 130,000 NCOs and enlisted men, including 30,000 mobilized militiamen.

The Spanish armies had about 400 general officers of various grades before 1808. The most senior rank, after King Carlos IV and Manuel Godoy, the
The Royal Guard

The troops of the royal household originated in the early 18th century, having been organized shortly after Felipe V, the grandson of France's Louis XIV, ascended the Spanish throne. It bore a strong resemblance to the French royal guards – even the uniforms were of the same blue-faced-red livery of the French Bourbon family. Except for the Guard Halberdiers, the units were detached in the field and amounted to some 6,000 men. In 1808 most of the guards joined the fight against the French. For instance, following the Madrid uprising on 2 May, the Life Guards simply left the Escurial with their standards and joined the patriotic forces.

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Generalissimo, who was also Admiral and 'Prince of Peace', was that of the five captain-generals. The hundreds of others did not all hold active commands with the army. Many were town governors in Spain or held a senior post in the colonies, others served some more-or-less important staff function, and some were simply retired from duty but could be recalled to the active list.

The Spanish Army had an elaborate corps of about 350 administrative officers. Nearly all served in Spain, with a few posted in Havana. They controlled finances and pay and various aspects in the procurement and making of supplies, food and lodgings. Generals and governors, the 'officers of the sword', could not by-pass the 'officers of the quill pen', the army intendants, commissaries and senior accountants when planning operations.

British Influence

At the beginning of 1812 the French still occupied most of Spain. From that time, however, the British and Portuguese armies under the Duke of Wellington – joined by increasingly large contingents of Spanish troops – slowly but steadily drove the French out of Spain. In 1812–14 the situation and service of the Spanish armies was generally as follows: the First Army (or Army of Catalonia) had been largely dispersed by the French in 1811. It rose again, however, and by June 1813 had 16,000 men under General Copons. The Second Army (Army of Valencia) under General Blake was 17,000 strong on 9 January 1812 when it surrendered at Valencia to Marshal Suchet. However, another 7,100 men of the Second Army rallied at Alicante. By June 1813 it mustered over 30,600 men under General Elío. Its 5th Division was the former guerrilla force led by El Empecinado.

The Third Army (Army of Murcia) was weak, with barely 5,500 men in January 1812, rising to 8,000 in October. In June 1813 it was led by the Duke del Parque and had 12,600 men. By April 1814 it was 21,000 strong when it crossed into France under the Prince of Anglona and occupied Pau. The Fourth Army initially covered the troops at Cadiz and Algeciras which, by
June 1813, had grown to a force of over 25,000. Led by General Giron, who had replaced General Castanos, it was attached to Wellington’s army. It was reinforced by Don Carlos de Espana’s division of 3,300 men and

SPANISH INFANTRY, 1812–13

(Left) Fusilier, Castropol Infantry Regiment, 1812–13. While at Algeciras new uniforms from Britain were supplied to the regiment on 24 June 1812. (Centre) Field officer, line infantry, 1812. The officer is shown wearing a blue long-tailed coat with scarlet collar, cuffs and piping. (Right) Trooper, Olivenza Cazadores Regiment, 1812–13. This two-squadron regiment served in eastern Spain as part of Whittingham’s Spanish Division.

(Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Count Arispal’s Army of Reserve of Andalucia of 17,500 men in July. Thus, by August 1813, over 46,000 Spanish troops had been attached to the Anglo-Portuguese army. This did not include Espez y Mina’s force of about 8,000 operating in Aragon and eastern Navarre.

Now led by General Freire, the Fourth Army was 35,000 strong in the autumn of 1813, decreasing to 30,000 by April 1814. This was the force that saw the most service with Wellington, its eight divisions being led by Morillo, Carlos de Espana, Losada and later Del Barco, Barcena and later Espeleta, and the guerrilla leaders Porlier, Longa and Espoz y Mina. Part of these troops were left in Spain, but several divisions served at Toulouse and Bayonne before being sent back.

The Army of Reserve of Andalucia led by General Giron was attached to Wellington’s army from summer 1813, reducing to about 10,000 men in August, 8,000 in November and 9,200 in April 1814. It served with the Anglo-Portuguese army up to Toulouse. The Fifth Army (Army of Extremadura and Castilla) was only about 8,000 strong, and served with Wellington’s army in 1812. Most were absorbed into the Fourth Army in 1813.

The Sixth Army (Army of Galicia), about 15,000 strong, served with Wellington’s army in 1812. Most went into the Fourth Army in 1813.

The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Armies of 1812 were somewhat theoretical forces. They included mostly the guerrillas in north-eastern Spain led by Mina, Longa, Campillo, Porlier and other smaller bands, and could hardly be expected to function as regular field formations. Most were absorbed into the Fourth Army in the summer of 1813.

Whittingham’s Spanish Division from Mallorca served in Valencia during 1812–13, about 4,000 strong, later rising to 5,000.

By the middle of 1813, the Spanish forces on regular service amounted to about 160,000 men. Of these, about a third were serving with Wellington’s Anglo-Portuguese army. Another 10,000–20,000 were deployed in conjunction with the Anglo-Sicilian force in Valencia.

As of 1 December 1814, the Spanish Peninsular army was reorganized by a
provisional regulation. This was a first step towards rationalizing the numerous and extraordinary collection of units raised since 1808. For the first time since the French invasion the Estado Militar de Espana – the register of the Spanish

SPANISH FUSILIERS, 1808–11

(Left) Fusilier, 4th Marine Regiment, c. 1810–11. In May 1810 the men of the 2nd Battalion of the 4th Marine Regiment at Cartagena were issued a blue jacket with no lapels or turnbacks and a white waistcoat and breeches. (Centre) Fusilier, Almeria Regiment. From 1808–11 the regiment’s uniform was a brown coatee with scarlet collar, cuffs, lapels and piping, brown pantaloons, a round hat and a yellow cockade loop. (Right) Fusilier, Castrapol Regiment, 1809. In May 1809, the regiment was issued British-made jackets. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Army which normally appeared yearly – was once again published in a complete edition early in 1815. No doubt compiled largely from information obtained from corps commanders and review reports, it gave a general listing of the field officers of the many units, and what uniforms were being worn.

From 1812 Britain considerably augmented its already significant aid to the Spanish armies. As regards weapons, some 100,000 firearms (of which 95,000 were infantry muskets and 3,000 cavalry carbines) were sent to Spain between April 1812 and March 1813 – up from about 40,000 stands of arms in 1811. In 1813 another 50,000 muskets were sent. To these were added thousands of cavalry sabres – 13,000 in 1812 alone – and thousands of pairs of cavalry pistols. These figures represented a considerable commitment; the 1812 shipment accounted for well over a third of the year’s production of India Pattern muskets. (No significant numbers of rifles were supplied for the Spanish forces, which had no rifle units as such.)

Ordnance was also sent to Spain, though not in such massive numbers. It would seem that large calibre pieces were already available, but light-calibre ‘mountain’ cannons were in much demand by guerrilla bands, and the British tried to deliver these in numbers. When one adds uniforms and camp equipage for 100,000 infantry in 1812, for 50,000 men in 1813 and again in 1814, added to cavalry saddlery and supplies, the total logistical aid from Britain to Spain in the final years of the Napoleonic Wars was very impressive.

The Spanish made good use of it all, and their armies were logistically transformed from 1812. However, the Spanish themselves also continued to
make arms and clothing. By 1814 the British supplied the requirements of 50,000 to an army of 154,000 men. Outfitting the remainder must have called for a tremendous effort in a country almost totally ruined by war, and whose population was traumatized by years of privations, bloodshed, instability and more or less arbitrary terror.

BRITISH-SUPPLIED UNIFORMS, 1813–14

(Left) Grenadier, line infantry. The clothing sent from Britain in 1813–14 was much the same as that sent in 1812, but simplified. It was in a single shade of blue, and the range of facing colours was reduced to red or green only. The distinctions of grenadiers were British-style red wings with white lace and fringes. (Centre) Sergeant, line infantry. (Right) Bugler, light infantry. The buglers’ uniform appears to have been the same as for the men, except for wings. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The scarlet national cockade of Spain was worn by all troops. However, from about 1812 a black centre was sometimes added to denote the alliance with the British; and a yellow edge seems also to have been used by some, thus reproducing the scarlet and gold of Spain’s national standard (possibly to differentiate the patriots from the renegade troops of Joseph-Napoleon’s forces, who also displayed scarlet cockades).

INFANTRY

In terms of the Spanish line infantry, in the early 1790s each regiment had two service battalions and one depot battalion, each with four companies of fusiliers: the service battalions also had a company of grenadiers each, giving a total establishment of 1,403 men, which was raised to 1,903 for all ranks in 1793. From 26 August 1802 until 1808, each regiment had three battalions: the first battalion had two companies of grenadiers and two of fusiliers, the second and third each had four companies of fusiliers giving a total of 12 companies. Each company had one captain, one lieutenant, one sub-lieutenant, one first sergeant, four second sergeants, eight corporals, eight second corporals, three drummers, 60 (in peacetime) or 164 (in wartime) privates. Each battalion had a staff of three field officers, an ensign, a chaplain, a surgeon, a drum major and a master armourer. The war establishment of each regiment was theoretically over 2,300 officers and men, but the actual strength was much lower. In 1808, the line infantry amounted to 59,000 men including 15,000 foreign soldiers.

The war of independence against the French saw a multitude of new units created. Between May and December 1808 some 210 regiments, 48 of which were light infantry, were listed. In 1809 another 18 line and 16 light infantry regiments were formed. The variety in organization of these units, raised spontaneously all over the country, was naturally considerable, and in 1810 some standardization was attempted. On 1 July 1810 it was decreed that the regular infantry would consist of eight battalions of grenadiers, formed from the remnants of the Provincial Militia grenadier battalions; 121 regiments of line infantry, which incorporated the Provincial Militia regiments; 32 battalions of light infantry; and Swiss regiments as necessary. The grenadier battalions were to have 681 men in four companies of grenadiers and one of light infantry. The battalion staff consisted of a lieutenant-colonel, one major, two lieutenant-adjutants, one ensign, a chaplain, a surgeon, an armourer and a drum major.

Line infantry regiments were now to have 2,554 men in the three battalions, each battalion having a company of grenadiers, a company of cazadores (chasseurs or light company), and four companies of fusiliers. Each grenadier company was to have a captain, two lieutenants, one sub-lieutenant, four sergeants, two drummers, two fifers, ten corporals and 91 privates. Each cazador
SPANISH INFANTRY, 1810–13

(Left) Drum Major, Voluntarios de Madrid, 1811. In February 1811, the regimental drum-major was assigned a blue coat with scarlet collar, cuffs, lapels and turnbacks, gold buttons and gold lace trim. (Centre) Trooper, Daroca/Aragon Hussars, c. 1811–13. From 1811 to 1813 they wore blue dolmans with scarlet collar and cuffs, white cords and lace and pewter buttons. (Right) Fusilier, 3rd Catalan Legion, 1810. The four Catalan Legions raised from the end of 1809 had sky blue coats and pantaloons, white waistcoats, pewter buttons, no gaiters, and round hats. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
company was to have a captain, two lieutenants, one sub-lieutenant, four sergeants, two drummers, ten corporals and 85 privates. Each fusilier company was to have a captain, two lieutenants, two sub-lieutenants, five sergeants, three drummers, 16 corporals and 136 privates. The battalion staff consisted of a colonel and a major in the 1st Battalion, a lieutenant-colonel in the 2nd, and a commandant in the 3rd, each battalion having a lieutenant-adjutant, one ensign, one chaplain, one surgeon, one armourer and a drum major.

Spanish light infantry corps were organized as single battalion units. Each light infantry battalion had an establishment of 801 men from 1792. From 26 August 1802 until 1808, each battalion had six companies: each company had one first captain, one second captain, two lieutenants, two sub-lieutenants, one first sergeant, five second sergeants, eight corporals, eight second corporals, three drummers, and 105 (in peacetime) or 175 (in wartime) privates. Each battalion had a staff of four field officers, an ensign, a chaplain, a surgeon, a drum major and a master armourer. In 1808, the regiments had about 13,600 men.

On 19 October 1811 two cornetas or buglers replaced two drummers in each cazador company in infantry regiments and in all companies of the light infantry battalions. At this time the French-style bugle horns were replaced by British bugles; at first the Spanish found these much harder to use, but soon preferred them because they could be heard at a much greater distance.

The official establishments of the regiments and battalions were, like the previous organization, much too optimistic.
Officially, line infantry regiments were supposed to have had three battalions from July 1810; but very few, if any, could boast such numbers. In reality a regiment often fielded barely the equivalent of a single battalion, with too many

**SPANISH RANKS, 1810–15**

(Left) Colonel, Cuerpo del Estado Mayor, 1810–15. For full dress, General Staff corps officers wore a blue single-breasted coat with sky blue collar and cuffs edged with gold lace. (Centre) Militia corporal, Alarmas Gallegas, c. 1810–12. (Right) Gunner, Collure Artillery Companies, Alarmas Gallegas, c. 1810–12. The three artillery companies at Collure (Betanzos) even had a uniform, approved by the Junta, consisting of a brown round jacket and breeches, with yellow collar and cuffs, gold grenades at the collar, brass buttons, black knee gaiters, and a black round hat. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
officers. A new order reorganizing the composition of infantry units was issued on 8 March 1812; this acknowledged the true situation. The regiments were now to have only one battalion; only in exceptional circumstances of extra manpower could they form a second. The battalion was to have six companies of fusiliers, one company of cazadores and one of grenadiers. Attached to the grenadier company was a detachment of six sappers under a sapper-corporal. This organization applied to both the line and light infantry battalions.

Regarding the independent companies, some were light infantry escopeteros mountaineers, so named because they were armed with the short and sturdy escopeta muskets. Others served as coast guards on the coast south of Granada (basically today's Costa del Sol), which was always subject to opportunist raids by pirates from nearby North Africa. Other companies, including cavalry, were in the Spanish enclaves in Morocco at Ceuta and Melilla.

The Provincial Militia was a reserve based on limited drafts made in rural Spain, somewhat like the Royal Militia in France. Each regiment was named after its area of origin. The militia grenadiers were gathered in four divisions of two battalions each. In wartime or in national emergencies the provincial militias were embodied for full-time military service, usually garrison duties. They were generally more popular among civilians than the regular troops, and their officers were recruited from the gentry in the area where the regiment was drafted. In 1808 the actual strength of the provincial regiments was about 550 men per battalion amounting to about 30,000 troops in total.

The Urban Militia consisted of 114 independent companies in 13 municipalities. Cadiz had 20 companies, Puerto Santa Maria 9, Campo Gibraltar 13, Cartagena 9, Ceuta 5, Badajos 14, Albuquerque 8, Alcantara 6, Alconchel 1, Valencia de Alcantara 7, La Coruna 12, Ciudad Rodrigo 6 and Tarifa 4. These companies were the urban equivalent of the rural provincial regiments, but they were not mobilized in 1808.

As revolution raged in France, nobles and royalists sought refuge in Spain. From May 1793, units of émigrés were raised and most saw much action. Following the end of hostilities with France by the Treaty of Basel on 22 July 1795, the three remaining corps were amalgamated to form the Borbon Infantry Regiment in April 1796. The units were as follows: Légion de Saint-Simon; Légion de la Reine; Royal-Provence; Royal-Roussillon; Vallespir.

**Urban and National Militias**

The system of urban militias which had existed up to 1808 was all but completely wrecked during the years of invasion, occupation and guerrilla warfare. In many ways the guerrillas and the armed peasantry replaced the volunteers and militias. The few cities unoccupied by the French, such as Cadiz, generally had a militia organization.
Spanish guerrillas surprise and massacre a convoy of French wounded. Combatants and noncombatants alike were treated mercilessly in this ugly side of the war in the Peninsula, and even Wellington, whose operations greatly benefited from ubiquitous partisan activity, remarked that once roused a Spaniard became an 'undisciplined savage'. While guerrillas were frequently responsible for such acts of butchery as shown here, the French committed their own fair share of atrocities. (Philippoteaux; Roget-Viollet)

When Madrid was first liberated by the British, a Milicia Nacional Urbana de Madrid was raised from 26 August 1812. This embodied militia, which was to serve as garrison and in the field in the vicinity of the capital, had eight battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry. The infantry uniform was a blue long-tailed coat with scarlet-piped white collar, cuffs, lapels and turnbacks, pewter buttons, a white waistcoat and breeches, black gaiters, and a plain bicorne hat with a white cockade loop. The cavalry had a light green coat with crimson-piped white collar, cuffs, lapels and turnbacks, pewter buttons, white waistcoat, light green pantaloons, black half-boots, and a bicorne with white lace edging and cockade loop.

In 1814 the government wished to re-establish the pre-1808 organizations, and the 1815 register lists those city units with the old uniforms. However, a new Milicia Nacional came into being on 15 April 1814. This had a streamlined organization, and was to mobilize all able-bodied men from 30 to 50 years of age in their local units according to a scale based on the village's or town's population. A village of a thousand souls was to furnish 20 men, increasing by 20 per additional thousand, so that, for example, a town of 6,000 would furnish a complete company of 120 men. These were to be infantry formations, but cavalry companies could also be formed in isolated rural areas.
SPANISH FUSILIERS, 1811

(Left) Infantry fusilier, eastern Spain, dressed in a uniform of British origin. (Centre and right) Infantry fusiliers, Andalucia. From June 1811 some '3,000 suit of blue clothing', to have 'one half faced with red and the remainder with yellow', went to Cadiz for issue to an unnamed 'particular corps of Spanish Patriots'. An ample supply of calico shirts, half-stockings and shoes was also supplied, but no shakos; thus round hats were probably worn. (Bill Youngusband © Osprey Publishing)
Engineers, Sappers and Miners

The Real Cuerpo de Ingenieros (Royal Corps of Engineers) was organized as a corps in 1711, with personnel posted in all parts of the peninsula, outlying islands and on all the colonies. There were about 170 officers in the Peninsula, including eight generals each of whom headed a segment of the corps. While competent in all aspects of military engineering, the corps’ work in coastal fortifications, both at home and in the colonies and especially in Cuba was renowned. From 1796 there was also a group of corps General Staff officers within the corps, first called Cosmografos de Estado and later Estado Mayor de Ingenieros, who were distinct and had a different uniform. From 1803, engineer cadets were trained at Alcala de Henares. The Regimiento Real de Zapadores-Minadores (Royal Regiment of Sappers and Miners) was led by engineer officers and was organized as a two-battalion regiment on 5 September 1802, each battalion having four companies of zapadores (sappers) and one of minadores (miners). Each company had an establishment of five officers and 120 men.

Distinguished Units

Although the Spanish infantry as a totality was often recognized as little short of a liability, there were regiments that set themselves apart from the rest (if only through notoriety), particularly as greater professionalization spread through the ranks of the army during the Peninsula Wars. A selective list, excluding many worthies, gives an idea of some of the organizational and ancestral diversity amongst the Spanish Army.

Hibernia

This ‘Irish’ regiment was in Galicia in 1808, and scattered into the mountains with other Spanish units while Sir John Moore’s army evacuated Coruña in January 1809. General Romana regrouped and reorganized the Galician army, and gave the colonelcy of Hibernia to William Parker Carroll, his Irish-born British liaison officer. With great energy and success, Parker Carroll reconstructed first one and eventually two battalions.

Hibernia took part in Romana’s capture of Villafranca and Vigo, the failed siege of Lugo, the repulse of Marshal Ney’s forces at San Payo bridge and, on 8 October 1809, the utter defeat of the French VI Corps at Tamames. Reinforced French troops defeated the Galician army on 28 November at Alba de Tormes, Hibernia being one of the few regiments to maintain its squares firmly against the French cavalry. Hibernia retreated into Extremadura with the Galician army, and was part of the Spanish contingent sent by Romana in October 1810 to assist Wellington in the Torres Vedras position during Marshal Masséna’s invasion of Portugal.
When Marshal Soult invaded Extremadura in February 1811 Hibernia was one of the units sent to the rescue, only to be crushed and almost destroyed at Gebora (19 February). Survivors escaped to Portugal, and Parker Carroll resurrected it with Castillian recruits. From February 1812 to the end of the

SPANISH INFANTRY, 1810–15

(Left) Fusilier, Toledo Regiment, c. 1811–13. This uniform changed again to blue in about 1813–14. (Centre) Field officer, Numancia Dragoon Regiment, c. 1810–13. The old yellow coat and bicorn have been exchanged for a green uniform and a crested helmet. (Right) Gunner, Marine Artillery, 1810–15. From November 1810 to 1815 the Marine Artillery wore a blue single-breasted coatee with scarlet collar and cuffs, brass buttons, a white waistcoat, blue pantaloons, black gaiters and a round hat. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
war it remained in Ciudad Rodrigo. The regiment, now completely Spanish, was disbanded in 1818.

**Voluntarios de la Victoria**

Two-battalion light infantry regiment raised in El Ferol, Galicia, from 11 June 1808, its early recruits being officers and men from the navy. It saw much action in the Basque provinces in the autumn, campaigned in Castille in 1809, Portugal in 1810, Extremadura in 1811, Castilla in 1812, was at the battle of Vittoria in 1813, in southern France in 1814 and was sent to America in 1815.

**Buenos Aires**

This unit had its origins in the British attacks on the Rio de la Plata in Argentina and Uruguay in January 1807. Initially successful, the British force captured Montevideo taking some 800 Spanish colonial regulars prisoner. They were sent to prison hulks in England, but following the Spanish uprising against the French in May 1808 they were shipped to Coruña and formed into a Buenos Aires Battalion during June. According to Captain [later General] Rondeau, they were issued British arms and uniforms consisting of ‘red coatees, white waistcoats and breeches’, which earned them the nickname Colorados – ‘the reds’. Attached to General Cuesta’s army which was defeated at Medina de Rioseco on 14 July, the battalion was decimated. The unit was reorganized, however, and reportedly lacked uniforms when in Galicia in January 1812.

**Titadores de Doyle / Cazadores de Barbastros**

A light infantry battalion of 300 men raised from 10 August 1808 in Galicia by Colonel Charles W. Doyle, a British officer sent to help the insurgents. It apparently had 1,200 men in ten companies in May 1810. Doyle led his unit in many actions, and was wounded several times, earning much renown for himself and his men. Doyle was promoted general and recalled to other duties in 1811; his unit, renamed Cazadores de Barbastros (after the unit raised in 1794) continued under Antonio Guerrero (however, the old name of ‘Doyle’s’ was still used). The corps fought at Albuera and Saguntum in 1811, and had grown to about 1,400 men by 1812.

**Legion Extremadura or Legion Estramaña**

This unit, proposed by John Downie, a romantic and wealthy British hispanophile, was approved by the Cortes in July 1810 and organized in southern Spain from September with ‘a proportion of British officers to join and assist in the formation of the said Legion’ (PRO, WO 1/1120). It was to have 2,400 light infantry in four battalions (six companies of 100 men each), 300 light cavalry in three squadrons, and 300 horse artillery. The British government supplied carbines and pistols, and
swords for the mounted troops were delivered in England to Downie, while the infantry arms were issued from the stores in Portugal. It seems that the light artillery did not last very long. The cavalry was, in addition, armed with lances and thus became known as lancers.

The unit saw much action and the Spanish were most grateful to the colourful Downie, even making him a gift of the Conquistador Pizarro's sword, which he carried into action when he was captured by the French in 1812. He managed to throw it to safety. On 1 December 1814 the legion's mounted troops became a distinct regiment of cavalry, and on 1 June 1815 were renamed Lanceros de Extremadura. The light infantry battalions mustered about 2,000 men in 1811; by December 1814, when it became an independent infantry unit, the corps stood at 1,289 men, who sailed to Lima, Peru in January 1815.

Downie wanted his unit's uniform to reflect Spain's 'Golden Age' and proceeded to provide regimentals at his own expense: 'with a view to excite the National feelings of the Spaniards, I have had made upon the model of the ancient Spanish costume' - which, incidentally, cost Downie 'considerably more' than ordinary uniforms. It was white and scarlet with a short scarlet cape and a scarlet bonnet, but the actual appearance remains conjectural. This costume caused astonishment when Downie's squadrons arrived in Cadiz in 1811, and more conventional uniforms were thereafter procured. According to Clonard, from late 1811 to about 1814 the lancers wore a black shako with a yellow top band, a red pompon, a brass plate and chin scales; a blue coatee, with straw-coloured pointed cuffs, collar and turnbacks, green lapels, scarlet piping, brass shoulder scales and buttons; blue pantaloons with yellow stripe.
and brass buttons; blue housings edged with yellow lace and red outer piping. A red lance pennon was carried. The lancers were sent ‘600 pairs of Hessian boots’ in December 1810 (PRO, WO 1/846).

SPANISH ARMY TROOPS, 1812–15

(Left) Lieutenant-colonel, Royal Corps of Engineers, 1812–1815. Engineer officers had no shakos and wore laced bicorne as shown. (Centre) Infantry fusilier, northern Spain, 1812. This figure is based on lists of supplies shipped from Britain to Coruna in January 1812. (Right) Infantry fusilier, Division of Don Carlos de Espana, 1812–13. The 4,000 men of this division received blue uniforms faced with red, with helmets (most likely in the Tarleton style) and black accoutrements from Britain. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The legion's modern infantry equipment consisted of British crossbelt accoutrements, knapsacks and shoes. The light cavalry had British saddles, holsters, carbine buckets, lance buckets, and shabraques with pouches, belts, boots and spurs for the troopers. The horse artillery had the same appointments as the cavalry with 'the addition of harness, &c., for the horses' (PRO, WO 1/1120).

Cazadores de Cataluña
This battalion of Catalonian chasseurs, also called Cazadores de Manso after their founder and commander José Manso, was raised from 30 June 1811 and had some 1,200 men in six companies, selected from the fittest so as to be very efficient and mobile. It became renowned for its hit-and-run tactics against French columns, who rarely caught up with Manso's men. At first the uniform was a brown greatcoat trimmed with green.

Guardias de Infanteria Espanola
The Spanish Guards Infantry Regiment was raised in 1704. The original four battalions were raised to six in 1791, each having seven companies of 100 men each, including one of grenadiers. The Cazadores Artilleros (Chasseurs-Artillerymen) of the Spanish Guard Infantry, raised 1793, had six companies, one for each battalion, of 105 officers and men, but were disbanded in 1803. Considerable reductions were made in 1803, when three battalions were disbanded, the number of fusiliers in the remaining three battalions was reduced to 50 per company, and the grenadier companies were limited to 100 men.

Carabineros Reales
The Royal Carabiniers (raised 1730) had four squadrons from 1793, each squadron having 276 men divided into four companies. There were six squadrons from 1802 when the two light cavalry squadrons (raised in 1800) serving as guards to the 'Prince of Peace' and Grand Admiral, Manuel Godoy, were added to the Carabineros.

* * * *

During the final period of the Peninsular War, the Spanish Army had about 168 regiments of various sorts. Some were pre-1808 'old' regiments, some were embodied provincial militia, and many were 'new' regiments raised since 1808. In March 1814 a muster was made which revealed some regiments – e.g. Princesa and Ceuta – as having over 1,200 men, while others might have less than 300 – e.g. the Rivagorza provincials and the Gerona Light Infantry. In all, the infantry regiments amounted to 153,238 men.

The great value of the Spanish infantry, even through its most deplorable years, was its enthusiast patriotism, which meant that it was rarely short of
new manpower to fill out the ranks as they were depleted. Although they suffered more than their fair share of outright defeats, they were never comprehensively crushed by Napoleon, and so added one more draw on the Frenchman’s steadily subsiding resources.

**Guerrillas**

From the start of the French invasion, small bands of patriots harassed isolated French parties using hit-and-run tactics. The concept caught on like wildfire and quickly became known as ‘guerrilla’ – ‘little war’ – a term that has since become part of the universal language (although the form guerrilleros was sometimes used for those who waged it).

On 28 December 1808, the Central Junta recognized the value of these groups and issued instructions as to composition, pay, etc. The basic organization was to be 50 men ‘more or less’ in each *partida*, headed by a commandant, a second-in-command and three subalterns for foot troops and two for mounted units. Discipline was to be according to the royal regulations in force in the army. They had to find their own arms and clothing; were to harass enemy communications and messengers, and ambush small garrisons and isolated troops. Local juntas in Extremadura, Galicia and Asturias issued orders to the same effect, and this spread to the occupied provinces.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams...

...in the whole of the northern and midland provinces, those patriot bands were denominated guerrillas; in the mountain districts included under the name of Serra de Ronda, in Andalucia, the irregular bands were termed serranos. The distinction was, that the guerrillas acted in concert, the serranos on his (sic) own responsibility. The dress of the guerrilla was a short jacket of russet brown, and leather leggings of the same dark colour; that of the serranos was velveteen, of an olive green colour, profusely ornamented with silver buttons, and his legs encased in leather boots. A belt of short leather surrounded the waist of each, stuck full of weapons of the French officers they had slain. When in small parties those predatory bands were called partidas.

Many of their arms were captured from the French, some were home-made, and others came from Britain. Following the distribution of weapons to the bands of Mina, El Pastor and Longa, James Johnson, a British officer sent to meet them, reported in September 1811 that ‘what these chiefs mostly complain of is the great want of clothing & shoes, their troops being in general, very ragged & barefooted’. Weapons were not likely to be wanted in quantity ‘for some time to come’, but it was essential ‘that they should be supplied, as early as possible with ammunition’ (PRO, WO 1/261).
SPAIN

SPANISH GUERRILLAS OF 1809–12

(Centre) Perseguidores de Andalucia 1808–11. The Perseguidores (persecutors) were involved in many battles in the field with the French. The dress of a trooper was brown with scarlet facings, buff piping and waistcoat, white metal buttons and a round hat.

(Right) Espoz y Mina’s guerrilla battalions of Alava, fusilier, 1810. (Left) Navarre Hussars, trooper, 1811–12. The Husares de Navarra were raised from 1 January 1811 by Don Francisco Javier de Mina. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
The French considered the guerrillas as bandits and rebels rather than soldiers, and capture often meant a French firing squad. Even family members of suspected guerrillas were imprisoned, deported or shot by the French in their efforts to intimidate patriots. This only increased Spanish determination and hatred, however, and some guerrillas consequently gave no quarter. Costello of the 95th Rifles recalled seeing ‘... a swarthy, savage-looking Spaniard ... armed to the teeth with pistols, daggers and a long gun ... together with his crimson sash and free bearing’, taking out of a purse ‘a number of human ears and fingers ... cut off from the bodies of the French whom he himself had slain in battle, each ear and finger having on a golden ring. Napoleon, he observed ... loves his soldiers, and so do the ravens.’

It is next to impossible to estimate the number of guerrillas under arms. It seems that some 58 groups were active in 1808, and 156 in 1810, decreasing to 35 by 1813. An estimated 25,000 guerrillas were active in northern Spain alone in 1810–11, tying down up to 50,000 French troops by their activities. Some bands became veritable armies, with their own supply and pay systems. The principal ones are outlined below. They were always known by the names of their leaders, often unsavoury characters, but talented warriors and natural leaders of men. These men had considerable popular followings; many used noms-de-guerre, e.g. El Pastor (‘the Shepherd’), El Medico (‘the Doctor’), El Abuelo (‘the Grandfather’), El Manco (‘One-Arm’), Chaleco (‘Waistcoat’), and even Calzones (‘Breeches’).

The value of guerrillas to Wellington’s army was tremendous. The French officer J. J. Pellet possibly summed it up best by noting that ‘the bands of Spanish insurgents and the English army supported each other. Without the English the Spanish would have been quickly dispersed or crushed. In the absence of the guerrillas, the French armies would have acquired a unity and strength that they were never able to achieve in this country, and the Anglo-Portuguese army, unwarned of our operations and projects, would have been unable to withstand concentrated operations’. To the Spanish, who saw their regular forces repeatedly defeated, the guerrillas’ successes kept hope alive during their relentless fight for independence.

**A SPANISH GUERRILLA CAMP** *(opposite)*

The camps of guerrilla groups were temporary, be they in mountain caves or secluded gullies on the plains. This plate shows a cigar-smoking ‘Majo’ from Andalusia bringing news from the events in the south. There is also a British officer from Wellington’s HQ on an intelligence mission; he is dressed in a plain frock coat and forage cap favoured by Wellington’s staff. In the background, an apprehensive French prisoner looks on, wondering if he will to see another day. *(Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)*
Juan Diaz Porlier, El Marquesito (‘the Little Marquis’) – so called because he was the nephew of the famous Marques de la Romana – was a former officer of the regular army who took to the hills. His band of at least 1,000 men operated in La Mancha and the Asturias. In July 1809 Porlier planned to dress his cavalry in grey jackets and trousers with red cords and piping, and his infantry in brown coats with scarlet facings. In 1810 his band embarked on British ships, and captured several ports including Santona and Gijon. Between September 1810 and September 1811 Porlier’s troops received ‘400 jackets, pantaloons, caps & cockades’ with ‘500 muskets & bayonets’ and 200 sabres from the British (PRO, WO 1/261).

Juan Martin Diez, El Empecinado (‘the Obstinate’), had been a regular soldier and was a farm labourer when he decided to fight the French, following Fernando VII’s detention by Napoleon in 1808. He intercepted French couriers in Guadalajara province, and within a few months was chief of some 1,500 guerrillas, eventually heading a respectable army estimated at 10,000 men by the French. His foot troops included the Siguenza Light Infantry Regiment, the Guadalajara Volunteers and the Molina de Aragon Volunteers. His cavalry, ‘excellent and perfectly mounted’ according to Hugo, consisted of the corps led by El Manco, Sardina, Mondideo and Don Damasco, his brother. He seized several French treasury convoys by daring ambushes in Old Castille, and three French battalions were captured when his guerrillas took Calatayud. In early 1811 the British managed to send ‘for the use of the Spanish Patriots of Guadalajara, vizt., 2,000 muskets, pouches & sets of accoutrements; medicines and surgical instruments &c for 5,000 men, 2,000 blankets’ (PRO, T 28/8). In December 1811 El Empecinado organized two regiments of mounted Cazadores of Madrid and of Guadalajara. From 1812 his troops became part of the regular army, and Diez was made a brigadier-general.

Xavier Mina, El Estudiante (‘the Student’), was only 18 when his father was arrested and the family estate in Navarra plundered during 1808. He procured a musket and a cartridge box, and with a few dozen men formed a guerrilla band in the mountains, ‘distinguished by a red riband in their hats, and a red collar to their jackets’ (Williams). His party soon grew to 1,200 men; but on 31 March 1809 Xavier Mina was captured by the French, and his band dissolved.

GUERRILLAS RETREAT AFTER AN ATTACK ON A CONVOY (opposite)

Up to half of the guerrillas would stay hidden in reserve by the sides of the road. If French relief troops arrived, the attacking guerrillas would run back into the sides of the road. French troops starting to pursue the guerrillas would be suddenly stopped by a volley from the hidden men. The startled French would hesitate until they regrouped, allowing the guerrillas to make their getaway. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
Francisco Espoz y Mina was Xavier Mina’s uncle and had served in Doyle’s Tiradores before joining his nephew’s band. Following Xavier’s capture, Espoz y Mina rallied some of his men, and went on to become one of the most outstanding of the guerrilla leaders. Colonel Don Lorenzo Xeminez reported that:

The French call Mina the King of Navarre... He never takes either a regular soldier, or a regular bred officer, into his corps... Whenever a volunteer of infantry joins Mina, he is not allowed to bring anything but a pair of sandals, half-stockings, breeches, and jacket... His arms are all rusty on the outside, but he is particularly careful to have them well cleaned within, and good locks and flints: his bayonets are encrusted with the blood of Frenchmen ... he ordered all his men to put three musket-balls in each of their pieces ... His cavalry, at this time, consisted of 150 intrepid and valiant men, dressed like hussars, with jacket and blue pantaloons; caps (shakos) like the rest of the army with this difference, that they have about a yard of red cloth hanging down their backs, in a point from the cap, and a gold tassel at the end. All of them wear sandals and spurs; and Mina himself never wears boots, or half-boots, but sandals, in order the more easily to escape, by climbing up the side of mountains, if he gets knocked off his horse...

(Annual Register, 1811)

By 1810 Mina had raised three infantry battalions of 1,000 men each, the battalions of Alava. Some of the cloth, powder and weapons were bought in France and smuggled in by bribing French Customs officials, and other supplies were British. In July 1811 James Johnson distributed some to ‘El Pastor, commanding the Volunteers of Guipuzcoa (Guipuzcoa), to the number of 500, subject to the command of Mina... I gave them 100 muskets, 50 sabres, 10,000 ball cartridges, 5,000 pistol cartridges, 30 pistols, 1,000 flints, our pouches not being calculated for the sort of warfare carried on by the Guerrillas, he refused to take any’ (PRO, WO 1/261). By his own account, Mina eventually raised, disciplined and maintained nine infantry and two cavalry regiments amounting to 13,500 men. From 1813, Mina exchanged the role of guerrilla leader for that of a leading general in the

GUERRILLAS ATTACK A FRENCH DISPATCH RIDER, C. 1810 (opposite)

The relatively mundane job of carrying dispatches performed by junior officers on the staff of armies soon became a most dangerous occupation in Spain. In this case, an officer with his escort of the Polish Lancers of the Imperial Guard is set upon by guerrillas on a mountain road in northern Spain. (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
regular forces, and his troops became a regular division of the army. From 1809 to 1814 he lost some 5,000 men, but reckoned that he had cost the enemy about 26,000 killed and wounded and 14,000 prisoners.

SPANISH ROYAL CORPS OF ARTILLERY, 1812–15

(Left) Gunner, foot artillery, 1812–15. With the wide-topped shako and red-faced dark blue uniform, foot artillery gunners resembled their French counterparts. The horse artillery was to have the same shako and coatee, but with blue trousers strapped with leather. (Centre) Driver, artillery train, 1813–15. The artillery train battalions were also given a uniform reminiscent of the French train. (Right) Captain, foot artillery, 1812–15. Everything here is according to regulations, including the newly adopted shako. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Don Julian Sanchez, born in Salamanca, became a guerrilla leader in Old Castille. He ‘first began his career as a pig-boy, but owing to some cruelties exercised on a branch of his family by the French, he took an inveterate hatred to them’ and sought revenge. He waged a ‘war to the death’ with about 500 lancers on the plains of Leon, and was in regular communication with Wellington, to whom he sent captured despatches and valuable intelligence. His renown increased as did ‘his sanguinary feats, and gradually collected a small band, then a body, and eventually commanded upwards of twenty thousand guerrillas, well armed, and equipped with British arms and accoutrements, and who rendered more assistance to the cause of the British than all the Spanish troops besides’, according to Rifleman Edward Costello.

Sanchez’s band was certainly much smaller than Costello’s quoted figure, but probably numbered several thousands. During one especially daring ambush he captured the French governor of Ciudad Rodrigo. In November 1812, Rifleman Costello ‘saw Don Julian Sanchez, the noted Guerrilla leader, linked in arm with the Duke (of Wellington)’. Don Julian was described as having a ‘square well-set figure, dark scowl and flashing eyes of the Guerrilla’. Another British officer, Captain William Bragge, saw him near Salamanca in June 1812 and wrote that ‘The Don himself wears a Pelisse like the 16th (British Light) Dragoons with an immense Hussar Cap and the Eagle of Napoleon reversed. In this dress, accompanied by two aides de camp equally genteel in Appearance, Twelve Lancers, a Trumpeter in scarlet on a grey Horse...’ By then, his infantry were ‘in English Clothing and the Cavalry, both Horse and Man, completely armed and equipped in the Spoils of the Enemy, so that it is next to impossible to distinguish Friend from Foe’.

When first organized from 1808 Sanchez’s lancers had wide-brimmed black hats, grey jackets with red collars and cuffs, brass buttons, yellow lace at the chest buttonholes and edging the collar and cuffs, a red sash, grey or buff breeches, and blue housings edged yellow; they were armed with a lance, sabre and pistols. Later on they wore captured blue and crimson uniforms of Napoleon’s Imperial Guard Polish Lancers. In 1811 some were seen by Kincaid wearing ‘cocked hats with broad white lace round the edges, yellow coats with many more than buttonholes, red facings, breeches of various colours, and no stockings but a sort of shoe on the foot with a spur attached. Their arms were as various as their colours; some with lances, some with carbines...’.

Geronimo Merino, El Cura, was indeed a ‘parish priest’. Revolted by the wanton brutality of the French, he raised a band which became the most famous in Old Castille. In July 1810, his men caused over 200 casualties to the 43rd and 44th Naval Battalions in an ambush near Soria; and in October they captured a vast convoy, depriving the French troops in Burgos of supplies for weeks.
ARTILLERY

The Real Cuerpo de Artillería (Royal Corps of Artillery) was organized as a corps in 1710. It consisted of specialist officers assisted by a group of Estado Mayor de Artillería (Artillery General Staff) officers, and a large and varied establishment in Europe and of many other units of the corps posted in the overseas colonies. The corps in the Spanish Peninsula had five battalions, which was raised to six in 1793. Reorganized into five regiments in 1802, two companies of horse artillery were also created per regiment. The corps was reduced to four regiments in 1806. Each regiment had two battalions and each battalion had four companies of foot and one of horse artillery, this amounting to 40 batteries with a theoretical 240 guns. There were also 15 companies of regular garrison artillery to serve fortress artillery, five companies of obreros de maestranza (artisans) and an establishment of invalids. The corps oversaw 74 companies of disciplined militia artillery in various locations in Spain, and four of urban militia artillery in Cartagena, Cadiz, La Coruña and San Sebastian. It was also responsible for 150 Gentlemen-Cadets at the Artillery Military Academy housed in the Alcazar castle at Segovia.

The quality of the officers, the men and their guns was generally considered quite good, but the proportion of artillery to the rest of the army was insufficient by 1807–08. Some batteries actually had only four rather than the six guns called for on the establishment. By 1808 the movement of the guns was very slow and still mainly dependent on inadequate hired mule trains. This had been normal in Europe during the 1790s, but Napoleon’s creation of militarized artillery trains put the Spanish army at a disadvantage.

In 1808 the Royal Corps of Artillery had its four regiments in Spain, apart from batteries detached in Denmark, 15 garrison companies in various cities, brigades in Mallorca, Ceuta and the Canary Islands, the academy at Segovia and the corps General Staff. Another large part of the corps was in America and the Philippines. The French invasion and occupation of the Iberian Peninsula brought considerable disorganization to the corps which, although repeatedly transformed, continued to exist as a fighting force in spite of enormous difficulties over supplies, arms and training. While some companies of the corps and its general staff ceased to exist, many new units came into being, such as the Brigade Maniobrera consisting of three horse batteries raised in Sevilla from October 1808. Indeed, many of the corps’ disorganized companies reorganized themselves into mounted batteries serving with the regional forces. Others were part of volunteer units, such as the units raised in Cadiz, but were not part of the corps as such.

By 1810 most of the country was occupied by the French but, in late December, a fifth regiment was nevertheless organized on the island of Mallorca. In March 1811 the horse artillery was organized into four squadrons, while the five regiments were now solely composed of foot artillery. In April
1811 the corps was renamed Cuerpo Nacional de Artillería (National Corps of Artillery) by the Cortes in Cádiz, but the ‘Royal’ style continued to be used.

A closer look into Spanish artillerymen’s uniform gives us some insight into Spanish Army modes of dress at the time. The uniform of the foot batteries consisted of a blue coat with blue lapels and cuff flaps, a scarlet collar with

SPANISH TROOPERS, 1814–15

(Left) Trooper, Voluntarios de Madrid Cavalry Regiment. By the later part of the war most if not all cavalry regiments had given up bicornees for shakos or helmets. (Centre) Colonel, Mallorca Infantry Regiment. The 1815 register records a blue coatee and pantaloons with scarlet lapels and cuffs; white collar and turnbacks; piping of opposite colours, and brass buttons. (Right) Fusilier, Castropol Infantry Regiment. The regiment was issued with this uniform on 8 April 1814. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
yellow grenade, scarlet cuffs and turnbacks and scarlet piping edging the lapels and cuff flaps; brass buttons; a blue waistcoat piped scarlet; blue breeches and knee-length black gaiters, later replaced by blue pantaloons and short gaiters. From 1808 to December 1811 the official headgear was the bicorné with yellow lace and a red plume, but illustrations, notably by Goddard and Booth, also show round hats with the brim turned up at the front or the side. Another English print by J. Booth shows the bicorné edged yellow, but the coatee lapels are red; this may have been a colourist’s error, but there might be a basis to some detachments of Spanish artillery having red lapels. When on Mallorca in 1812, Lieutenant Woolcombe noted the uniform of the artillery as ‘blue jackets and red facings (lapels), cuff and cape (collar)’. This would have been the 5th Regiment of the corps formed from December 1810.

The 1808 artillery regulations permitted the wear in warm climates of ‘waistcoats, breeches or pantaloons of white linen...and a coat of the same material with the cuffs and other distinctions as on the (blue woollen) uniform’ of the corps. This was merely putting into regulations a practice which went back several decades.

In principle the horse batteries wore the same uniform as the foot companies, except that they had short-tailed coatees instead of coats. However, there were variations. The Maniobrera Brigade, for instance, had silver lace edging the lapels, white metal buttons and black leather caps with a black crest with brass fittings and a red plume. Others appear to have had fur busbies.

Officers had the same uniform, but of finer material with a gold collar grenade, epaulettes, lace and button. Their bicorné hats were laced with gold, and their shakos had gold lace and cords.

Volunteer artillery units did not belong to the Royal Corps and had their own uniforms.

CAVALRY

The Spanish cavalry had the painful honour of consistently being the worst of a bad bunch in the Spanish Army. Known for being ill-trained and unreliable, the cavalry generally contributed little to what military successes Spain gleaned during the early 1800s.

From 1787 Spanish heavy cavalry regiments each had three squadrons: each squadron had three companies, and each company had an establishment of 70 men by 1793. Dragoons had 60 men per company. The official establishment was 670 men and 540 horses, but actual strength was often lower. In 1800 the heavy cavalry regiments had 9,878 men, 869 short; the dragoons had 4,129 men, missing 183. This situation became worse, however, after 1802.

From 30 January 1803, all heavy and light cavalry regiments were to have the same organization and establishment. Each regiment had five squadrons,
of two companies, with a total of ten companies. Each company had one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, one first sergeant, two second sergeants, four corporals, four second corporals, one trumpeter, four carabiniers or elite troopers, 38 mounted troopers, 13 dismounted troopers. Each regiment had a staff of eight field officers, four standard bearers, a marshal major, a chaplain, a surgeon, a trumpet major, a kettle-drummer, a master saddler, a master armourer and a picador. Light cavalry regiments had the same organization, lacking only the four standard bearers and the kettle-drummer. In 1808, each of the 24 regiments should have had 700 men, but in fact the total amounted to only 14,440 troopers with 9,500 horses.

The organization of cavalry regiments changed once again on 1 October 1808. Each regiment was now to have four squadrons, each of three companies. Each company had one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, four corporals, one trumpeter, 42 mounted troopers, and 11 dismounted troopers. Each regiment had a staff of eight field officers, four standard bearers, a marshal major, a chaplain, a surgeon, a trumpet major, a kettle-drummer and a picador. On 30 January 1809, the establishment of troopers per company was raised to 81. On 23 April 1809, just to keep administrators on their toes, the composition was changed to eight corporals, 48 mounted troopers and 11 dismounted. The staff had nine field officers, four standard bearers, a marshal major, a chaplain, a surgeon, a trumpet major, a kettle-drummer, a master saddler, a master armourer and a picador. On 15 July 1809, each regiment was reduced by one squadron; but by then all this was largely theoretical.

From 1808 many new squadrons of heavy and light cavalry were raised or reorganized from older formations. The deficiencies in men and horses often...
GUERRILLA CAVALRY OF DON JULIAN SANCHEZ, 1810–12

(Right) Colonel Don Julian Sanchez. (Left) Lancer. Sanchez’s lancers usually had wide-brimmed black hats with red plumes or black shakos, grey or blue, or blue-grey jackets with red collar and cuffs, brass buttons or hook and eyes, broad yellow lace at the chest buttonholes, red sash, grey or blue trousers. (Centre) Lancer officer (back view). (Richard Hook © Osprey Publishing)
meant a much lower actual strength; only one squadron was actually mounted, the two others serving on foot as infantry. Yet new units also appeared, including many of line cavalry (such as the Voluntarios de Sevilla, Voluntarios de Ciudad Rodrigo, Carabineros Reales de Extremadura, Perseguidos de Andalucía, 2nd Alcántara, Cruzada de Alberquerque, 2nd Santiago, Cuenca, and the 2nd Algarve); of dragoons (Cáceres, Castilla, Madrid, Granada, 2nd Luisitania, and Soria); of cazadores (Granada, Valencia, Sevilla, Fuen-Santa, Sagrario de Toledo, Mantuán de Córdoba, 1st and 2nd Squadrons of Francos de Castilla, Navarra, Mancha, Ubrique, Jaén, Galicia, and Madrid); of hussars (1st and 2nd Extremadura, Granada, Daroca later Aragón, San Narciso later Cataluña, Ríoja, Iberia, Navarra, Francos de Castilla, Burgos, and Numantinos); of mounted grenadiers (Fernando VII, and Galicia), of cuirassiers (Coraceros Españoles), and of lancers (Utrera, 1st Castilla, and Legion Estremerena).

On 6 April 1811, a regulation from the Cortes in Cádiz tried to organize the multitude of units, and decreed that the regular cavalry would consist of 12 regiments of heavy cavalry (Rey, Reina, Príncipe, Infante, Borbón, Faresio, Alcántara, España, Algarve, Calatrava, Santiago, and Montesa); ten of dragoons (Rey, Reina, Almansa, Pavía, Villaviciosa, Sagunto, Numancia, Luisitania, Granada, and Madrid); four of cazadores (Olivenza, Voluntarios de España, Sevilla, and Valencia); and four of hussars (Extremadura, Españoles, Granada, and Fernando VII).

There were also regular provincial squadrons: one of heavy cavalry (Cuenca), one of cazadores (Ubrique), one of dragoons (Soria) and five of hussars (Cataluña, Aragón, Galicia, Cantabria, and Castilla). In addition to these units there were also the Coraceros Españoles, and some of the larger guerrilla groups also maintained cavalry units, such as the Iberia Hussars raised by El Medico. It is impossible to list all units; but those mentioned below will give an idea of the diversity of the Spanish cavalry corps serving between 1808 and 1812.

**Dragones del General Company**

Formed by General Joaquín Blake after General Cuesta’s defeat at Medina de Rioseco on 14 July 1808, with survivors of the Colorados de Buenos Aires Battalion (see below), who were best suited for mounted service. They dressed in typical South American ‘gaucho’ style with the poncho-like chirispas, and when on patrol would try to rope French soldiers with their lazos. The dragoons fought at Astorga, Tamaros and Ciudad Rodrigo, after which the troop was dissolved, the remaining men being sent back to Montevideo in 1812.

**Cazadores de Olivenza**

With four squadrons in Valencia in 1808 totalling 37 officers and 558 men, they fought the French in many engagements including Bailen and Tudela, and were
A rough impression of the dress purportedly worn for a time by some of the Spanish lancers of Don Julian Sanchez's band - captured (at least partial) uniforms of the Polish lancers of the French Imperial Guard, in blue faced with crimson. Sanchez was one of the most feared guerrilla leaders; raised in Salamanca during 1808, his band waged a relentless struggle against the French, no quarter being asked or given. Besides practising guerrilla warfare, the unit participated in the defence of Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810, and fought at the battles of Salamanca (Los Arapiles), Vittoria and San Marial. (Rene Chartrand)

nearly wiped out at Maria. They were reconstituted in three squadrons and saw action again from November 1809 in Barcelona and Valencia province. Part of the regiment helped form the Granada Hussars in June 1808, the Coraceros Españoles in July 1810, and the Cazadores de Valencia in March 1811. Transferred to Mallorca in April 1811, two squadrons landed at Alicante in 1812, and one remained at Mallorca, but all three were in the Peninsula in 1813 campaigning in General Whittingham's Mallorca Division. They became the Costa de Granada Line Cavalry Regiment on 1 December 1814.

**Extremadura Hussars**

The Maria Luisa Hussars were amalgamated to form the 1st and 2nd Extremadura Hussars (raised in 1808) and later united into Extremadura Hussars. Uniform was an all sky blue dolman, a scarlet pelisse and pantaloons, with pewter buttons, white cords, and emerald green housings edged white.

**San Narcisso/Cataluña Hussars**

Raised from 15 December 1809 as San Narcisso Hussars during the siege of Gerona, their name was later changed to Cataluña Hussars, and they were incorporated into the Numancia Dragoons on 1 October 1814. Uniform was an all sky blue dolman, a green pelisse edged with brown fur, yellow cords, brass buttons, a scarlet and yellow hussar sash, sky blue breeches, and a tall, visored, conical black cap with a white wing edged scarlet and a red plume.
FUSILIERS AND CAVALRY, 1813–14

(Left) Fusilier, Walloon Guards, 1813. Note the belly belt for cartridges. (Centre) Trooper, Fernando VII Hussars, 1813–14. In late August 1812, clothing for a hussar regiment was shipped from England to Gibraltar. It was not until about late March or April 1813 that this unit finally received its new uniforms at Alicante. (Right) Trooper, Catalan Lancers of Baron d’Eroles, 1813. D’Erole’s cavalry had Tarleton helmets and all-green uniforms. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Guardias de Corps

The Life Guards (raised 1704) consisted of four cavalry companies, the 1st Spanish, the 2nd Italian, the 3rd Flemish and the 4th American (raised 27 January 1795), each of 225 officers and troopers including two trumpeters and a kettle-drummer. They were reduced to three companies of 180 men in 1803 following the disbandment of the Flemish company. From 1797 to 1803, there was also a

SPANISH CUIRASSIER AND FUSILIERS, 1810–11

(Left) Trooper, Coraceros Espanoles, 1810–11. The uniform was a red coatee with green collar and cuffs, white piping and turnbacks, pewter buttons, white pantaloons, black high boots and a white cape. The white sheepskins were edged with red ‘wolfsteeth’, and the green housings with white lace. (Centre and right) Infantry fusiliers, northern Spain, 1810. The Shakos, sent from England, had cockades but no plates. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Brigada de Artillería Volante of 67 officers and light artillerymen with eight light cannon in the Life Guards. Officers of the Life Guards ranked as colonels in the line cavalry, NCOs ranked as captains and lieutenants, and troopers as ensigns or gentlemen cadets.

All in all, there were scores of cavalry units of all sizes and descriptions, until 1814. Some of these were fleeting corps about which there is little on record. Others would change names or designations, e.g. becoming hussars after starting out as heavy cavalry, or vice-versa.

On 1 December 1814, a new ‘provisional’ organization of the cavalry streamlined the many corps down to 16 heavy cavalry regiments, three of mounted cazadores, and three of hussars. All were to have five squadrons each of two companies, each company having four officers and 58 troopers. The heavy cavalry regiments were as follows: Rey, Reina, Principe, Infante, Borbon, Farnesio, Alcantara, Espana, Algarve, Calatrava, Santiago, Montesa, Costa de Granada, Voluntarios de Espana, Legion Estremena and Coraceros Espanoles. Rey and Reina were henceforth also equipped as cuirassier regiments. The mounted cazadores were: Madrid, Guadalajara and Burgos. The hussars were: Espanoles, Estramadura (Bailen from 15 June 1815) and Iberia.

Other units continued to exist but were to be altered or disbanded later. For instance, the Cazadores de Sevilla were sent to America as the Cazadores del Rey. Already existing were the eight dragoon regiments: Rey, Reina, Alamanza, Pavia, Villaviciosa, Sagunto, Numancia and Lusitania.

Cavalry Uniforms

By the latter part of the Peninsular War, the dress of the Spanish cavalry had changed considerably. The long-tailed coats were generally replaced by coatees, often blue for cavalry and yellow for dragoons, with regimental facings at the collar, cuffs and turnbacks. Leather helmets with fur crests somewhat resembling the British Tarleton type were now used by many heavy cavalry and dragoon regiments. Mounted cazadores had emerald green dolmans with shakos, and hussars wore various colours with fur busbies or shakos. Besides breeches, all generally had grey overalls strapped with leather and striped with the facing colour.

The Peninsula veteran G. R. Gleig left a fine impression in The Subaltern of some elements of this cavalry, seen on campaign near San Sebastian in August 1813: ‘... some were arrayed in green jackets, with slouched hats and long feathers, others in blue, helmeted with Tarleton helmets like our yeomanry or artillery drivers, whilst not a few wore cuirasses and brazen head pieces such as they had plundered from their slaughtered enemies ...’. Gleig thought them imposing, and admired their ‘... loose and independent march’, adding that they were well mounted.
1815 and after

As the era of the Napolenic Wars came to a close, the Spanish Army performed one of its periodic shake-ups. On 2 March 1815, a massive reorganization of the Spanish Army reduced the number of infantry line regiments to 47 and the number of light regiments to 12, nearly all units being amalgamated into the pre-1808 ‘old’ regiments. Each now had two battalions, each with a company of grenadiers, a company of cazadores and six of fusiliers. The company organization remained the same as in 1812, but there were now only two drummers (or buglers), four second corporals and 48 privates. The cavalry also went through a reorganization from the end of 1814, the most notable effect of the inevitable reductions being the cutting of the number of dragoon regiments to five from 1 June 1815. There were four regiments of hussars, four of mounted cazadores, 15 of heavy cavalry including three of cuirassiers, and two of lancers. From 1815 infantry and cavalry alike adopted a new and elaborate system of uniforms.

The revolutions that broke out in Spain’s colonies in South America and Mexico drew many troops across the Atlantic. On 12 May 1815 many regiments raised in Spain during the Peninsular War, as well as old regiments, were allocated to the Americas. These were renamed segundo regimiento of their name, or even given another name. Thus the Leon Regiment was the 2nd Leon in Colombia, while the Murcia Regiment became the 1st Americano in Mexico. In 1818 the term segundo was replaced by the more appropriate expeditionarios (expeditionary) to avoid confusion.
The Army of King Joseph-Napoleon

A factor of the Emperor Napoleon’s ‘Grand Plan’ for regenerating Spain was the imposition of his brother Joseph as King of Spain and the Indies. Joseph was not entirely thrilled with the idea, being already happy as King of Naples, but he nevertheless bowed to his imperial brother’s will and started for Spain in June 1808. The reception he received from the Spaniards was equally unenthusiastic. News of the disastrous defeat of the French Army under General Dupont at Bailen obliged Joseph and his staff to evacuate Madrid in July. By the end of the year Napoleon had to march into Spain with an army of 200,000 men. Madrid was taken in December, and King Joseph was installed once again.

From December 1808 steps were taken to organize for Joseph a ‘Spanish’ army along French lines. French officers and men were transferred to the new force, and Napoleon made sure that the most senior regiments of his brother’s Guard were French. Recruiting Spaniards to serve the French cause was no easy task. The effective strength of Joseph’s army is open to conjecture, estimates varying from less than 6,000 to over 17,000 men. Of these, about half were actually French or of other nationalities; most of the rest were Spaniards forcibly impressed into the ranks. The quality and loyalty of such an army could not be high. Soldiers deserted at the first opportunity, fully equipped, to a guerrilla band. Indeed, a common joke was that Joseph was the clothier of the guerrillas. Some of King Joseph’s Spanish troops served faithfully, but French generals always doubted their reliability. It is of interest to note that the Count de Teba, a Spanish officer of the Guard light artillery, remained loyal to Joseph and found refuge in France; and four decades later his daughter Eugenie became the Empress of France.

It was a transformed army in a deeply perturbed country, largely ruined by the War of Independence – as the Spanish call the Peninsular War. Spain’s previous eminence as a naval power was no more, and thus she lost much of her influence in world affairs. Much of her vast colonial empire was gone by the mid-1820s. Internal politics also remained turbulent, with liberals and conservatives confronting one another in a repetitive cycle of civil wars, which would once again draw French and British soldiers – many of them veterans of the Napoleonic campaigns – south of the Pyrenees.
PORTUGAL

OVERVIEW
General Andoche Junot disbanded the Portuguese Army during his occupation of the country in 1807, and it was not resurrected until in 1809, when Wellington assigned General William Beresford the task of raising and organizing new units that were then incorporated into British brigades. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese officers were badly paid and had no opportunity for advancement. A man could remain a captain for literally decades. William Warre, a Portuguese-born British officer, noted in 1808 that the Portuguese were ‘... cowards who won’t fight a one-sixteenth of a Frenchman with arms, but plunder and murder the wounded ...’

The following year he found the men ‘... well enough, very obedient, willing, and patient, but also naturally dirty and careless of their persons ... The Officers ... are detestable, mean, ignorant ...’

Beresford found the army numbering half its establishment, with only 30,000 instead of nearly 60,000. Among the many measures introduced by Beresford was the institution of printed daily general orders to keep the army well informed and under strict regulation. Over the next five years countless improvements were daily ordered. Some of the most important measures included the creation of recruiting depots; the reopening of the military academy; the reorganisation of all units and service corps; the distribution of new weapons and equipment; the grouping of the line infantry regiments into brigades, and their dispersal among the divisions of Wellington’s British army; and the creation of a more effective logistic organisation. On 1 February 1810 the soldiers’ pay was raised and a campaign bonus was instituted. These measures had a most beneficial effect on morale – for the first time in living memory wages were actually being paid more or less on time, with less swindling by treasury officials.

Scores of British officers were detached to serve in integrated cadres; for instance, if the colonel of a Portuguese regiment was British his lieutenant-colonel would be Portuguese, and vice-versa. Drill and battalion manoeuvres were made as similar as possible to those in use in the British army. Words of command were given in English as well as Portuguese so that the men would understand
both immediately; this was vital in battle, where Portuguese and British units were brigaded together. The British soldier of the day was not overly inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to foreign armies, but many were impressed by the response of the Portuguese to these reforms. At Thomar in December 1809 Surgeon Boutflower recorded that the ‘soldier-like manner in which they went through their evolutions astonished the English officers’. They deployed in two ranks like the British troops, and their volley fire became just as murderous and steady as that of Wellington’s redcoats. Years later, Baron Marbot of the French Army wrote that firepower had been the greatest cause of the success of British troops in the Peninsula, adding that Portuguese troops were in no way inferior to the British.

Traditionally many Portuguese noblemen considered their officers’ commissions as a birthright. Many were too elderly, vain, ignorant and conservative to be of any use to their country. The new measures which were instituted to improve their professionalism struck the officer corps like a whirlwind. Officers were now suddenly expected to give the utmost exertions in the field; to be continually educating themselves in their profession; to take good care of their men, not only ensuring that they were properly provided for but even seeing that they kept themselves clean and had their clothes mended. Negligent officers would be severely chastized. For example, in April 1811 the officers of the 3rd and 15th Infantry were humiliatingly reprimanded in general orders for imperfect discipline, and those of the 2nd Infantry for their men’s unsatisfactory appearance. Predictably, a proportion of older officers resigned their commissions – and were quickly replaced by eager, energetic younger men.

By 1812 a number of British observers commented that the Portuguese were fine soldiers and in some cases fought on a par with their British counterparts, and Wellington would call them ‘the fighting cocks of the army’. As early as at Busaco in 1810 Schaumann remarked how ‘The Portuguese fought with conspicuous courage ... They behaved just like English troops’. Apart from the regular soldiers there were the mule-drivers and camp-followers, who gained a dreadful reputation for pillaging and the murder of French wounded after battle. Unlike the infantry, the Portuguese cavalry and siege train never improved. A shortage of horses plagued the former and obsolete equipment the latter.
The Portuguese contribution to the war was important, and while it is natural to think of Wellington's army as 'British', it is only right to observe that by 1810 it was nearly half Portuguese. Beresford performed his task well, and his soldiers made a solid contribution to the Allied victory.

PORTUGUESE ARMY, 1808–15

(Left) Trooper, Corps of Mounted Guides, 1808–14. (Centre) Captain, Quartermaster-General's Department, 1806–15. The uniform was the same as for other General Staff officers. Our figure shows the complete uniform and rank distinctions according to the 1806 regulations, with gold-laced hat and white-over-red plume. (Right) Aide-de-camp, c. 1811–15. This figure illustrates the regulation uniform of the time. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The British also supplied huge material aid to Portugal, in a similar manner as it had done to Spanish forces. Between 1796 and 1801 the shipments totalled some 32,500 muskets, 17,000 carbines (including 8,000 sergeants'), 6,300 pistols and 16,500 swords (including 3,500 for infantry and drummers), and 20 brass 12pdr field guns, with ammunition, accoutrements and equipments (PRO, WO 1/223). However, it was from 1808 that this British government aid became extraordinary; money, arms of all sorts, clothing, and equipments of all types were sent in great quantity.

To that end, in November 1808 Britain agreed to provide not only the money to pay 10,000 men, but also all arms, clothing and equipment for that number. This was doubled to 20,000 men in 1809, and increased yet again to 30,000 by January 1810 — in addition to providing the £130,000 necessary to increase the abysmal pay of Portuguese officers. It was, to quote the House of Commons papers, ‘a great and generous effort’ from an already much indebted British Treasury.

It was an extraordinarily expensive policy for a government already deep in debt whose spending was practically out of control due to military operations and support to other countries. It is therefore hardly surprising that in February 1809 the wisdom of further aid to Portugal was questioned in the House of Lords, raising the possibility of ‘the positive refusal’ of such aid ‘however visionary the project of defending Portugal by English money and English troops against the united forces of the whole Continent’. When it came to a vote the policy for further aid was carried by 124 to 94, which shows there were substantial reservations on the issue. Nevertheless, the aid to Portugal rose from £600,000 to £2,000,000. The opposition to such spending continued; and in 1812 Lord Castlereagh ruled that the value of all arms, clothing and equipments would henceforth be charged against the Portuguese subsidy.

Portugal still had to pay for her own regular troops above the 30,000 men paid by Britain, as well as the militia, the Ordenanza (the reserve; see below) and various other establishments, plus colonial troops and the navy. It was a tall order for a country with a modest peacetime economy which had been practically ruined by trade sanctions and repeated invasions. Revenue was moderate even from something as basic as the tax on salt cod — a staple element in the country’s diet — which brought in less than £30,000; so in spite of Britain’s open-handed aid there were real hardships due to lack of funds. Fortunately, this burden could be to some extent off-set against the wealth of Portugal’s colonies, especially Brazil, which could fund their own defence and naval expenses and also contributed towards the war effort in Europe. The reduction of the British subsidy in 1812 was a disappointment to the Portuguese government, but was balanced by increased revenue now that the war was finally being fought entirely outside the national borders. Some
Portuguese ministers started suggesting that the Portuguese army in the field should no longer be brigaded with British troops but should form a distinct corps. Wellington managed to counter this view, but it was an indication that British influence over Portuguese policy would, in time, come to an end.

ALBUERA
INFANTRY

The Portuguese Army was recruited by conscription rather than by volunteers or recruiting parties as in England. Conscripts were to serve six years in the regular army. The province was the general area for recruiting the conscripts, who were first drafted by the Ordenanza and then trained by the affiliated militia regiment. From 1806 the recruiting system was refined according to the three newly created military divisions of the country.

When the army was re-raised in 1808 the same recruiting system was employed, the Ordenanza brigades and militia regiments being recreated. On 15 December 1809, in order to complete the regiments, it was decreed that every man able to bear arms between 18 and 35 years of age (reduced to 30 from 1813) was to be drafted, with one tenth of them kept at the provincial depots in reserve. Initially the recruits were sent at once to their different regular regiments with very little or no basic training. What they learned with their regiments was better than nothing, but insufficient to create steady, well drilled and disciplined units.

Beresford therefore created, in May 1810, a central recruit depot for the line infantry and cazadores. The great coastal fortress of Peniche was selected and Colonel Blunt, seconded from the British 3rd Foot (The Buffs), was appointed inspector-general of the recruiting service. Officers and NCOs detached from the various regiments were posted to Peniche to drill and organize their men prior to sending them on to their units in the field. At Peniche they were clothed, fed and given basic training; this was important as these men, described on their arrival there as ‘depressed, half-starved, and ill-treated peasants’, would be expected to serve in concert with British units when they reached their regiments. The manual and words of command for the platoon exercise were now given in English and Portuguese together to ensure comprehension of orders throughout the united army. The results of the training regime were outstanding; but Peniche proved to be swampy and unhealthy for the recruits, and in 1811 the depot was moved to Mafra near Lisbon.

In early 1812 ‘the success of the Depot for infantry recruits at Mafra’ persuaded Beresford to organize a similar establishment for the cavalry at Salvatora, under the command of Colonel John Brown, formerly of the 5th Cavalry. The Portuguese cavalry could never be completed as a totally mounted force, but this depot trained the recruits and their young horses for those regiments that were ‘mounted in an efficient state’ with the army in the field. The efficiency of this recruiting system was proved by the fact that in barely two years the regular army effectively doubled to an establishment of some 55,000 men, the largest in Portugal’s history. Of this total some 30–35,000 were providing about a third to a half of Wellington’s field army.
In the last decades of the 18th century, the Portuguese line infantry had 26 regiments. These were not numbered but known by the name of the areas or towns to which they were attached; a few, such as Lippe or Freire, bore the names of prestigious officers. Under Marshal Lippe’s reforms, each infantry

PORTUGUESE FUSILIERS, 1809–10
(Right) Fusilier, infantry. To Marshal Beresford’s intense displeasure, grey cloth uniforms were sent from Britain in 1809. Our figure also wears an old 1806 shako. (Left) Fusilier, infantry. In late November 1809, 14,000 grey jackets, 20,000 grey trousers and 20,000 shakos with cockades were sent to Lisbon as ‘slop clothing for recruits’. (Centre) Fusilier, infantry. The infantry were also sent 6,000 blue jackets as ‘slop clothing’ in late November along with the grey trousers and the shakos. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
regiment had two battalions, each having seven companies. It was led by a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel and a major with a staff consisting of an adjutant, a quartermaster, a surgeon, six assistant surgeons, a drum-major, an armourer

PORTUGUESE INFANTRY, 1810–15

(Left) Grenadier sergeant, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 1813–15. Blue shoulder straps/epaulettes with fringes of mixed blue and piping colour were the official distinction of grenadiers from 1806; however, some units started using wings from about 1812–1813. (Centre) Officer, 13th Infantry Regiment, 1810–15. For cold weather officers had a blue double-breasted greatcoat with collar and cuffs of the regimental facing colour. (Right) Sapper, 16th Infantry Regiment, 1813–15. Sappers had the same distinctions as grenadiers – by this time blue wings with white worsted lace and fringes. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
and a provost. The 1st Battalion had a company of grenadiers and six companies of fusiliers; the 2nd Battalion had a light company and six fusilier companies. Of the 26 regiments, three (Estremos, Moura and 1st Braganza) had been sent to reinforce the garrison of Brazil in 1767, and remained overseas. So there remained 23 regiments in Portugal until the 24th, the Lisboa Regiment, was raised in 1797 from part of the personnel from two disbanded marine regiments.

In the 1790s each company had an establishment of 116 NCOs and privates but the actual strength, as we have typically found, was far lower. Following the ‘War of the Oranges’ of 1801 the infantry regiments were supposed to have ten companies of 150 men each. Each regiment was divided into two battalions of five companies each, one battalion having a grenadier company and the other a light company. Again, the actual strength was lower than establishment. The 1806 regulations introduced the numbering of the regiments; although known henceforth by their numbers, each continued the traditions of the original areas where they were first raised. Each regiment was now attached to one of the country’s three new military divisions:

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On 13 July 1808, the reorganized regiments were to have a single battalion of ten companies – eight of fusiliers, one each of grenadiers and light infantry. Each regiment had a staff consisting of: one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors,
two adjutants, one quartermaster (a senior NCO, the equivalent of a British sergeant-major), two brigade sergeants, two quartermaster sergeants, one chaplain, one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, one gunsmith for woodwork, one gunsmith for ironwork, six sappers, one drum-major, one drum-corporal, two fifers, a bandmaster and eight bandsmen. Each company had a captain, a lieutenant, two sub-lieutenants, six sergeants, six corporals, six lance-corporals, two drummers and 128 privates.

Naturally, the regiments were often below the establishment, although this improved over the years.

Some 21,094 men had rallied to the regiments by December 1808, but they had only 19,113 weapons and 6,912 uniforms. These, however, were new uniforms, as the men who still had old uniforms were not counted. Weapons were reported of 'various calibres to a great part of them, little fit for use, as well as the letheren belts'. From these beginnings British aid and Portuguese determination would produce one of the best infantries in Europe. By January 1811 the infantry had increased to an effective strength of about 36,000 men, only 1,200 short of its establishment strength. Following the Peninsular War, no regiments were disbanded, although the establishment was reduced to 24,264 infantry in late 1814 – only to be raised again to the old establishment of 37,248 on 21 October 1816.

Light Troops

On 7 August 1796, a new all-arms light corps was raised at the behest of – and under the command of – General Pedro de Almeida, Marquis de Alorna. Entitled Legiao de Tropas Ligeras (Legion of Light Troops), it consisted of a battalion of eight companies of infantry; three squadrons of cavalry, each having two companies; and a battery of horse artillery armed with four six-pounders, having 56 men and 40 horses. The establishment totalled 1,339 men. Sometimes called the 'Experimental Legion', it was trained according to Alorna's adaptation of French tactical manuals.

The experiment, however, remained isolated. The Legion was somewhat resented by the more conservative elements in the army, and was treated as a separate entity; the tactical novelties which it practised – and which were being adopted in other armies – largely failed to spread to the rest of the army. Perhaps the only concession that might be ascribed to its avocation of light troops' tactics was the formation of a light infantry company in each infantry regiment. On 7 July 1803, the battery of artillery was incorporated into the Corte Artillery Regiment. The Legion was little affected by the 1806 regulations and remained a very distinct corps. In any event, the French soon marched in and the Legion of Light Troops was disbanded on 22 December 1807. The pro-French Alorna and some of his officers and men formed the Portuguese Legion in French pay.
Thus in 1808 the Portuguese Army found itself totally without regular light infantry units. Light infantry would therefore have to be organized, equipped, armed, clothed and trained from scratch. Consequently the Portuguese general staff ordered the creation of a new light infantry arm to be called *cazadores*, the Portuguese word for hunters or chasseurs. It was hoped that with rigorous training in modern light infantry tactics the *cazadores* would become elite units within the army – a hope that was to be vindicated.

The first six battalions of *cazadores* were authorized to be raised on 14 October 1808. From 23 November 1809, each battalion was to have a staff of 23 officers and men consisting of: one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one paymaster, one adjutant-sergeant, one quartermaster sergeant, one chaplain, one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, one artisan, one gunsmith, one bugle-major, one bandmaster and eight bandsmen. Each company had one captain, one lieutenant, two sub-lieutenants or ensigns, one first sergeant, two second sergeants, one third sergeant, eight corporals, eight second or lance-corporals, two drummers, one bugler and 96 private soldiers, giving a total company establishment of 123 officers and men. Each battalion had four ordinary *cazadores* companies and one elite *tiradores* sharpshooters company. The five companies and battalion staff came to a total establishment of 628 officers and men. The officers and battalion cadres were organized as far as was possible during the next two months. As in the line infantry, each *cazadores* battalion was attached to a town or city. The 1st Battalion was assigned Castelo de Vide, the 2nd Moura, the 3rd Vila Real, the 4th Viseu, the 5th Campo Maior and the 6th Porto.

On 15 December 1808, the order to draft the men was issued, and it was quickly obeyed; many came from local volunteers. The 1st Battalion was formed with the Portalegre Volunteers Regiment in Alentejo province; the 2nd with part of the Transtagana Legion (Regiment of the Honoured Volunteers of Beja) in Alentejo; the 3rd was raised at Vila Real in Tras-os-Montes, the 4th at Viseu in Beira, the 5th with part of the Transtagana Legion at Campo Maior in Tras os Montes, and the 6th in Minho. All these were provinces on the north-eastern border with Spain, where the French were expected to attack next; men with a thorough knowledge of these rough mountainous areas were especially sought-after. Indeed, most Portuguese *cazadores* were mountaineers and men from small farms in the hills, familiar with hunting habits and experienced in handling guns since childhood.

Some 2,419 men had joined the *cazadores* within two weeks, but there were barely enough arms for half of them, and only part of one regiment reported uniforms in wear. During 1809 the number of *cazadores* climbed to about ‘3,000 chasseurs’, and stayed at that level for a couple of years. In April 1810, there were a total of 3,018, of whom 2,366 were ‘present and fit for duty’
(PRO, WO 1/244). This was below the establishment strength, which is not surprising. However, it must be remembered that there were also the two stronger battalions of the Loyal Lusitanian Legion (a British-sponsored all-arms legion formed in 1808), which were considered part of the light troops. The cazadores battalions were trained according to British light infantry manuals which were translated into Portuguese by William Warre, Marshal Beresford’s ADC.

The good services of the cazadores, who quickly made themselves a reputation as daring elite troops, and the increased need for light infantry, brought about a consolidation and an increase in the establishment of such units. On 20 April 1811, a decree created six additional battalions, to have the same establishment as previously. The Loyal Lusitanian Legion was disbanded to form three battalions: the 7th formed in Guarda, the 8th in Trancoso and the 9th at Lamego. The recruiting area of these three battalions was the province of Beira. The 10th was raised in Aveiro from volunteers in the Porto District. The 11th was raised at Feira, and was said to be ‘composed of fine healthy lads from the northern provinces’, who ‘were in as fine order as any troops in the world’ when they passed through Coimbra in March 1812. The 12th Battalion was raised at Ponte de Lima with recruits from the province of Minho.

The cazadores went on to earn ever greater distinction. In the final years of the war, in 1813 and 1814, the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 9th battalions fought on the Nivelle and Nive rivers, at Bayonne and Toulouse. By then they were considered elite light troops by both the British and the French. For instance, Lt Woodberry noted that the 2nd Cazadores were on picket duty guarding the general headquarters in January 1814, showing Wellington’s great confidence in these troops. When the battalions returned from France to Portugal they were all

Cazadores, Royal Volunteers of the Prince, 1815–16: detail from a print after J. B. Debret. The uniform of the four cazadores battalions was inspired by those in Portugal but made somewhat simpler, without black cords. The jacket was brown with a single row of black buttons in front and black turnbacks, green wings, the collar and cuffs of various battalion facings (yellow is shown in this print); white pantaloons, black gaiters, shako with brass bugle badge and green plume, and black accoutrements. (Rene Chartrand)
assigned new HQ and depot locations. The 1st was assigned Portalegre, the 2nd Tomar, the 3rd Vila Real, the 4th Penamacor, the 5th Miranda do Douro, the 6th Penafiel, the 7th Guarda, the 8th Trancoso, the 9th Sao Pedro do Sul, the 10th Aveiro, the 11th Feira, and the 12th Ponte de Lima.

PORTUGUESE CAZADORES, 1808–15

(Left) Fusilier, 3rd Cazadores, 1808–09. This unit was apparently the first to be fairly well uniformed and armed from the time of its raising in late 1808. (Centre) Drummer, 5th Cazadores, c. 1810–15. Musicians had regimental uniforms with distinctive lace edging the collar and cuffs. (Right) Fusilier, 6th Cazadores, c. 1810–15. This was the standard dress worn by the cazadores during their campaigns with Wellington which took them from Portugal to France. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Auxiliary Forces

Besides the regular forces, there were reserves whose origins went back to the Middle Ages. However, it was King Joao IV’s decrees in the 1640s that were really the background to the auxiliary troops existing at the time of the Napoleonic Wars.

PORTUGUESE SPECIALIST TROOPS, 1806–15

(Left) Officer, Royal Corps of Engineers, 1806–15. From 1806 the uniform of the corps included a blue coat with black collar and cuffs, white breeches in summer and blue in winter, and bicorne hat. (Centre) Private, Company of Artificers, 1806–10. The barretina shako had a white metal bottom band with black letters ‘ARCM’. (Right) Officer, Royal Arsenal, c. 1806–15. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
These troops were the militia, the volunteers and the Ordenanza. Between them they could mobilize every adult male able to bear arms, between the ages of 17 and 60, of every social class and condition anywhere in Portugal.

From 1641, militia units were formed into regiment-like Terzos de Auxiliares with an establishment of 600 men each. These units were based in the main centres, and were known by the names of their current commanders as well as their location, e.g. Terzo Auxiliar do Mestre de Campo José Cardoso de Carvalho, do Porto. – this city, for instance, had three such units. From 1796, Regimento de Milicia was the term used and the Mestre de Campo was henceforth known as the colonel.

The militia, like the regular units, was also raised by conscription and ‘formed of such of the inhabitants, capable of bearing arms, as can be taken from agricultural employments with the least inconvenience’. The officers were from the local gentry and veteran officers were especially sought after. Each militia regiment was based in the same recruiting region as the regular infantry regiments. By October 1807 the country had been divided up into the 48 areas, replacing and potentially greatly augmenting the previous militia force. However, the French came into the country before it was totally set up and ready for war. The French disbanded the militia regiments on 22 January 1808.

On 20 December 1808, the militia was formally ordered re-raised, at the 1806 establishment of 48 regiments totalling 52,848 officers and men. Each nine-company regiment was to have a staff, a grenadier company, and two battalions each of four fusilier companies. The establishment consisted of a colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, one major, two adjutants, one quartermaster, two colour bearers, one drum-major and two fifers. Each company had a captain, a lieutenant, two ensigns, four sergeants, eight corporals, eight lance-corporals, one drummer and 121 privates. Each regiment was to have 1,101 officers and men.

In Lisbon, the militia units were reorganized according to special tactical needs. On 10 June 1810, two ‘national battalions of artillery’ were created from the two Lisbon infantry units as auxiliaries to the regular gunners; each battalion was to have a staff of six officers and eight companies each having 76 officers and men, making a total of 1,228. The battalions of Oriental and Occidental Lisbon were organized as light infantry sharpshooters and by 1814 became known as ‘national cazadores’. There was also a battalion of Chaves Militia Grenadiers and a battalion of Chaves Cazadores from 1811 to 1812, as well as several independent militia companies at Viana, Valenza, Chaves, Beira, etc.

The militia regiments could be called out – but only one battalion at a time – for periods of two to six months, usually for garrison duties. It was seldom that the complete regiment would be embodied. When mobilized, it was usually to
replace regulars for garrison duties or to escort prisoners, although some militia units occasionally served in the field. During 1809 and 1810 many regiments lacked officers, arms and clothing, and most had not managed to organize their second battalions. The militiamen were said to have initially ‘displayed a want of steadiness, but they have since much improved’ and were now found to be ‘very useful in the present war’, according to the 1811 Annual Register. During the 1810 French invasion, the following regiments were mobilized: Arganil, Arouca, Alcacer, Aviero, Arco, Boja, Basto, Braga, Barca, Barcelos, Braganza, Castello Branco, Covilha, Coimbra, Chaves, Evora, Figueira, Faro, Feira, Guarda, Guimaraes, Idanha, Lagos, Lamego, Louza, Leira, Moncorvo, Maia, Miranda, Oliveira de Azemis, Portalegre, Porto, Penafiel, Soure, Santarem, Setubal, Tavira, Tondela, Trancoso, Torres Vedras, Villa Viciosa, Vizeu, Villa do Conde, Viana, Villa Real and the Lisbon regiments – in total mustering about 50,000 men. They were released from service from the end of 1811 to early 1812.

During 1811, Marshal Beresford and General Stewart turned their administrative talents towards the quality of the militia and the Ordenanza. A sizeable assessment was sent to the Prince Regent that called for many administrative changes in order to make the militia more efficient. As with many things in the Portuguese military, the organizational structure was quite good, but its workings needed refinement. The problem lay with the way officers were selected, which often resulted in men of ‘absolute ignorance’
being appointed. The venality of senior officers, who might excuse some persons from duty in return for gifts or favours, resulted in reserving ‘the militia for poor people’, thus provoking desertions so that the regiments were ‘never complete’. A number of remedies were proposed. These were to appoint ‘the many good officers that are majors in the troops of the line’ as militia colonels so that they could educate subaltern officers; to increase their budgets; to make sure that promotions would be gradual and based on merit; and to punish all peculation and corruption.

The Prince Regent approved, and 1812 saw the militia being transformed into a more effective branch, notably after instructions issued on 22 August. Men from 18 to 40 years of age who were not liable to be drafted into the regular army were sent into the militia, and the period of service was 12 years. Special care was taken over officer selection. Colonels, who were selected by the Inspector General of Militia, needed to be not merely noblemen but physically and morally fit, active and experienced. All other commissioned ranks were to be filled by veteran regular officers. It was the same with NCOs, who were also to be veterans from the line and employed in training the militiamen. Training was given to everyone; field officers were to be trained for 15 days a year, company officers for eight days, and the companies were to assemble for drills every first and third Sunday. The battalion was to assemble for three days a month and the regiment for five days. In general, battalions were to serve as close as possible to their home area, and would not be mobilised for more than three months unless there was ‘a great necessity’.

With the threat of a French invasion receding, the militia’s main role now became the training of conscripts for the regular army. From then on, two regiments of militia trained and disciplined ‘a number of men equal to one regiment of the line’ (PRO, WO 1/401). Following the war, the structure of the militia remained much the same for conscription; but it was increasingly thought to be irrelevant in peacetime, and increasingly resented. The government finally abolished the militia on 5 May 1828.

There were several special volunteer units that fell outside the regional militia organizations. Before 1808 the government allowed very few such units, but the revolt of that year provoked the spontaneous raising of many. The Transtagana Legion, the Portalegre Volunteers, the Honoured Volunteers of Beja, the Cazadores Voluntarios de Coimbra, to name but a few, were soon nearly all incorporated into regular or militia units. This controlled approach contrasted with the situation in Spain, where large numbers of new units were raised and retained their identity. In Portugal only a few major new urban volunteer units remained in existence alongside the more ancient ones, and these included the Royal Militia Volunteers, Royal Commerce Volunteers of Lisbon, Porto Volunteers, Royal Commerce Volunteers of Porto and the Coimbra University Corps.
PORTUGUESE TROOPERS, 1804–14

(Left) Fusilier, Royal Police Guard, 1804–11. Headgear changed from a black leather helmet, to a barretina shako introduced in the army two years later. The British-style ‘stovepipe’ shako was probably adopted around 1810–11. (Centre) Private, Telegraph Corps, 1810–14. The corps’ uniform included a blue coatee with blue cuffs, shoulder straps and turnbacks and a black collar. (Right) Private, Pe de Castelo, 1806–12. The uniform of these veterans’ companies featured a blue coatee with blue collar, cuffs, lapels, shoulder straps and turnbacks. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
The Ordenanza was the ultimate reserve organization in Portugal, and was another ancient institution that permitted the mobilization of all able-bodied men not already in the armed forces. It was the country's so-called 'third line' of defence; the whole Ordenanza could be called out in a national emergency such as an invasion. Its organization from 1649 had a permanent feature to it in that its staff maintained the rosters of all able-bodied men from 15 to 60 years old from which the regular and the militia regiments were conscripted. From that time, companies of Ordenanza of 240 men each were established all over the kingdom. Each company was commanded by a capitao-mor (translates as captain-major, but the rank was equivalent to lieutenant-colonel or colonel). The local village’s or town’s residing nobleman or squire was automatically the capitao-mor by virtue of his social status. He was assisted by subaltern officers and NCOs, whom he chose.

This organization remained essentially a local affair until the army reforms of May 1806. The Ordenanza's role was not substantially altered but it was more efficiently set up. Each company had the capitao-mor, an ensign, a sergeant, a meirinho (which was something like a bailiff), a clerk, ten corporals and 250 men; the company was divided into ten-man squads. The various companies were assembled into 24 regional numbered brigades attached to one of the three military divisions of the country. There were four brigades in Minho, four in the District of Porto, two in Tras os Montes, five in Beira, six in Estremadura, two in Alemtejo and one in Algarve. Each brigade acted as a recruiting depot and reserve for a regiment of the line and two militia regiments. Enlisted men released after their service with a regular infantry or militia unit were obliged to serve another eight years in their Ordenanza brigade. These experienced ex-soldiers acted as NCOs and gave basic training to new recruits bound for the regular and militia regiments.

These reforms had only been partly implemented when Napoleon’s troops occupied the country in November 1807, and the French disbanded the Ordenanza along with the militia on 22 January 1808. With revolts against the French all over Portugal in June 1808, the Ordenanza re-formed everywhere, and some fought the enemy armed only with pitchforks and other farm implements. The 1806–07 reforms were brought back and fully implemented from 1808. Each re-raised brigade had eight captaincies, and each captaincy was subdivided into eight companies. The theoretical total came to 1,536 companies. This organization was not set up everywhere until 1812 due to the war being waged in the country. Ordenanza units were to drill on the first and third Sundays of each month and to assemble to practise battalion manoeuvres in March, June and September.

The city of Lisbon had a special organization of 16 'legions' of three battalions each, ordered raised on 23 December 1808. This gathered all
remaining able-bodied men fit to bear arms who were not already in the militia or volunteers. Each battalion had ten companies and the companies were divided into three ranks, the first consisting of men armed with firearms and the two others of men armed with pikes. They assembled and drilled each Sunday and during holidays. These legions became inactive from about 1811.

During the 1809 and 1810-11 French invasions, the Ordenanza in northern and eastern Portugal was called out for limited periods and mobilized tens of thousands of men, possibly up to 60,000 or 70,000 from 1810 to 1811. Most were badly armed, but they were especially effective at partisan warfare against French supply lines and isolated units. In his report on the militia and the recruitment of the army, Beresford had noted the crucial importance of the Ordenanza in the process of obtaining men for the regular army. Yet it often did not fully deliver its quotas. Many of its officers lacked motivation and were often ‘old, infirm, ignorant, without spirit, indolent, lazy’, and some were ‘oppressing the people with vexations, enriching themselves at their expense, and in the face of the enemy, taking measures to save their own riches’. These criticisms were amongst the worst features reported.

From 1812, the Ordenanza’s role as a recruiting organization became predominant, and ‘the whole kingdom’ was at last effectively ‘divided into captaincies, each containing some 4,000 hearths. Every captaincy is subdivided into eight companies. Eight captaincies for a brigade, and 24 brigades being 192 captaincies comprise the entire population fit to carry arms. By the application of this system to the militia … each brigade of Ordenanza supplies the recruits to two regiments of militia in the proportion of 4 companies of Ordenanza to one in that arm’ (PRO, WO 1/401).

The vast majority of units consisted of infantry. However, there were also small cavalry detachments of mounted Ordenanza recruited from those who could afford to keep a horse. There appear to have been very few, as less than 200 horsemen are listed out of some 71,000 men in the province of Beira. They were most likely used for scouting and carrying despatches rather than for any tactical purposes.

In 1810, some 49 artillery companies were organized to ‘occupy the various [Torres Vedras] lines of works in the neighbourhood of Lisbon, the batteries on the coast, and the fortresses on the frontier’. On 10 September a regulation assigned these companies as part of the Ordenanza, and specified each to have a lieutenant-commandant, a lieutenant, two sergeants and 56 other ranks for a total of 3,189. Their service was restricted to garrison artillery and most appear to have been posted in the lines of Torres Vedras. In March 1812, there were ‘about 50 companies of artillery … drawn from the Ordenanza, each not exceeding a force of 50 or 60 men’ on duty in ‘the various works in the
neighbourhood of Lisbon, the batteries on the coasts, and the smaller fortresses of the frontier’ (PRO, WO 1/401). They seem to have been sent home gradually from 1813, but detachments were still reported on duty in 1814. The rest of the structure remained in place following the war until conscription, and thus the Ordenanza, was abolished by a government decree of 28 August 1821 which introduced voluntary ten-year enlistments instead.

It is usually assumed that the men, when called out, often had no firearms and carried whatever they could get. While the data is not complete, returns of January 1809 concerning the northern provinces of Tras os Montes and Beira show that many men did indeed have firearms. Tras os Montes had 21,190 fusiliers and 12,704 pikemen; Beira, 30,975 fusiliers and 39,802 pikemen (PRO, FO 63/75). The pikes were made locally or came from Britain – some 17,000 were sent in 1808. An idea of how an Ordenanza unit was armed is given by Royal Navy Lt. Gillmor who, in November 1810, was ‘quite delighted’ to see a unit near Almeirim ‘going out on parade’. The officers ‘in general had swords. Men, some muskets, fowling-pieces, pikes, broken bayonets on poles, and one passed me and said Viva Inglesses with a great pitchfork on his shoulder.’ Regular weapons and accoutrements were carried by officers and NCOs.

ARTILLERY

The first body of Portuguese artillerymen to be raised dated back to 1515 when King Manuel I decreed that 100 bombardiers would reside at Lisbon to serve the guns in its forts. The gunners were considered specialists rather than fighting soldiers until 1677, when they were militarized into artillery units; they were grouped into a regiment in 1708. From the 1760s, artillery services in Portugal were performed by four regiments of foot artillery, each consisting of eight batteries. In the 1790s, each regiment had an establishment of 989 men in ten companies. There were, in addition, some invalid artillery companies posted mostly around Lisbon in the less important fortifications. There were also several artillery units in the off-shore islands and in the colonies.

Each artillery regiment in Portugal was known by the name of its HQ as well as its number. The first regiment in order of precedence had its HQ in Lisbon and was considered ‘the regiment of the Court’, hence its name of Corte. Its duties were confined to the capital and the adjacent seacoast. The second was named Algarve and served in the forts of Algarve province with its HQ at Faro. The third, named Alemtejo, garrisoned the frontiers of Alemtejo and Beira Baixa provinces and had its HQ at Estremoz. The fourth, named Porto, garrisoned forts on the northern frontier and had its HQ at Porto. Each regiment had a company of bombardiers, one of miners, one of pontoneers and seven of gunners. Independent companies of garrison artillery made up of ‘Pe de Castello’ veteran soldiers were added for forts in the Algarve in 1795,
PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY PERSONNEL, 1793–1810

(Centre) Officer, Corte Artillery Regiment, 1793–94. This regimental dress varied little from the 1770s to 1806. (Left) Gunner, 1st (Lisbon) Artillery Regiment, 1806–10. The 1st Artillery changed to blue collar and cuffs in 1806. All artillery regiments had scarlet turnbacks and piping, irrespective of military district, and by that time all wore the new shako. (Right) Musician, 2nd (Algarve) Artillery Regiment, 1806–10. In 1806 the drummers and musicians of artillery regiments were ordered to have the same distinctions as line infantry regiments.

(Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
Reconstruction of a field gun crew of the 1st (Lisbon) Artillery Regiment, c. 1808–10. The uniform is all blue with scarlet piping, scarlet turnbacks with blue triangle, brass buttons, gold buttons and epaulettes for the officer. Except for the shako, which changed to a ‘stovepipe’ style c.1810–11, the dress remained the same during the Peninsular campaigns. The Portuguese field and siege artillery carriages and limbers were similar to those of the British artillery. They were painted grey with black ironwork.

(Museu Militar do Porto)

Minho in 1796 and Beira in 1797. Overall, Portuguese gunners had a mainly fortress artillery role, and this did not change until the Peninsular War.

There were exceptions to this tactical character. In 1794, a train of field artillery was organized and sent to serve with the Spanish Army in Roussillon. They had four 3pdrs, two 6pdrs and six howitzers of 152mm (6in) bore. In 1797, two companies of artilheiros-cavaleiros of 72 men each were ordered raised and attached to the Corte Regiment, but this experiment in horse artillery was not followed up. After incorporating the battery of horse artillery from the Legion of Light Troops in July 1803, the horse artillery companies of the Corte Regiment were disbanded on 22 January 1804.

There appear to have been no sustained artillery actions in the short 1801 ‘War of the Oranges’. Following the war, the four regiments went back to their traditional garrison artillery duties. The decree of 16 May 1806 created an inspector general of artillery so that there would be some central coordination. The regiments were numbered: Corte was renamed Lisbon and numbered 1st; Algarve was renamed Lagos and numbered 2nd; Alemtejo was renamed Estremoz and numbered 3rd; and Porto kept its old name and was numbered 4th. The 1st was attached to the Centre Division, the 2nd and 3rd to the Southern Division and the 4th to the Northern Division. Regimental field batteries, each having two 3pdrs, two 6pdrs, one 9pdr and a 5in. howitzer, were to be organised. However, the regiments were all disbanded in December 1807 following the French occupation.

During the summer and autumn of 1808 the regiments were re-raised, and used anything they could get for weapons and uniforms. On 30 September
the artillery was ordered to reorganize according to the 1806 regulations. The re-raised regiments at the end of 1808 contained a total of 3,918 men with 3,564 muskets and 3,416 uniforms. These could be considered respectable numbers compared to the infantry and cavalry. Still, they were far from perfect. Because of their former role as essentially garrison and fortress artillery, the fact that they managed to get guns out into the field in quantity was a feat in itself. Not only was there a shortage of field guns and equipment, but the gunners were inadequately trained to serve efficiently in a field artillery role on campaign. However, they did preserve and use the available artillery pieces in the various towns and forts – an essential first step towards an effective artillery corps. Beresford foresaw that in the future the primary ordnance need of the army would be field artillery, and that while on campaign the Portuguese artillery would have to act in conjunction with the British artillery brigades. The coordination between the British and Portuguese would have to be excellent to match the French artillery, then considered the world’s best. British artillery officers were attached to the Portuguese artillery and, with the Portuguese officers, created a most efficient operational artillery for the Anglo-Portuguese army.

Beresford kept the previous regimental organization but instructed each regiment to contribute detachments to be formed into battery-like brigades. Once formed and trained, the brigades were attached to each division of the army. They were armed with 3 and 6pdrs, with 12 cannons forming a battery of field artillery. Some light 9pdr guns were later added. An example of brigade composition in June 1810 was as follows: Arentschild’s Brigade had 123 gunners from the 1st Regiment and 276 from the 2nd; Dickson’s Brigade had 313 from the 1st; Tras os Montes’ Battery had 319 from the 4th, and Cabreira’s Battery 105 from the 2nd. The Portuguese brigades were organized along almost the same lines as those of the British Royal Artillery with whom they served. Most brigades provided field artillery, but there were one or two brigades of mountain artillery armed with 3pdr guns. To help move this ordnance, a field train of 99 NCOs and drivers was organized from 4 June 1809 and attached to the 1st Regiment.

The main administrative difference from the British was that the Portuguese had no Master General of Ordnance, each regiment keeping its own staff. As the Portuguese artillery officers were, in general, well educated and proficient in their art, the change of role from primarily garrison to mainly field artillery went smoothly. From 20 October 1809, artillery regiments had a staff consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a chaplain, a surgeon, three assistant surgeons, one drum-major, two fifers, one bandmaster and eight bandsmen. There were seven companies of gunners, one company of bombardiers, one of pontoneers and one of miners. Each company had one
captain, one lieutenant, two second-lieutenants, six sergeants, eight corporals, two drummers and 92 privates. The bombardier company had in addition six artificers. On 12 October 1812, the pontoneers and miners were transferred to the Battalion of Artificers and replaced by gunners.

As the Anglo-Portuguese army moved further into Spain in 1812, new difficulties regarding the replacement of men and supplies arose. Measures were taken to replace the regular gunners left in Portugal with Ordenanza artillery companies, as well as to forward additional artillery supplies to Beresford's and Wellington's forces. Overall, the battle record of the Portuguese artillery brigades in the field was excellent and on a par with that of their British colleagues. Some of the Portuguese gunners were well versed in moving artillery through their mountainous country, and this became important in the Pyrenees during 1813. Sherer relates that Wellington’s artillery could not be moved down the ‘narrow and broken road’ leading to Ortiz until ‘some Portuguese artillery, under the direction of a most active and intelligent officer, did contrive to pass’ the guns, much to the surprise of ‘the French, who were perfectly incredulous.’ At the end of the war in 1814 the artillery was kept at the same establishment of 3,568 officers and men, and this was confirmed in 1816.
Artillery uniforms

After having had white uniforms with green cuffs, the Portuguese gunners were dressed in blue from the mid-18th century. Initially, the four regiments organised in 1764 had an identical uniform but regimental distinctions crept in during the early 1770s. In the 1790s, the artillery regiments all wore a blue coat with regimental distinctions. The Corte and Alemtejo regiments had blue waistcoat and breeches, the Algarve black waistcoat and breeches, and the Porto scarlet waistcoat and black breeches; the hat lace was the colour of the buttons. The three independent garrison artillery corps had a blue coat without lapels, blue collar and cuffs, scarlet turnbacks, yellow buttons, and blue waistcoat and breeches. The officers had silver or gold buttons and epaulettes according to the regiment's button colour.

By the uniform regulations of 19 May 1806, the artillery regiments adopted a single-breasted blue coatee with appropriate facings. The buttons were of yellow metal for all four regiments, and the piping and turnbacks were scarlet irrespective of the regiment's division. Blue breeches or pantaloons were worn in winter and white in summer, both with black gaiters. Drummers and fifers had the same distinctions as the infantry. In 1806 the raised-front 'barretina' shako was introduced, with brass plate and bottom band, red cords and black plume at the left side. From about 1810 the headgear changed to the British style cylindrical 'stovepipe' shako with a brass band at the bottom, brass crossed cannons badge, and black plume in front.

Battalion of Artillerymen-Conductors

The battalion of Artilheiros-Conductores was raised from 8 October 1812 and consisted of four companies totalling 276 officers and men and 400 horses or mules. It had a staff of one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one sergeant-adjutant, one quartermaster-sergeant, 14 'picadors', artisans, blacksmiths and cornets. Each company had a first lieutenant, three second lieutenants, four sergeants, and 60 corporals and gunner-drivers. The purpose of the corps was to create the army's 'Brigada Volante' – a brigade of flying artillery to have ten guns: five 9pdrs, four 6pdrs and one 5.5in howitzer. This unit was a corps of gunner-drivers, not unlike the British Royal Horse Artillery, and not solely an artillery train unit in spite of its misleading name. Its men could serve the guns as well as drive them. The battalion does not appear to have seen action but must have been found useful, as it was kept at the same strength after the war.

Ordnance

Cannons were made in Evora as early as 1382, so by the end of the 18th century Portugal had a long tradition of gun making. The preferred material was brass and the designs, while ornate, tended to be more sober than those of Spanish
or French guns. In the late 17th and 18th centuries the Portuguese artillery generally followed the French system. The Count de Lippe found that the Portuguese artillery was deficient in light pieces and appointed Colonel de Vallère, a French artillery and engineering specialist, to modernise the ordnance. General Bartolomeu da Costa was put in charge of design and manufacture. New light pieces and larger calibres of lighter weight were cast at the Royal Arsenal in Lisbon from 1766.

The new pieces were 1 and 3pdr light guns to accompany the infantry and for mountain artillery. The calibres in service were henceforth 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12pdr campaign pieces; and 18, 24, 36 and 48pdr siege and garrison artillery. Older guns could have various calibres, e.g. 13, 16, 22, 28, 38 and 40pdrs. They were generally installed in fortresses and coastal batteries. Howitzers were usually 152mm (6in) and mortars, 310mm (12in). In all, there were some 1,900 guns in the country. They were mounted on Vallières carriages and, from the end of the 18th century, Gribreauval style carriages. It appears that the wood was oiled and the ironwork painted black.

Da Costa was succeeded in 1801 by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Antoine Napion, a French émigré, who was familiar with the latest technology in gun founding. Napion experimented with the ordnance system introduced by Vallère. He wanted to cast cannons which were lighter in weight while keeping to the same calibres. Emphasis was put on the production of 6, 9 and 12pdr campaign pieces, and a new 15pdr field gun was introduced from 1802 to fill the gap between the 12 and 18pdrs. Although a good idea, it was not to be used for field artillery as it did not fit in with the systems used by the British in the Peninsular War.

Some of the light pieces appear to have been appropriated by the French during their occupation from December 1807 to June 1808, as there was later a lack of those types of guns in the Portuguese inventory. The hundreds of heavier guns, old and new, remained quietly mounted in the fortresses and batteries during this period. For instance, the area around the city of Porto had some 35 batteries, mostly covering the entrance of the Douro River, containing a total of about 200 cannons and mortars.

A few of the cannons and some artillery equipment used by the Portuguese before 1807 were of British provenance, as some 20 field pieces complete with all their equipment were sent by Britain to Portugal in 1797. From 1808 much ordnance, equipment and ammunition was supplied by Britain. The weakness in light pieces was immediately noted by the British, who sent 12 light 3pdrs on mountain carriages, 12 Coehorn howitzers on mountain carriages and ten brass 3pdrs without carriages. Fortunately, the Royal Arsenal at Lisbon was back in production by 1809, casting mostly field pieces to meet demand. Not only did needs in Portugal have to be met but,
in 1810, the Prince Regent in Rio de Janeiro ordered substantial numbers of guns to be transferred to arm properly the seacoast forts of Brazil. The single block trail carriages, limbers, ammunition wagons and other types of artillery vehicles made in Portugal were now made to British patterns and painted grey with black ironwork.

In Portugal, Marshal Beresford reorganized the field artillery to have, from March 1809, 13 field brigades of six guns each, reduced to 11 brigades in May 1810. There were seven field brigades (or field batteries) with Wellington’s army, each having two mountain 3pdrs, four 6pdrs and one each of 9pdrs and 152mm (6in) howitzers; the four other brigades were in Tras os Montes province as reserves. In 1812 this changed to eight field brigades with the Anglo-Portuguese army marching into Spain, five of which each had five 9pdrs and a howitzer, the other three having 6pdrs. Another eight field brigades were held in reserve.

CAVALRY

The Portuguese cavalry originated in 1640 when a number of permanent companies were mustered as part of the new regular army raised by King João IV. They were organized into regiments from 1707, but all were disbanded and totally reorganized from 1715. Regiments of dragoons were added to the heavy cavalry units from the 1730s, and the Braganza Light Cavalry in 1754; the dragoon regiments were Olivenza, Evora, Chaves and Miranda. The Count de Lippe reorganized and augmented the cavalry to 12 regiments, which could best
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS
be defined as medium cavalry. Although some of the regiments officially kept their titles as dragoons until 1806, they were in fact all similar from the 1760s and were routinely designated as ‘cavalry’ in almost every document. The arms, equipment and uniform were similar for all regiments. There was no light cavalry such as hussars or light dragoons.

Cavalry regiments, as organized under Count Lippe’s 1762 instructions, consisted of eight companies, each with a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, five NCOs, a trumpeter, a farrier and 30 troopers, making about 300 officers and men per regiment. This was increased in the 1790s and early 1800s to 470 all ranks. Before the French invasion of 1807 regiments had, on paper, 58 troopers per company with a suitable number of good horses. This was the theoretical strength determined by the army HQ at Lisbon; the reality in the various garrisons was very different. The actual strength of cavalry regiments was much lower than establishment, perhaps as low as half in some cases. There were not enough horses even for these reduced numbers of troopers, and the training appears to have been fairly abysmal.

Tactically, the Portuguese cavalry were not really heavy cavalry, nor were they trained to be dragoons, and they were certainly not light cavalry. Here lay the root of the problem. The general staff never really made up its mind as to what role the cavalry was to fulfil on the battlefield. As a result, the mounted arm was not divided to perform the various tactical functions incumbent on cavalry of the Napoleonic period, as was the case in most other armies. The only tangible effort in that direction was the creation of the squadrons of light cavalry in the 1796 Legion of Light Troops. Even the reforms of 1806 did not really address the problem, other than to reorganize that arm into something like medium cavalry. There were no provisions for true shock heavy cavalry, nor were more light cavalry created.

PORTUGUESE CAVALRY, 1806–10 (opposite)

(Left) Officer, 4th Cavalry. Officers had the same uniform as their men, but of better quality materials, with gold epaulettes and crimson sash with silver tassels. The 4th had scarlet collars and cuffs with white piping and turnbacks. The regiment was raised in 1762 as Mecklenburg and numbered 4th in 1806. It fought in many actions between 1809 and 1814. (All three figures are based on the 1806 regulations.) (Centre) Trumpeter, 11th Cavalry. Cavalry trumpeters had the same uniform as the men of their regiment, except that their jackets were trimmed with yellow lace at the seams. The trumpeter-major had yellow silk lace and sergeant’s epaulettes. The 11th had sky-blue collars and cuffs with scarlet piping and turnbacks. The regiment was raised as the Almeida Cavalry in 1715. Numbered 11th in 1806, it was present at most major battles and many small engagements between 1808 and 1814. (Right) Trooper, 8th Cavalry. The new 1806 uniform was dark blue with, for the 8th, yellow collar and cuffs with scarlet piping and turnbacks. The regiment fought a number of actions in south-eastern Spain during 1810–11. (Bill Younghusband © Osprey Publishing)
It could be said that Portugal was not quite a ‘horse country’ like England, France or Spain in terms of breeding a plentiful variety of mounts. The typical horse was a good and sturdy animal, but somewhat too small for heavy cavalry and a bit too slow for light cavalry. Most crucial was the fact that the country could never produce enough horses nor forage for a large cavalry establishment. It was thus the weakest arm of service in the army. All this explains in large part the lacklustre role it played during the Peninsular War. Following the French occupation at the end of 1807, Marshal Junot considered it next to useless and disbanded it. He correctly believed that the best elements, which included the better light cavalrymen from Alorna’s Legion of Light Troops, could make useful light cavalry, and formed them into two mounted chasseur regiments in the new French Portuguese Legion.

During the second half of 1808 the Portuguese cavalrymen gathered and spontaneously reformed their old regiments, although severely short of horses, arms and uniforms. In December 1808, the cavalry had 3,641 men but only
629 uniforms and 2,617 horses. Arms were not listed, but a 'great want of harness, carbines, pistols and swords' was noted.

In 1809 Marshal Beresford reorganized the Portuguese cavalry to have an establishment of 595 officers, NCOs and men per regiment, giving a total of 7,140. Each regiment had a staff and four squadrons, with two companies per squadron. There were no elite companies. The regimental staff had one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, one major, one adjutant (a senior NCO), one quartermaster, one squadron sergeant-major, one quartermaster sergeant-major, four standard bearers, one chaplain, one surgeon-major, two assistant surgeons, one picador, one trumpeter-major, one saddler, one gunsmith for woodwork and one for ironwork. Each of the eight companies had one captain, one lieutenant, one ensign, three sergeants, four corporals, four lance corporals, one trumpeter, one farrier and 56 troopers. Each regiment was supposed to be 'in every respect, similar to the British cavalry, and manoeuvre upon the same principles', according to Halliday.

Sufficient mounts were now even harder to find due to the ruinous French invasions. Part of the country, especially the centre and the north where most of the horses were bred, was devastated, and thousands of farms had been ruined and abandoned during 1808-11. At the same time, great quantities of forage had to be found for the British cavalry as well as the Portuguese. Priority was given to the large British cavalry contingent, which was already deployed in the field and vital to the war effort. In any event, what horses were found for the Portuguese cavalry came mostly from the provinces of Beira and Tras os Montes, and were considered to be small by British observers. With such difficulties in obtaining mounts, some of the Portuguese cavalry regiments were often short of recruits – who must not have been sought too earnestly at times.

From 1811 to 1812 there were really too many regiments for the numbers of horses available. Another factor was the shortage of well-trained and experienced Portuguese cavalry officers and NCOs; British officers had been attached to make some regiments effective. Only six regiments were truly operational in the field, two were 'part mounted', and the rest were simply used as dismounted garrison troops.

Of the regiments in the field, the 1st and 7th formed a brigade under Brigadier-General Otway, and 'distinguished itself very much' against French cavalry near Badajos in 1811 and at Salamanca on 22 July 1812. Its tactical role was clearly defined as light dragoons, and the 1st/7th Brigade was attached to the British Light Cavalry Division. The 4th and 10th were also brigaded as light cavalry. The 1st and 11th 'behaved nobly' at Salamanca under the command of Benjamin D'Urban, but were scattered and put to flight at an affair against French cavalry at Majahonda near Madrid on 11 August. The
5th and 8th formed a brigade under BrigGen Maddon, and served with the Spanish forces in Estramadura during 1811–12, where they seem to have been employed as light and medium cavalry.

As can be seen, Portuguese cavalry sometimes wanted confidence and might suddenly scatter, but they also gave some good service, such as the 1st and 11th at Salamanca. Still, as D'Urban noted after seeing them charge 'like British dragoons' at Salamanca, only to vanish a few days later before 'French helmets', they were an 'uncertain sort of fighting people'.

In early 1813 it was decided to mount only the 1st, 4th, 6th, 11th and 12th regiments and to leave the rest as dismounted units in garrisons. Regiments frequently mustered less than 300 men from an official establishment of 595. At the end of the war in 1814 the 12 regiments were reduced to an establishment of 6,372 men and 5,220 horses, although it must have been much less in reality. In 1816 the establishment went back to Peninsular War levels.
OTHER ARMIES

Although we tend to see history as having only two world wars, the wars of the Napoleonic era encompassed a huge number of nations and timezones, and brought in many more players than is often perceived. Such are the number of contributors that space does not allow an extensive treatment of their armies here. What follows, however, is a selective overview of some armies that contributed to the wars either as allied forces, or directly as part of far larger forces.

DENMARK/SWEDEN

Denmark was a reluctant participant in the Napoleonic Wars, dragged into the conflict after long period of attempting to maintain neutrality. Compared to the other monstrous forces slugging it out in Europe, the Danish Army was relatively small. In 1789 there were 15 foot regiments of infantry, each regiment consisting of two battalions, and each battalion comprising one grenadier and four musketeer companies. In terms of cavalry there were nine regiments, each with four squadrons, plus the Mounted Life Guard (two squadrons) and the Hussar Regiment (six squadrons). For artillery, there was the Artillery Corps built around three brigades totalling 15 foot companies, three mounted companies and one special company. Throughout the Napoleonic period, the Danish Army went through only modest deviations from this establishment.

Ultimately, a series of provocations, principally British, forced Denmark into the hands of the French, signing an allegiance with Napoleon on 31 October 1807. In hindsight, this was a poor decision. The Danish forces found themselves dragged into a series of bloody engagements in North Germany and southern Denmark, and fought in Norway against their traditional Scandinavian enemy, Sweden. Eventually the country was driven to economic ruin by the war, its people and its army suffering from social and financial breakdown. Denmark was forced to relinquish its hold over Norway in 1814, and support itself out of a disastrous period of conflict by the midpoint of the year.

Like Denmark (and indeed, partly because of Denmark), Sweden was another Scandinavian country surrounded by potential and real enemies, these including Russia (which menaced Finland, a Swedish province) and Prussia.
DANISH INFANTRY, 1809–13

(Left and 2nd left) Grenadiers, Oldenburgske Infanteriregiment (Oldenburg Infantry Regiment). Figure (1) shows the medium grey calf-length greatcoat worn at this time, plus the standard white leather infantry equipment and fawn hide pack. Figure (2) wears the 1809 pattern red jacket. (2nd right) Officer, 3rd Jydske Infantry Regiment, 1813. An army order of 1 August 1812 created the uniform seen here, with rank denoted by stripes and buttons. Note that the order prohibited the wearing of gold or silver epaulettes and sashes. (Right) Officer, Oldenburg Infantry Regiment, 1809. This uniform includes the gold and silver epaulettes and sashes that were forbidden in the later 1812 regulations. (Michael Roffe © Osprey Publishing)
Relations with France had traditionally been amenable, and after some turbulent politics of Franco-Swedish alliance was signed in June 1795. Gustavus IV attempted to keep this relationship militarily neutral, but eventually went over to join the Third Coalition against Napoleon on April 1805, in which the Swedish Army suffered a significant defeat.

**DANISH DRAGOONS, 1813**

(Left) Jydske Regiment Lette Dragoner (Jydske Regiment Light Dragoons). This regiment served primarily in the Auxiliary Corps, mainly in northern Germany. The trooper here is seen wearing service dress. The helmet type was worn between 1795 and 1815. (Right) Jydske Regiment Light Dragoons, mounted officer. The rank of a Danish officer was shown, following regulations of 1812, on the lower sleeve. (Michael Roffe © Osprey Publishing)
Between 1805 and effective cessation of Swedish hostilities in 1814 at the treaty of Kiel, the Swedish Army’s role in the revolution of the Wars was relatively minor, although was kept militarily busy by the Russo-Swedish War

SWEDISH ARMY, 1807

(Left) Guardsmen, King’s Life Guards. Before 1807, the guards wore a black bicorné headdress, but during this year they switched to the kusket Swedish headdress, as seen here. (Centre) Officer, King’s Life Guards. Although the guards had adopted the kusket, the bicorné hat was still worn on ceremonial occasions. (Right) Officer, King’s Life Guards. The officer is of the 1st Regiment; the other two figures are of the 2nd Regiment. (Michael Roffe © Osprey Publishing)
of 1808–9, during which Sweden lost control of Finland. For most of the period the Swedish Army was not a large one – during the early years of the Russo-Swedish War, it consisted of 14 line infantry regiments, ten Jäger regiments, three Guard regiments, four artillery regiments and eight cavalry regiments, although one guard regiment and one artillery regiment were disbanded in 1809.

In 1810 the former French Commander Jean-Baptiste-Jules Bernadotte became the Crown Prince of Sweden (by invitation on the death of the childless Christian Augustus), and under his jurisdiction the Swedish army would undergo a period of considerable growth. In 1813, motivated by the desire to build a powerful army for campaigns in Germany, Bernadotte introduced mass conscription, calling up all Swedish males aged between 21 and 25 for periods of annual compulsory military training. Nevertheless, crushing economic circumstances, which chronically limited supplies of everything from uniforms to weapons, meant that the Swedish army would never amount to a mighty force and they remain on the peripheries of the continental war.

HANOVER

The Hanoverian Army was long regarded for its martial excellence, bred in part by its close allegiance and cooperation with the British Army. By 1794 it totalled 18,000 infantry and 6,500 cavalry (the latter were particularly renowned for their dash and skill), and there were 13 line regiments, one light infantry regiment and also one regiment of Foot Guards. Despite the British allegiance, the army was neutral in the period 1795–1803, at which point the electorate of Hanover was dissolved by the French. Many of its army soldiers headed abroad to continue their military service, some heading for German territories but the largest numbers congregating in Britain. In December of that year, the surplus soldiers were formed into a corps of all arms which came to include two regiments of dragoons and three regiments of hussars. The King’s German Legion (KGL) was, although a foreign force, nevertheless an integral part of the British Army, and a closer look at its structure and function is useful for gaining insight into the best of Hanoverian/British cavalry practice.

From 1803–05 the KGL grew steadily as more officers and men joined its ranks and new units were raised. By 1804 the KGL cavalry consisted of a regiment of dragoons and a regiment of light dragoons, each of 450 horse. A second regiment of light dragoons was raised in June 1805 as all units of the KGL prepared for active service in the light of events on the Continent.

The establishment for the eventual five cavalry regiments of the KGL called for a regimental headquarters similar to that of the infantry battalion, but with the addition of a veterinary officer, a riding-master, a farrier and
a saddler. There were four squadrons each of two troops. Troops were distinguished by the usual letters, and squadrons by numbers. As in the infantry, posts such as trumpet-major, bandsmen, orderlies and servants were filled by men from the troops.

HANOVERIAN ARMY, 1794–1800

(Centre) Private, 14th Light Infantry Regiment, 1794. The private here wears the black ‘Corsican’ hat and pale grey coatee. (Left) Officer, 14th Light Infantry Regiment, 1794. Officer distinctions include a feather plume, gold hat trim, sabre and full-length black boots. (Right) Trooper, 10th Light Dragoons, 1800, with headdress forming a dashing contrast to that of the infantry. (Bryan Fosten © Osprey Publishing)
From their formation, the King’s German Dragoons wore a similar uniform to that of the British dragoon regiments. Not all of their equipment was new. The 15th Light Dragoons passed over 745 sets of saddlery to the 2nd KGD on their formation in 1805, including ‘300 sets at £5 [and] 445 sets at £1.10s.0d’, indicating that most were well-used. The value of this saddlery was credited to the colonel of the 15th – a reminder of the way in which regiments were run like businesses in those days. The King’s German Light Dragoons began life in the Tarleton helmets and dolman jackets worn by British light dragoons, but fairly soon took unto themselves the costume of hussars – very fashionable in the early 1800s. It is recorded that the 3rd King’s German Light Dragoons styled and dressed themselves as ‘Hussars’ from their formation.

In the period covered by this title the only KGL unit insignia was that borne on uniform buttons, and painted on equipment, the title or initials of the Legion being worn on shako and helmet plates, buckles and belt plates.

The King’s German Dragoons broadly followed the rules governing infantry regarding badges and indicators of rank, as did the King’s German Artillery. The Light Dragoons/Hussars, however, only followed the rules in that their NCOs wore chevrons. Officers of British light cavalry were obvious by the richness of their uniform, the magnificence of their saddlery and horse furniture, and the breeding of their mounts. They wore no other marks of rank, feeling, perhaps, that none were necessary.

The dress and insignia of the KGL changed little over the first decade of its existence. But when, in February 1811, the illness (thought to be madness) of King George III brought about the passing of the Regency Act, changes in uniform became inevitable. The king’s eldest son was George, Prince of Wales, and his lifestyle had been a cause for concern to king and Parliament for many years. Amongst his many self-indulgences was that of dandyism, imagining himself an authority on sartorial elegance, adorning his portly frame with costumes expensive enough for ‘the first gentleman of Europe’, and consorting with the most famous dandies of the day. He may have known little of soldiering, but he considered himself an expert on military fashion.

Shortly after the Prince became Regent, his brother the Duke of York (whom the nursery rhyme described marching his 10,000 men ‘to the top of the hill’ and down again) was reinstated as C-in-C, a position he had been forced to resign in 1809 after a scandal involving the sale of commissions by his mistress. Under the chairmanship of yet another royal brother, the Duke of Cumberland, a board of general officers was set up to report on new clothing and equipment for the cavalry, the Prince Regent taking a keen interest in its deliberations. Before the year was out orders had been issued for new uniforms for officers, and in the new year of 1812 new patterns for the rank and file were ‘sealed’. Little of this tinkering was of any practical value.
There were extensive changes for the heavy cavalry and for the Light Dragoons, who were ordered to wear shakos similar to those of the French, and jackets cut in the style of Polish lancers. This was to be the type of uniform adopted by the two dragoon regiments of the KGL when they were converted to Light Dragoons in December 1813. From this date the three original Light Dragoon regiments of the Legion were officially styled 'Hussars', a title they had used unofficially for years; as they had also long worn hussar uniform their dress was not altered.

SOLDIERS OF THE KING’S GERMAN LEGION, 1813–14

(Right) Grenadier, line infantry, c. 1812. This uniform was of British design and manufacture, and was almost identical to British Army standard uniform. (Centre) Officer, 1st Hussars, c. 1813. This regiment adopted the uniform style of the hussars in 1805. (Left) Officer, 2nd Light Dragoons, c. 1814. White breeches were worn as full dress, while grey overalls were donned on campaign. (Bryan Foster © Osprey Publishing)
KGL cavalry weapons included pistols, carbines, bayonets and swords. By far the most important were the latter, which were the 1796 pattern heavy cavalry sword, a straight, heavy weapon with a 88.9cm (35in) blade; and the 1796 pattern light cavalry sabre, a curved slashing weapon with a 83.8cm (33in) blade. Neither was an ideal sword, both being copies of foreign weapons; however, there is ample evidence that the cavalry of the KGL worked at the sword exercise until a high degree of skill was achieved. The following extract from the history of the Gordon Highlanders makes the point.

July 1812, Spain: 'At Villa Alba the Highlanders admired the conduct, and regretted the fate of a hussar of the King’s German Legion, who, on being attacked by a powerful French dragoon, after a deal of dexterous sword-play, killed him just as a second arrived to his assistance. To it they went, cut and thrust, till a third dragoon ran his sword through the gallant German, at the same moment that the point of the latter pierced his second antagonist.' Again, at Venta del Pozo Sergeant-Major Kielpennig of the 1st KGD, wounded and surrounded by French Lancers, hacked his way out of their encirclement by sheer skill with the sword.

THE LOW COUNTRIES

In the late 18th century, the Low Countries were divided between the United Provinces (roughly, modern Holland) and the Austrian Netherlands (roughly, modern Belgium). Both were overrun by France in 1794 during the Revolutionary Wars. The following year the Dutch ruler — William V, Prince of Orange — fled to Great Britain, and the former Austrian provinces remained effectively under French rule until 1814. Stripped of part of their territory, the United Provinces became the Batavian Republic, under French domination and providing troops for Napoleon’s campaigns. Following his victory over Austria and Russia at Austerlitz in December 1805, Napoleon set about redrawing the map of Europe; he raised the Batavian Republic to the dignity of the Kingdom of Holland, placing his brother Louis (Ludwig) on the throne. Louis Bonaparte disappointed his brother, however, by showing signs of wishing to rule in fact rather than merely as a puppet. Napoleon harboured suspicions about Dutch loyalty, and determined simply to annex Holland (and large parts of northern Germany) to France. In 1810 French troops moved into Dutch territory, and in July King Louis was forced to abdicate. The 27,000-strong Dutch Army was absorbed into the French forces.

Following the French disaster in Russia, in early 1813 Prussia rose in revolt. In March a new anti-French alliance was formed by Britain, Russia, Prussia and Sweden, joined by Austria from August 1813. In October the French were defeated by the Allied armies at Leipzig; and soon afterwards a patriotic
insurrection broke out in Holland. On 30 November 1813, Prince William VI of Orange – whose father had died in exile in 1806 – returned to his country; landing at Scheveningen, he had himself proclaimed Prince Sovereign of the United Provinces. His first aim was to turn his nominal authority into reality, and to stabilize the situation in his divided country. This required the creation of a national army; on 6 December 1813 the Prince Sovereign called his people to arms.

Most of the soldiers of the newly formed army were Dutch former prisoners of war, captured by the Allies mainly during the 1813 campaign in Germany. The officers, however, were mostly drawn from among retired veterans who had left the army as long ago as 1795; it would be some time before one could speak of a real army that was fit for campaigning.

When the Prince Sovereign called his people to arms, his treasury was virtually empty, and there were no weapons, uniforms or equipment for the new army. Following the Prussian example, they started collecting gold, silver and jewellery donated by private citizens to fund the war against the French.

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**DUTCH INFANTRY OF THE LINE, CAMPAIGN DRESS, 1815** *(opposite)*

From left to right: officer; private; private in foul weather dress; drummer. The typical shako was of quite low construction, slightly bell-topped, with both front and rear peaks but no chinstrap. There were two main models of brass plate: one copied that of the British 1812 ‘Belgic’ shako with the ‘W’ for William replacing ‘GR’; the other was of oval shape, crowned and stamped ‘W’ like the first. Above the orange national cockade was a short plume, all-white for centre companies and red-tipped white for flank companies. The rank-and-file coatee was basically of British infantry cut, single-breasted and short-tailed, of dark blue cloth with red lining and turnbacks. The facing colour was white for all battalions, showing at the collar and cuffs; and as piping on the front edge, cuff flaps, pockets, and rear vents from the rear waist buttons. The buttons were brass, stamped with the battalion number – the only unit identification. Centre companies had blue shoulder straps piped white, and flank companies padded shoulder rolls with white lace. Trousers were white linen for warm weather and grey cloth for cold; contemporary images all show grey worn for the Waterloo campaign. Short grey or black cloth gaiters were worn over the shoes. Contemporary engravings show rankers wearing French equipment: white crossbelts for the cartridge pouch and bayonet, and brown calfskin knapsacks with white straps. There are also records of Britain supplying numerous complete sets of equipment, and we may suppose that some units received these instead of old French stocks. The armament was mostly the British ‘Brown Bess’ musket of India Pattern – including some actually made in Holland. Drummers and fifers were distinguished only by ‘swallow’s nest’ shoulder ornaments, of the white universal facing colour with false gold fringes and lace, the latter in the shape of two interwoven ‘Ws’, upright and reversed. The drum rims were painted in triangles of blue, red and white. A loose grey-brown overcoat, and a shako cover of quite elaborate construction, were worn in bad weather; our only pictorial source is from a contemporary but anonymous series, possibly by Langendijk, now in the collection of HM Queen Elizabeth II. Officers wore long-tailed coats of the standard officer’s pattern in the same basic colours but of finer quality, with horizontal pockets; portraits indicate blue piping around the collar. Officers’ status was identified by single or paired silver epaulettes, and the orange silk waist sash of various slightly differing patterns; their shako ornaments were also of appropriate materials and quality, and they carried gilt-hilted swords. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
Increasing numbers of volunteers offered their services and several volunteer units were formed; but the new state still lacked an efficient professional army or the means to pay for one. For two weeks the Prince Sovereign’s government watched the disappointing progress of his call to arms; then, on 20 December, they were forced to decree a *levée en masse* – general conscription – in order to organize a large corps of militia to support the small regular army. While living in England the Prince Sovereign had been introduced to the British Army’s system, and he now copied elements of it for his new Dutch army. The regular army would be based on voluntary enlistment. Where there were not enough volunteers, he would fill the ranks with soldiers from the regular militia (infantry and artillery), or from the Landstorm – local militia, formed from all healthy men between 17 and 50 years of age. Unavoidably, the basis on which the army was built was a core of former Dutch soldiers of Napoleon’s army.

The Landstorm of Amsterdam would consist, from 1 January 1814, of 18 battalions of six companies each (these would be disbanded in July 1815). In cities where an armed civil guard existed – the Schutterij, an old name now revived for e.g. the National Guard of Amsterdam – a part of the Landstorm would be incorporated into the Schutterij. They were to play their part in liberating the country, but once their services were no longer needed they could be disbanded. On the last day of the year 1813, all infantry battalions were ordered organized with ten companies each. The existing battalions were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Infantry</th>
<th>Based</th>
<th>Formerly</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn</td>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>Orange Legion (De Perponcher)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Bn</td>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>Phaff’s Bn, Rotterdam</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Bn</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>1st Bn, Grunebosch’s regt</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th Bn</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>2nd Bn, Grunebosch’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Bn</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>3rd Bn, Grunebosch’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Bn</td>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>Orange-Prussia Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Bn</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1st Bn, Orange Legion (De Constant Rebecque)</td>
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<td>8th Bn</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2nd Bn, Orange Legion</td>
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<tr>
<td>9th Bn</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3rd Bn, Orange Legion</td>
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<tr>
<td>10th Bn</td>
<td>England</td>
<td>PoWs; arrived Hellevoetsluis, 27 March 1814</td>
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**Jägers**

| 1st Bn       | Geertruidenberg |

**Cavalry**

| 1st Hussars  | Haarlem       | Boreel’s Hussars |
| 2nd Dragoons| The Hague     | Timmerman’s regt |
BELGIAN DRAGOONS, 1815

(Left) Trooper, 5th Light Dragoons; campaign dress. In campaign dress the troopers were hard to distinguish from French chasseurs à cheval. (Centre) Trumpeter, 5th Light Dragoons. Some sources give a yellow single-breasted jacket, and white plumes in place of green tipped with yellow. (Right) Lieutenant, 5th Light Dragoons; campaign dress. On campaign not much of the elegant French-style uniform would be visible. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
On 9 January 1814, it was decreed that the regular Dutch army was to consist of: 6 battalions of chasseurs; 14 battalions of line infantry; 9 foreign battalions (mostly Swiss and Nassau troops); 4 regiments of cavalry - 2 of Heavy Dragoons (later to become carabiniers), 1 regiment of light dragoons and 1 of hussars; 4 battalions of foot artillery; 1 corps of horse artillery; 1 battalion of engineers, sappers and miners; 1 train battalion; 1 garrison battalion for the Dutch possessions in the Indies. The total was to reach some 30,000 men, backed by a regular militia of about 23,000 more. Only when Dutch troops were allowed to leave the French Army after Napoleon’s first abdication later that year would the ranks of the new Dutch Army become stronger and more efficient.

In Belgium events unfolded in a more complex manner. As the Allies invaded the former Austrian Netherlands, most of the former administrators fell back towards France. A strong French force under Carnot held the port of Antwerp; several other French garrisons still occupied smaller coastal towns; and the army of Général Maison, near Lille, kept large parts of Flanders under threat.

Before crossing the Rhine, the Allies had already decided, at the Convention of Basle, on a plan for the immediate administration of former French territories until final decisions could be reached. It had been agreed to divide Belgium under three temporary governments: the government of the Lower Rhine, with a capital at Aachen (the former departments of the Ruhr, Lower Meuse and Ourthe); the government of the Middle Rhine, based at Trier (the former department of the Forests); and the General Government of Belgium, whose capital was Brussels (the remainder of the country). In August 1814 this pattern of control was changed, leaving only two governments: that of the Lower Rhine, covering all territories east of the Meuse, and administered by the Prussians; and the General Government, covering the rest of the country and administered by the Austrians.

The Prussians and Austrians alike were eager to strengthen their positions in occupied territory, to improve the defence of their frontiers against any eventual French attack. Both began recruiting troops from amongst the Belgian population; and this created units of three different origins. The Légion belge – the most important of these forces – was raised by the Austrians in the territories of the General Government; Walloon (French-speaking Belgian) forces were raised by the Prussians in the territories of the Lower Rhine; and further Walloon troops were raised in the Lower Rhine territories by the Prince of Orange for the army of the United Provinces, with the (grudging) agreement of the Prussians.

La Légion Belge
With most of the former Austrian Netherlands under their control, the Allies organized a provisional government of Belgium on 11 February 1814; the next
day the Duke of Beaufort was named as governor-general. One of the first steps taken by the Allies was the creation of ‘la Légion belge’ to keep the peace. On 4 March, an announcement informed the populace of the immediate organization, from volunteers, of four regiments of infantry with a total strength of 3,500 men, one regiment of cavalry and a corps of artillery. Each infantry regiment was to draw men from one of the provinces and set up a recruiting office in the provincial capital:

1st – Brabant (Brussels) – Colonel Baron de Poederlé  
2nd – Flanders (Ghent) – Colonel de Polis  
3rd – Hainaut (Mons) – Colonel N. Dupont  
4th – Namur (Namur) – Colonel Marquis de Trazegnies d’lttre

However, after a few days and for some unexplained reason the 3rd Regiment was ordered to move to Namur and the 4th to Tournai. Colonel de Poederlé was charged not only with the command of the 1st Regiment but also with the organization of the entire Belgian Legion.

The cavalry regiment that had been announced was in fact not needed, since two other units were already being organized. The first, raised at Mechelen, was the Chevauxlégers of Count Charles van der Burch, a former page of Louis XVI. The second, organized from 1 March at Tervuren, was the hussars of the 22-year-old Prince Ferdinand de Croij. Each regiment was to consist of a staff and four squadrons each of two companies, with a company strength of 100 men.

The artillery was to consist of one foot battalion of four companies, and two companies of horse artillery, all commanded by Colonel F. C. Aman de Schwanberg – a man whose only visible talent was for amassing enormous debts. At first this arm suffered from a lack of volunteers, but benefited from the appointment of Major Vander Smissen – commissioned on 1 March 1814 – to take over its organisation and recruitment. This officer was a former sous-lieutenant of the French artillery who had retired from service after losing five toes to frostbite in the Russian campaign. The first volunteers were lucky to receive complete uniforms and equipment; this luxury would not last for long, however, and the more recruits arrived the less they were issued, until the last-comers had to make do with their civilian clothes and no equipment at all.

From his first volunteers Smissen was able to present 60 NCOs and men, fully uniformed and armed, for inspection by Count von Lottum, governor of Brussels. Commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Vervoet, they were sent to Tournai to reinforce the Prussia garrison of General Thielmann. On 5 April a second detachment consisting of three corporals, two trumpeters and 21 soldiers, was sent to reinforce the first at Tournai.
On 9 April the Legion numbered 1,850 infantry, 350 cavalry and 400 artillerymen. According to the 'Gazette de Bruxelles', on 4 May the 1st Regiment received a banner showing the Austrian eagle. That same month the Legion numbered just 4,000 men, of whom 2,500 were wearing some kind of uniform; the remaining 1,500 were the laughing stock of the local civilians, and demonstrated an eagerness to desert at every opportunity.

Raised by the same authorities, we find the so-called 1er Régiment de Chasseurs à pied, organized in Bruges on the initiative of Count von Puckler-Muskau, ADC to the Duke of Saxe-Weimar. Recruiting in Flanders, it came from 19 March 1814 under the command of Prince Ernest d'Arenberg. After the absorption of the Chasseurs Leloup battalion, the regiment was fully organized by mid 1814. The Chasseurs Leloup were raised near Chimay by Charles Graux, a former captain in the Austrian army, from early April 1814; it was intended to have six companies, but never managed to get enough recruits or equipment.

On 22 March the Duke of Beaufort was replaced as governor-general by the more capable Prussian Baron van der Horst. Taking stock of the catastrophic state of the Belgian Legion, he immediately stopped all recruiting, and on 29 March dismissed Baron Poederle as head of the Department of War. In late April, Van der Horst, in his turn, was replaced as governor-general by the Austrian Lieutenant-General Baron von Vincent, who created a new Department of War.

The Lower Rhine
The government of the Lower Rhine also recruited a light infantry regiment — variously called the 2nd Chasseurs, or Regiment of the Lower Rhine — in the territory between the Rhine and the Meuse temporarily administered by the Prussians. The unit, commanded by Colonel Baron de Luninck, never managed to obtain uniforms, pay, or even food, and once again desertion was chronic. Once the Prince Sovereign of Holland decided to take over control of all Belgian territories Baron de Luninck handed over the regiment to the new Dutch government with relief. In August 1814 it numbered six companies with a total of 402 men. Even in January 1815, most of the officers were still complaining that they had not been paid for more than six months.

Also raised in the territory under Prussian rule were Belgian troops destined to serve in the Dutch Army of the United Provinces. On 16 December 1813, a Belgian battalion had already been raised in Holland — at first at Breda, later moved to Geertruidenberg, and finally to Kempen. Commanded by the Belgian-born Major Perez, it would be known as the 3rd Chasseurs.

On 17 February 1814, the Prince of Orange ordered his ADC Constant-Rebecque, acting as quartermaster-general of the Dutch Army, to organize a
regiment of two battalions of Walloons. Their recruitment in Liège proves that
the Dutch intended to create their own Walloon Legion. Constant-Rebecque
organized his two battalions but, called to another post, he handed over
command to Colonel van der Maesen; this regiment would be known as the
Legion of the Lower Rhine. The Prussians, reluctant to see these troops in
Dutch service, tried every means to slow down their recruitment. Even when
these territories came fully under the control of the Prince Sovereign, the
regiment had a full staff, all necessary officers, but only 400 men – enough for
only a single battalion of six companies.

All troops levied outside the territory of the United Provinces proper
and serving with the Dutch Army would be regarded as foreign regiments.
Thus two distinct forces would be formed: that in the north, the army of the
United Provinces and exclusively raised from Dutchmen; and that in the south,
consisting of different Belgian corps of which the Belgian Legion was the
principal component.

These were hard times for the Belgian population, and for the soldiers of the
Belgian Legion. At an early stage the Austrian authorities in Belgium ran out of
money for wages, equipment and uniforms. Officers and soldiers alike had to
find themselves food and lodgings, but were refused quarters by the civilians,
who already had to provide billets for the occupying foreign armies. Officers
who had no private means lived in total misery. These hardships – added to
the fear that they might have to fight against their countrymen who were still
serving in Napoleon’s forces – all discouraged volunteers from joining the
Belgian Legion. The rate of desertion was higher than the rate of enlistment.
The only bright spot was the eventual distribution of some equipment, originally
requisitioned for Swedish Allied troops.

On 30 March 1814, Napoleon was defeated. The Treaty of Paris sent
thousands of foreign troops home from French service; experienced veterans
of the Empire would find a warm welcome in the ranks of the Belgian Legion
(and indeed, the Belgian regiments were almost entirely officered by men who
had followed careers under Napoleon). Nevertheless, the situation did not
improve; June 1814 saw no new volunteers, and an increasing toll of desertion.
The 4th Infantry Regiment still had 1,600 men wearing the clothes in which
they had enlisted. Conditions in the cavalry were no better; the Hussards de
Croij had no uniforms at all.

With the withdrawal of French forces, the local Gendarmerie disappeared
as well, leaving a vacuum in the maintenance of peace in the towns and
countryside. The cities created militias known as Gardes Bourgeoises, but this
tended to drive the criminal element out into the countryside, where the
population were already suffering depredations at the hands of the various
Allied forces now occupying the former French territories.
Carabiniers (i.e. grenadiers) of the 2nd Nassau-Usingen Light Infantry Regiment charging at Waterloo, painted in 1816 by Dighton. Most of their equipment is French, but he shows flat-folded grey greatcoats or blankets worn round the body under their knapsack straps. (Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library)

The Allied commissioners controlling the occupied territories reacted by ordering, on 27 February 1814, the formation of a police force under the control of the General Government of Belgium, known as the Maréchaussée. Each department under the rule of the General Government had its own company — known as a legion — commanded by a colonel, with an adjutant acting as secretary. There were two categories. Departments which had four districts were assigned first class companies, composed of a captain, a lieutenant, two sous-lieutenants, a sergeant-major, eight corporals, and 80 men forming eight escouades, totalling 93 all ranks. Other departments were to have second class companies, with only one sous-lieutenant, six corporals and six squads, totalling 70 all ranks. Subsequently those departments of Belgium under the control of other authorities also received a company of Maréchaussées each.

By 17 March the organization was still incomplete. Even during the process of formation the plans were altered, giving each legion fewer men. Like the Belgian Legion, this police force lacked funds and was in dire need of uniforms and equipment. It was to be 1 September 1814 before the Belgian forces could look forward to a more professional level of organization, equipment and armament.
DUTCH HUSSARS, 1815

(Left) NCO, 6th Hussars, full dress. (Right) Trooper, 6th Hussars, campaign dress. (Centre) Officer, 6th Hussars, campaign dress. The French appearance of this uniform owed much to the tall single-peaked shako, resembling the non-regulation French light cavalry style of 1810–12. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
The Army Of The North & South Netherlands, 1814–15

Article 6 of the Treaty of Paris, dated 30 May 1814, indicated that Holland, ruled by the House of Orange, would govern larger territories than previously. Two weeks later the Prince Sovereign’s younger son Prince Frederik took over command of the Dutch forces ‘occupying’ Belgium. On 1 August 1814, the Austrian-Belgian territories were handed over to the United Provinces; and Prince Frederik took over the task of organizing the Belgian Legion, independent from the regular Dutch Army. Command of the Legion was given to the Dutch general Fagel. The battalions commanded by Major Perez (3e Chasseurs) and Colonel van der Maesen (Legion of the Lower Rhine) were absorbed.

On 15 August it was decided that from 1 September onwards the Belgian troops would receive the same organization, regulations and training as their Dutch brothers-in-arms. They would, however, retain their autonomy – and also their uniforms, with the exception of the cockade worn on the headgear, which was changed from black to orange with effect from 24 August.

When the Belgian troops were handed over to the United Provinces by the Austrians their establishment was as follows:

4 regiments of line infantry – 1,545 men each, total 6,180
1 regiment of chasseurs – 1,545 men
Total establishment of infantry – 7,725
1 battalion of artillery – 500 men
1 regiment of chevauxlégers – 500 men
1 regiment of hussars – 500 men
Total establishment of Belgian units – 9,225 men

However, at that stage these establishments were far from filled; and less than 50 per cent of the troops had uniforms of any kind. The artillery, for example, still had no uniforms or arms at all. The officers had not yet been paid, and the troops only sporadically. The only equipment they had were 12 English cannon, without other matériel, and the artillery train had only 12 draft horses. The rate of desertion was still high, and the men threatened to abscond en masse if the pay problem was not solved. Under the circumstances the inflow of new volunteers was extremely low.

On 10 August 1814, the newly annexed Belgian territories were divided into four military districts: the 1st, comprising Brabant and Antwerp, had headquarters at Louvain; the 2nd, Hainaut and Namur, HQ at Mons; the 3rd, East and West Flanders, HQ at Ghent; and the 4th, Liège and Luxembourg, had headquarters at Hasselt. Each district had a recruiting office linked to one of the infantry battalions. The cavalry and artillery recruited their men where their depots were located: the Chevauxlégers at Mechelen, the Hussars at Ath,
and the artillery — composed of four companies — also at Mechelen. However, these military districts existed only until 16 December 1814, when a general recruiting office was established in Brussels; this would last until 25 June 1815. One by one, the original unit commanders were replaced by more experienced officers who had earned their epaulettes during the Napoleonic Wars.

The Maréchaussée was once more reorganized. The legions were transformed into seven companies, each consisting of several ‘brigades’, and some improvement was achieved. For a while the former title ‘Gendarmerie’ was re-introduced, but this was short-lived: to the population it was a name with unhappy echoes of their sufferings under the French Imperial equivalent, and Maréchaussée was soon restored.

When Napoleon escaped from Elba in late February 1815 the reorganization of the Dutch Army was still taking place. Those responsible for the organization of these Belgian units encountered the same difficulties as had the Dutch in early 1814. The existing infantry regiments of the Belgian Legion, used as the nucleus for the new organization, in fact had only enough men for a single battalion each. In September 1814, the Dutch government decided to dissolve six Dutch infantry battalions; and to amalgamate the 3rd Chasseurs with the
Dutch 6th Chasseur (or Jager) Battalion stationed at Doesburg. Some 137 men of Belgian origin transferred, with the approval of Perez, to the new Belgian 10th Chasseur Bn at Hasselt. This consisted of eight companies, of which six were centre companies; the other two were considered crack troops. One was formed from De Luninck’s Lower Rhine battalion, still wearing their steel-grey uniforms; the other, from men of the former 3rd Regiment of the Belgian Legion, who retained their Austrian-style white uniforms with light blue facings.

Despite the gradual replacement of inexperienced officers by returning Belgian veterans of Napoleon’s army, the situation in the battalion remained unsatisfactory. Most of the troops at this stage were Poles, Russians, Germans, Frenchmen and Spaniards. Colonel van der Maesen’s Walloon regiment, the Legion of the Lower Rhine, ceased to exist as a foreign corps, and became the new Belgian 2nd Line Battalion. Each of these units was to consist of a regimental staff, six companies of which four were centre and two flank companies, and a depot company; their total effective strength was to be 30 officers and 912 men. Company establishment was one each captain, first and second lieutenants, sergeant-major and quartermaster; 4 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 drummers, a fifer and 108 privates. By 15 September 1814 the reorganisation was complete. Two days later it was stated that the 1st, 4th, and 7th Line Bns and 5th Chasseur Bn were at full strength and fully staffed.

The regiments of Van der Burch and De Croij became respectively the ‘Chevau-légers belges’ and ‘Hussards belges’. On 7 September 1814, the Prince Sovereign decreed the formation of two regiments of heavy cavalry – ‘Carabiniers belges’ – but through lack of success in recruiting only one would be formed. Commanded by Colonel de Knijff and quartered in Brussels, the Carabiniers Corps was nevertheless ordered reorganized from 31 October 1814 in three regiments – two North and one South Netherlands. Command of the Belgian unit passed to Lieutenant-Colonel Baron van Oldeneel on 3 April 1815, but the next day to Colonel de Bruyn. This 2nd Carabiniers’ first official appearance was on 4 January 1815 at the funeral of the Prince de Ligne, when they formed a guard of honour at the Church of Saints Michel & Gudule.

On 4 April a Militia Carabinier regiment, 805 strong, was ordered raised in the South Netherlands; Colonel du Chastel would preside over its organization between 10 April and 21 June 1815, when Baron van Oldeneel took over command. They were not committed to the Waterloo campaign – indeed, no Belgian Militia units would serve there. After the Hundred Days, the Militia carabiniers would become the 9th regiment, rebaptized cuirassiers and equipped with French cuirasses from the field of Waterloo. In terms of artillery, on 14 September 1814 it was decided that the Belgian artillery establishment was
BELGIAN INFANTRY, 1815

(Left) Hornist, flank company, 35th Chasseur Battalion. The yellow-faced green uniform and Austrian-style shako was worn by both Dutch Jäger and Belgian chasseur light infantry battalions. (Centre) Chasseur, 36th Chasseur Battalion. This is the regulation uniform of the centre companies of both Belgian battalions. (Right) Lieutenant, 35th Chasseur Battalion. The overall appearance of the officer’s uniform resembles that of line officers apart from the colours and the Austrian shako. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
to be: one horse brigade (two companies); one foot brigade (six companies); one train brigade (two companies in peacetime, six in wartime).

The political situation in France would soon drastically change the organization of the two autonomous armies of the North and South Netherlands. On 17 February 1815, the Belgian forces were informed that they were to be united with the Dutch regiments in a single Netherlands army.

Some two weeks later Napoleon landed in the south of France and began the triumphant progress northwards by which, without firing a shot, he would regain the Imperial throne of France. The predictable threat of a French offensive directed at Belgium prompted an Allied instruction that the Netherlands should start organizing an armée mobile (field army). Orders were accordingly sent out on 25 March; but they presented considerable difficulties. On 14 March, General Evers had inspected the Hussards de Croij; he noted that although the personnel numbered 36 officers and 827 troopers, and the officers had 68 horses, only 379 mounts were available for the men.

On 16 March 1815, without waiting for a final decision from the Allied powers gathered at the Congress of Vienna, the Prince Sovereign took the crown, becoming King William I of the Netherlands and Grand Duke of Luxemburg. The Congress ratified his decision on 31 March. The king’s eldest son now took the title of William, Prince of Orange. A former ADC to the Duke of Wellington during the Peninsular War, the prince took command of the combined army of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In the campaign of June 1815 the northern (Dutch) and southern (Belgian) regiments of the Netherlands Army would serve shoulder to shoulder.

On 21 April 1815, the Netherlands Army made its final reorganization before marching off to prove itself on the battlefield. The Belgian and Dutch regiments were now numbered in a single sequence, and would operate together in amalgamated brigades and divisions. Before this reorganization the Belgian units comprised:

2 bns Chasseurs
4 bns Line Infantry
1 regt Carabiniers
1 regt Light Horse
1 regt Hussars
1 bn Foot Artillery
2 cos Horse Artillery
2 cos Train
7 cos Marechaussée (Gendarmerie)

The April 1815 changes were as follows:
Men of the Dutch 4th Light Dragoons. Although they did not serve at Quatre-Bras, the regiment still suffered 38 per cent casualties at Waterloo. The trumpeter (centre) is shown wearing the red jacket specified in the January 1815 regulations. (Ronald Pawly)

1st Line Inf Bn unchanged
2nd Line Inf Bn became 3rd Bn
4th Line Inf Bn unchanged
7th Line Inf Bn unchanged
5th Chasseur Bn became 35th Chasseur Bn
10th Chasseur Bn became 36th Chasseur Bn

The carabiniers regiment became the 2nd Carabiniers; the Chevau-légers regiment (ex-Van der Burch) became the 5th Light Dragoons; and the hussar regiment (ex-De Croij) became the 8th Hussars. The Belgian Horse Artillery and Train were entirely absorbed into the Dutch Horse Artillery and Train Corps. The Belgian Foot Artillery became the 4th Artillery Battalion. Local Militia artillery battalions Nos. 1, 2 & 3 became battalions Nos. 2, 5 & 6. In total, the artillery corps of the new Netherlands Army consisted of four line foot battalions, six Militia battalions, eight horse companies and eight companies of the artillery train.

For the Waterloo campaign, the eight-gun artillery batteries would not be assigned to brigades but to divisions. Major Vander Smissen commanded the artillery of the 3rd Infantry Division, consisting of Capt C. F. Krahmer de Bichin's horse battery and Capt J. H. Lux's Dutch foot battery. De Villers du Fourneau acted as assistant to Vander Smissen, his battery being united with that commanded by Krahmer, who thus now commanded the Belgian 7th and 8th artillery companies. Captain E. J. Stevenart's foot battery would be assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division.
In their new formations the South Netherlands regiments (as they were still called) went into battle at Quatre-Bras and Waterloo. Most of their general officers were Dutch, with the exception of Van Merlen, De Collaert and d’Aubremé, as were most staff officers at division and brigade level.

The levels of political and social change experienced by the armies of the Low Countries during the Napoleonic era were daunting to say the least, and many of the problems in organization, equipment and morale were to be expected. Nonetheless, by the end of the wars the region had produced some units and formations of martial quality, even if the big picture remained a little discouraging.

ITALY, SICILY AND SARDINIA

The Italian contribution to the Napoleonic Wars is frequently overlooked in many histories of the era. This oversight is not justified, as the Italian Army fought with vigour and significance from the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy under Napoleon in 1805, through to the end of the wars. Italian forces performed with genuine courage in many of the Napoleon’s greatest battles, and its sacrifice is not be doubted – Italy suffered some 21,000 casualties in the Peninsular War alone between 1808 and 1814, and nearly the identical figure in a single year it committed its forces to Napoleon’s disastrous Russian campaign.

The origin of Napoleon's Italian army is found in the Army of the Cisalpine Republic, which in 1797 consisted of 7,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, these primarily divided between the Lombard Legion and the Cispadane, with additional forces in the form of one company that formed the Milan civic guard and the eight companies of the Milan national guard. Nonetheless, this core force grew extremely rapidly as Europe immersed itself deeper in war, adding additional units of infantry, cavalry, engineers and artillery before the end of the year, taking the strength up to 15,000 men. Further aggrandisement came from the ranks of foreigners, principally the Poles and the French. During 1798, 6,000 Poles and 25,000 French soldiers added their strength to the Italian core, and the army they helped produce consisted of six legions of line infantry (these later became four French-style demi-brigades), one hussar regiment and one dragoon regiment.

In such a restive political and military climate such as early 19th century Europe, changes came thick and fast to the Italian Army’s structure. In 1800 a major restructuring took place, resulting in the following organizational structure:

Legio italica (The Italian Legion)
Two elite companies; one officers’ battalion; one regiment of hussars; one regiment of chasseurs à cheval
ITALIAN ARMY, 1806

(Left) Pioneer Sergeant, Grenadiers of the 1st Italian Line Infantry. The figure wears the new 1806 white uniform. (Centre) Drummer, fusiliers, Italian line infantry. This drummer is still wearing the old green uniform. (Right) Trooper, Italian 1st Chasseurs à Cheval. The czapska was not regulation issue, so may have been from Polish stocks. (Mike Chappell © Osprey Publishing)
**Divisione italica (The Italian Division)**
1st and 2nd Italian Demi-Brigades; one battalion of light infantry; 1st Hussars Regiment; 1st Chasseurs a Cheval; two companies of foot artillery; one company of horse artillery; one company of artillery train; one company of sappers

**Divisione cisalpina (The Cisalpine Division)**
1st and 2nd Cisalpine Demi-Brigades; one battalion of light infantry; 2nd Hussar Regiment; one officers’ battalion; one company of foot artillery; one company of horse artillery; one company of artillery train; one company of sappers

**Divisione polacca (The Polish Division)**
1st and 2nd Polish Demi-Brigades; one battalion of grenadiers; one battalion of carabiniers; one squadron of the 1st Hussar Regiment; one company of foot artillery

**Divisione del interno (The Internal Security Division)**
One squadron of chasseurs a cheval

**Corp distaccato (The Detached Corps)**
One battalion of Bersaglieri di Brescia (Sharpshooters of Brescia); one squadron of the 1st Hussar Regiment

In addition to this force there was also the Guardia del presidente (Presidential Guard), comprised of mixed infantry, artillery and cavalry, and in 1805 Napoleon ordered the formation of the Guards of Honour, which had risen to five companies strong by the following year.

The process of expansion continued apace in the Italian Army of the subsequent years, taking into the strength of over 40,000 men in 1806. In 1808 the structuring of infantry regiments was remodelled along French lines, each regiment having one depot battalion and four field battalions, each field battalion consisting of four fusilier, one grenadier and one voltigeur company.

From 1808 wartime attrition began eating into the manpower of the Italian Army in earnest. Even with an increase in the number of formations, including the addition of the 3rd Chasseurs a Cheval, manpower was still 7,000 men down in 1809 and when compared with the previous year. Numbers recovered considerably in time for the Italian Army to have a total force of nearly 80,000 men in 1812, including eight line infantry regiments, four light infantry regiments and five line cavalry regiments, plus assorted guard, militia, engineer and reserve units. A sizeable portion of the 1812 army went into Russia to support Napoleon’s campaign there, fighting in actions at Smolensk and Borodino. Incredibly, the fearsome losses incurred during the Russian campaign did not
ITALIAN MUSICIANS AND FUSILIER, 1808–12

(Left) Drummer of Chasseurs, 1st Neapolitan Light Infantry, 1810–11. The strange colour of blue may be that of faded French blue. (Centre) Trumpeter, Neapolitan 2nd Chasseurs à Cheval, 1808–12. The figure is taken from contemporary sketches, but differs from many descriptions. (Right) Private, fusiliers, Regiment Illyrien, 1811. Napoleon ordered this regiment to wear French light infantry uniform. (Mike Chappell © Osprey Publishing)
break the back of the Italian Army, which managed to expand its ranks in 1813 to a prodigious 90,000 men, aided by the formation of four new infantry regiments. These troops fought on Italian soil against forces of the Sixth Coalition in 1814, their last action in a series of wars that established the sound reputation of Italian martial capabilities.

Although not part of the Italian mainland, Sicily and Sardinia were nonetheless sucked into the Napoleonic Wars, although to a minor degree when compared with the states of its mainland neighbour. Sardinia contributed military forces essentially at the beginning of the Revolutionary Wars and the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Its troops fought with the allies of the First Coalition against France from 1792, and in 1815 a Sardinian Corps was part of the combined Austro-Sardinian Army of Upper Italy. Sicily was also forced to develop a defensive army following French interventions on the Italian mainland.

POLAND

The development of Poland’s military forces during the late 18th and early 19th century was twisted by the convoluted political experience of the country. Austria, Russia and Prussia all had expansionist desires on Poland, and in 1772, 1793 and 1795 the country was increasingly partitioned by the outside forces, the last occupation by Russia and Prussia effectively voiding Poland as an independent nation.

Under such hostility, it is little wonder therefore that Polish émigrés and exiles gathered into the ranks of the French Army to fight against the Allied coalitions. A Polish Legion was formed in Italy in 1796, and for the next two years it fought in the Italian campaign of 1796–97. Ironically, almost all of the action that the Poles would see over the course of coming years was usually related to Napoleon’s imperial ambitions, rather than to the liberation of the Polish homeland itself. In 1806, following Napoleon’s victories over the Prussians in Poland, and the Treaty of Tilsit that created the French-controlled Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon gave orders to General Jan Dombrowski for the creation of a new Polish Army. Dombrowski established set strict quotas for the recruitment of infantry, light infantry and cavalry, and by January 1807 he had just under 25,000 troops assembled, organized into three legions. By the end of the year the army contained 12 infantry regiments, six cavalry regiments and three battalions of artillery, and by this time the Poles were beginning to establish a good reputation as committed fighters, although the cavalry were still somewhat lacking in tactical finesse and leadership. In 1809, the Poles were eventually able to stop the full weight of an Austrian onslaught against the Duchy of Warsaw, forcing the Austrians out of several city possessions, including Warsaw. The victory galvanized Polish recruitment, and at the end of 1809 the number of units has risen to 21 infantry regiments and 16 cavalry
POLISH ARMY, 1809–14

(Left) Tambour of fusiliers, 4th Infantry Regiment, 1809. This soldier wears the field service marching order. (Centre) Sous-lieutenant, 13th Hussars, 1806–14. The 10th and 13th Hussars had particularly ostentatious uniforms, with colours reflecting those of the national colours of Poland. (Right) Grenadier, 13th Infantry Regiment. This white uniform was only seen in the duchy. (Michael Roffe © Osprey Publishing)

NEXT PAGES

The Polish light horse of the Imperial Guard at Somosierra, 30 November 1808. This was the action in which the 3rd Squadron of the regiment, led by Ched d’esadron Kozietulski, charged in column up the narrow road through the pass of Somosierra in the face of Spanish artillery and infantry, suffering terrible casualties but gaining the crest of the pass. They were followed by the rest of the regiment and also by the Mounted Chasseurs of the Guard. The 3rd Squadron were the Emperor’s duty squadron that day, and we have therefore shown them in full dress with crimson trousers – that is how they are represented in the painting by Baron Lejeune, who was present at the action. At right, Kozietulski is seen immediately behind General Montbrun. (Patrice Courcelle © Osprey Publishing)
regiments totalling 70,000 men (including the Vistula Legion and Guards Lancers), plus three battalions of foot artillery, one squadron of horse artillery and four sapper/engineer companies. By the beginning of 1812, there would be an additional four cavalry regiments, and in total the artillery would bring 104 guns to the field.

POLAND AND GERMANY
Altogether the Polish Army would provide nearly 100,000 troops for Napoleon's ill-fated adventure into Russia. As with so many other contributors to that campaign, the Poles' losses were catastrophic – only about 10,000 men returned from the disaster. Nevertheless, the hugely thinned ranks of Polish soldiers continued to fight for Napoleon, and in December 1814 Napoleon even formed the Polish Corps, which consisted of the following: Krakusi Regiment; 1st Uhlan Regiment; 2nd Uhlan Regiment; Vistula Infantry Regiment; four companies of foot artillery; one company of horse artillery; one sapper company. There were also seven independent Polish cavalry regiments in France itself. The manpower and horsepower within each of these units was often very low and kept dwindling across the army, so much so that at Waterloo in 1815 there was only a single squadron of Polish lancers.

BALKANS

The periods of French rule over the Ionian Islands (1797–99 and 1807–14), Dalmatia and Istria (1805–14), and finally the Illyrian Provinces (1809–14) were relatively short, yet as in other countries occupied by the French, significant numbers of soldiers were raised, both to garrison the territory and to fight in Napoleon's campaigns. Eleven battalions totalling nearly 8,000 soldiers from the Illyrian Provinces took part in the 1812 invasion of Russia.

The Dalmatians had a reputation as good soldiers and sailors, so Napoleon followed the previous Venetian traditions in employing them. The French also raised one battalion from Istria, together with two battalions and one legion from Dalmatia, all of which were part of the Royal Italian Army (even after the Illyrian Provinces were established in 1809). These Dalmatian troops were later merged into one regiment, while sailors were also recruited from both territories for the Royal Italian Navy.

The core of the Illyrian troops were six former Austrian Grenz regiments with more than 18,000 soldiers, who had their homes in the part of the Military Border ("Military Croatia") ceded to France in 1809. No fewer than 16,494 Croatian Grenzers who had fought in the 1809 war were assembled at Zala-Egërszeg in Hungary, to be released from their oath of allegiance to the

A Polish NCO in campaign dress reporting to two officers. He is shown here with double silver edging to his collar; this, the silver chevron showing above the gauntlet, and the mixed crimson-silver aiguillettes indicate that he is a maréchal des logis or sergeant. Note that while the NCO has his aiguillette on the left shoulder, in post-1809 fashion, the officers – who did not carry lances – retain theirs on the right. (Ronald Pawly)
Austrian Emperor and disarmed before returning to their French-occupied home districts. Napoleon was aware of their great military reputation in Austrian service; and although anxious about their famous loyalty to the Habsburgs, he was equally keen to employ their specialist skills, so he sent a commission to investigate the unusual border arrangements. When he received their report, Napoleon summoned a delegation of local officers to Paris in the summer of 1810. With the active support of the governor-general Marshal Marmont (who had engaged Grenzers in his 1809 campaign in Dalmatia), they persuaded the emperor to retain the traditional system to provide substantial numbers of troops for both border defence and campaign service.

Renamed the Régiments de chasseurs d’Illyrie (Illyrian Chasseur Regiments), these former Grenzer regiments were usually referred to simply as the Régiments croates (Croat regiments).

The regiments retained their Austrian organization. A peacetime establishment, comprising two battalions of six companies plus a reserve division (two companies), was expanded to as many as four battalions in wartime. The famous Doppelstutzen (double-barrelled rifle/muskets) had been spirited away to Austrian depots, so the sharpshooter detachments were soon abolished, but the regiments retained the 50-strong artillery detachments with their light pieces.

Continuing Austrian Grenzer practice, the Illyrian Chasseurs never served on campaign as complete regiments, but operated as independent battalions. The high casualties sustained by the Grenzers over the previous 20 years initially made it difficult for each regiment to provide more than one battalion for field service, so these battalions were paired into four Régiments provisoires croates (Croatian Provisional Regiments) of two battalions each.

Early in 1810, Napoleon wanted to raise a regiment from the people in the non-frontier parts of the Illyrian provinces: Civil Croatia, Rijeka (Fiume), former Austrian Istria, the provinces of Carniola and Carinthia, plus Gorizia with Trieste. Created by a decree of 16 November 1810 and formed by the end of the year at Ljubljana, the Régiment d’Illyrie (Illyrian Regiment) was raised around a reserve company formed by Marshal Marmont in early 1810 from officers and soldiers of disbanded Austrian regiments previously recruited in these areas.
The Illyrian Regiment was assembled at Turin in Italy to be uniformed and equipped. It was organized as a light infantry regiment, initially with one depot and three field battalions. In 1811 it was ordered expanded to five battalions and was incorporated into the French Army, conscription being introduced the same year. However, desertions and the avoidance of conscription made for constant difficulties in filling its ranks. The Illyrian Regt was formally disbanded on 17 November 1813; the survivors were sent to Corsica to join the 2nd Colonial Battalion.

After suffering the almost complete destruction of his cavalry in the Russian campaign, Napoleon welcomed Governor-General Bertrand's proposal of 15 February 1813 to revive the former 18th century Grenzer hussar units in the Illyrian Provinces. Bertrand believed (correctly) that the Croats' long experience of small-scale frontier warfare made them good riders who could be organized and trained quickly. Each of the frontier regiments was to finance and supply a troop of 100 hussars and their horses which – together with officers, NCOs and trumpeters – would be consolidated into a regiment organized in three squadrons of two troops each.

Napoleon's decree of 23 February 1813 created the Régiment de hussards croates (Croatian Hussar Regiment), which was assembled on 5 March. So many men volunteered that a week later, instead of forming a second regiment as Bertrand advised, Napoleon amended his original decree to expand the regiment to six squadrons organized on the usual French hussar model.

A few weeks later, however, a decree of 25 November 1813 ordered the disbandment of all foreign regiments. The very next day General Corbineau arrived with Napoleon's order to disarm the 1,276 men of the regiment.

National Guard

The first Garde nationale unit was raised by General Lauriston from the inhabitants of Dubrovnik in 1806, to help him defend the city from the Russians and Montenegrins. In 1809 there were four battalions of National Guard, located at Zadar, Dubrovnik (two battalions), and Kotor to strengthen the defence of these towns and their harbours after the French troops had left for the campaign against Austria. In the following years the Guard was considerably expanded, especially after the French troops in the provinces were reduced to one division, and in 1811 it numbered around 10,000 men. It was formed in all the towns and ports on the Adriatic coast and islands, individual companies being raised from local populations under the command of prominent citizens. The ports, which had gun batteries, raised Compagnia di cannonieri guarda costa (coastal guard artillery companies) under the command of French instructors, to resist the regular raids by British vessels.
The Hussars were stripped of much of their equipment: 639 of their horses were passed to the 31er Chasseurs à Cheval and 208 to the 1er Hussards, 1,232 carbines, 1,249 sabres and 469 bayonets were placed in the Lyon arsenal, and the unit was formally disbanded on 23 January 1814. All French citizens were sent to the 4e Dragons, while some Croatian officers with particularly strong connections to France were allowed to petition the Minister of War for active employment in other cavalry regiments.

On 12 October 1797 Napoleon approved the recruitment of about 3,000 Albanians, most of whom were refugees from the harsh rule of the local Ottoman governor of the Albanian coast, Ali-pasha of Janina. The combined force was organized as the Régiment albanais (Albanian Regiment) on 12 December 1807, with three battalions each comprising a staff and nine companies. Despite additional recruitment among local Greeks, Italians and Dalmatian communities, it never reached its official establishment of 3,254. A battalion of Chasseurs à pied Grecs (Greek Foot Chasseurs), also known as Pandours de Albanie, was raised by the French under an order of 10 March 1808 from Albanian and Greek refugees discovered on the Ionian Islands after the treaty of Tilsit. Its 951 men were divided into eight companies, three being designated as elite. The two units were combined into a single Albanian Regiment on 1 July 1809, organized on the French model into six battalions, totalling 160 officers and 2,934 men.

Desertion rates were always high; consequently the regiment was reorganized into a staff and two battalions on 6 November 1813, totalling 47 officers and 1,204 men – augmented unofficially by 1,036 women and children, 1,426 goats, 36 horses, a mule and a cow... Following the French evacuation of the island of Corfu in 1814, the Albanian Regiment was taken over by the British, but it quickly evaporated of its own accord, before being officially disbanded on 21 June 1814.

The Bataillon Septinsulaire (Seven Islands Battalion) was a six-company light infantry unit raised on 13 September 1807 from the men of a former Venetian regiment, who had then been in Russian pay. Each company’s strength stood at about 150 men, who were to be recruited exclusively from the

BALKAN TROOPS, RUSSIA, 1812 (opposite)

(Left) Sergeant-major of carabiniers, Royal Dalmatian Regiment. This sergeant-major of the elite company displays the standard campaign equipment. (2nd left) Drummer of Chasseurs, 1st Croatian Provisional Regiment. This tambour is shown wearing a pokalemp forage cap. (2nd right) Voltigeur, 3rd Croatian Provisional Regiment. His shako is enclosed in a black oilskin, with the pompon left uncovered. (Right) Lieutenant of Voltigeurs, Illyrian Regiment; Russia, 1812. This officer wears a bicorne and a single-breasted surtout with a scarlet collar, both these items being preferred on active service. White or blue long trousers, or even overalls of light cavalry style, were common on campaign instead of the breeches worn here. The bicorne, with the yellow voltigeur pompon, was usually covered with oilskin or linen. On his waist belt he carries a curved sabre, in place of the regulation epee and shoulder belt, to emulate the light cavalry style. (Darko Pavlovic © Osprey Publishing)
Ionian Islands population. In January 1808, the battalion was reorganized into nine companies and the number of soldiers reduced to 100 per company. Nevertheless, the battalion had constant problems with recruiting enough men, and resorted to filling its ranks with Austrian prisoners of war in 1809, and later with Dalmatians, Italians and Neapolitans while it was briefly stationed in Dalmatia. Another proposal to take in Spanish prisoners was rejected by Napoleon. The battalion was deployed in the defence of the Ionian Islands, but after the detachment under Colonel Piéris on Cephalonia surrendered to the British without firing a shot in 1809, Napoleon took the view that they did not justify their cost and the Septinsular Battalion was disbanded in 1812; the remnants were incorporated into the Sapeurs Ioniens.

A squadron of Chasseurs à cheval Ioniens was created on the island of Corfu on 27 November 1807, but served on all the Ionian Islands. Its provisional form was one squadron of cavalry, but it was reduced to a single company of 128 officers and men on 13 December 1808. The unit was recruited from the natives, but some men of the 25e Chasseurs à cheval also joined them from the Kingdom of Naples, and the latter's uniform was adopted by all personnel.

Foreign troops in the Illyrian provinces
The Oriental Chasseurs (Chasseurs d'Orient) originated in the local volunteer units raised by the French from the Greeks, Turks, Copts and Syrians in the Middle East during Napoleon's 1798-99 campaign. These troops were shipped back to Marseille after Egypt was evacuated in 1801, and organized into a light unit by an order of 7 January 1802. The eight companies, including one each of carabiniers and artillerymen, totalled just 339 men. Despite a steady stream of desertions, an order of 10 September 1802 directed the battalion to be expanded to 1,000 men organized into a staff and ten companies, but it never numbered more than 400. Nevertheless, when assigned to General Molitor's expedition to relieve General Lauriston besieged in Dubrovnik in 1806 by the Russians and Montenegrins, the unit distinguished themselves and earned three crosses of the Legion of Honour; but the price was heavy, total strength being reduced to 17 officers and 60 men by 20 November 1806.

After service in southern France and Italy, the battalion was transferred in 1809 to garrisons in Dalmatia and then Corfu, where it was attached to the Albanian Regiment. It continued to fight alongside the French until 1814, when it was again transferred to Marseille. All non-French were sent to a refugee depot, and the battalion was officially disbanded on 24 September 1814 at Lyon. The uniform, equipment and armament of the Middle Eastern Chasseurs were the same as those of the French light infantry.
It consisted of a green jacket with dark red (garance) facings but with buttons bearing the inscription ‘Chasseurs Ioniens’. The unit was evacuated to France in 1814 with the rest of the French garrison of Corfu, and remnants were incorporated into the 6e Lanciers at Lyon.

The other Ionian units were two companies of Artillerie Septinsulaire (Septinsular Artillery) raised on 1 January 1808; a company of Sapeurs Ioniens formed on 7 August 1812 by combining the former 9th Company of White Pioneers (Pionniers Blance) with the remnants of the Septinsular Battalion; the Gendarmerie Septinsulaire, probably one company strong; and the Vétérans Septinsulaire/Ioniens. All appear to have been organized and equipped in the same way as their French counterparts, but were probably dressed in national costume. All served sporadically on the Dalmatian coast as well as the islands, and all were disbanded in 1814.

GERMAN ALLIES

The German states were fluid partners in the Napoleonic Wars, changing sides and making alliances of a complexity too great to recount in any detail here. The composition and nature of the military contribution made by each state naturally varied on a case by case basis. Bavaria, for example, formed an alliance with France in 1801, a relationship that initially brought it territorial expansion and military distinction gained in battles such as Austerlitz and the Russian campaign of 1812. As France’s fortunes later waned, however, Bavaria successfully jumped sides in 1813.

In the early 1790s, Bavaria had 35,000 soldiers, including nearly 6,000 cavalry divided up into eight regiments. Each infantry regiment received a unit of four artillery guns and crew. Its troops were variously packaged out to different campaigns, ranging from small-scale contributions of a division through to the commitment of the entire army to Napoleon’s campaigns. During this period the army grew modestly within its population limits, contributing some 30,000 infantry alone for the 1812 campaign, formed into two divisions. Russia proved, as with other armies, to be Bavaria’s nemesis, and the army was decimated. Although it was restructured around a single corp in 1813, the Bavarian Army’s military contribution was limited in the post-Russia period when compared to its commitments before.

Other variable French allies from the German states included Westphalia and Nassau, although both would characteristically flip sides once the war began to run against Napoleon. At its establishment as a member of the Confederation of the Rhine in December 1807, Westphalia had a small-scale army built from an assortment of soldiers from across German territories and beyond. For example, two regiments from the state of Hessen-Kassel became the new 1st and 2nd Westphalian Line Infantry Regiments, and a detachment of Polish
lancers laid the foundations for the 1st Squadron of the Chevauxlegers of the Guard and the Garde du Corps. Many of Westphalia’s troops were French, however, hence they had French ranks (and rank badges) and were instructed in French tactical thinking and drill. A corps of Westphalians went off the war in Russia in 1812, but like the Bavarians, they were decimated (fewer than 200 men returned), and the following year Westphalia was essentially crushed by the Allies.

The duchy of Nassau was comprised of two districts – Nassau-Usingen and Nassau-Weilburg. Between them the united territories of Nassau in 1803 could only produce four infantry battalions. Nassau-Usingen had the 1st (Leib) Battalion and the 4th Battalion (together these became the the 1st Nassau Infantry Regiment in May 1808), while Nassau-Weilberg had the 2nd Battalion and 3rd (Jäger) Battalion, destined to become the 2nd Nassau Infantry. Each battalion had four companies for a total strength of just under 600 men, each company having four platoons. March 1808 reorganizations increased the number of companies per battalion to five, while the infantry regiments formed four months later had two battalions each with one grenadier, four fusilier and one voltigeur company.
Soldiers of the Grand Duchy of Berg, 1812.
(Left) Pioneer, 2nd Infantry Regiment. The bearskin, red plume, cords, epaulettes and sabre knot distinguish this man as a pioneer.
(Centre) Trooper, elite company, 1st Regiment Chevau-Légers Lancers, seen in campaign dress.
(Right) Corporal, 1st Chevau-Légers Regiment in Spain. The infantry uniform seen under the effects of field living. (Rick Scollins © Osprey Publishing)
ARMIES of the NAPOLEONIC WARS
In 1806, Nassau joined the Confederation of the Rhine, and added its military talents, which would also include a regiment of light cavalry, to the French forces. Although diminutive in size, the Nassau army was highly competent and known for its bravery in combat. Nevertheless, it suffered heavy losses fighting in the Peninsula War and after the battle of Leipzig in 1813 Nassau was motivated to switch sides. Once this had taken place, Nassau began a radical restructuring of its forces, creating a third infantry regiment, a Landwehr Infanterie-Regiment, a Jäger Corps and a Landsturm (Home Guard). Its martial skill remained strong, however, and its army is remembered for the seminal role it played at Quatre Bras in 1815.

The examples of Bavaria, Westphalia and Saxony are typical of the nature of many German states during the Napoleonic wars, vacillating in their alliances according to the political fortunes of their own interests and those of Napoleon himself. The contributions of individual states may have been small, but together they formed a substantial resource for Napoleon for many years of his campaigning.

UNITED STATES

The United States was militarily 'involved' in the Napoleonic Wars only at a tangent. Politically it was bound up with the fortunes of Europe on account of France, Britain and Spain still controlling much of North America’s land and shipping lanes, a situation that created an increased tension as the period went on. In military terms, this tension was eventually expressed in the Anglo-American War of 1812–15, during which the ad hoc US military nevertheless delivered some impressive victories over the British.

The US Army at the beginning of the Revolutionary period was tiny, numbering just over 5,000 men by the end of 1792. The tiny size of the regular army was understandable, given that only two years before the country had no standing army, the Continental Army having been disbanded following the American Revolution – the states were mistrustful over too much power concentrated in federal hands. Its purpose was mainly the garrisoning of frontier outposts, and in the event of a more significant conflict it would have to rely on its state militias, which were of distinctly variable quality. Evidence suggests that many of the militia units were without respectable quantities of
serviceable muskets, and that deference for authority could be low, hence command-and-control could be tenuous at the best of times.

In the first decade of the 19th century, however, the US Army underwent a reasonably significant expansion, and by 1812 it had an establishment of 35,600 men, consisting of 17 infantry regiments, three artillery regiments and two cavalry regiments. Admittedly, much of the increase in scale was achieved through de facto bribery, the offering of expanses of land in return for fixed periods of military service – by 1812 a soldier could acquire some 320 acres of land in return for just 12 months of military service. Although the militia gave distinctly variable service, the regular army proved itself in battle against the British, such as in General Andrew Jackson’s defeat of the British invasion of New Orleans in January 1815, in which the US 7th Infantry and 44th Infantry fought. There the US forces proved that they could make judicious tactical infantry manoeuvres and handle artillery – a much-respected talent with artillery is something that remains within the US Army to this day. Although the British defeat had little effect on the eventual political solution of the conflict, the United States had emphatically proved the worth of its regular army forces.

FRENCH TROOPS, WEST INDIES AND AMERICAS, 1802–10 (opposite)

(Left) Private, infantry, West Indies, c. 1802–10, in undress uniform. (Centre) Captain, New Orleans City Militia Battalion, Louisiana, 1803. (Right) Private, line infantry, in the Colonial Dress Regulations of 1802. (Rear) Gendarme, Martinique, 1802–09. (Francis Back © Osprey Publishing)
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